Judgment Kiran Anand Lall, J. 1. Telu Ram plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of agreement dated 22.6.1980 for the sale of three shops, with staircase on the ground floor, and chobaras on the first and second floor with latrine and bath etc. , bearing municipal property No.1191/2. The agreement was, statedly, executed by defendant no.1, gauran Devi, for a sum of Rs.20,000/-. As per the terms of agreement, a sum of rs.5000/- was paid as earnest money at the time of execution of agreement, and remaining consideration (Rs.15000/-) was to be paid at the time of registration of the sale-deed, to be done on or before 13.9.1980. In case of plaintiffs failure to get the sale-deed executed within the stipulated time, the earnest money was to stand forfeited, and in case of defendant no.1s failure to execute the sale-deed, she was to return the earnest money and also pay damages, both totalling rs.10,000/-. 2. However, before the date fixed, defendant no.1 sold the property to defendant no.2, Sharanjit Pal Singh, vide registered sale deed dated 18.8.1980, and, thus, violated the terms of agreement. The plaintiff who had always been ready and regular Second Appeal No.1171 of 1986. (2)willing to perform his part of the contract, thereupon, filed the present suit. 3. In the written statement, defendant no.1 denied having executed the agreement or having received any earnest amount and pleaded that the agreement was a fabricated document. According to her, the plaintiff was tenant in her two shops which bore property no.1192/2. She had full faith in him, since he was servant of her husbands brother, Kaka Ram. Her further case was that she is an illiterate and aged lady who could only put her signatures, and it seemed that taking advantage of her such position, the plaintiff, who was her tenant, might have obtained her signatures/ thumb impression. About the sale of said property in favour of defendant no.2, she pleaded that she was owner thereof and as such she had validly sold it. 4. Defendant no.2 pleaded that he was a bonafide purchaser, for value and without notice, of the suit property. He was employed in the Municipal committee. He had applied for loan in the year 1979, and after loan was sanctioned in his favour, he purchased this property from defendant no.1. 4. Defendant no.2 pleaded that he was a bonafide purchaser, for value and without notice, of the suit property. He was employed in the Municipal committee. He had applied for loan in the year 1979, and after loan was sanctioned in his favour, he purchased this property from defendant no.1. Before getting the sale-deed executed, he had made inquiries from the plaintiff (who was tenant therein) who told him that he was not interested in purchasing this property. The plaintiff never told him about the alleged agreement. Defendant no.2 also pleaded that the plaintiff and defendant no.1 had colluded, in order to deprive him of the suit property and had, therefore, brought into existence a fabricated agreement to sell. 5. Trial court framed the following issues:- 1. ). Whether Smt. Goran entered into an agreement dated regular Second Appeal No.1171 of 1986. (3)22.6.80 with the plaintiff and received Rs.5000/- as earnest money? OPP 2 ). If issue No.1 is proved, whether said agreement is an act of fraud practised by the plaintiff on defendant no.1 as alleged in para No.1 of her written statement? OPD.1.3 ). If issue No.1 stands proved, whether the said agreement is an act of collusion between the plaintiff and defendant No.1? OPD.2 4 ). Whether the plaintiff has ever been ready and willing to perform his part of contract OPP 5 ). Whether defendant No.2 purchased the property with notice of the alleged agreement dated 22.6.80? opp 6 ). Whether defendant No.2 is a bonafide purchaser for consideration? OPD-2.7 ). Whether the alleged agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable? OPD-1.8 ). Whether plaintiff was aware of the negotiations and bargain between defendant No.1 and 2? OPD-2.9 ). Relief. 6 On the conclusion of trial, the trial court decided issues no.1, 4 and 5 against the plaintiff, issues no.2 and 7 in favour of defendant no.1, and issues no.6 regular Second Appeal No.1171 of 1986. (4)and 8 in favour of defendant no.2, and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court set aside the verdict of the trial court and passed a decree for specific performance, directing defendant no.1 to execute the sale-deed in terms of agreement, Ex. P1. In case of her failure to do so, plaintiff was held entitled to get the same executed through court. The lower appellate court set aside the verdict of the trial court and passed a decree for specific performance, directing defendant no.1 to execute the sale-deed in terms of agreement, Ex. P1. In case of her failure to do so, plaintiff was held entitled to get the same executed through court. This is now regular second appeal filed by defendant no.2, wherein challenge has been thrown to the correctness of the verdict of the lower appellate court. 7. The substantial question of law which falls for determination in this second appeal is "as to whether the judgment of the lower appellate court, reversing the verdict of the trial court, is perverse?" i have heard both sides and have also carefully gone through the records including judgments of both the courts. 8. Though, admittedly, the agreement Ex. P1 bears the signatures of defendant no.1, the lower appellate court rightly concluded on the basis of evidence on record that it was not executed by defendant no.1. The mere presence of the signatures of a person on a document is, by itself, not indicative of the fact that the document had been executed by him/ her. In the case in hand, there is ample, oral as well as documentary, evidence on record to show that gauran Devi defendant was an aged and rank-illiterate lady. In fact, this fact was not disputed even by the plaintiff, at any stage. A mere perusal of the shape and manner of the signatures of defendant no.1 appearing on the rent-receipts, Exs. P2 to p33, which pertain to payment of rent of the disputed premises by the plaintiff to her and the place where those have been appended, is, by itself, sufficient to lead to the conclusion that defendant no.1 was illiterate and she could hardly sign. 9. The subject-matter of some of these receipts is in Urdu, and of others, is in english, hindi, or Punjabi. The case of defendant no.1 is that the subject matter (of receipts) used to be written by the plaintiff and, some times the latter even used to obtain her signatures on blank papers for the purpose of converting those into receipts, by recording the subject matter, later on. Learned counsel for the defendant no.1- appellant drew my attention towards receipt Ex. P12, particularly. 10. Learned counsel for the defendant no.1- appellant drew my attention towards receipt Ex. P12, particularly. 10. This document, it may be stated, is illustrative of the manner in which the illiteracy of defendant no.1 and her faith in the plaintiff was being exploited by the latter (plaintiff ). In it, the signatures of defendant no.1 appear above the subject matter, and that, too, in an upside-down situation. In fact, there could not have been a better proof than this document, for demonstrating the rank- illiteracy of defendant no.1 and the extent to which her this handicap was being exploited by the plaintiff. 11. The trial court, therefore, rightly took note of this fact and reached the conclusion that the plaintiff had been obtaining signatures of defendant no.1 on blank-papers and had converted one such paper into the sale-agreement under reference. 12. The "agreement" had not been got scribed from a petition-writer. It was scribed by PW3, Pirthi Chand, who runs a Bakery, and was, thus, a coprofessional of the plaintiff. This witness had earlier also appeared as a witness of the plaintiff in a suit filed by him against one Madan. He was attesting witness of a rent-note also, which was executed between the plaintiff and one Shanti devi. In fact, admittedly, he is a close relation of the plaintiff. His sisters daughter is regular Second Appeal No.1171 of 1986. (6)married to sisters son of the plaintiff. The trial court had, therefore, rightly refused to believe him. But, the first appellate court went palpably wrong in placing reliance on his testimony, inspite of the fact that he was an interested and a partisan witness. PW2 Sadhu Ram, who claims to have attested the agreement, was also not an independent witness. He not only belonged to the community of the plaintiff but had also been on visiting terms with him since the year 1947. He was not familiar with the language (viz. Urdu) in which the agreement was written, nor he had talked to Gauran Devi defendant, at any point of time, about the contents of this document. The trial court had, therefore, rightly discarded his testimony. But, unfortunately, the lower appellate court did not take note of any of the said facts while placing reliance on his testimony. Urdu) in which the agreement was written, nor he had talked to Gauran Devi defendant, at any point of time, about the contents of this document. The trial court had, therefore, rightly discarded his testimony. But, unfortunately, the lower appellate court did not take note of any of the said facts while placing reliance on his testimony. If the court had considered these facts, and considered in proper perspective, I am sure it could not have believed him and would have held the execution of the agreement as not proved. Be that as it may, even otherwise, the appellant was a bonafide purchaser, without any notice of the disputed agreement. There is no legally admissible evidence on record to indicate that he had come to know of the agreement in question, even if any such existed, before he purchased the property. No doubt, respondent no.1-plaintiff did depose, as PW1, that he had informed the appellant about the agreement. But, this statement cannot be taken into consideration as no such plea had been taken up by him in his pleadings. Besides, it is also in his deposition that when he reached the Tehsil office on 18.8.1980, the sale-deed (Ex. D.1) had already been registered. Well, if it was so and the disputed agreement was also in existence at that time, I am sure, he would have, regular Second Appeal No.1171 of 1986. (7)immediately, brought the factum of the existence of the agreement to the notice of the registering authority and would have also given notice to the appellant, in this regard. But, he did not do so. That being so, it would have to be presumed that, in fact, no such agreement had come into existence, at least by that time. In any case, it is clear that no such agreement was brought to the notice of the appellant, before the sale-deed was executed in his favour. He was, therefore, clearly a bonafide purchaser, without notice. 13. In view of the above, it is clear that the lower appellate court had taken a perverse view, by reversing the well reasoned judgment of the trial court. The appeal is, therefore, accepted and the verdict of lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.