ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. The Petitioner is an industrial proprietorship unit which availed electricity connection. A demand was raised to the tune of Rs. 20 lacs. On disconnection of electricity, the Petitioner negotiated for settlement and the demand was revised to Rs. 8.99 lacs vide Annexure P/1 dated 24-8-1996. This amount is stated to be inclusive of surcharge on the strength of letter dated 20-8-1997 issued by the Superintendent Engineer of M.P.S.E.B. as contained in Annexure P/1-A. Surcharge in addition to Rs. 8.99 lacs was demanded which was deposited by the Petitioner vide letter dated 6-4-1998 contained in Annexure P/2 The Superintendent Engineer again informed vide letter dated 12-8-1998 contained in Annexure P/3 that after appropriation of security amount etc., the total liability has been worked out to Rs. 7,90911/- and no surcharge would be left in future. It was offered by the Petitioner that its pending writ petition bearing No. 2855/91 will be withdrawn provided the M.P.S.E.B withdraws the surcharge and minimum charges and provide instalment facility. This offer was accepted and instalments of Rs. 2,63,637/- each were allowed. Accordingly, the entire amount was deposited on 15-6-1998, 15-7-1998 and 15-8-1998 vide receipts placed on record cumulatively as Annexure P/4. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 2-7-1998. A no dues certificate, pursuant to the aforesaid was also issued by the Superintendent Engineer on 15-9-1998 as revealed in Annexure P/5. A demand of Rs. 16,11,496/- was again raised by the Tahsildar and the Assistant Engineer of M.P.S.E.B. vide notice dated 7-5-2001 as contained in Annexure P/7 which was duly replied vide Annexure P/8 on the ground that the matter was already settled between the parties at Rs. 7,90,911/- and the same was duly paid. Again vide memo dated 18-3-2002 contained in Annexure P/9, the Additional Chief-Engineer (City Circle) of M.P.S.E.B. raised a demand for Rs. 16,11,472/- stating that the amount of surcharge was not included in Rs. 7,90,911/- and the same is still outstanding against the Petitioner which is required to be deposited. This was again duly replied vide Annexure P/11 on the ground that the full and final settlement was already made. It was informed to the Petitioner that no dues certificate contained in Annexure P/1-A was cancelled and the Petitioner was liable to deposit Rs. 7,90,911/- and the same is still outstanding against the Petitioner which is required to be deposited. This was again duly replied vide Annexure P/11 on the ground that the full and final settlement was already made. It was informed to the Petitioner that no dues certificate contained in Annexure P/1-A was cancelled and the Petitioner was liable to deposit Rs. 16,11,472/- On the basis of the aforesaid facts stated in the writ petition, it has been urged that the amount of settlement at Rs. 7,90,911/- was inclusive of surcharge etc. and the Petitioner is not liable to make any payment. Accordingly, the memo contained in Annexure P/11 is liable to be quashed, being illegal and arbitrary. In the return it has been stated that the proposal of the Petitioner was considered by the Board and the bill of the Petitioner was revised to 8.99 lacs + surcharge thereon at applicable rate from the date of initial supplementary bill until payment. This is clearly revealed in the letter of Chief-Engineer dated 19-8-1996 contained in Annexure R/1, This was accordingly informed to the Petitioner vide Annexures R/2 and R/3 dated 24-8-1996 and 20-8-1997 respectively. The claim for surcharge amount was not withdrawn by the Board and the bill for Rs. 2468978.66 paise was raised vide bill dated 25-9-1997 as contained in Annexure R/4. The break up of this bill was as follows: (1) Revised supplementary bill Rs. 899000.00 (2) Surcharge (w.e.f. 4-9-1991 to 31-8-1997) Rs. 161472.00 (3) Other arrears bill Rs. 28506.66 (4) S.D. Adjustment Rs. (-) 70000.00 Total Rs. 2468978.66 Against the aforesaid demand the Petitioner paid merely Rs. 7,90911/- . Thus an amount of surcharge to the tune of Rs. 1611472/- remained outstanding. It is expressly and specifically contended that the proposal of the Petitioner regarding waiver of the surcharge was not accepted at all by the Board and the Superintending Engineer had no jurisdiction or authority either to waive the surcharge or to issue a no dues certificate. The letter as contained in Annexure P/3 was not issued either under the direction or with the approval of the Board. Thus, the petition is without any substance and is liable to be dismissed. The Petitioner as well as the Respondents submitted the rejoinder and additional reply with accompanying documents which, too, have been taken into consideration. The letter as contained in Annexure P/3 was not issued either under the direction or with the approval of the Board. Thus, the petition is without any substance and is liable to be dismissed. The Petitioner as well as the Respondents submitted the rejoinder and additional reply with accompanying documents which, too, have been taken into consideration. Shri Rajesh Maindiretta, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner mainly contended that the proposal of the Petitioner for waiver of the surcharge and final settlement at Rs. 7,90,911/- was duly accepted and the aforesaid amount was duly deposited in three instalments as granted by the Respondents. It has clearly mentioned in Annexure P/3 that no surcharge would be payable by the Petitioner in future. Similarly, no dues certificate was also issued vide Annexure P/5. Accordingly, it is stated that, firstly, the amount of surcharge is not payable on account of amicable settlement at Rs. 790911/- . Secondly, the Petitioner has acted upon the acceptance and made the deposit as per settlement. In view of this, the Respondents are estopped from raising demand vide Annexure P/11 which is highly illegal and arbitrary. Per contra, Shri M.L. Jaiswal, Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents contended that the amount of surcharge was not included in the settlement amount of Rs. 790911/- The Board did not accept the proposal for waiver of surcharge at any point of time. The Superintendent-Engineer had no power/authority and/or jurisdiction to waive the surcharge without approval of the Board. Accordingly, the letter contained in Annexures P/3 and P/5 are without authority and the Petitioner is liable to make the payment of amount of surcharge as raised vide Annexure P/11. Considered the submissions and perused the records. The writ petition bearing M.P. 2855/91 was dismissed in the absence of the counsel for M.P.S.E.B. An application for withdrawal of the said writ petition was submitted by the Petitioner itself wherein it was stated that the matter was amicably settled outside the court. It is important to note that the counsel for M.P.S.E.B. was not present on 2-7-1998 when the W.P. No. 2855/91 was dismissed as withdrawn vide Annexure P/6. It is important to note that the counsel for M.P.S.E.B. was not present on 2-7-1998 when the W.P. No. 2855/91 was dismissed as withdrawn vide Annexure P/6. The facts stated in the application for withdrawal of the petition were not accepted by the M.P.S.E.B. The order Annexure P/6 about the dismissal of the earlier writ petition as withdrawn, merely records the version of the counsel for the Petitioner that the matter has been amicably settled outside the Court. Since this order was not passed in the presence of counsel for M.P.S.E.B., it cannot be said that the allegation of the Petitioner about full and final settlement of the dispute about bill was accepted by the M.P.S.E.B. This order Annexure P/6 does not convey anything more than the fact that the earlier Writ Petition No. 2855/91 was dismissed as withdrawn by the Petitioner. No other meaning can be attributed to this order of dismissal. Thus, the Petitioner does not get any advantage by virtue of Annexure P/6. The surcharge by the consumer is liable to be paid by virtue of Clause 26(b) of the agreement for High Tension Supply contained in Annexure/A submitted with the additional submission on 15-9-2006. The same is reproduced below for perusal: (b) If the Consumer fails to pay any bills as provided in Clause 25 he shall be liable to pay a surcharge of two percent per month from the date of the bill. If the bill is not paid within twenty one days of the date of the bill, the Board shall give the consumer seven days' notices of intention to discontinue the supply of electrical energy and at the expiry of such period if full payment has not been made, may forthwith disconnect the supply until full payment for all dues outstanding and the charges for the work of disconnection and reconnection has been made. It is contended by Shri Maindiretta, Learned Counsel for Petitioner that the High Tension agreement dated 21-8-1994 between the Petitioner and M.P.S.E.B. was terminated w.e.f. 29-2-1992 and amount of surcharge could not have been claimed after termination of the agreement. This contention is of no force for the reason that under Clause 26(b) a consumer is made liable to pay surcharge as provided in Clause 25 of the said agreement. This clause is reproduced below for convenience. This contention is of no force for the reason that under Clause 26(b) a consumer is made liable to pay surcharge as provided in Clause 25 of the said agreement. This clause is reproduced below for convenience. 25(a) The Board will as far as possible within fifteen days after the expiration of each calendar month deliver to the Consumer a bill of charges stating the number of units supplied to the consumer by the Board in accordance with the readings of the said meters and the amount payable therefor according to the tariff applicable together with other charges payable by the Consumer to the Board and the Consumer shall pay the same within twenty one days from the date of the bill. The fuel cost adjustment charges as applicable under the tariff will be calculated and incorporated as a part of the bill on the basis of provisional average fuel cost as may be fixed by the Board from time to time; these charges are subject to final adjustment on the basis of average fuel cost for the period of account as certified by the Chief (Finance and Accounts) of the Board. (b) The amount to be billed for each month shall be either the charges enumerated in Clause 25(a) above or one-twelfth (1/12) of the guaranteed annual minimum under clauses 21 and 22 whichever is higher, subject to monthly necessary adjustment without prejudice to Clause 20. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that so long as there is failure on the part of the consumer to pay the bill, he is made liable to pay surcharge. Thus, the levy of surcharge relates to non-payment of bills and not to the termination of the agreement. With regard to alleged waiver of surcharge it is pertinent to take a note of Annexure R/1 which clearly mentions that the revised amount of the bill has been worked out to Rs. 8.99 lacs and the approval of the Board was accorded as under: M/s M.P. Re-rolling Mills Adhartal, Jabalpur may be asked to pay an amount of Rs. 8.99 lacs plus surcharge thereon at applicable rate from the date of initial supplementary bill till payment is made. The Petitioner was duly informed vide Annexure R/2 that the surcharge would be payable as per the rules on the revised bills. 8.99 lacs plus surcharge thereon at applicable rate from the date of initial supplementary bill till payment is made. The Petitioner was duly informed vide Annexure R/2 that the surcharge would be payable as per the rules on the revised bills. The Petitioner was again so informed on 20-8-1997 as contained in Annexure R/3 that according to approval of the Board the bill for Rs. 20 lacs was revised to Rs. 8.99 lacs towards theft of electrical energy along with surcharge thereon at the applicable rate from the date of initial supplementary bill. Thus, from the documents on record it cannot be said that the waiver of surcharge was ever approved by the Board in favour of the Petitioner. The alleged waiver of surcharge as informed vide Annexures P3 and P/6 are found to be in contravention of the approval of the Board and has no binding force qua M.P.S.E.B. Moreover, the Respondents have placed on record the order dated 20-3-1985 contained in Annexure -B which empowers the Superintending Engineer to waive surcharge to the tune of Rs. 100/- only. The Petitioner has not placed any document on record to establish that the amount of surcharge was ever waived by the Board. Thus, it is found that neither the amount of surcharge was waived nor the Superintending Engineer had any power or authority to waive the surcharge and grant no dues certificate vide Annexures P3 and P/5 and no benefit can legally be derived by the Petitioner on the basis of said documents which are found to have been issued in excess of statutory power. Reference may be made to paragraph 30 of the Apex Court's decision rendered in the case of Shri K. Ramadas Shenoy Vs. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Others, . In the present case the settlement was obviously made in respect of theft of electrical energy and not in respect of surcharge. Accordingly, the surcharge is liable to be paid by the Petitioner at uniform rates applicable as per the rules of M.P.S.E.B. and Petitioner has no right to claim immunity from it. I may like to derive strength on this point from the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Rajasthan State Electricity Board and Another, . I may like to derive strength on this point from the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Rajasthan State Electricity Board and Another, . Although the Petitioner has not very expressly taken a specific plea yet seems to have taken the plea of waiver/estoppel/promissory estoppel in different context. As to waiver, it is stated in the petition that the surcharge has been waived by the Respondents. Obviously, waiver is a question of fact and it must be properly pleaded and proved. There is no specific document on record to establish that surcharge was waived by the M.P.E.B. in express language. Thus, the plea of waiver does not hold the field. As regards plea of estoppel, it has already been observed that the earlier Writ Petition bearing No. 2855/91 was dismissed on the statement of Petitioner's counsel that the parties have already settled the matter outside the Court. This version was not acknowledged or affirmed by the counsel for the Respondents/Board. The settlement between the Petitioner and the Respondent is found to have been made to a limited extent i.e. with respect to theft of electrical energy. No material on record is placed to establish that it was ever settled with respect to the amount of surcharge. Thus, the plea of estoppel is also not available to the Petitioner. More so, the plea of estoppel does not work against the provisions of law. Since it has already been found in the light of Annexure - B that the Superintending Engineer has no power to waive the surcharge to the tune of amount in the excess of Rs. 100/- , the promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, wherein it has been held: It is equally settled law that the promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the government or the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority, for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The court on satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against government or the public authority. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Sharma Transport Rep. by D.P. Sharma Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . Shri Rajesh Maindiretta, Learned Counsel relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as AIR 1968 SC 718 , Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., , Union of India and Ors. v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd contended that the M.P.E.S.B. is bound by its letters issued by the Superintendent-Engineer as Annexures P/3 and P/5. The letter and no dues certificate contained in Annexures P/3 and P/5 are already found to be without any authority or power and the Petitioner is not found to be entitled to any benefit on the basis of these documents. In the result, I do not find any force in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed with cost quantified at Rs. 5,000/- , if already certified. Final Result : Dismissed