JUDGMENT The appellant challenges the order passed on an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for brevity) seeking review of an order recording a compromise dated 25-9-1992 in F.D.P. No. 10/90. 2. The appellant was the plaintiff in O.S. No. 22 of 1985 which was a suit for partition and separate possession, of a share in the joint family properties. Respondent 1 was defendant 7 in the said suit. She had engaged Counsel and filed written statement. A preliminary decree was passed as on 28-2-1990 in favour of the appellant 1 herein. The same was challenged in an appeal before this Court in R.F.A. No. 239 of 1990 which was allowed by a judgment dated 7-9-1990. Thereafter, the appellant had filed F.D.P. No. 10/90 before the Trial Court. 3. The respondent 1 had entered appearance through Counsel. It is the case of respondent 1 that without her knowledge, the alleged power of attorney holder has represented her in a compromise petition, which was entertained and a compromise recorded as on 25-9-1992 in the F.D.P. proceedings. The application having been filed in the year 1994, alleging that she was not a party to the compromise petition and there was no authority granted by her in favour of any person to act on her behalf in the said compromise petition, the Trial Court having examined the pleadings and evidence on behalf of the parties, has held that an application under Section 151 of the CPC was maintainable to review the compromise order and to reopen the F.D.P. proceedings and on facts, has found that the allegations of respondent 1 as to the power of attorney being a false document, on the basis of which she was represented in the compromise petition, and has accordingly allowed the application. 4. The Counsel for the appellant would contend that there is inordinate delay which was not sought to be explained nor was any contention of such delay sought to be condoned, before the Trial Court and hence, the very jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such an application after prolonged and unexplained delay, was not available. 4. The Counsel for the appellant would contend that there is inordinate delay which was not sought to be explained nor was any contention of such delay sought to be condoned, before the Trial Court and hence, the very jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such an application after prolonged and unexplained delay, was not available. He would secondly point out that respondent 1 being represented by Counsel and the Counsel, acting on her behalf, was precluded from not recognising a document such as a power of attorney executed by her in favour of an agent and in the absence of proof that the same was fraudulent, the Trial Court has proceeded on a presumption as to the same being a false document. He would further contend that in terms of Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power of attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul or representative of the Central Government, as being so executed and authenticated. In the absence of challenge to the power of attorney, the same could not have been negated by the Court below. 5. Per contra, the Counsel for the respondent, would submit that it was in order to overcome the direction issued by this Court on remand in the appeal, that a device was engineered by the appellant to execute and have the compromise petition recorded, even though respondent 1 was never a party to the same. The findings as to the serious discrepancies noticed by the Trial Court as to the execution of the power of attorney, leave no doubt that fraud was perpetrated. The further circumstance that independent evidence was tendered by respondent 1 to establish that she had always affixed her signature in English language and that the signature appearing in the power of attorney was in vernacular, was wholly inconsistent was the further circumstance, apart from the fact that. the respondent 1 was denied her legitimate share under the compromise, has culminated in the Court's findings. the respondent 1 was denied her legitimate share under the compromise, has culminated in the Court's findings. In any event, the suit being for partition and the object of the F.D.P. proceedings being an equitable partition between the parties, no harm or prejudice is caused by the compromise having been set aside and the F.D.P. proceedings being reopened and submits that in the facts or in law, no case is made out. 6. I fully agree with the Counsel for the respondent. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.