JUDGMENT H. L. GOKHALE, J. :- First of the above two appeals i.e. Appeal Loding) No. 643 of 2006 is filed by a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 which, inter alia, conducts, supervises and oversees all se racing in Western India (Mumbai and Pune). The 1st respondent to this appeal is by occupation a Trainer of horses and is permitted to operate in the race course for training the horses for various owners whose horses run the races. The appellant-Club desires that the horse races at its club should be genuine and fair and that there should not be any doping of the horses who run the races. 2. At the time of a race on 23rd March, 2006, one of the successful horses was Glory by name and who was trained by respondent No.1. It is alleged by the at appellant-Club that at the end of the race when the urine sample of this horse as collected by a Jamadar working under the 1st respondent, he mixed it with later. The urine sample is collected to test whether any horse has been doped. e appellants amongst others charged the 1st respondent for the vicarious ability and after holding an enquiry, suspended his licence as a trainer. The original order of suspension was passed on 26th March, 2006 by the Committee Stewards of the 1st appellant. That order was carried in appeal to respondent. 4 i.e. Board of appeal.The Board of appeal reduced the punishment to suspension of the licence for a period of five and half months by its order dated the April, 2006. 3. Being aggrieved by this order, the 1st respondent herein (original aintiff) filed Suit No. 2173 of 2006 wherein the first prayer is for a declaration at the above two decisions are null and void. The second prayer is for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from acting upon and/or forcing the order dated 28th April, 2006. The third prayer is to seek Compensation as detailed in Exhibit-A V to the Plaint quantifying the claim at Rs. 1,75,368/- with further interest from the date of filing of the Suit till payment. 1st respondent (original plaintiff) also prayed for an injunction restraining appellants herein (original defendant No. 1) from implementing and forcing the aforesaid two decisions. 4. The third prayer is to seek Compensation as detailed in Exhibit-A V to the Plaint quantifying the claim at Rs. 1,75,368/- with further interest from the date of filing of the Suit till payment. 1st respondent (original plaintiff) also prayed for an injunction restraining appellants herein (original defendant No. 1) from implementing and forcing the aforesaid two decisions. 4. The 1st respondent took out a Notice of Motion bearing No. 2457 of 6 for the very interim relief. The Motion was heard by a learned Single Judge ad-interim order and has been pleased to grant the relief by an order dated 2nd August, 2006. The ad-interim order has been granted in terms of prayer clause (d) of the Motion, whereby the appellants herein are restrained from forcing the said decisions and/or from obstructing the 1st respondent herein- from carrying on the activities as a Trainer. It is material to note that second impugned order is passed on 28th April, 2006, the suit is fill half months later in July, 2006. Being aggrieved by this ad-interim appeal has been preferred by the appellants. The second connected an Appeal No. 608 of 2006 is filed by the Committee of Stewards. The order passed by the learned Single Judge has been stayed in the meanwhile. 5. We have heard Appeal (Lodging) No. 643 of 2006 filed appellant-Club. The appeal has been argued at length by the Counsel re the appellants as well as the 1st respondent. Since a decision on this order will practically operate as a decision on the Motion itself, the C the parties have agreed that while deciding this appeal, this Court ma dispose of the Motion. They have made their submissions on the accordingly. 6. On behalf of the appellants, it was principally pointed out that respondent is a licensee and is permitted to come into the premises of only as a Trainer of a horse. With a view to see to it that the races are the appellants have set up closed circuit surveillance cameras (CCTV) to various developments concerning the races. On 23rd March, 2006, particular event was over, this horse Glory was declared to be successfully end of the race, the Jamadar attending the horse is supposed to take the an enclosure where the urine sample is collected. On 23rd March, 2006, particular event was over, this horse Glory was declared to be successfully end of the race, the Jamadar attending the horse is supposed to take the an enclosure where the urine sample is collected. In the instant case, t dispute that on the CCTV it is seen that the Jamadar was collecting sample and at that time he mixed up some water in the bag in which t was collected. It is material to note that in Clauses 2, 4 and 11 of his a for a Trainers licence the 1st respondent has accepted the following to 2. I have familiarized myself with the procedures laid down to time by the Stewards of the Club for holding enquiry otherwise dealing with matters arising out of and pertaining to accept the validity and reasonableness of the procedure and a bound and observe all the decisions and orders of the Stewar of the Club as well as the Board to appeal under the Articles of Association the Club. 4. I take the full responsibility for the horse in my charge or which will subsequently come into and to be responsible to the Stewards of for my irregularities or breaches in the Rules, Regulations or Notices connection with any of the horses in my charge. 11. I accept that as a licensee of the Club I have an obligation ensuring that racing is properly conducted and administered not take any solution or step which will have the effect of in disrupting or adversely affecting racing." 7. It is further material to note that before the race is run the Trainer signed a document confirming certain details. In that document address Secretary of the 1st appellant-Club, he has accepted that when the race run on 23rd March, 2006, the urine sample of his horse Glory will be collected the presence of his Jamadar Kalu Singh Rathod. Thereafter he has declaration certified in Clause-3 thereof as follows :- "I am responsible for the collection of urine sample from my horse that the urine sample collected from the horse named hereinaabove properly been sealed and packed by the horse’s representative in my presence or in the presence of my representative .” 8. Thereafter he has declaration certified in Clause-3 thereof as follows :- "I am responsible for the collection of urine sample from my horse that the urine sample collected from the horse named hereinaabove properly been sealed and packed by the horse’s representative in my presence or in the presence of my representative .” 8. In view of the fact that water was seen being mixed up with the urine simple on the CCTV, initially a preliminary enquiry was conducted on the very day by the Stipendiary Stewards into this incident of tampering. The notes of inquiry were recorded. Thereafter a regular enquiry was conducted by the communities of Stewards on 26-3-2006. At the time of enquiry the Chairman of the committee informed the 1st appellant about the purpose of the meeting, as to hat was the allegation, then recorded the explanation of Jamadar Kalu Singh d the 1st respondent-Trainer as well as the owner of the horse. Upon the insistence of the owner, the second sample of the urine of the horse was collected the Chairman of the Committee clarified that the second sample would have legal value. He did observe that everything will depend upon the result of the original urine sample but it was clear to everyone that the enquiry was into the legation of tampering. Therefore, the question to be gone into was not merely to what would be the result of the sample but whether any such act of impending was indulged into by the Jamadar and whether he and the Trainer could be responsible for it. After the aforesaid preliminary enquiry was inducted on the same date, a notice for a regular enquiry had been served on the trainer on 25th March, 2006 calling upon him for an enquiry into the incident of tarpapering with the urine sample of Glory on 23rd March, 2006. The transcripts of the earlier enquiry were made available to him. Detailed statements of Kalu ingh and Trainer were recorded when the enquiry was held and their explanation was sought. Before proceeding with the regular enquiry, the committee of Stewards considered the notes of the preliminary enquiry made by the Stipendiary Stewards amongst other documents. During the enquiry the 1st respondent- Trainer clearly admitted that it was a very stupid act on the part of the Aamadar. Before proceeding with the regular enquiry, the committee of Stewards considered the notes of the preliminary enquiry made by the Stipendiary Stewards amongst other documents. During the enquiry the 1st respondent- Trainer clearly admitted that it was a very stupid act on the part of the Aamadar. At the end of the enquiry, the Stewards decided to withdraw the licence of the Jamadar and not to renew it for a period of five years. As far as the 1st respondent is concerned, they decided that his licence will also be withdrawn and it will not be granted for one year i.e. upto and inclusive of 9th April, 2007. 9. The 1st respondent filed an appeal against the said order before the onward of appeal and as noted above, the appeal has led to reduction of punishment to withdrawal of licence and non-renewal till five and half months. 10. When the Motion was heard by the learned Single Judge, she was ,pressed by the fact that some influence appeared to have been exerted on a member of the Appellate Committee and that a Member thereof was intimidated into deciding the appeal in a particular manner. The learned Judge was also pressed by the submission that the urine sample had been collected to find out whether there was any prohibited substance therein, implying that the act of dilution by itself was not the misconduct alleged. The learned Judge also held at the appellants did not establish that the 1st respondent was vicariously liable or the act of the Jamadar and the procedure adopted was not in consonance with e principles of natural justice. This led to the learned Judge passing the ad interim order in terms of prayer clause (d) which restrained the appellants from enforcing their decisions. This order is challenged in the present appeals. 11. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the allocation the Trainer was that the Jamadar, who was the attendant working tampered with the urine sample. The act of tampering itself was so required an appropriate action. The fact that the urine sample did n damaging input is not something for which the 1st respondent or Jamadar be exonerated. 12. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the 1st respondent a licensee and his licence could be determined or revoked if any such demeanour was detected. The fact that the urine sample did n damaging input is not something for which the 1st respondent or Jamadar be exonerated. 12. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the 1st respondent a licensee and his licence could be determined or revoked if any such demeanour was detected. That was a term of the licence which could from the relevant clauses of the licence which are quoted above. 13. Mr. Chagla, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that when it comes to taking an appropriate action against the license party, he was on a much weaker footing when compared with an against his employer or member of a Club as against the Club. Evidence present case, first a preliminary enquiry was held, thereafter a detail the Committee of Stewards and the 1st respondent was afforded an of file an appeal which was also decided by the Authority concern submission, the principles of natural justice could not be carried to proposition. The enquiry notes clearly show that the 1st respondent the purpose for which the enquiry was being conducted. He had fully therein and thereafter the report was made by the Committee of Ste reasons and holding the Trainer also vicariously liable and direction licence be suspended. 14. Our attention was drawn to Rule 202 of the Rules of Racin the 1st appellant-Club which are effective from 14th December, 2 was placed on Rule 202(i) and (viii) of these Rules which read as fo11 "202. The Stewards and/or the Stewards of the Club shall punish and/or warn off and/or exclude and/or eject and/or suspend or withdraw licences, for any reason or reason race course or place where these Rules are in force, any of the persons VIZ.: (i) Any person who in their opinion has been guilty of any corrupt, fraudulent, or improper practice or dishonorable, connection with racing anywhere. (viii) Any person who conspires or connives with any other the commission of, or shall connive with any other person being any corrupt of fraudulent practice in relation to racing to any . 15. Mr. Chagla then referred us to a judgment of the Chancery the case of Maclean vs. The Workers Union reported in I Ch. (1929 602. (viii) Any person who conspires or connives with any other the commission of, or shall connive with any other person being any corrupt of fraudulent practice in relation to racing to any . 15. Mr. Chagla then referred us to a judgment of the Chancery the case of Maclean vs. The Workers Union reported in I Ch. (1929 602. That was a case of disqualification of a member of a Trade Union plaintiff therein had issued circulars in connection with the election Executive Committee of the Trade Union without obtaining approval Committee. When he stood for the election to the post of President of the attention of the Executive Committee was drawn to this face Committee thereafter fined and disqualified him. Before doing that fixed at his convenience for affording him a hearing in regard to the rules. He attended that meeting, stated his case and then withdrew. The committee thereupon resolved that he had committed a serious breach of the rule question and then he was excluded from membership of the Union. It was held at matter that the Court had no jurisdiction to vary or to set aside the decision e domestic Tribunal if in giving its decision the Tribunal had acted honestly accordance with its own rules and in good faith. As far as the distinction between a Court of justice and a domestic Tribunal is concerned, what is observed in that judgment is quite apt which reads as follows :_ "Speaking generally, it is useful to bear in mind the very wide differences between the principles applicable to Courts of justice and those applicable to domestic tribunals. In the former the accused is entitled to be tried by the judge according to the evidence legally adduced and has a right to be represented by a skilled legal advocate, All the procedure of a modern trial, including the examination and cross examination of the witnesses and the summing-up, if any, is based on these two circumstances. A domestic tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer oath and, a circumstance which is perhaps of greater importance, no party has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is indeed probably ignorant of them. A domestic tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer oath and, a circumstance which is perhaps of greater importance, no party has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is indeed probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them (like in English jury in ancient days) are themselves both the witnesses and the judges. Before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made. The members of the tribunal may have been discussing the matter for weeks with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one even to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views." thereafter it referred to the observations of Court of appeal (per Bowen, L. J.) in reason vs. General Council of Medical Education and Registration, 43 Ch. D. 6 to the following effect :_ "There must be due inquiry. The accused person must have notice of what he is accused. He must have an opportunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at if he has had a full opportunity of being heard." 16. The second judgment relied upon by Mr. Chagla was in the case of P. Daver vs. Lodge Victoria No. 863, S. C. Belgaum and ors. reported in A1R 64 SC 1144. This was a case where a member of a Masonic Lodge was removed from its membership on the ground that he had committed 12 Masonic offences. He was sent the notice of the complaint against him and was informed t he was entitled to be present and to state his defence. The member concerned submitted his answers in extenso to the charges levelled against him. In a special meeting of the Lodge the charges were read out and were put to vote after receiving comments from the members. The members held that each of the charges was proved and then the order excluding him from membership was passed. An appeal was filed to the District Grand Lodge Bombay and then to the and Lodge of Scotland which confirmed that decision. The members held that each of the charges was proved and then the order excluding him from membership was passed. An appeal was filed to the District Grand Lodge Bombay and then to the and Lodge of Scotland which confirmed that decision. On a Suit being filed to challenge these decisions and the matter being carried to the Apex Court, it referred with approval to the above cited decision in Maclean vs. The Union (supra). The Apex Court then observed in paragraph 9 as follows: "The following principles may be gathered from the above discussion (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide by the rule lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled the manner provided by the rules. (2) The lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules; w particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each having regard to the well settled rules of construction in that regard (3) The jurisdiction of a civil Court is rather limited; it cannot sit as a Court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of justice as explained in the decisions cited supra." 17. The third case relied upon by Mr. Chagla is concerning a similar Club. This was also a case of cancellation of Trainers licence on ad administered to a horse. In the judgment of the Privy Council in the Lennox Arthur Patrick OReilly and ors. vs. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens reported in AIR (36) 1949 Privy Council 313 what is stated in paragraph 15 thereof relevant wherein the Privy Council observed as follows:- "All these matters, however, are essentially matters for the tribunal to decide as it thinks right. Provided that the tribunal exceed its jurisdiction and acts honestly and in good faith, the cannot intervene, even if it thinks that the penalty is severe or that strict standard has been applied." 18. We were also informed about the past conduct of the 1st respondent namely, that there were three incidents in the past and punishments imposed almost of similar type which were all implemented. 19. We were also informed about the past conduct of the 1st respondent namely, that there were three incidents in the past and punishments imposed almost of similar type which were all implemented. 19. On behalf of the 1st respondent, it was submitted that it was essentially an enquiry into the allegation of doping of a horse and the moment the urine sample was a negative one, nothing remained in the enquiry contended that it was not specifically stated to the Trainer that the enquiry with respect to the dilution of the urine sample. Principles of natural require that the delinquent must be specifically informed as to what is the charges against him and the enquiry must be held fairly. It cannot be a pre decision. Besides, the Trainer cannot be held responsible for the laps Jamadar. For establishing the vicarious liability of the Trainer, it must that the person, who indulged into the disputed conduct, did that as a duty under the Trainer. It was further submitted that the collection of under the supervision of the Veterinary Doctor and not that of the Train pointed out that neither the result of the racing was cancelled nor was t of the horse made to suffer seriously or at all. Our attention was drawn to of the Rules of Racing and particularly Clause (b) thereof which follows :- "(b) The Veterinary Officer shall be responsible for collection of saliva and samples of urine or blood as the case may be, for the purposes of analysis as directed by the Stewards of the Meeting/club. 20. With reference to the decisions relied upon on behalf of the appellants, submitted by Mr. Virag Tulzapurkar, Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st dent-Trainer, that all these judgments imply an honest decision of the domestic Tribunal concerned. For that, it is also necessary that the delinquent rued has got to receive the notice of the charges and an opportunity to meet. He then submitted that the notice given to the Trainer was a vague one as compared to the one which was given to the owner. Although a second sample collected, the Chairman of the Stewards one Mr. Shivlal Daga in his affidavit has stated that as such no second sample was necessary. 21. An allegation was made that the appellate enquiry (as well as the alone for that matter) was vitiated for the reason that one Mr. Although a second sample collected, the Chairman of the Stewards one Mr. Shivlal Daga in his affidavit has stated that as such no second sample was necessary. 21. An allegation was made that the appellate enquiry (as well as the alone for that matter) was vitiated for the reason that one Mr. Mohit Lawani, a member of the Appellate Board, was pressurized not to attend the meeting. Certain tape-recorded conversation and SMSs were relied upon. It is submitted that it was planned to impose higher punishment to begin with and .to reduce it in appeal to show the reasonableness of the Club. It is, however, material to note that one of the members Dr. Cyrus Poonawalla to whom this conversation is attributed, has filed an Affidavit stating that the tapes are red and has denied the contents thereof. Further in defence it could be said it is a conversation with only one person from a Seven-Member Board and it is only about the punishment and that, by itself, cannot absolve the delinquent from the charge. But more than that it must be noted that they are lay ns and as observed in Macleans case (supra), the members of a Domestic Tribunal may have been discussing the matter with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views. That, by itself, cannot lead to an inference that the enquiry and the appellate proceedings were not fair or vitiated on account of bias. One will have to see as observed in Leesons case (supra) as to whether there was a due enquiry, accused knew of the charge, whether he had an opportunity to defend and the decision is honestly arrived at. The decision in our case cannot be faulted on tests. 22. As far as the vicarious liability of the 1st respondent is concerned, it pointed out on behalf of respondent No.1 that it was the Veterinary Officer. asked the Jamadar to collect the urine sample and not the 1st respondent that was in addition to the earlier submission that it was the responsibility of the Veterinary Officer to collect the urine sample and not that of the Trainer. asked the Jamadar to collect the urine sample and not the 1st respondent that was in addition to the earlier submission that it was the responsibility of the Veterinary Officer to collect the urine sample and not that of the Trainer. It was denied that the Jamadar was the employee of the 1st respondent but it was submitted that for the temporary period during which he acted for the Veterinary officer he could not be said to be acting under the instructions of the 1st respondent. 23. It was submitted that for establishing vicarious liability mens rea has ,to be established as a constituent part of the crime alleged. In this behalf, reliance was placed on the judgment in Srinivas Mall Bairoliya and anr. vs. Emperor reported in AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 135. Our attention was drawn to the Oxford Dictionary to show the meaning of the word "vicarious". As performed or suffered by one person as substitute for another. Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (1981 edition ) was also referred to submit servant may have two or more masters at a given point of time. On the tort of a servant for which the master is held to be liable, a reference was made to S Motilal Kalal vs. Santanuprasad laishanker Bhatt reported in 1966 (S.C.) 881 == A1R 1966 SC 1697 wherefrom paragraphs 27 and 30 were into service. It was submitted that for a master to be vicariously liable for of his servant acting in the course of his employment, the act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing act authorised by the master. It was then submitted that in the present case of the tests will apply. Paragraph 30 of this judgment was referred to p that the act must be committed in the course of business of the master form part of it and not be merely coincident in time with it as quote Salmond and Heuston on the Torts. 24. As far as the past record of the 1st respondent is concerned, submitted that the past record becomes relevant only if the misconduct established. It cannot be useful, in any way, to decide whether at the particular time the 1st respondent was responsible for the conduct of his Jamadar. 25. 24. As far as the past record of the 1st respondent is concerned, submitted that the past record becomes relevant only if the misconduct established. It cannot be useful, in any way, to decide whether at the particular time the 1st respondent was responsible for the conduct of his Jamadar. 25. We have noted the submissions of the Counsel appearing contesting parties. The fact remains that the 1st respondent was a licens vis the 1st appellant-Club. He was a Trainer appointed by the owner of the and in that capacity he was permitted to enter the Club premises. He remuneration from his owner and not from the Club. He only had the permissions to enter in the Club premises and the race course as a Trainer of the horse. The terms of his licence clearly stipulated as to what was expected of him. We have quoted the relevant terms. Clause 4 thereof clearly stated that he took responsibility for any irregularities or breaches in the Rules, Regular Notices in connection with any of the horses in his charge. In Clause-II accepted that he had an obligation towards ensuring that the racing is conducted. The confirmation letter given by him on the date of the race i.e. 23rd March, 2006 clearly stated his acceptance that he was responsible for the collection of the urine sample from his horse and that the same was collected, properly sealed and packed by the Clubs representative in his presence presence of his representative whose name is given as Kalu Singh in that There is no dispute or denial of the fact that Kalu Singh was seen on the mixing water with the urine sample he had collected. In the preliminary the 1st respondent clearly called the conduct of Kalu Singh as a stupid one, meaning thereby that he did not approve of it at all. As noted above, licence as well as in the document signed on the date of the race, he ha full responsibility for the horse as well as for the conduct of the Jama was his representative. 26. Mr. Tulzapurkar, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent Trainer, has referred to the judgment in the case of Srinivas Mall B (supra) which was in connection with an offence under the Defence Rules that of contravening the order fixing the price of salt. 26. Mr. Tulzapurkar, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent Trainer, has referred to the judgment in the case of Srinivas Mall B (supra) which was in connection with an offence under the Defence Rules that of contravening the order fixing the price of salt. In the present we are concerned with a domestic enquiry concerning a civil wrong. In the document which the 1st respondent had signed, mens rea no longer relevant. The fact that a particular act has been done is not disputed. The 1st respondent had signed the document had signed the document accepting his responsibility in the event of any misconduct concerning the horse or by the Jamadar is also not disputed.Thus, in fact, the 1st respondent had accepted his vicarious liability in terms the licence as well as the confirmation letter which he had signed on the f the race. It is not his case that the Jamadar was acting under the ions of somebody else. It is true that the Veterinary Officer is responsible collection of the sample of urine under Rule 67(b) but that cannot absolve the Trainer from the conduct of the Jamadar who was his employee. Under Rule the Rules of Racing, it is clearly stated that the Stewards can withdraw the of any person who in their opinion is found guilty of any dishonest or practice concerning the races or connivance therein. In our view, re, it is not possible for the 1st respondent to say that he was not respondent for the conduct of his Jamadar. 27. As far as the enquiry conducted by the Committee of Stewards and the appellate proceedings are concerned, it has got to be noted that they are domestic proceedings by lay persons. Strict principles of judicial determination cannot to these enquiries. Although much defects are sought to be pointed in the and the proceedings of the enquiry, the 1st respondent has not stated any that he did not understand as to for what purpose the enquiry was being conducted or what was the charge against him. The submissions sought to be on the basis of the tape-recorded conversation are to point out that the ns were premeditated and that one of the members of the Appellate Board was pressurized to act in a particular manner. These allegations are denied on an Affidavit by one Dr. Cyrus Poonawalla whom the conversation is attributed. The submissions sought to be on the basis of the tape-recorded conversation are to point out that the ns were premeditated and that one of the members of the Appellate Board was pressurized to act in a particular manner. These allegations are denied on an Affidavit by one Dr. Cyrus Poonawalla whom the conversation is attributed. it is a matter of word against word. Merely on the strength of the Affidavit d copy of the alleged conversation or the denial thereof, one cannot reach particular conclusion. The fact remains that on the date of the incident, a preliminary enquiry was held. It was followed by a detailed enquiry wherein the respondent participated and the fact also remains that there was an internal made available. All the pleas, which are sought to be raised by the 1st respondent, are technical pleas to submit now in Court that he should not be connected with the act of his Jamadar. It is also true that the past conducts of a are not to be looked into at the time of deciding whether a particular was indulged into by him or not. The fact, however, remains that the 1st dent was proceeded with in similar domestic actions thrice earlier, held and thereafter was appropriately punished. The 1st respondent, therefore, as to what can happen at the time of race and what conducts are supposed unfair conducts. He is not novice in the field. He has been charged with identical charges earlier. Although it is true that the past conducts are to ked into at the time of awarding punishment, they are relevant from the aforesaid limited point of view. The 1st respondent, therefore, cannot feign ignorance about his responsibility what manner about his responsibility and that of the Jamadar working under him or not manner the enquiries are conducted. It is, therefore, not possible to accept submission on his behalf that the enquiry was not fairly conducted or that he did not get an opportunity or that he did not know as to what action was being His denial of any connivance with what Jamadar has done is also someing which is difficult to accept. 28. In any case, it is a determination of domestic Tribunal. Und the domestic Tribunal is entitled to take a view which a reasonable person arrive at on the facts before him. 28. In any case, it is a determination of domestic Tribunal. Und the domestic Tribunal is entitled to take a view which a reasonable person arrive at on the facts before him. In the present case, the allegation w tampering by mixing water with urine sample. Jamadar was seen doing it. The Trainer had taken specific responsibility for any misconduct on the part of his Jamadar. This has to be noted in the context of a responsibility of a whose horse is going for a race and he knows that at the end of it urine to be taken. Surely, some limited consequence is bound to follow on hi present case, in view of the facts as stated above, the 1st appellant-Club respondent No. 1 to be vicariously liable for the misconduct of the which is admittedly established. Where on the facts of a case the Tribunal takes a particular decision a Civil Court is not expected to substitute its view for that of the domestic Tribunal unless it is based on no evidence something which a reasonable man cannot arrive at. In that case alone Court can have a jurisdiction to disturb the decision of the domestic Tribunal by calling it as a perverse one. In the facts of the present case, no such perversity can be alleged. Similarly, what action is taken in the case of the owner oft whether the result of the race is cancelled or not is not something deviate one from the expectation from the Trainer which he had clear accepted in writing. The action taken by the 1st appellant-Club cannot, the interfered on any such count. 29. In the present matter, one has to look to the entire episode point of view of the regulators of the races. They are concerned confidence that people participating ought to have in the races that the question is when the Club has a clear evidence on CCTV of water mixed with the urine sample whether it should still allow the Trainer free or should he be visited with appropriate consequences. As seen not a case of a member of a Trade Union or that of a member of a ma .This is a case of a licensee who is a third party. Some minimum fair required even in his case and undoubtedly it cannot be said that such f not been observed in the present case. As seen not a case of a member of a Trade Union or that of a member of a ma .This is a case of a licensee who is a third party. Some minimum fair required even in his case and undoubtedly it cannot be said that such f not been observed in the present case. 30. It is further to be noted that whereas the impugned action was taken 28th April, 2006, the suit is filed nearly two and half months there July, 2006. The licence is revoked for a period of five and half mo end of that period, the 1st respondent can certainly apply for renewal licence and it is for the appellants to decide whether the licence renewed or not. The question is whether in the intervening period the any injunction restraining the appellants from acting on their and whether the Court should pass such an order. It is submitted that respondent suffers in his earnings. As against that, what is to be granting of any such injunction at this stage will almost amount to granting a decree and permitting the 1st respondent to join at an interlocutory the decision on his Suit is yet to be arrived at. Besides, it must be noted that he is 1st respondent has quantified the loss that he has suffered or he suffer and in Exhibit-A V to the Plaint he has made a claim for co Rs. 31,75,368/-. That is a claim which he can certainly get at the en in the event he is in a position to establish it. Prayer (c) of the Suit is for this compensation whereas prayer (a) is for declaration that the decisions of the appellants are and void. Prayer (b) is for a permanent injunction. A permanent injunction is referable to Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 b-section (2) thereof directs that when any such obligation arises from a contract, the Court shall be guided by Chapter II of this Act. Section 14 of this chapter II specifically lays down as to which contracts are not enforceable and (a) thereof refers to a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief. Clause (c) refers to a contract is in its nature determinable. 31. Mr. Section 14 of this chapter II specifically lays down as to which contracts are not enforceable and (a) thereof refers to a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief. Clause (c) refers to a contract is in its nature determinable. 31. Mr. Tulzapurkar, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, drew our attention to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Srivastav vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and ors, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2046 it that the Suit for a declaration that the termination is invalid, though not maintable under section 14, was admissible by a Civil Court as a declaratory under section 34. His submission is that the 1st respondent is a mere licensee that this is not a Suit for specific performance of any contract. There cannot, quarrel with the propositions in Ashok Kumars case (supra) which also amongst other in paragraph 17 that the Act is not exhaustive of all kinds of relief. It is, however, material to note that although the judgment does to section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, it does not deal with a situation an injunction is sought while seeking damages at the same time. As far as aspect is concerned, the principles analogous to section 14 will have to be extended to a situation like the present one. The reference to the judgment in vs. Wells reported in 44 Chancery Division 661 by Mr. Chagla, learned Council appearing for the appellants, in this behalf is quite apt. That was a case of expulsion of a member by a proprietary Club and irregularity of the proceedings by the Committee were raised as a ground of challenge. It was squarely held that the damages were proper relief and not injunction. 32. For the reasons above, in our view, the 1st respondent did not have a facie case to justify an injunction nor was any balance of convenience in your. The delay in filing the Suit and the fact that the punitive action will be expiring on 15th October, 2006 clearly shows that no serious prejudice is being to the 1st respondent. That apart, the impugned action has been taken enquiry and for an act of a subordinate of the 1st respondent which is not disputed. The delay in filing the Suit and the fact that the punitive action will be expiring on 15th October, 2006 clearly shows that no serious prejudice is being to the 1st respondent. That apart, the impugned action has been taken enquiry and for an act of a subordinate of the 1st respondent which is not disputed. Granting any such injunction will mean interfering with the domestic decision of the Club at an interlocutory stage and interfering with its disciplinary measure. In our view, that was not called for. The learned Single Judge has, are, clearly erred in granting the ad-interim injunction. 33. In the circumstances aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The impugned dated 2nd August, 2006 passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. 34. The Counsel for both parties had argued the matter at length. They had, ore, accepted that the Notice of Motion itself will get worked out with the on this appeal. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion stands dismissed. 35. We may add that we have made the observations in this judgment on sis of the submissions made by both Counsel appearing for the contesting parties and on the basis of the material placed before us. When the Suit is heard and decided it will certainly be open for the learned Judge . 36. Appeal No. 608 of 2006 is filed by the Committee of India Turf Club. This appeal seeks to challenge the very ad-interim is challenged in Appeal (Lodging) No. 643 of 2006. Consequently also allowed. 37. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be costs.