( 1 ) AGGRIEVED by the acquittal of both the accused representing Sri Venkateswara transports as its partners, of the offence under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short "the Act") by the judgment dated 13-9-2000 in C. C. No. 274 of 1998 on the file of the Vth Additional Munsif Magistrates Court, chittoor, the complainant filed the present appeal. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the appeal are that the complainant, claiming to be an erstwhile partnerof Sri Venkateswaratransports, truck operators, along with the 1st and 2nd accused, stated that the 1st accused has issued six cheques on different dates to him for the amounts to be paid to him by the partnership, but later paid cash and received back five cheques. The complainant further claimed that on 30-5-1998 the 1st accused issued a cheque for Rs. 24,000/- drawn on Vysya Bank, chittoor, which was presented by him for collection in Indian Bank, Greamspet, Chittoor on 18-6-1998, which was returned with advice insufficient funds. The complainant issued a notice to both the accused on 29-6-1998, after which there was a mediation and it was agreed that the amount will be paid within a week or the cheque be presented again in the bank. When the complainant presented the cheque on 13-8-1998 again for collection, it was again returned with the endorsement of insufficiency of funds on 20-8-1998. The complainant issued a notice on 24-8-1998 to the accused, but the same was returned with an endorsement of avoidance of taking delivery, on 4-9-1998. The accused gave belated reply to the former notice and thus, the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138 read with section 142 of the Act. ( 3 ) THE trial Court took the case on file after recording the sworn statement of the complaint and furnished copies of documents to the accused on their appearance. The accused denied the offence when they were examined under Section 251 of the Code of criminal Procedure and P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-5 were marked during the trial. The 1st accused examined himself as D. W. 1 and marked Exs. D-1 to d-3. The accused denied the offence when they were examined under Section 251 of the Code of criminal Procedure and P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-5 were marked during the trial. The 1st accused examined himself as D. W. 1 and marked Exs. D-1 to d-3. The accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against them when they were examined under section 313of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the trial Court in the impugned judgment found that the complaint was pre-mature having been filed before the expiry of 15 days notice and it also found that as the complaint was barred by time from the first notice and as the second notice could not have given rise to a fresh cause of action, the complaint is not tenable. Consequently, it acquitted the accused. ( 4 ) THE complainant filed the appeal contending that the acquittal of the accused is contrary to the principle laid down in narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das partani and another 2000 (6) ALT 1 (SC) = 2000 (4) Crimes 12 (SC ). and the finding that the complaint is pre-mature is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Assailing the reasons given in the judgment as unsound and untenable, the complainant desired the impugned judgment to be set aside. ( 5 ) SRI S. V. Muni Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Narsingh Das tapadias case1, wherein it was held that pre-mature filing of complaint under section 138 of the Act need not necessarily make the complaint liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel also contended that when the complainant has a right to present the cheque any number of times during the period of its validity, he also gets cause of action to issue fresh statutory notice for each endorsement of dishonour and the complainant could not have been non-suited on that ground. ( 6 ) SRI T. C. Krishnan, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2/accused 1 and 2 while conceding that the complaint need not have failed on the ground of the same being premature, pleaded that it cannot be definitely sustained on the strength of the second statutory notice when it was barred by time from the first statutory notice. ( 6 ) SRI T. C. Krishnan, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2/accused 1 and 2 while conceding that the complaint need not have failed on the ground of the same being premature, pleaded that it cannot be definitely sustained on the strength of the second statutory notice when it was barred by time from the first statutory notice. The learned counsel relied on Sandanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar1998 (2) ALT (Crl.) 289 = AIR 1998 SC 3043 . M/s. Prem Chand vijay Kumar v. Yash Pal Sigh 2005 (2) ALT (Crl.) 286. and Maruthi college Engineering and Technology v. Mohd. Salahuddin Ghor2006 (3) ALT (Crl.) 96 (A. P. ). 1. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: (1) Whetherthe complaint is pre-mature and unsustainable? (2) Whether the complaint is barred by time? (3) To what result? point No. 1: ( 7 ) THOUGH the trial Court thought that filing of the complaint before expiry of 15 days from the receipt of demand notice makes the complaint pre-mature and unsustainable, the authoritative pronouncement by the Apex court in Narsingh Das Tapadias case (1 supra) runs counter to the same. The Apex court made it clear that if the complaint is found to be pr-mature, it can await maturity or be returned to the complainant for filing later and its mere presentation at an earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve himself from the criminal liability forthe offence committed. Therefore, the complainant could not have been non-suited on the ground that the complaint is pre-mature. Point No. 2: ( 8 ) IN Sadanandan Bhadrans case (2 supra), the Apex Court made it clear that a cheque can be presented any number of times during the period of its validity by payee and the payee may, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his right under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But, once he gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. The Supreme Court made it clear that the combined reading of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142 of the Act arises and can arise only once. Following the said decision, the Apex Court once again held in m/s. Prem Chand Vijay Kumars case (3 supra) that if the dishonour of the cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action, it is not permissible for the payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque and it was not in dispute in that case that there was issuance and receipt of lawyers notices on both the occasions and that the complaint was barred after receipt of the first lawyers notice. In Maruthi College engineering and Technologys case (4 supra), our High Court also followed Sadanandan bhadrans case (2 supra) and made it clear that once the payee gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, he forfeits his right to go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right under Section 138 of the Act and the learned Single Judge quashed the criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Act on that ground. No authority contrary to the principle laid down in the above said binding precedents, has been brought to my notice and if so, the application of the principle to the admitted facts of this case, where there was presentation twice and lawyers notice twice, makes the complaint incompetent under section 138 of the Act read with Section 142 thereof. The acquittal of both the accused by the trial Court on that ground does not appear to be susceptible to any interference. Point No. 3: ( 9 ) THOUGH the complainant could have succeeded on the first ground of maintainability of the complaint in spite of its being premature, he cannot sustain his complaint in view of the complaint being barred by time from the issuance of the first statutory notice on dishonour of the cheque. Point No. 3: ( 9 ) THOUGH the complainant could have succeeded on the first ground of maintainability of the complaint in spite of its being premature, he cannot sustain his complaint in view of the complaint being barred by time from the issuance of the first statutory notice on dishonour of the cheque. In the light of the interpretation of sections 138 and 142 of the Act by the precedents above referred to, the judgment of acquittal cannot, therefore, be interfered with. ( 10 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed.