Ayudh Upaskar Nirmani Kalyan Samiti, Kanpur v. Government of India
2006-11-14
ARIJIT PASAYAT, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted. 2. Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution). 3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:- The writ petition was filed for quashing the order dated 1.4.2005 passed by the Joint Director (Personnel and Administration), Ordnance Equipment Factories, Kanpur, (in short OEF), the respondent No.4 and the order dated 21.6.2005 passed by the Director General, Ordnance Factories, Government of India, Kolkatta, respondent No.6. A further relief was sought for restraining the respondents from interfering with the running of the O.E.F. Secondary School (hereinafter referred to as the Secondary School) from the premises in question pursuant to the aforesaid orders and for restraining the respondents from demanding an amount of Rs.18,307/- towards monthly rent and Rs.21,968/- and premium towards lease rent and to permit the appellant to run the Secondary School on payment of rent of Rs.3,904/- per annum. A direction for refund of the amount of Rs.32,95,315/- to the appellant which had been deposited by it, was also claimed. 4. The appellant (for sake of convenience described as Society) had been registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1861 (hereinafter to as the Act). The said Society has been established by the officers and employees of the OEF. Basic object of the Society is to impart education to students in the field of Art, Science and Commerce by establishing Institutions. The Society has accordingly established the aforesaid Secondary School, which is recognized by the Central Board of Secondary Education (in short CBSE). The Secondary School is running classes from class I to class XII and there are about 1000 students and 35 teachers. 5. According to the appellant, previously a Kendriya Vidyalaya was being run and managed in the building in which the present Secondary School is being run. Upon shifting of the Kendriya Vidyalaya to another place, the building along with the playground was handed over to the OEF.
5. According to the appellant, previously a Kendriya Vidyalaya was being run and managed in the building in which the present Secondary School is being run. Upon shifting of the Kendriya Vidyalaya to another place, the building along with the playground was handed over to the OEF. The appellant Society was then constituted by the Officers and employees of the OEF for the purposes of establishing the Secondary School and an application was submitted by the Secretary of the Society to the General Manager of the OEF in the year 2000 seeking permission to run the Secondary School in the building. A certificate dated 14.6.2000 was issued by the Deputy General Manager of the OEF certifying that the building, which had been vacated by the Kendriya Vidyalaya, had been handed over to the Secondary School. A communication dated 2.8.2001 was also sent by the Works Manager (Administration) of the OEF to the Secretary of the Society enquiring as to whether the total lease rent of Rs.3,904/- per annum was acceptable to it. This letter was replied to by the secretary of the Society pointing out that the annual rent of Rs.3,904/- was acceptable to it. 6. The Director General then sent a communication dated 4.4.2005 to the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the Secondary School conveying the directives of the Chairman which are as under: i)OEF Secondary School run by OEF Kalyan Samiti shall not run from OEF premises after the academic session 2005-06 ends All concerned should be intimated about the same immediately. ii) No student should be taken in class IX and class X in the academic year 2005-06. iii) The Managing Committee should deposit Rs.32,95,315/- (Rupees Thirty Two lakhs Ninety Five thousand Three hundred and fifteen only) lease rent plus premium within the period of one month without fail. iv)The Managing Committee shall pay a monthly rent of Rs. 18,307.00 till the school functions from OEF premises i.e. till the academic session 2005-06. It was further ordered that a compliance report may be submitted.
iv)The Managing Committee shall pay a monthly rent of Rs. 18,307.00 till the school functions from OEF premises i.e. till the academic session 2005-06. It was further ordered that a compliance report may be submitted. This order dated 4.4.2005 was challenged by the appellant by filing Writ Petition No. 39846 of 2005 which was disposed of by the High Court by the judgment and order dated 17.5.2005 with the following directions:- "After hearing learned counsel for the parties we dispose of this petition in terms of the undertaking given by Sri U.N. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Board that no action adversely affecting the petitioner pursuant to the order dated 4.4.2005 shall be taken till the mater is decided by the Board. However, we make it clear that in case the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the Board, he shall be at liberty to approach the appropriate Forum and the deposit already made by the petitioner shall be subject to the decision to be taken by the Board". 7. After the decision in the aforesaid writ petition, the appellant filed a representation dated 14.6.2005 before the Chairman of the OEF. This representation was rejected by the Board by the order dated 21.6.2005 which was impugned in the writ petition. In the order it has been observed that according to the guidelines, the Society was created by well meaning officers and staff to look after the educational requirement of the wards of the employees and allied establishment, but the rational behind the creation of the Society had lost its relevance as only 10% to 11% of the total students of the school are wards of employees and officers. Thus the decision was taken to close down the School more particularly when the Audit Department had also raised objection. In the order it was also pointed out that the School was running without there being any sanction of the Competent Authority as per the Land Lease Policy. A further observation was made that the Board has also given directions several times in the past that officers of the Organization should not involve themselves in the running of the Educational Institutions and should instead concentrate on their core activity for which they had been arrived at on wrong understanding of the relevant provisions.
A further observation was made that the Board has also given directions several times in the past that officers of the Organization should not involve themselves in the running of the Educational Institutions and should instead concentrate on their core activity for which they had been arrived at on wrong understanding of the relevant provisions. According to the correct calculation the lease rent shall be Rs.2,19,688/- per annum and one time premium was also to be charged. The appellant was, therefore, directed to comply with the directives contained in the communication dated 4.4.2005. This order dated 21.6.2005 was also impugned in the writ petition. By the impugned judgment, the writ petition was dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erroneously proceeded on the basis that the occupation of the premises in question was unauthorized. Earlier in the same premises, a school was being run by the Kendriya Vidalaya. Society which is registered has as its members, officers and employees of the OEF. The school is primary meant for the children of the employees and officers of the factory. Documents on record go to show that permission as requested was granted and the monthly rent was fixed at Rs.3,904/-. The premium has been raised to Rs.18,500/- p.m. in addition to the arrears of the amounts of Rs.32,95,315/- which has been deposited on 5.5.2005. The school which is running in the premises is affiliated to CBSE. Only after the High Courts order, the affiliation was discontinued. But in view of the order passed by this Court the affiliation has been restored. About 1000 students are prosecuting their studies. It was pointed out that reasonable time may be granted to the appellant so that the students who are prosecuting in class IX and XI of the institution can appear at the final examinations. With reference to policy of the OEF, it is submitted that the appellant is willing to pay the lease amount and has in fact deposited about Rs.22 lakhs on 5.5.2005. 9. In response, it is pointed out that though appellant claims that school is meant for the wards of the employees and the officers, their number is 10 to 11 percent of the total students strength. It is pointed out that the so called handing over of possession was done by the same person who had applied for the allotment of the land.
It is pointed out that the so called handing over of possession was done by the same person who had applied for the allotment of the land. Because of the fact that large number of students are unconnected with the families of the employees and the officers, there is likelihood of security problems. 10. In reply, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the possession was handed over to the appellant and it was within the knowledge of all concerned. Nearly 600 students were earlier prosecuting their studies. They continued in the appellants school. Subsequently, there may have been some variation in the number of students, but that cannot be a ground to refuse continuance of appellant in the premises. 11. We find that undisputedly, there is no decision of the OEF Board to grant any lease. But at the same time the school has been running and was affiliated to CBSE. Students are prosecuting their studies. In that sense the students prosecuting their studies are not students of any non-affiliated institution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that contrary to the original position the percentage of wards of employees and officers is less than 15%. Therefore, the stand that there is valid sanction in favour of the appellant to run the school in the premises cannot be accepted. It is not disputed by learned counsel for the respondents that students are prosecuting studies in class IX and XI. It would not be in the interest of students to direct immediate closure of the institution and/or to direct the appellant to vacate the premises forthwith. 12. Let an undertaking be filed by the appellant to vacate the premises latest by 31.3.2008 with the further undertaking to pay the amounts to be charged by the respondents for occupation of the premises. On such undertaking being filed, appellant shall be permitted to occupy the premises till 31.3.2008. 13. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. However, disposal of the present appeal shall not stand on the way of the appellant moving the authorities for grant of lease of the premises in question. If such request is made the same shall be considered in its own perspective about which we express no opinion. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of. ployee may be considered for regularization, subject to vacancies being available.
If such request is made the same shall be considered in its own perspective about which we express no opinion. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of. ployee may be considered for regularization, subject to vacancies being available. Such regulations, if any, may be considered after two years of contract/short term service if requirement continues. iv) 50% of the service put in on short term basis/contract basis before the date actual regularization will be reckoned for weightage for the purpose of seniority. However, the Committee may recommend less than 50% service, for reasons to be recorded. Under no circumstances, the weightage for the seniority will be more than 50% or maximum of 3 years. This will be reckoned on the basis of half year for each completed year of service, fraction of an year being ignored. In the case of persons who are not found fit for regularization in the grade of initial appointment but are found fit for regularization in the lower grade, the seniority may be assigned in the lower grade by giving 50% credit for the service in the initial grade of appointment subject to maximum of 3 years. This would be subject to his acceptance of regularization in lower grade in writing. 12.2.2 – If the posts, against which deputationists and other staff are working are still being operated on temporary basis but are evidently justified to be retained on permanent basis, their conversion in permanent posts may first be decided before the question of absorption of staff working is considered against them.” 14. Learned counsel further submitted that in fact the company has made short term advertisement and asked these project employees to apply for their regular recruitment under these rules and in pursuance of that large number of people applied. Some of the adhoc employees of the Projects were absorbed on their successful selection. In this connection learned counsel made a reference of Shri Prabir Basak who was one of the persons like the appellants and who after going through the process of selection as per the rules was selected and appointed but the appellants did not appear in any of the recruitment test. Therefore, they could not be appointed or regularized on that basis. Learned counsel also submitted that in the writ petition one of the prayers was to treat these petitioners as permanent employees.
Therefore, they could not be appointed or regularized on that basis. Learned counsel also submitted that in the writ petition one of the prayers was to treat these petitioners as permanent employees. In this connection learned counsel has read out clause 7 in the writ petition. Learned counsel submitted that since the recruitment under the Company is governed by the Rules of 1979 and these persons were given an opportunity to appear in the test and on their selection they could have been appointed as some of them were appointed. This factual aspect has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants. 15. We have bestowed our best of consideration to the rival contentions of the parties. We regret to say that we have failed to be persuaded by the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants to infer that the appellants were the employees of the Company and not of Project. In the appointment orders it was mentioned that appointment was adhoc and they were directed to join the Project. Therefore, these conditions, which have been stressed by the learned counsel does not lead us to the inference that incumbents were employees of the company. Employment to the company is regulated by the service rules and none of the posts which has been mentioned against these persons is in the list annexed to the Schedule appended to the Rules. That apart an opportunity was given to the petitioners to appear for regular selection in the company and they failed to avail that opportunity. Therefore, from these facts, it is more than apparent that the petitioners were not employees of the company but they were employees of the Project. Since it is a public sector company and it is governed by its own rules and those rules clearly contemplate a method for recruitment into service and that opportunity was given to the incumbents for being regularly recruited in the company but they failed to avail the same. Simply because the company had said that these persons will not be permitted to take any other employment or business without prior permission, their group insurance was made and were placed in the pay scale of the company that does not mean that they will be deemed to be employees of the Company.
Simply because the company had said that these persons will not be permitted to take any other employment or business without prior permission, their group insurance was made and were placed in the pay scale of the company that does not mean that they will be deemed to be employees of the Company. Simply because they adopted the basis for giving them the benefit of the Company as was being given to other employees who have been duly recruited in accordance with the rules, by such conferment of benefit will not be deemed to be employees of the Company. The regular recruitment Rules have been framed with the approval of the Government, as the company is a public sector undertaking. These rules may not be given a status of statutory rules but those rules are binding on the company and company cannot take departure from acting under the rules, for all purposes, they are almost analogous to the statutory rules. These rules have a legal sanctity as they have been framed in terms of memorandum and articles of association with the approval of the Government. Therefore, they have a binding force for the company and company cannot make a departure for recruitment except than following these rules. As per the provisions pointed out above, there is methodology provided under the rules and that was not followed in the present case. They were appointed being the local hand as workmen were required for completion of the project and therefore they were appointed for the project and as soon as the project was over they cannot claim as a matter of right to be permanent employees or to be regularized in the company. A distinction has to be borne in mind who is employee of the company and who is employee of the Project. The services of project employees come to an end as soon as the project is over and they cannot be given permanent status. Since they were employees of the project their services have to be terminated after completion of the project. In this connection the Full Bench has considered the necessary provisions of the rules and after a detailed discussion on the matter has rightly come to the conclusion that they are employees of the project and they are not the employees of the company.
In this connection the Full Bench has considered the necessary provisions of the rules and after a detailed discussion on the matter has rightly come to the conclusion that they are employees of the project and they are not the employees of the company. There is no question of violation of Articles 14,16 & 21 of the Constitution of India in the matter as they were employees of the project and at the end of the project they have taken their benefits as are admissible in accordance with the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, there is no violation of Articles 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India. So far as question with regard to Article 12 is concerned, the same is not relevant in this matter because the whole service conditions of the employees are governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, it is purely an academic question whether company is a State within the meaning of Article 12 or not. 16. Now question arises what benefit could be given to the petitioners, in this connection reference may be made to Section 25-O read with Section 25-FFF of the Act as it has been held by this Court that Chapter V-B is applicable to these proceedings. Section 25-O lays down procedure for closing down an undertaking and proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 25-O clearly lays down that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams, or for other construction work. Section 25-O is reproduced as under:- ”25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking:- (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner; PROVIDED that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams, or for other construction work.
(2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the appropriate government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may, having regards to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refused to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication: PROVIDED that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under sub-section (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3) every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.” 17. Since this was a project for construction of some railway lines, therefore, the rigour of sub-section (1) for seeking a permission of Government is not required in the present case. Once the project is completed the service of the incumbent comes to an end. But the legislature in its wisdom has provided relief for such class of workmen on completion of project under section 25-FFF. Sub-section (2) of Section 25-FFF provides compensation for such class of workmen. Sub-section (2) of Section 25-FFF reads as under:- ”(2) Where any undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams, or other construction work is closed down on account of the completion of the work within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set up, no workman employed therein shall be entitled to any compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F, but if the construction work is not so completed within two years, he shall be entitled to notice and compensation under that section for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.” 18.
According to sub-section (2) when such construction work is closed down and on completion of work within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set up, the workman employed therein shall not be entitled to compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F, but if the construction work is not completed within two years he shall be entitled to notice and compensation under that section for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 19. Mr. Rao learned counsel for the Company submitted that the position of the company vis-a-vis these workmen should not be worse when their undertaking is closed with the permission. He submitted that in fact sub-section (8) of Section 25-O clearly lays down that if the permission had been granted for closure then every workman employed therein shall be entitled to receive compensation, which will be equivalent to 15 days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. Learned counsel submitted that position of the company where the project is completed cannot be said to be worse than the undertaking, which is closed with the permission where the compensation is only awarded as mentioned in sub-section (8) of Section 25-O. We regret to say that we cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent company. The legislature in its wisdom has especially provided on closure of such projects, a special benefit to such workers under sub-section (2) of Section 25-FFF in the event the company has completed construction after more than two years, the workman will be entitled to notice and compensation under that section 25-F for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. This is the legislative mandate and the intention of the legislature is more than apparent. Since this is legislative mandate and we cannot sit over the matter to decide that whether the position of the company, which closed down the undertaking with the permission and company which is closed down because of the completion of the project should not be worse. Since it is a legislative mandate the company has to comply with those provisions.
Since this is legislative mandate and we cannot sit over the matter to decide that whether the position of the company, which closed down the undertaking with the permission and company which is closed down because of the completion of the project should not be worse. Since it is a legislative mandate the company has to comply with those provisions. Therefore, these incumbents have already been given notice and if the compensation has not been determined in terms of Section 25-F then that should be calculated and paid to the workers if not paid so far. They have been directed to collect their dues from the office. If that amount has not been collected by them then it will be open to them to collect same or any shortfall that will be made good by the company. So far as the termination of the incumbents is concerned after completion of the project they have no right to continue. They are only entitled to notice and compensation to be determined under Section 25-F. Shortfall of period of notice or compensation will not render termination bad on that count. 20. In this connection learned counsel has also invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh & Ors. reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682 where the similar question was considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court and it was observed, “Thus, by this Amendment Act the Parliament clearly provided that though such termination may not have been retrenchment technically so-called, as decided by this Court, nevertheless the employees in question whose services were terminated by the transfer or closure of the undertaking would be entitled to compensation, as if the said termination was retrenchment. As it has been observed, the words “as if” brought out the legal distinction between retrenchment defined by Section 2(OO) as it was interpreted by this Court and termination of services consequent upon transfer of the undertaking. In other words, the provision was that though termination of services on transfer or closure of the undertaking may not be retrenchment, the workmen concerned were entitled to compensation as if the said termination was retrenchment.” This view has been further reaffirmed by this Court in S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telcom District Manager, Karnataka reported in (2003) 4 SCC 27 .
vs. Telcom District Manager, Karnataka reported in (2003) 4 SCC 27 . It was observed, “It is pertinent to note that in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar – AIR 1957 SC 121 the Supreme Court held that “retrenchment” as defined in Section 2(oo) and as used in Section 25-F has no wider meaning than the ordinary accepted connotation of the word, that is, discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever otherwise than by way of punishment inflicted in disciplinary action. Retrenchment was held to have no application where the services of all workmen were terminated by the employer on a real and bona fide closure of business or on the business or undertaking being taken over by another employer. The abovesaid view of the law taken by the Supreme Court resulted in promulgation of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 with effect from 27-4-1957, later on replaced by an Act of Parliament (Act 18 of 1957) with effect from 6-6-1957 whereby Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF were introduced in the body of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1957. Section 25-FF deals with the case of transfer of undertakings. The term “undertaking” is not defined in the Act. The relevant provisions use the term “industry”. Undertaking is a concept narrower than industry. An undertaking may be a part of the whole, that is, the industry. It carries a restricted meaning. (See Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa – (1978) 2 SCC 213 and Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Workmen – (1973) 3 SCC 564 ) With this amendment it is clear that closure of a project or scheme by the State Government would be covered by closing down of an undertaking within the meaning of Section 25-FFF. The workman would therefore be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F though the right of the employer to close the undertaking for any reason whatsoever cannot be question. Compliance with Section 25-F shall be subject to such relaxations as are provided by Section 25-FFF. The undertaking having been closed on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer i.e. by its own force as it was designed and destined to have a limited life only, the compensation payable to the workman under clause (b) of Section 25-F shall not exceed his average pay for three months.
The undertaking having been closed on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer i.e. by its own force as it was designed and destined to have a limited life only, the compensation payable to the workman under clause (b) of Section 25-F shall not exceed his average pay for three months. This is so because of failure on the part of the respondent employer to allege and prove that the termination of employment fell within sub-clause (bb) of clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act.” 21. Therefore, in view of the legislative history as mentioned above, it clearly stipulates that Section 25-FFF was in fact incorporated in order to give benefit to the workers, where an undertaking is closed because of completion of the project or on account of transfer. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Rao learned counsel cannot be accepted. In this connection our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in A. Umarani vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies & Ors. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 112 wherein it was held that illegal appointment cannot be regularized. 22. Learned counsel has invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. & Ors. vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Employees’ Union, Hyderabad & Anr. reported in (1995) 3 SCC 474 wherein when one of the unit of the Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. was closed down and similar relief was sought by the employees of the Hindustan undertaking and in that context this Court observed that on closure of unit at Hyderabad the workmen were not entitled as a matter of right to be absorbed, and it was held: “The question whether the units at Hyderabad are independent establishments or parts of a larger establishment is not a pure question of fact. The tests laid down in this behalf in the decisions of the Supreme Court need not all be satisfied in every case. One has also to look to the nature and character of the undertaking while deciding the question. The tests evolved are merely to serve as guidelines. The appellant is a government company wholly owned and controlled by the Government of India. Its job is to undertake construction works both in India and abroad.
One has also to look to the nature and character of the undertaking while deciding the question. The tests evolved are merely to serve as guidelines. The appellant is a government company wholly owned and controlled by the Government of India. Its job is to undertake construction works both in India and abroad. The construction works are not permanent works in the sense that as soon as the construction work is over, the establishment comes to an end at that place. In such a case, functional integrality assumes significance. The nature of the construction work may also differ from work to work or place to place, as the case may be. It is not even suggested by the respondent-Union that there is any functional integrality between the several units or several construction works undertaken by the appellant. It is not suggested that closure of one leads to the closure of others. There is no proximity between the several units/works undertaken by the appellant; they are spread all over India, indeed all over the world. It would thus appear that each of the works or construction projects undertaken by the appellant represent distinct establishments and did not constitute units of a single establishment. The mere fact that Management reserved to itself the liberty of transferring the employees from one place to another did not mean that all the units of the appellant constituted one single establishment. In the case of a construction company like the appellant which undertakes construction works wherever awarded, does that work and winds up its establishment there and particularly where a number of local persons have to be and are appointed for the purpose of a particular work, mere unity of ownership, management and control are not of much significance. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the material on record, the conclusion is inevitable that the units at Hyderabad were distinct establishments. Once this is so, workmen of the said units had no right to demand absorption in other units on the Hyderabad units completing their job.” 23. Therefore, this case is nearer to our case in hand that once this project is completed then it is not incumbent on the company to necessarily employ these persons at other projects in any other part of the country. 24. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in MD.
Therefore, this case is nearer to our case in hand that once this project is completed then it is not incumbent on the company to necessarily employ these persons at other projects in any other part of the country. 24. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in MD. U.P. Land Development Corporation & Anr. vs. Amar Singh & Ors. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 388 wherein it has been held that employees working under a scheme/project have no vested right so as to claim regularisation of their services with regular pay scales. It was observed that when the scheme/project comes to an end, the services of the employees working the project also come to an end. 25. Learned counsel has invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Mahendra L. Jain and Ors. vs. Indore Development Authority & Ors. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 639 . This was a case of regularization of illegal appointments. This has no relevance so far as our case in hand is concerned. 26. Before parting with the case, we may clarify that if any compensation amount has not been paid to the workers then that should be determined and be paid to them forthwith, if not paid so far. 27. Therefore, in the light of discussion made above, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Full Bench is correct. The petitioners are not entitled to be regularise their services in the Company and they are not employees of Company. They are only entitled to compensation as indicated above. The above appeals and writ petitions filed by workers are dismissed. No order as to cost. Appeals and Writ Petitions filed by workmen dismissed.