Judgment :- (Writ Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.) M. Karpagavinayagam, J. George Dhanamony and Lazer, claiming themselves as the owner and the lessee respectively of the suit property, filed a suit in O.S.No.10 of 1970 on the file of Sub-Court, Nagercoil, as against the District Forest Officer and the District Collector, against the order of eviction passed by the District Forest Officer, which was confirmed by the District Collector on 25.10.1969, for declaration of title and permanent injunction and also to set aside the order dated 25.10.1969, passed by the District Collector. 2. After contest, the suit was dismissed on 31.10.1974. Therefore, both the owner and the lessee filed an appeal before the District Judge, Nagercoil, in A.S.No.357 of 1974 and the same was allowed, decreeing the suit, declaring the title of the plaintiffs, granting injunction and also quashing the order of the District Collector, dated 25.10.1969. 3. Aggrieved over the same, the State of Tamil Nadu filed Second Appeal No.679 of 1986 on the file of High Court and the same was allowed as against the first plaintiff alone by the judgment dated 12.01.1999 and dismissed as against the second plaintiff, as he died. 4. On coming to know that George Dhanamony also died on 14.03.1996 i.e., even prior to the judgment dated 12.01.1999, the Forest Department filed applications to condone the delay, to set aside the abatement and also to bring the legal representatives on record and the same were dismissed by the High Court. Against the said order of dismissal, the Forest Department filed S.L.P.Nos.2828 to 2830 of 2002 before the Supreme Court and the same are pending. 5. In the meantime, the persons, who were in possession of the suit property, were evicted on 10.06.2000, in pursuance of the decree passed by the High Court in the Second Appeal. 6. One Sobia Helan, daughter of Lazer, filed W.P.No.9919 of 2000 for the relief of mandamus. When the matter came up for hearing, it was represented that the writ petitioner was already evicted and, as such, the writ petition, seeking for a mandamus not to interfere with the possession of the petitioner, had become infructuous. On that basis, Sobia Helan filed another W.P.No.4197 of 2001 on 20.02.2001 for issuance of a mandamus, directing the respondents to hand over possession of the property to her. 7. On that basis, Sobia Helan filed another W.P.No.4197 of 2001 on 20.02.2001 for issuance of a mandamus, directing the respondents to hand over possession of the property to her. 7. Ultimately, on 30.10.2001, both the writ petitions, namely, W.P.No.9919 of 2000 and 4197 of 2001 were dismissed by a common order by Justice P.Shanmugam, as he then was, mainly on the ground that the suit was dismissed in O.S.No.10 of 1970 and the same was confirmed in S.A.No.679 of 1986 by the High Court. 8. Challenging the said order, Sobia Helan filed Writ Appeal Nos.573 and 574 of 2002. 9. At that stage, the brother of Sobia Helan, by name Johnson, filed W.P.No.2505 of 2004, seeking for a mandamus, directing the respondents to vacate the land and deliver possession to him, on the basis that the decree in S.A.No.679 of 1986 is a nullity as against the dead person and especially when the S.L.Ps. are pending before the Supreme Court. The said writ petition came up before Justice K.Raviraja Pandian and he allowed the writ petition, directing to hand over the possession of the suit property to the petitioner, mainly on the ground that the second appeal, in which the judgment was rendered confirming the dismissal of the suit, was restored. As against the said order of the learned single Judge, the State filed Writ Appeal No.69 of 2005 and the same was admitted by a Division Bench. 10. Since the issue is same, we have taken up both W.A.Nos.573 and 574 of 2002, filed by Sobia Helan, and, W.A.No.69 of 2005, filed by the State, together, for hearing. 11. Elaborate arguments were made by the counsel on either side. 12. 10. Since the issue is same, we have taken up both W.A.Nos.573 and 574 of 2002, filed by Sobia Helan, and, W.A.No.69 of 2005, filed by the State, together, for hearing. 11. Elaborate arguments were made by the counsel on either side. 12. According to Sobia Helan, sister, and, Johnson, brother, they had been dispossessed from the suit property by the District Forest Officials on 10.06.2000, based on the judgment in Second Appeal No.679 of 1986, dated 12.01.1999, confirming the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.10 of 1970 and in view of the fact that their predecessors had died pending second appeal and also the second appeal has been restored by the High Court, the judgment in Second Appeal is a nullity; as such, they are entitled for restoration of possession, based on the judgment of the first Appellate Court in A.S.No.357 of 1974, dated 26.04.1983, and, therefore, the order of Justice P.Shanmugam in Writ Petition Nos.9919 of 2000 and 4197 of 2001 is to be set aside. 13. According to the learned counsel appearing for Johnson, who is the petitioner in W.P.No.2505 of 2004 and first respondent in W.A.No.69 of 2005, the order of Justice K.Raviraja Pandian, dated 08.02.2005, is perfectly justified, as, at that time, the second appeal was restored in the review petition in respect of the first plaintiff and the SLP had been filed in respect of the second plaintiff and the same is pending. On that reason, Justice K.Raviraja Pandian distinguished the order of Justice P.Shanmugam and allowed the Writ Petition, by giving correct reasons and issuing a mandamus. 14. In short, the submissions made by both sister and brother are that the order of Justice K.Raviraja Pandian for restoration and possession of the suit property from which they have been dispossessed on 10.06.2000 is to be confirmed and the order of Justice P.Shanmugam, dismissing the writ petitions in W.P.No.9910 of 2000 and 4197 of 2001, is to be set aside, in view of the fact that the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs by the first Appellate Court is in force, subsequent to the restoration of the Second Appeal, which is now pending. 15. 15. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State would submit that the suit itself is not maintainable and the decree obtained thereon in the Appellate Court is a nullity, in view of Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act and the Second Appeal, which is pending, has to be heard by the High Court; if the Second Appeal is allowed, as was done by the judgment rendered earlier by the High Court, the writ petitioners cannot claim any right, since their predecessor's right is claimed as a lessee under the first plaintiff, who claimed to be the owner and, in that event, the writ petitioners would not be entitled to get back the property. 16. We have carefully heard the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 17. The crux of the arguments advanced by the writ petitioners is that the decree passed in second appeal is a nullity, since their predecessor had died pending the second appeal; therefore, dispossession, on the basis of the decree passed in second appeal, is illegal and, as such, possession has to be restored to them. 18. The gist of the reply given by the learned Additional Advocate General, who argued contra, is that the suit itself, which has been decreed by the Appellate Court and the subject matter before the High Court in Second Appeal, is a nullity, in view of Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, as the suit in question, filed by the predecessor of the writ petitioners, was instituted in the year 1970, which was between the date of notification under Section 4 (1908) and Section 16 (1980). 19. In our view, this question can be decided only in the Second Appeal, which is now said to be pending before this Court. Therefore, we are not inclined to go into the said question, as this Court, in Second Appeal alone, would be competent to decide the said issue, relating to the maintainability of the suit, or the consequences, in the event of the Second Appeal being allowed. 20. We feel that this matter can be disposed of on a short ground. Admittedly, the suit filed by the predecessor of the writ petitioners in O.S.No.10 of 1970 for declaration and permanent injunction and to set aside the order of District Collector was dismissed on 31.10.1974. 20. We feel that this matter can be disposed of on a short ground. Admittedly, the suit filed by the predecessor of the writ petitioners in O.S.No.10 of 1970 for declaration and permanent injunction and to set aside the order of District Collector was dismissed on 31.10.1974. Though the said decree of dismissal was set aside in A.S.No.357 of 1974 on 26.04.1983, ultimately, this High Court, on 12.01.1999, set aside the decree passed in A.S.No.357 of 1974 and restored the dismissal order in O.S.No.10 of 1970. In pursuance of the decree passed on 12.01.1999, the persons, who were in possession of the land in question, were evicted on 10.06.2000. At that stage, both sister and brother filed W.P.Nos.4197 of 2001 and 2505 of 2004. W.P.No.4197 of 2001 was dismissed on 30.10.2001 and W.P.No.2505 of 2004 was allowed on 08.02.2005. 21. Now, the point for consideration is, whether this Court has got jurisdiction to issue a mandamus, directing the respondents to hand over possession to the writ petitioners, on the basis of a civil court decree, passed by the appellate Court? 22. It is settled law that no mandamus can be issued based on a civil court decree, which would be in the nature of executing or giving effect to a civil decree and the remedy will be only before the civil court. This proposition has been laid down in 1992 (4) SUPREME COURT CASES 61 (Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria); 1996 (2) CTC 211 (Government of Tamil Nadu v. Rajamanickam) and 1997 (1) SUPREME COURT CASES 134 (Ramniklal N.Butta v. State of Maharashtra). The relevant observations are as under: (i) In 1992 (4) SUPREME COURT CASES 61 (Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria), the Supreme Court has held as under: "6.....Further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the house property which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court. The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court. The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon. We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court. It has repeatedly been held by this Court as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged. And in such a case, the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned. If the real grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of the criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to the litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly....." (ii) In 1996 (2) CTC 211 (Government of Tamil Nadu v. Rajamanickam), this Court has held as follows: "2.....When once the first respondent in each of these appeals had obtained a decree in the court of the District Munsif, Valangaiman, for declaration and injunction, it is for them to execute the said decree and take appropriate proceedings to prevent the defendants therein from interfering with their possession. Instead of doing so, they have chosen to file these writ petitions. It is not known how the writ petitions are maintainable at all. This Court cannot be used as a sort of executing court to implement the decrees passed by the District Munsif. Instead of doing so, they have chosen to file these writ petitions. It is not known how the writ petitions are maintainable at all. This Court cannot be used as a sort of executing court to implement the decrees passed by the District Munsif. The learned single Judge should have simply dismissed the writ petitions directing the petitioners therein to approach the District Munsif for appropriate reliefs." (iii) In 1997 (1) SUPREME COURT CASES 134 (Ramniklal N.Butta v. State of Maharashtra), the Supreme Court observed as follows: "10......Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-Ã -vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 indeed any of their discretionary powers...." 23. Admittedly, in the instant case, the civil proceedings have not reached a finality, in view of the fact the Second Appeal has been restored as against the first plaintiff, who is the owner. In the event of the Second Appeal being allowed, the predecessor of the writ petitioners, who claimed as a lessee, would have no better title. Further, the dismissal of the petitions to bring on record the legal representatives of the predecessor of the writ petitioners, namely, second plaintiff is also the subject matter of SLP before the Supreme Court. 24. As indicated above, Justice P.Shanmugam dismissed both the writ petitions, filed by sister, mainly on the ground that there is already a decree passed in favour of the Government in Second Appeal. Justice K.Raviraja Pandian, while disposing of the writ petition, namely, W.P.No.2505 of 2004, filed by the brother, held that the writ petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for in the writ petition, as the Second Appeal has been restored. Justice K.Raviraja Pandian, while disposing of the writ petition, namely, W.P.No.2505 of 2004, filed by the brother, held that the writ petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for in the writ petition, as the Second Appeal has been restored. So, both the Courts did not deal with the situation, whether the mandamus could be issued based on a civil court decree. 25. In our view, as laid down by the Supreme Court, the main questions with reference to the maintainability of the suit and, even assuming that the suit is maintainable, whether the petitioners' predecessor, a lessee, would be entitled to the relief in the event of the Second Appeal being allowed are all to be decided by this Court in the Second Appeal. 26. Therefore, we are of the view that the order passed by Justice K.Raviraja Pandian in W.P.No.2505 of 2004 is not legally valid. It is open to this Court in Second Appeal to deal with the main question relating to the maintainability of the suit or the entitlement of the reliefs sought for and decide the same, without being influenced by any of the observations made in the orders, passed by Justice P.Shanmugam and Justice K.Raviraja Pandian. 27. In the result, W.A.Nos.573 and 574 of 2002 are dismissed and W.A.No.69 of 2005 is allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Contempt Petition No.321 of 2003, Sub-Application No.477 of 2003 and W.A.M.P.Nos.1195 and 1196 of 2002 are closed.