JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The Petitioner, Amresh Narayan Choudhury, joined United Bank of India (in short, 'the Respondent Bank') as cashier-cum-general clerk on 4.3.1964. Having received promotion from time to time, and having served in various capacities at various establishments of the Respondent Bank, the Petitioner came to be posted as Branch Manager of the Respondent Bank, at Bharalumukh Branch, Guwahati, and the Petitioner accordingly joined on 8.11.1993. When the Petitioner so joined the Respondent Bank on 8.11.1993, one Kalyan Chakraborty was already functioning as Branch Manager of the Respondent Bank at Bharalumukh Branch. Though the Petitioner joined as Branch Manager at Bharalumukh Branch on 8.11.1993, he, in effect, held the charge of this Branch as its Branch Manager, when Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned was released from the said Branch on 12.1.1994. While the Petitioner was still serving at the said Branch as its Branch Manager, he was, on 16.2.1996, placed under suspension and served with a chargesheet containing altogether four charges. The Petitioner submitted, on 15.7.1996, his written statement to the charges levelled against him. As the Respondent Bank found the Petitioner's written statement unsatisfactory, a departmental enquiry commenced. The enquiry ended with the submission of the enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer on 31.12.98, whereunder the Petitioner was found guilty of the charges levelled against him. The Petitioner was, then, served, on 9.1.98, with a copy of the Enquiry Report directing him to show cause, if any, against the findings reached in the Enquiry Report. The Petitioner submitted, on 18.2.98, his reply to the said show cause notice. In the reply to the said show cause notice, the Petitioner not only challenged the correctness and justification of the manner in which the enquiry was conducted, but also the correctness of the findings reached by the Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, the Respondents/ authorities concerned passed an order, on 12.10.99, imposing on the Petitioner the penalty of removal from service. The Petitioner, then, preferred an appeal on 6.12.99. Though the Petitioner submitted reminders seeking disposal of his appeal, no order, in this regard, was passed by the appellate authority concerned. Thereafter, the Respondents/ authorities concerned passed an order, on 12.10.99, imposing on the Petitioner the penalty of removal from service. The Petitioner, then, preferred an appeal on 6.12.99. Though the Petitioner submitted reminders seeking disposal of his appeal, no order, in this regard, was passed by the appellate authority concerned. It were in these circumstances that the Petitioner approached this Court with the help of the present writ petition, his case being, inter alia, that the departmental enquiry was not conducted in accordance with law and the findings reached against him are not correct and, further, while Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned, whom the Petitioner had succeeded as Branch Manager of the Respondent Bank, at Bharalumukh Branch, had faced charges, which were more serious in nature than the charges levelled against the Petitioner, Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned was let off with mere penalty of reduction of basic pay including stagnation of increment and FPA, the Petitioner, who had unblemished career spanning over 30 years, was penalized by removal from service. The penalty so imposed on the Petitioner was, thus, according to the Petitioner, arbitrary as well as discriminatory in nature and the same, being in violation of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is not sustainable. 2. I have heard Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, for the Petitioner, and Mr. B. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondent Bank. 3. Before entering into the rival submissions, which have been made before me on behalf of the parties, it is imperative for effective disposal of the present writ petition that the four charges on which the Petitioner had faced the disciplinary proceeding and his comments thereon as well as his explanation thereto are briefly taken note of and kept in mind, while deciding this writ petition on merit The charges levelled against the Petitioner and his explanation thereto are, in substance, as follows: Charge No. 1: On 10.10.95, you had given effect to a Cheque for Rs. 7,00,115/- drawn on State Bank of India, Guwahati Branch, by crediting the said amount to S.B. A/c No. 4439 of Shri Raj Kumar Das, who is also holder of one C.D. A/c No. 756 with your Branch after debiting Clearing Adjustment A/c and by signing the relative vouchers singly. But the said Cheque for Rs. 7,00,115/- drawn on State Bank of India, Guwahati Branch, by crediting the said amount to S.B. A/c No. 4439 of Shri Raj Kumar Das, who is also holder of one C.D. A/c No. 756 with your Branch after debiting Clearing Adjustment A/c and by signing the relative vouchers singly. But the said Cheque for Rs. 7,00,115/- was not sent for collection through clearing on any date before 12.12.95 though the effect of the said Cheque was allowed to be withdrawn by the Account holder on 10.10.95 and 12.10.95. The said Cheque, was, however, sent for collection through clearing on 12.12.95 which was again returned and ultimately it was relodged and realized on 15.12.95. Thus, with an ulterior motive, you had extended undue favour to the Account holder of S.B. A/c No. 4439 and in gross violation of Bank's rules and procedure, you allowed him to enjoy the Bank's funds thereby jeopardizing the interest of the Bank and for your such unauthorized act; the Bank remained out of fund for more than 2 months for the said amount. Explanation offered by the Petitioner in respect of Charge No. 1: The said cheque was left lying in the drawer of the Deputy Manager Shri N. Baishya. This was admitted by Shri N. Baishya himself as MW 1. Further, the Petitioner was not the custodian of the cheque. Charge No. 2: You had recklessly allowed overdrawings in the CD. A/c No. 745,749,756 and 773 in gross violation of the Bank's rules and procedure and also without ensuring coverage of the overdrawn amounts by any/proper security. Out of those 4 CD. A/cs, there was not a single deposit in the CD. A/c No. 745 and 749 and there was a very meager deposit in the CD. A/c No. 773, excepting the initial deposits made at the time of opening of those accounts. In all these cases, you deliberately did not report of such overdrawings allowed by you to your R.M. Office in order to suppress your misdeeds. Again to misguide the Bank you had passed the cheques (as detailed in the Annexure-A) through O.D. Cheque Passing Register to show and suggest that the O.D. facilities had been allowed to the parties concerned as usual, but the required procedures and formalities on this score had not been observed by you at all. Again to misguide the Bank you had passed the cheques (as detailed in the Annexure-A) through O.D. Cheque Passing Register to show and suggest that the O.D. facilities had been allowed to the parties concerned as usual, but the required procedures and formalities on this score had not been observed by you at all. You had, thus, extended undue benefit to the aforesaid parties and allowed them to enjoy the Bank's funds in an unauthorized manner jeopardizing the interest of the Bank. In utter disregard to the laid down norms and procedures of the Bank on this score, you had exposed the Bank to financial risk for a total outstanding balance of Rs. 20,90,585/- as on 10.1.96 excluding the usual interest to be charged thereon. Explanation offered by the Petitioner in respect of Charge No 2: All the over-drawings were allowed, within the full knowledge of the CRM (Chief Regional Manager), to the group/associate accounts of Shri Kushal Kumar Talukdar, a valued customer having long standing relationship with the Branch much before the Petitioner joined as Branch Manager and was also the single largest borrower of the Branch. The over-drawings were permitted on genuine business considerations. The entire outstanding has been fully recovered now and no loss whatsoever has been suffered by the Bank. Charge No. 3: You had allowed unauthorized drawings for Rs. 75,000/- to India Automobiles, the holder of the CD. A/c No. 646 on 14.12.94 and the said amount was drawn by the account holder by a Cheque No. 875863. Thereby, you had shown undue favour to the said party and allowed him to enjoy the Bank's funds in gross violation of the Bank's norms/rules in this regard. You had not reported such drawings to your R.M. Office in order to suppress your misdeeds and thus you had exposed the Bank to financial risk to the extent of Rs. 69,235/- as on 10.1.96 excluding usual interest to be charged thereon. Explanation offered by the Petitioner in respect of Charge No. 3: Payment was made by the earlier Manager, Shri Kalyan Chakraborty, and the date of the Cheque was distorted by putting the date of payment as 14.12.94 instead of 14.12.93. In the enquiry, it was proved by MW 1 that the Cheque "Ex-M.Ex-35" was passed by the earlier Manager, Shri Kalyan Chakraborty, who was released, on 12.1.94, after handing over the charge. In the enquiry, it was proved by MW 1 that the Cheque "Ex-M.Ex-35" was passed by the earlier Manager, Shri Kalyan Chakraborty, who was released, on 12.1.94, after handing over the charge. In any case, the entire liability is fully liquidated and there remains no outstanding. Charge No. 4: You had extended undue benefit to 7 (seven) Nos. of Cash Credit A/c holders (as per the Annexure-A) by deliberately allowing excess drawings much beyond the respective sanctioned limit without taking due care to protect the interest of the Bank by obtaining proper security as coverage for the excess drawn amount. In all these cases, you did not obtain the required stock/book debt statement as per rules/norms of the Bank and also failed and neglected to conduct any inspection to the said borrowal unit in order to ascertain the end use of the funds so disbursed by you. You had also not reported to your R.M. Office about such excess drawings allowed by you in the said Cash Credit A/cs. and by your such unauthorized act, the Bank has been exposed to financial risk to the extent of Rs. 32.35 lacs as on 10.1.96. Explanation offered by the Petitioner in respect of Charge No. 4: The Bank itself, in its affidavit-in-opposition, has admitted that out of the total amount of Rs. 32.25 lakhs, the Petitioner has only allowed over-drawings of about Rs. 2 lakhs and the remaining amount of Rs. 30 lakhs was allowed by the earlier Manager, Shri Kalyan Chakraborty. In any case, the entire outstanding is fully liquidated by the parties concerned. 4. I may, at this stage, pause and point out that the reasons summarised by the Enquiry Officer, in support of the findings reached by him, are as follows: REASONS FOR FINDING: Analysis of evidence on record made herein above show that Bank's rules and procedures were violated, overdrawals were allowed to the parties far in excess of the powers delegated to the CSO, the instances of overdrawals allowed by the CSO were not at all reported through the irregularity Statement to Regional Office, reasons for allowing overdrawal in the accounts beyond the authority of the CSO as envisaged by him provided to be shallow justifying financial risk to a great extent. Instance of overdrawal is not once but repeated. Instance of overdrawal is not once but repeated. The cumulative consideration of documentary evidence does not lead any prudent mind that the CSO while performing his duties as Manager has taken all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank, the evidence on record further does not lead to conclude that the CSO discharged his duties of Manager with due care and attention while dealing with public money and extending undue favour to the account holders named above. From the instances and manner in which the CSO favoured the limited No. of account holders, it is established through evidence that the CSO has failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. The acts do not fall within the phraseology of "becoming of an Officer of the Bank" that is the acts are unbecoming of an Officer of the Bank whose foremost duty is to protect the interest of the Bank. 5. Before proceeding any further, it is also imperative to note that though in the writ petition, the Petitioner challenges the fairness and legality of the procedure adopted in the enquiry, attributed bias to the Enquiry Officer and challenged the correctness of the findings reached in the Enquiry Report, these submissions, as I shall show shortly, have not been pursued at the time of hearing of the writ petition except for the purposes of showing that the accusations made against Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned were comparatively more serious and graver in nature than those made against the present Petitioner and that the penalty imposed on the Petitioner is arbitrary as well as discriminatory, for, while Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned has been let off with almost a minor penalty, the Petitioner has been removed from service. 6. Bearing in mind the above prominent features of the present writ petition, let me, now, take note of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 7. Presenting the case on behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has pointed out that while the Petitioner faced four charges in the disciplinary proceeding drawn against him, Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned had faced as many as 18 charges. Similarly, points out Mr. P. K. Goswami, while the Petitioner had allegedly allowed excess drawings of diverse sums of money, covered by Charge Nos. 3 and 4, amounting to Rs. Similarly, points out Mr. P. K. Goswami, while the Petitioner had allegedly allowed excess drawings of diverse sums of money, covered by Charge Nos. 3 and 4, amounting to Rs. 13.6 lakhs, the access drawings of money allowed by Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned was, on the other hand, as much as Rs. 49.72 lakhs and as many as three borrowers were common to whom the Petitioner as well as Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned had either advanced loan or allowed excess drawings of money. In fact, points out Mr. P. K. Goswami, even in respect of Charge No. 4, the excess drawing permitted by the Petitioner was, at the most, Rs. 4.2 lakhs, whereas the excess drawing permitted by Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned was as much as 30.25 lakhs. Moreover, further points out Mr. P. K. Goswami, the cheque, which has been referred to in Charge No. 1, was, as admitted by Mr. N. Baishya, (who was examined as Management's witness No. 1), left lying in the drawer of N. Baishya, who was, at the relevant point of time, Deputy Manager of the Respondent Bank at the said Branch, and the Petitioner was, thus, insists Mr. P. K. Goswami, not the custodian of the said cheque and the delay in sending the cheque, in question, could not have been attributed to the Petitioner merely because the Petitioner, as Branch Manager, had supervisory jurisdiction over the functioning of the other employees/ officers of the Respondent Bank at its said Branch. Thus, emphasizes Mr. P. K. Goswami, though Kalyan Chakraborty was let off by mere reduction of basic pay including, of course, stagnation of increment and PFA, the Petitioner has been penalized by removal from service. It is, therefore, clear, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami, that the penalty imposed on the Petitioner is not only arbitrary, but also discriminatory in nature and the same, being violative of Article 14, cannot be sustained, particularly, when the Petitioner has, submits Mr. P. K. Goswami, served the Respondent Bank for 30 years without any adverse remarks and there is no material to show that he has made any personal gain for himself from the transactions, which had become the subject-matter of the disciplinary proceeding. There is also no material to show, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami, served the Respondent Bank for 30 years without any adverse remarks and there is no material to show that he has made any personal gain for himself from the transactions, which had become the subject-matter of the disciplinary proceeding. There is also no material to show, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami, that Respondent Bank had sustained any loss as a result of the transactions, which formed the basis for drawing the disciplinary proceeding against the Petitioner. Even post-removal conduct of the Petitioner is, submits Mr. P. K. Goswami, quite different from that of Kalyan Chakraborty inasmuch as the Respondent Bank has acknowledged by its letter, dated 22.5.2001, that the Petitioner has pursued realization of the amounts covered by the over-drafts, which had allegedly been allowed by the Petitioner to be withdrawn by the drawees of the amount. In the face of these facts, it was, complains Mr. P. K. Goswami, wholly unreasonable and arbitrary on the part of the Respondents/authorities concerned to impose on the Petitioner the penalty of removal from service, particularly, when the Petitioner was to retire on 2.2.2002 and while Kalyan Chakraborty, who had faced charges more serious and graver than those, which the Petitioner had faced, had already been let off with a lighter punishment. 8. In support of his submissions that the penalty imposed on the Petitioner is discriminatory in nature and such discrimination, being violative of Article 14, cannot be sustained, Mr. P. K. Goswami has referred to, and relied upon, the decisions in Probin Kumar Phukan v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2001 (2) GLT 227, Samorendra Kishore Endew v. State Bank of India and Ors. reported in 2004 (1) GLT 449, Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer (R.K. Rai), Allahabad Bank and Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1377 , Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation reported in (1947) 2 All E.R. 680 and Khudiram Das v. State Bank of India and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 550 . 9. Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondent Bank has, on the other hand, submitted that a bank is a repository of public trust and deals with public money. A banker, points out Mr. B. K. Goswami, has to be a person with great sense of responsibility and unimpeachable integrity, particularly, when he deals with public money as a Branch Manager of a bank. A banker, points out Mr. B. K. Goswami, has to be a person with great sense of responsibility and unimpeachable integrity, particularly, when he deals with public money as a Branch Manager of a bank. Retention in service of a person, who is careless or dishonest in monetary transactions in an institution like bank or who cannot be depended and confidently relied upon by the bank, is not desirable and if the Respondents/authorities concerned were of the view that a person, such as the Petitioner, who had exposed the Respondent Bank to the risk of financial losses and had acted contrary to the Respondent Bank's specific instructions and interest, did not deserve to be retained in service, such a conclusion drawn by the Respondents/authorities concerned cannot be found fault with, for, in such a situation, as the one at hand, the service of the Petitioner cannot be confidently utilized by the Respondent Bank as custodian of the public money. In the circumstances of the present case, submits Mr. B. K. Goswami, the penalty of removal from service imposed on the Petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the charge brought against him. In support of his submissions that a person, working in a Bank, cannot be retained in service if he is found to have acted contrary to the instructions of the Bank with regard to the financial transactions to be carried out by the Bank, Mr. B. K. Goswami has placed reliance on Union of India v. Vishwa Mohan reported in (1998) 4 SCC 310 and Chairman and Managing Director v. United Commercial Bank and Ors. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364 . 10. It is also submitted by Mr. B. K. Goswami that if Kalyan Chakraborty was let off lightly, it is not necessary that the same mistake shall be repeated in the case of the Petitioner too. Before the penalty imposed on the Petitioner is interfered with, the Court, according to Mr. B. K. Goswami, ought to come to an unhesitant conclusion that the imposition of penalty of removal from service imposed on the Petitioner was not justified in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case. If such a conclusion cannot be reached, the penalty imposed on the Petitioner, contends Mr. B. K. Goswami, ought to come to an unhesitant conclusion that the imposition of penalty of removal from service imposed on the Petitioner was not justified in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case. If such a conclusion cannot be reached, the penalty imposed on the Petitioner, contends Mr. B. K. Goswami, cannot be interfered with merely because of the fact that some other person, with similar or more serious charges than what the Petitioner had faced, has been let off lightly. Support for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr. B. K. Goswami from the decisions in Indian Oil Corporation and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora reported in (1997) 3 SCC 72 , and Balbir Chand v. Road Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 371 . It is further submitted by Mr. B. K. Goswami that the mere fact that any person, situated similarly as the Petitioner is, was let off with lighter punishment cannot be made a ground to set aside the penalty imposed on the Petitioner if the penalty so imposed is, otherwise, just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. To strengthen the submission so made, Mr. B. K. Goswami has referred to State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 and Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy reported in AIR 2005 SC 2005 . 11. When the holder of an office of trust acts beyond his authority, this, in itself, contends Mr. B. K. Goswami, is a breach of discipline and gross misconduct and no further proof of loss to the person, who had reposed the trust, is really necessary. In the case at hand, the Petitioner had acted, according to Mr. B. K. Goswami, far beyond his authority and thereby exposed the Respondent Bank to great financial risks, which, in reality, involved the risk of financial loss to the public at large and, hence, the fact that the Respondent Bank did not, eventually, sustain financial loss is not really material. In the face of the facts of the present case, contends Mr. B. K. Goswami, the Petitioner's dismissal from service is wholly justified and not blameworthy, for, a person, reiterates Mr. In the face of the facts of the present case, contends Mr. B. K. Goswami, the Petitioner's dismissal from service is wholly justified and not blameworthy, for, a person, reiterates Mr. B. K. Goswami, who betrays the trust reposed in him by exposing to the risk of great financial loss the person, who had reposed the trust, cannot be retained in the capacity of the trustee. Reliance, in support of this submission, is placed by Mr. B.K. Goswami on Disciplinary-cum-Regional Manager and Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik reported in (1996) 9 SCC 69 . 12. Reacting to the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent Bank, Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner, has submitted that in the present case, the Petitioner has not only challenged the penalty imposed on him on the ground of discrimination, but also on the ground of arbitrariness. In the later case, i.e., in a case, where the penalty is challenged on the ground of arbitrariness, the writ Court's role, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami, becomes that of a secondary reviewing authority and while discharging the role of the secondary reviewing authority, the High Court has to test the penalty on the basis of Wednesbury and CCSU principles. If, while arriving at the decision as to what penalty shall be imposed on a person, the authority concerned does not take into account any factor, which was relevant, or takes into account any factor, which was irrelevant, then, in either case, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami, the decision-making process must be held to have suffered from inappropriate application of mind warranting interference by the Court. In the case at hand, according to Mr. P. K. Goswami, the fact that Kalyan Chakraborty had been let off with lighter punishment was a relevant factor and since this factor was not taken into account, while imposing penalty on the Petitioner, it clearly follows, submits Mr. P. K. Goswami, that the decision-making process suffered from illegality inasmuch as an important and relevant factor had not been taken into account, while deciding the quantum of punishment. In such a case, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami. P. K. Goswami, that the decision-making process suffered from illegality inasmuch as an important and relevant factor had not been taken into account, while deciding the quantum of punishment. In such a case, contends Mr. P. K. Goswami. this Court may set aside the penalty imposed on the Petitioner and remit the matter to the Respondent/authority concerned to re-examine the quantum of penalty in the light of the fact that the lighter punishment for more serious and graver charges has been imposed on Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned. 13. In the backdrop of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parries, I am, now, required, to consider whether the penalty imposed on the Petitioner needs interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction and, if, so, what shall be the extent of interference by this Court. While considering these aspects of the matter, what needs to be noted is that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in matters of administrative action imposing penalty, is, somewhat, circumscribed. The question as to whether the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226, can interfere in matters of quantum of penalty imposed by a disciplinary authority and, if so, what can be the extent of such interference were considered in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , and replied as follows: 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 14. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 14. From what has been observed and laid down in BC Chaturvedi (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that after considering a catena of authorities, what the Apex Court held was that the disciplinary authority, and, on appeal, the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities, have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline, they are the ones vested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct and the High Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot, ordinarily, substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty and if the punishment, imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, shocks the conscience of the High Court, it would appropriately mould the relief by either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or, to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 15. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham reported in (1997) 7 SCC 643, the Supreme Court has, at length, dealt, with the development of law-both in England and India-on the scope of the power of judicial review of administrative actions on the principle of proportionality and has summarized, at paragraph 31, the position of law, in this regard, thus: 31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and India can be summarized as follows: (1) To Judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury [(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 ] test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational-in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU [ 1985 ACC 374: (1984) 3 All ER 935 ] principles. (3)(a) **** (3)(b) **** (4) (a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4) (b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of "proportionality" and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the Courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14. 16. How far Wednesbury and CCSU Tests apply, in India, in the matter of punishment in disciplinary matters, the Apex Court, in G. Ganayutham (supra), clarified as follows: 33. In Ranjit Thakur (1987)4 SCC 61 this Court interfered with the punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational. In Ranjit Thakur (1987)4 SCC 61 this Court interfered with the punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational. In other words, this Court felt that, on facts, Wednesbury and CCSU tests were satisfied. In Anr. case, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44 a three-Judge Bench said the same thing as follows : (SCC p. 762, para 18) 18....The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary authority/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. Similar view was taken in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 636 that the Court will not intervene unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate. 17. From a careful reading of the position of law summarized by the Apex Court in G. Ganayutham (supra), what becomes transparent is that a challenge to the imposition of penalty can be posed on the ground of discrimination as well as on the ground of arbitrariness. When more than one person face a disciplinary proceeding and the penalties handed over to them are drastically different from each other, then, the question of discrimination arises and while considering whether such discrimination calls for interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court's role would be of primary reviewing authority. While discharging the role of primary reviewing authority, High Court will obviously decide the question as to whether the penalty imposed on the delinquent needs interference on the ground of violation of the right to equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, when the challenge to the quantum of penalty is not posed on the ground of discrimination, but on the ground of arbitrariness, then, the role of the High Court would be that of a secondary reviewing authority. However, when the challenge to the quantum of penalty is not posed on the ground of discrimination, but on the ground of arbitrariness, then, the role of the High Court would be that of a secondary reviewing authority. When the role of the High Court is of secondary reviewing authority, then, the test of reasonableness, as propounded in Wednesbury's case by Lord Greene and in CCSU's case by Lord Diplock, would be applied to determine if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at the decision as primary authority. These aspects of the role of the High Court, while dealing with the quantum of punishment, can be better understood by referring to the case of Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , wherein the Apex Court held and observed: 66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the Constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in essence, applying "proportionality" and is a primary reviewing authority. 18. While considering this writ petition, one must also bear in mind, as that in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364 , the Supreme Court has laid down the scope of interference in matters of penalty in the following words: 11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the, decision. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the, decision. 9. To put it differently (sic), unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten (sic) litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 19. What follows from a careful reading of the above observations made in Om Kumar (supra) and also the discussion held, as a whole, above is that when an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as arbitrary under Article 14, the Court shall keep itself confined to the role of a secondary reviewing authority and act on the Wednesbury and CCSU principles for testing if the penalty imposed on a person suffers from arbitrariness. The Court will not, in such a case, apply the concept of proportionality as a primary reviewing authority, because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 arises in such a context. If the Court, on reviewing the question of punishment, is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it shall, ordinarily, remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment and it is only in rare cases, where there has been long delay for the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and for the time taken in the Courts, can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment. 20. 20. In short, when the role of the Court is secondary, the Court will, normally, remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision on the question of quantum of punishment and it is in rare cases that the Court will substitute its own views on the question of quantum of punishment, the basic test being that if the authority concerned has taken into consideration a fact, which was irrelevant in determining the question of penalty, then, interference is possible and, similarly, if the authority concerned, while determining the quantum of penalty, has not taken into consideration a fact, which was relevant, then, too, interference is permissible. If the authority concerned has not taken into account any irrelevant fact and has not omitted to take into account any relevant fact, then, interference is not possible unless the penalty imposed is wholly irrational. In other words, if none of the said two factors exists in a given case and the penalty imposed is also not wholly irrational, interference may not be possible, particularly, when, in a given set of facts, the administrator has more than one choices of punishment and he chooses to adopt one of such choices. In view of the fact that it is basically for the disciplinary or the appellate authority (which the administrative mechanism in a given establishment provides) to determine as to what the penalty in a given set of facts in an organization shall be and in order to ensure that this freedom is maintained, punishment imposed on a delinquent must not be interfered with, in a routine manner, by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226. In fact, even when the High Court takes the view that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the proven misconduct, it is necessary for the High Court to assign reasons. In the absence of reasons, there can be no interference with the penalty imposed, for, such interference would be nothing, but arbitrary. (See Depot Manager, APSRTC v. P.P. Basga and Anr. reported in AIR 1999 SC 4753. 21. The observations of Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation reported in (1947) 2 AllER 680 relied upon by Mr. (See Depot Manager, APSRTC v. P.P. Basga and Anr. reported in AIR 1999 SC 4753. 21. The observations of Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation reported in (1947) 2 AllER 680 relied upon by Mr. P. K. Goswami, in this regard, are not misplaced, for, the Court, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses (supra), speaking through Lord Greene, observed thus: ...The law recognizes certain principles on which the discretion must be exercised, but within the four comers of those principles the discretion is an absolute one and cannot be questioned in any Court of law. What then are those principles? They are perfectly well understood. The exercise of such a discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is to be found, expressly or by implication, matters to which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard, then, in exercising the discretion, they must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the subject-matter and the general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be germane to the matter in question they must disregard those matters. Expressions have been used in cases where the powers of local authorities came to be considered relating to the sort of thing that may give rise to interference by the Court. Bad faith, dishonesty-those of course, stand by themselves-unreasonableness attention given to extraneous circumstances, disregard of public policy and things like that have all been referred to as being matters which are relevant for consideration. In the present case we have heard a great deal about the meaning of the word "unreasonable". It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. What does it mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to the exercise of statutory discretions often use the word "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. It does not obey those rules, he may truly be said and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. It does not obey those rules, he may truly be said and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, you may have something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington, L. J. I think it was, gave the example of the red-haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense. In Anr. sense, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith. In fact, all these things largely fall under one head. 22. From the observations made in Associated Provincial Picture House (supra) too, it becomes clear that when a discretion is vested in an authority, the authority concerned, while exercising the discretion, must act in a manner, which reflects reasonableness and the test for determining as to whether an authority has acted reasonably is when the authority is found to have, while exercising the discretion, taken into all factors, which were germane for consideration to arrive at a reasonable decision, and has not taken into account any factor, which was irrelevant for the purpose of arriving at the decision. 23. Bearing in mind the principles of law governing the scope of the power of judicial review in the realm of penalty imposed by an administrator, when I turn to the factual matrix of the present case, what attracts my eyes, most prominently, is that though the Petitioner claims to have served the Respondent Bank with utmost sincerity and dedication and without any blemish on his service career for long 30 years, the pleadings of the parties indicate that before imposition of the penalty on the Petitioner, which has given rise to the present writ petition, the Petitioner was already found guilty of misconduct, in Anr. disciplinary proceeding drawn against him by the Respondent Bank, for allowing overdrawings in three accounts of the Respondent Bank and in consequence thereof, penalty of reduction of basic pay by one stage was imposed on the Petitioner and the penalty, so imposed, has not been challenged in any writ petition filed by the present writ Petitioner. disciplinary proceeding drawn against him by the Respondent Bank, for allowing overdrawings in three accounts of the Respondent Bank and in consequence thereof, penalty of reduction of basic pay by one stage was imposed on the Petitioner and the penalty, so imposed, has not been challenged in any writ petition filed by the present writ Petitioner. This apart, the Petitioner has been found guilty of the charges framed against him in the disciplinary proceeding, which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition, and these findings are not challenged at the time of hearing of the petition except for the purpose of drawing comparison between the degree of seriousness of the charges made against the Petitioner and Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned. The fact of the matter, therefore, remains that the Petitioner has been found guilty of violating the instructions of the Respondent Bank with regard to maintenance of accounts and allowing overdrawings therefrom. In a case, such as the present one, when the Respondent Bank contends that they have lost confidence in the Petitioner as an officer, the contention of the Respondent Bank cannot be ignored as unfounded. The fact that the amounts, which were allowed to be withdrawn by the present Petitioner in the form of overdrawings or overdrafts, have been, eventually, recovered by the Respondent Bank is not really a redeeming feature, for, made it clear the Apex Court, in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), that when the funds of the bank are placed in jeopardy by an employee's acts, which were beyond his authority, such lapse cannot be condoned inasmuch as the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable if each of the officer/employee of the bank is allowed to act beyond his authority. Points out the Apex Court, in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), that the very discipline of an organization, more particularly, of a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere and within the bounds of their limits. Clarifies the Apex Court, in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), that acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and since such breach of discipline constitutes misconduct, no further proof of loss is necessary. Clarifies the Apex Court, in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), that acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and since such breach of discipline constitutes misconduct, no further proof of loss is necessary. In short, thus, the fact that the Respondent Bank has not, eventually, sustained financial loss cannot be considered as a factor relevant for determination of the quantum of punishment in the case of, at least, an officer of a bank, for, a bank is a repository of public money and trust. No wonder, therefore, that the norms of the banks require every officer/employee of the bank to take all possible steps to protect the interest of the bank and, in turn, the interest of the public at large and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing, which is unbecoming of a Bank Officer (See P.C. Kakkar (supra) and Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan reported in (1998)4 SCC 310 ). 24. In Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), though some of the acts, which the officer concerned had done in allowing the overdrawals, had fetched some profits for the bank, yet the Apex Court made it very clear that even such profit yielding acts, having been done beyond the authority of the officer concerned, were no less blameworthy and that such acts cannot be characterized as errors of judgment. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Apex Court, in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), observed: True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a bank-for that matter, in the case of any other organization-every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organization/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. In the case of a bank-for that matter, in the case of any other organization-every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organization/bank will disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior, motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority-that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances-is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of banks which deal with public funds, if what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organization and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the Respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. 25. The views expressed in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra) were followed by the Apex Court in P. C. Kakkar (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has struck a note of caution for the High Courts, when the question of penalty imposed on employees of bank following departmental proceeding is sought to be interfered with. In this regard, the Apex Court observed: 14. A Bank Officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. In this regard, the Apex Court observed: 14. A Bank Officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank Officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, 1996 (9) SCC 69 , it is no defence available to "say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. 26. Pointing out to the facts of the case in P. C. Kakkar (supra), Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel, has submitted that in P.C. Kakkar (supra), some of the charges against the delinquent officer related to fabrication and manipulation of records, whereas, in the present case, there is no fabrication and/or manipulation of records.. This is, to my mind, not really material for determining the issues raised in the present case, for, the Supreme Court has made it clear in P.C. Kakkar (supra) itself that acting beyond one's authority is, in itself, a breach of discipline and misconduct and that an employee/officer of a bank shall maintain higher standards of honesty and integrity. Similar views were expressed by the Apex Court in Union Bank of India v. Fishwa Mohan reported in (1998) 4 SCC 310 , when the Court observed thus: 12....It needs to be emphasized that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. 27. Even in Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal and Anr. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. 27. Even in Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal and Anr. reported in (2003) 3 SCC 605 , the Apex Court has reminded the High Courts that in respect of imposition of penalty on persons, who deal with public money, the High Courts shall not, normally, interfere with the choice of punishment adopted by the disciplinary authority concerned. Such a guidance can be gathered from the following observations made in Hoti Lal (supra): 10. It needs to be emphasized that the Court or Tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment does not commensurate with the proved charges. As has been highlighted in several cases to which reference has been made above, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases in the indicated circumstances. Unfortunately, in the present case as the quoted extracts of the High Court's order would go to show, no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. (Alexander Machinery Dudley Ltd. v. Crabtree 1974 LCR 120). A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. A party appearing before a Court, as to what it is that the Court is addressing its mind. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, highest degree of integrity and trust-worthiness is must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of learned Single Judge upholding order of dismissal. 28. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of learned Single Judge upholding order of dismissal. 28. I may also pause here to point out that in Canara Bank (supra), which the Respondents rely upon, is a case, wherein the Court refused to interfere with the bank employee's dismissal from service, when the employee was found to have failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty and devotion and when his acts were found to be prejudicial to the interests of the bank. 29. In the background of the scope of judicial review of administrative decision involving imposition of penalty on an employee or on an officer of a bank as has been repeatedly laid down by the Apex Court, when the facts of the present case are dispassionately examined, it becomes more than abundantly clear that in the case at hand, though the diverse sums of money, which were allowed to be withdrawn by the Petitioner, might have been received back by the Respondent Bank and these returns of borrowed amounts might have been at the instance of the Petitioner, yet the fact remains that the Petitioner had, in the face of the report of the enquiry, exceeded the limits of his authority and exposed the Respondent Bank to the risk of grave financial losses. A bank is, if I may reiterate, a repository of the public money and the Petitioner was, at the relevant point of time, working as a Branch Manager. When, in such a case, no bias has been proved against the enquiry officer and/or the disciplinary authority, the penalty imposed on the Petitioner cannot be taken lightly. The ethos and responsibility of an organization, such as a bank, needs to be borne in mind by the Court, while considering the question of determination of the penalty to be imposed on a bank employee. The ethos and responsibility of an organization, such as a bank, needs to be borne in mind by the Court, while considering the question of determination of the penalty to be imposed on a bank employee. Considered thus, it cannot be said, in the face of the facts of the present case, that the penalty of removal from service imposed on the Petitioner is irrational and/or shocking to the conscience of the Court or shockingly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the misconduct nor can the penalty be described as irrational, for, no rational mind would say that the Petitioner ought not to have been dismissed from service. It is really for the disciplinary authority to determine as to what penalty in a given set of facts in an organization shall be and it is the duty of the Court to ensure that this freedom is allowed to be maintained by the disciplinary authority. 30. Now, in view of the fact that in the face of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the imposition of penalty of removal from service cannot be said to be irrational or shocking to the conscience of the Court or biased, should a writ Court, in a situation, such as the present one, interfere with the penalty so imposed in the name of removing discrimination on the ground that Kalyan Chakraborty, who had faced more serious charges, has been let off lightly. While dealing with this aspect of the case, what is crucial to note is that in Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 745 , the Apex Court has held that the mere fact that an authority has passed a particular order in the case of Anr. person, similarly situated, cannot be a ground for issuing a writ in favour of the Petitioner on the plea of discrimination if the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case. person, similarly situated, cannot be a ground for issuing a writ in favour of the Petitioner on the plea of discrimination if the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case. Noticing that the High Courts, in exercise of their writ jurisdiction, have been passing orders, indiscriminately, to remove discrimination, which were tantamount to asking the authorities concerned to repeat the illegalities and mistakes, the Apex Court has expressed its anxiety on such approach and has laid down the position of law, in no uncertain words, in Chandigarh Administration (supra), in the following words: 8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the Respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of Anr. person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the Petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the Petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the Respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass Anr. unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the Respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the Respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law -indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law-but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the Respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one, it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the Petitioner if it is found that the Petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine Anr. person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the Petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the Petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in Anr. persons' case, which other person is not before the Court nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course-barring exceptional situations-would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no option. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.) 31. In the light of the law laid down in Chandigarh Administration (supra), when the facts of the present case are dispassionately examined, it clearly transpires that the Petitioner, for the proven acts of misconduct, did not deserve to be retained in service and the Respondent Bank's decision to remove the Petitioner from service cannot be interfered with as irrational or shocking to the conscience. At the same time, in the face of the charges, which were levelled against Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned, the quantum of penalty imposed on him cannot be said to be appropriate; rather, the penalty imposed on Kalyan Chakraborty was grossly inadequate. With the charges, as indicated hereinabove, Kalyan Chakraborty also deserved to be dismissed from service inasmuch as he exposed the Bank, contrary to the specific instructions of the Respondent Bank, to the risk of huge financial losses. In a situation, such as the present one, should this Court, in the name of removing discrimination, interfere with the penalty imposed on the Petitioner? If the role of a bank employee or officer as indicated and emphasized repeatedly by the Apex Court in Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), Vishwa Mohan (supra), P. C. Kakkar (supra), Hotilal (supra) and Canara Bank (supra) are kept in view, it clearly and logically follows that in the face of the charges levelled against the Petitioner, the Petitioner did not deserve to be retained in service and with more serious charges levelled against Kalyan Chakraborty aforementioned, Kalyan Chakraborty too did not deserve to remain in service. Should, in such a case, this Court, in the name of removing discrimination, now, interfere with the penalty imposed on the Petitioner. The answer to this momentous question has to be in the negative. Should, in such a case, this Court, in the name of removing discrimination, now, interfere with the penalty imposed on the Petitioner. The answer to this momentous question has to be in the negative. If the observations made by the Apex Court in Chandigarh Administration (supra) are taken to their logical conclusion, this Court cannot, in order to merely remove discrimination, direct the Respondent Bank to re-examine the quantum of penalty imposed on the Petitioner in the light of the fact that Kalyan Chakraborty has already been let off with lighter punishment. Since the Petitioner's removal from service is not irrational or shocking to the conscience, the penalty imposed on him cannot be interfered with in the name of removing discrimination and thereby command the Respondents/authorities concerned to repeat an illegality, which was committed by the Respondent Bank in letting off Kalyan Chakraborty lightly. Such a step will, if taken, shake the confidence of the people in the entire banking system and this will not augur well for the country, when we have entered into the era of economic globalization, which makes it imperative for the bank to ensure that the interest of the depositors are well-protected and no employee/officer of the bank is allowed to act beyond his or her authority and if anyone has acted beyond his authority or contrary to the specific instructions of the bank, he is severely punished. This demands that the banks function with highest standards of discipline, integrity, honesty and efficiency. 32. Had it been the case of the Petitioner that he had the authority to allow the borrowers/customers, in question, to withdraw the amount (s) beyond the sanctioned limits and that there was mere error of judgment in exercising the authority, the situation might have been a little different. In the case at hand, however, the excess drawings have been allowed by the Petitioner beyond his authority. Thus, when the acts of a trustee are beyond the specific instructions of the person, who reposes the trust, such actions are in themselves sufficient to remove the trustee from occupying any position in the trust. In the case at hand, however, the excess drawings have been allowed by the Petitioner beyond his authority. Thus, when the acts of a trustee are beyond the specific instructions of the person, who reposes the trust, such actions are in themselves sufficient to remove the trustee from occupying any position in the trust. Considered thus, there remains no escape from the conclusion that the Petitioner, having violated the specific instructions of the Respondent Bank in allowing overdrawings, has forfeited his rights, if any, to remain in the employment of the Respondent Bank, for, his continuation in the Respondent Bank would be against the public interest. 33. Realizing that interference with the penalty imposed on the Petitioner may not be possible by this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, on the ground of discrimination, Mr. P. K. Goswami, learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner, has, however, submitted that the Petitioner has also challenged the quantum of penalty on the ground of arbitrariness, for, Anr. person, namely, Kalyan Chakraborty, who had faced more serious accusations, has been let off lightly and the fact that Kalyan Chakraborty has been so let off lightly was not considered at all by the disciplinary authority, while imposing punishment on the Petitioner. It is, no doubt, true that when a disciplinary authority, while imposing punishment, does not take into account a relevant factor, the decision-making process cannot be sustained. The most crucial question, which, now, stares at us for decision is as to when a factor can be said to be relevant or germane for arriving at a reasonable decision. While considering this aspect of the matter, what is of utmost importance to note is that when a disciplinary authority arbitrarily favours a person or, brazen-facedly, ignores the gravity of the misconduct or imposes grossly inadequate penalty, such a fact cannot be treated as a relevant fact, while determining the penalty to be imposed on Anr. person, for, adopting such an unjustifiable approach, once again, would amount to repeating the vices with which suffered the earlier punishment. person, for, adopting such an unjustifiable approach, once again, would amount to repeating the vices with which suffered the earlier punishment. In order to treat the quantum of punishment imposed on a delinquent as a relevant factor, imperative it is that the High Court be satisfied that such a penalty, in a given set of facts and circumstances, could have been justifiably imposed on the person, who has been imposed lesser punishment Conversely, when the Court notices that a person, who ought not to have remained in service, has been retained in service, it will be travesty of justice if merely to remove discrimination, the Court directs the vice of inadequate penalty to be repeated in the subsequent case too. In short, illogically or arbitrarily imposed penalty cannot be treated as a relevant factor for determining the quantum of penalty in a subsequent case in similar circumstances. Thus, an arbitrary decision, such as the one, which was reached in the case of Kalyan Chakraborty, cannot be made a ground for imposing similar arbitrary punishment on yet Anr. employee, such as, the Petitioner. This position of law has been made clear in Balbir Chand (supra), wherein the Apex Court observed: 6. It is further contended that some of the delinquents were let off with a minor penalty while the Petitioner was imposed with a major penalty of removal from service. We need not go into that question. Merely because one of the officers was wrongly given the lesser punishment compared to Ors. against whom there is a proved misconduct, it cannot be held that they too should also be given the lesser punishment lest the same mistaken view would not be repeated. Omission to repeat same mistake would not be violative of Article 14 and cannot be held as arbitrary or discriminatory leading to miscarriage of justice. It may be open to the appropriate higher authority to look into the matter and take appropriate decision according to law. 34. Though the facts of the present case may not be as serious as in the case of Balbir Chand (supra), the reality remains that enunciation of law in Balbir Chand (supra), is that on the mere fact that one of the officers was wrongly given lesser punishment compared to Ors. 34. Though the facts of the present case may not be as serious as in the case of Balbir Chand (supra), the reality remains that enunciation of law in Balbir Chand (supra), is that on the mere fact that one of the officers was wrongly given lesser punishment compared to Ors. against whom there is proved misconduct, it cannot be held that they too should be given lesser punishment, for, a mistake or illegality cannot be repeated over and over again. The omission to repeat the same mistake, as emphasized by the Supreme Court, in Balbir Chand (supra), would not be violative of Article 14 and non-repetition of such mistake cannot be held to be arbitrary and discriminatory leading to miscarriage of justice. Had in the face of the facts of the present case, this Court been of the view that Kalyan Chakraborty and/or the Petitioner did not deserve to be dismissed from service, then, the situation would have, perhaps, been a little different; but when this Court is more than convinced and satisfied that the punishment imposed on Kalyan Chakraborty was demonstratively inappropriate and inadequate, the mistake, which the Respondent Bank had committed in the case of Kalyan Chakraborty, cannot be directed to be repeated in the case of the Petitioner too and since this cannot be done, it would not be fair for this Court to remand the matter to the disciplinary authority with direction to decide the quantum of penalty to be imposed on the Petitioner after taking into account the fact that Kalyan Chakraborty has been let off lightly. If Kalyan Chakraborty's case is made a ground for interference, the consequence would be that whenever the Respondent Bank would conduct disciplinary proceeding against an employee or officer in similar circumstances, the Respondent Bank would become bound to follow Kalyan Chakraborty's case and let off its employee or officer with glaringly noticeable inadequate, unjustified and improper penalty. 35. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this writ petition and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 36. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed