Judgment :- Plaintiff in O.S.No.73/1992 on the file of the Sub Court, Manjeri is the appellant. The suit was filed for partition of the plaint "B" schedule property. As per the plaint averments, Parangodan, grand-father of appellant and respondents, had acquired the plaint schedule properties as per registered assignment deed No.4052/1948. The said Parangodan had two male children namely, Kundu and Raman. After the death of Parangodan, the property devolved upon his sons, Kundu And Raman. They partitioned the property as per partion deed No.2692/1953 and ever since Raman was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint "B" schedule property. Raman died in the year 1963. His legal representatives are his wife, appellant and respondents. Later his wife died in 1967. Thus, the plaint schedule property devolved upon the appellant and the respondents. The 3rd respondent, the only male son of Raman, has been managing the plaint schedule property on behalf of appellant and other respondents. The appellant requested the respondents for partition of the plaint schedule property and separate allotment of her share. Since the respondents were not amenable, she sent registered notice for partition. The respondents sent reply stating that the plaint schedule property was ancestral property and that the appellant and respondents are governed by Hindu-Mithakshara Law and therefore, the plaint schedule property was not partible and the appellant had no right over the property. Hence, she had filed the suit. Resisting the averments raised in the suit, respondents 1, 2 and 4 had filed a joint written statement in tune with the plaint averments. The 3rd respondent had filed a separate written statement contending that plaint "B" schedule property originally belonged to Parangodan and on the death of Parangodan the property was partitioned among his children namely, between Raman and Kundu. It is stated in the written statement that after death of Raman, The Right over the property would devolve upon the 3rd respondent only and hence the "B" schedule property was not partible and either the appellant or respondents 1, 2 & 4 were not entitled to any share on the property. It is further stated in the written statement that during the lifetime of Raman, the 3rd respondent had acquired right over the property equal to that of his father. It is further stated in the written statement that during the lifetime of Raman, the 3rd respondent had acquired right over the property equal to that of his father. It is also stated that deceased Raman had only ½ share over the plaint schedule property and his right, after his death, devolved upon his wife, appellant and respondents and the remaining half right devolved upon the 3rd respondent. Therefore, plaint schedule property was liable to be divided into 10 equal shares and the appellant is entitled to get only 1/10 share over the plaint schedule property. According to him, the appellant was not entitled to get any profits from the respondents. After considering the evidence, the court below passed a preliminary decree holding that plaint "B" schedule property was liable to be partitioned into 10 equal shares and the appellant was entitled to get one such share and respondents 1, 2 and 4 were entitled to get one such share each and that the 3rd respondent was entitled to get six such shares. It is also held that the 3rd respondent was liable to pay past and future profits to the appellant and respondents 1,2 and 4. 2. Heard both sides. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant relies on a decision reported in Chittur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. V. Kumaran (1992 (1) KLT 216) and sections 218 to 222 of the Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 13th Edition and content that the findings of the court below are against the principles of Mithakshara Law. Learned counsel for the respondent relies on a decision of this court reported in Narayanan Nair V. Taluk Land Board (1987 (1) KLT 760), a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Ruli Ram (deceased) through L.R. and others V. Amar Singh (AIR 1994 HO 102) and decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Thamma Venkata Subbamma (dead) by L.R. V. Thamma Rattamma and others ((1987) 3 SCC 294), State Bank of India V. Ghamandi Ram (dead) by his legal representative Curbux Rai (AIR 1969 SC 1330) and Eramma V. Veerupana and others (AIR 1966 SC 1879) and contend that Paragodan died before the commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the 3rd respondent got right by birth the property acquired by his father. 4. 4. Question to be decided in this appeal is whether the plaint schedule property could be considered as ancestral property, as far as the appellant is concerned, or the property succeeded as per the provisions of Hindu Succession Act 1956. Admittedly, the property in question originally acquired by deceased Paragodan. After his death, two male children of Paragodan namely, Raman and Kundu, partitioned the entire property of B schedule as well as other property succeeded by Paragodan as per partition deed No.2692/1953. In this context, it could be seen that as per the Principles of Hindu Law coparcenary properties are of two types obstructed heritage and unobstructed heritage. The property acquires an interest by birth is called unobstructed heritage whereas property acquires an interest not by birth but to the death of original owner without leaving male issue is called obstructed heritage. Relying on this principle the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Raman and Kundu the two male children of parangodan, get right over the property only because of the death of parangodan and not by way of birth. If that be so, plaint B schedule property succeeded by the application of law of succession and not by applying the principles of Mithakshara Law. This point has been considered by this court in 1992(1) KLT 216 (supra) and had taken the view that as far as separate or self acquired property is concerned the devolution can only be under S.8 of the Act which lays down the rule of succession in respect of the property of a male Hindu dying interstate. It has come out in evidence that even though Paragodan acquired the property as a self acquired one, due to the death of Parangodan the property devolves on his male sons namely, Kundu and Raman and they had entered into a partition 1953 before the commencement of Hindu succession Act, 1956. In the above circumstances, this court is of the view that the finding entered by the court below that the 3rd respondent would get half right over the property and 1/5th right over the remaining half is correct. In this context, a decision of the Apex Court relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent AIR 1969 SC 1330 (supra) is very relevant. In this context, a decision of the Apex Court relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent AIR 1969 SC 1330 (supra) is very relevant. In the above decision the Supreme Court held that "having regard to the juristic nature of the Hindu joint family. According to the doctrine of Mitakshara, we are of the opinion that the Hindu joint family firm of Ghamandi Ram Gurbax Rai cannot be treated as an "individual" within the meaning of the notification of the Pakistan Government dated 19th February, 1952, but the said firm must be treated as a body of individuals whether incorporated or not within the meaning of that notification." Further the same view was expressed by this Court in 1987 (1) KLT 760 (supra) with regard to the meaning of ancestral property is also relevant. In the above decision this court held that under Mitakshara law son has got a right by birth in father's property. The son's right is vested by birth. This court further held that "the term ancestral property" denotes the property which decends upon one person in such manner that his male issue acquired certain rights in it as against him." 5. In view of the above legal principles of succession held by this court as well as the Apex Court, this Court holds that the view taken by the trial court is based on the legal principles of succession by a member of a joint Hindu family in the matter of principles of heritage governed by the law of Mitakshara law. Hence, the judgment under appeal requires no inference by this court. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it stands dismissed. No order as to costs.