Honble BALIA, J.–This appeal is directed against the order of learned Judge, Family Court, Jodhpur dated 15.10.1999 by which application filed by the appellant under Section 13 for dissolution of his marriage with respondent has been rejected. (2). The parties to this appeal were married in April 1957 at Jodhpur. Two sons were born out of this wedlock. At the time of filing of application under Section 13 on 19.7.1994, the elder son was aged about 28 years and younger son was aged about 25 years. Second son was born at Jaipur where appellant had shifted after he got the job in Jaipur. The application for dissolution of marriage preferred after 37 years of marriage was founded on two fold grounds. Firstly, that the respondent wife treated the appellant-applicant with cruelty, which has caused the appellant mental and physical harassment and physical harassment and he does not feel safe to live with his wife anymore, secondly, willful desertion by wife since 25.12.1991, after the marriage of their elder son. Thus, according to the averments made in the application, as on the date of filing of application on 19.7.1994, the respondent had deserted the applicant for more than two years. (3). The instances of cruelty pleaded in the application were:- (i) Wife often mixed pieces of glass in the food which has endangered his life; (ii) She turned out the visitors at home by insulting them which has caused great embarrassment to husband. (iii) She often indulges in beating him and insulting him. (iv) She used to fight withe the members of family as well as wives of other tenants, as a result of which time and again the applicant has to vacate the premises and go to other house. (v) While applicant was living in Shastri Nagar, Jaipur, wife alleged that he had illicit relation with neighbour Shanker Lals wife and defamed him. (vi) On 7.12.1991, at the occasion of marriage of his son Ravindra, wife ill treated the guests and insulted him in front of the guests by abusing the applicant. (vii) On 2.5.1994 wife visited his the then residence with anti social elements at about 11 p.m. armed with iron pipes fixed with union and assailed him with said pipe resulting in fracture of his left leg. (vii) On 2.5.1994 wife visited his the then residence with anti social elements at about 11 p.m. armed with iron pipes fixed with union and assailed him with said pipe resulting in fracture of his left leg. (viii) Lastly, on 17.6.1994, respondent wife accompanied with their two sons came to Jodhpur and created a fuss and attempted to assault him and also threatened to kill him. (4). At this stage, it may also be noticed that admitted position as has emerged from the record is that while husband has claimed that wife was deserted him since 25.12.1991, he is actually residing in a separate house since March, 1994 and earlier thereto, both were living in the same house at Jaipur. (5). The respondent in her reply denied all the acts of cruelty attributed to her but has counter alleged the act of cruelty on the part of husband. It was stated by wife in her replication that parties to marriage have discharged their marital obligation until March, 1994. She also referred to a notice dated 2.12.1994 sent by her husband through advocate demanding certain articles lying in house No. B-456, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur, where parties were residing together. It was further stated by respondent in her replication that on the basis of said notice, which was filed along with reply, husband had left the matrimonial home only in May, 1994 and has taken a house on rent in Pratap Nagar Housing Board Scheme. Sanganer-House No. 64/642, in support of her claim that parties were living together until March/May, 1994 and, thereafter, husband has left the matrimonial home and not the wife. It was countered by the wife that in fact husband has deserted voluntarily the matrimonial home since March, 1994 and treated the wife with cruelty and, therefore, he is not entitled to decree for divorce. In her additional pleas, she stated that she is not detailing acts of cruelty towards her by her husband because she is still prepared to live and discharge her marital relation with her husband. She also pleaded that had she treated her husband with cruelty, husband would not have started Video Audio Palace and Padamshree Enterprises in her name. (6). In her additional pleas, she stated that she is not detailing acts of cruelty towards her by her husband because she is still prepared to live and discharge her marital relation with her husband. She also pleaded that had she treated her husband with cruelty, husband would not have started Video Audio Palace and Padamshree Enterprises in her name. (6). Learned Judge, Family Court held against the husband that he has failed to prove any of the acts of cruelty attributed to wife in his application and also relied on the fact that admitted position is that husband and wife were living together until April, 1994 in the same house and keeping in view the fact that acts of cruelty attributed to wife have not been proved and considering the admitted position that wife has tried to bring her husband back to matrimonial home from the house of Meena Sahai, where the husband was staying at Jaipur suggest that wife has not deserted the husband and husband has failed to prove that wife has deserted him for the requisite period without any cause. (7). The appeal was preferred against the order dated 15.10.1999 on 12.11.1999. After about three years of preferring the appeal, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 was filed by the appellant to permit him to lead additional evidence by producing written statement dated 31.5.2000 filed by the wife in Civil Original Suit No. 20/99, Sohan Lal vs. Vimla Devi pending in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 6, Jaipur and reply dated 6.9.2002 submitted by wife in response to objection petition filed by one Meena Sahai in Execution case pending in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 2. Jaipur at the instance of Vimla Devi to recover the amount of maintenance allowed to her. The objection petition filed by Meena Sahai was registered as Objection Petition No. 47/2002, Meena Sahai vs. Vimla Devi. Jaipur at the instance of Vimla Devi to recover the amount of maintenance allowed to her. The objection petition filed by Meena Sahai was registered as Objection Petition No. 47/2002, Meena Sahai vs. Vimla Devi. These documents were sought to be produced on record in order to bring out that wife has accused husband of infidelity time and again in her pleadings and relying on decisions of Supreme Court, a ground was sought to be raised at appellate stage that such act of accusing infidelity against husband amounts to an act of cruelty which makes it impossible for husband to live with wife and on that premise, entitles him to claim a decree for dissolution of marriage. During the course of hearing on 7.12.2005. an application was moved captioned under Order 7 Rule 7 read with Section 151, CPC for taking on record the facts which have come into existence subsequent to the decision of Family Court. (8). In response to the application under Order 7 Rule 7, the respondent filed an application under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151, CPC on 9.1.2006 to place on record a copy of compromise arrived at between the parties to this appeal and their two sons to settle all disputes in terms of the compromise dated 11.2.2003 and in pursuance of which the respondent has acted by withdrawing her criminal complaint against her husband also withdrawing execution application. The orders passed by the concerned Courts in the two proceedings were also placed alongwith the application on record of this appeal. (9). This application dated 9.1.2006 was replied to by the appellant in which the execution of compromise deed dated 11.2.2003 was admitted and also agreed that in terms of said compromise appellant Sohan Lal was acquitted from the criminal case and also Ravindra Vyas was acquitted from another criminal Case No. 543/2000. He also admitted that Rs. 15,000/- has been paid to the respondent and he also started paying monthly maintenance of Rs. 500/- to wife through cheque, which according to him he continued to pay until March, 2005. However, it was alleged in the said reply that even after the aforesaid compromise, respondent wife had filed another application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. for increasing maintenance amount to Rs. 3500/- p.m., which is still pending in the Family Court No. 2, Jaipur. 500/- to wife through cheque, which according to him he continued to pay until March, 2005. However, it was alleged in the said reply that even after the aforesaid compromise, respondent wife had filed another application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. for increasing maintenance amount to Rs. 3500/- p.m., which is still pending in the Family Court No. 2, Jaipur. He also admitted that in Suit No. 20/99, Sohan Lal vs. Vimla, at his instance, pending in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 6, Jaipur, on 14.2.2003 parties have asked for time for compromise, but the respondent had not filed compromise in that case until the next date of hearing and she led evidence and on 7.10.2003 the suit was dismissed against which the appellant has preferred an appeal. With these allegations, it was stated that respondent is not desirous of acting on the said compromise and, therefore, the compromise dated 11.2.2003 has been frustrated. (10). With this background the appeal was heard. The principal contention raised by the appellant before this Court for seeking a decree for divorce was confined to allegations made by wife in written statement dated 31.5.2000 in civil original Suit No. 20/99 filed by the appellant, copy of which has already been placed on record. The appellant has claimed that house in which respondent and their two sons are residing was constructed in the name of respondent Vimla Devi by the appellant Sohan Lal and Vimla Devi is only a benami owner of the house, whereas, he is the true owner of the house. On this premise, he had claimed a decree for declaration of his title in the house and eviction of wife and two children. The ground for seeking a decree of divorce is the accusation of infidelity, which has come in reply submitted by wife to the objection petition filed by Meena Sahai in execution laid by wife against her husband, which reply was submitted on 6.9.2002. Obviously, the allegation of infidelity leveled against the husband was not the ground taken in the petition under Section 13 when it was filed in 1994 in which though it was alleged that wife has accused husband of keeping illicit relation with Shanker Lals wife, but that allegation was found to be not proved. Obviously, the allegation of infidelity leveled against the husband was not the ground taken in the petition under Section 13 when it was filed in 1994 in which though it was alleged that wife has accused husband of keeping illicit relation with Shanker Lals wife, but that allegation was found to be not proved. Apparently, these allegations which have come at a later stage cannot be taken to be part of the existing grounds in the application dated 19.7.1994 so as to consider them only as an additional evidence to be permitted for the purpose of proving the ground raised in the application. Undoubtedly, filing of these allegations cannot be denied, however, same has to be considered in the background of totality of circumstances which are not in dispute. (11). Apparently, the fact of entering into a compromise had not been brought to the notice of the Court alongwith the application under Order 41 Rule 27. The compromise dated 11.2.2003 bearing signatures of appellant, respondent and their two sons is not a fact in dispute and admitted by the husband in his reply to the application dated 9.1.2006. Therefore, the existence and correctness of that document is an admitted fact which can be taken note of while considering the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC or for that matter application under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC for bringing on record subsequent facts which may have relevant bearing. If that were to be allowed then the application dated 9.1.2006 for bringing on record the compromise arrived at between the parties also become relevant fact and if all these facts are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the real dispute between the parties is the house which stand in the name of wife. The appellant claims himself to be the true owner of the house whereas, wife claims that house to be her own. Another feature appears to be the future course of dealing with the house as appears from the compromise deed dated 11.2.2003. It is also not in dispute that in pursuance of compromise deed dated 11.2.2003, to some extent both the parties acted in furtherance of the compromise so much so that while wife has withdrawn criminal complaint as well as execution proceedings, the husband has agreed to withdraw the suit in terms of the compromise dated 11.2.2003. It is also not in dispute that in pursuance of compromise deed dated 11.2.2003, to some extent both the parties acted in furtherance of the compromise so much so that while wife has withdrawn criminal complaint as well as execution proceedings, the husband has agreed to withdraw the suit in terms of the compromise dated 11.2.2003. But, he has not withdrawn that suit on the jejune ground that after the compromise was arrived at on 11.3.2002, the parties have sought time on 14.2.2003 to produce that compromise before the Court had that compromise had not been produced and evidence had been led and ultimately suit was dismissed. As per that compromise, parties have agreed that the suit and criminal proceedings pending between the parties will be withdrawn and so far as house is concerned, the husband has agreed that respondent and two sons will continue to stay in the house and he will not interfere with their possession and further agreed that during their life time, no party will transfer or alienate the property and it was further agreed that after the death of husband and wife the property would go to two sons in equal share. This is also supported from the fact that during the course of hearing this offer was again made by the appellant that he is prepared to forego his right of proprietorship in the house if the wife does not alienate the property during her life time and after death the property will to two sons in equal share and she does not transmit the property to elder son Ravindra Vyas. (12). (12). In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the opinion that the application moved almost after three years of filing of the appeal and two years after the written statement in civil original Suit No. 20/99 has come into existence as reply to the objection filed by Meena Sahai is virtually repetition of the allegations made in the written statement submitted in the suit and at this stage pinning the case only on the allegation founded in subsequent document makes it abundantly clear that by these proceedings the appellant wants to hold a de novo inquiry into the new facts for upturning the judgment in appeal on a cause of action which has subsequently arisen and in our opinion such a course is not open to the appellant as a matter of right and the Court will also not ordinarily permit such course if the conduct of appellant himself is not bonafide. Apparent reason for disruption in marriage appears to be the dispute about the ownership of the house. We are, therefore, of the opinion that application under Order 41 Rule 27 and application under Order 7 and 7 CPC cannot be allowed at this stage for permitting the appellant to raise altogether a new foundation for dissolution of marriage, which needs further inquiry into the correctness of these acts. Undoubtedly, the allegation of infidelity affects the fibre of marriage and baseless allegation against a spouse may amount to cruelty which may furnish foundation for claiming a decree for dissolution of marriage but such statement of law is with a rider that foundation of leveling such allegation must not be groundless and must not be merely a matter of imagination of an overzealous and nagging spouse living on perpetual mistrust. The fact of the present case are not such in which this finding can be reached without investigation into background of the allegation and without considering effect of the compromise. (13). It may also be taken note that as per terms of compromise at which both the parties have agreed to withdraw all the cases and agreed to live separately but there is no indication in the terms of compromise that parties have agreed to dissolve the marriage. (13). It may also be taken note that as per terms of compromise at which both the parties have agreed to withdraw all the cases and agreed to live separately but there is no indication in the terms of compromise that parties have agreed to dissolve the marriage. This is indicative of the fact that notwithstanding the allegations levelled in the written statement and the reply referred to above, at the time the parties have entered into compromise, they have not considered it to be a ground for seeking dissolution of marriage. (14). The lame excuse of the appellant not to act on the compromise is that since in the application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act sons were not parties, it was not subject matter of compromise and that wife has filed another application for increase of maintenance allowance. (15). Admittedly, the appellant has neither withdrawn the suit for declaration and possession in respect of house in pursuance of the compromise entered into by him. He having not withdrawn the suit and blaming the wife for not placing the compromise on record withdrawal is an act of suitor. It was for the husband as plaintiff to have withdrawn the suit and not for the wife to place on record the compromise and pray for dismissal of suit as withdrawn. Moreover considering the statement made in the written statement dated 31.5.2000, and reply to objection filed in execution case need enquiry into it. The decree for dissolution cannot be founded on the allegation of infidelity, but it must be on the basis of such groudless allegation arising form imagination of a suspicious and nagging spouse. Reason is not far to seek, if the allegations of infidelity are not groundless, an erring party who himself or herself is guilty of breaking marital vow cannot seek its dissolution to the determent of other. One cannot himself lay the ground for dissolution by ones wrongful conduct. (16). In view of aforesaid, the finding of the learned Judge Family Court having not been challenged, on the basis of material on record before us, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. One cannot himself lay the ground for dissolution by ones wrongful conduct. (16). In view of aforesaid, the finding of the learned Judge Family Court having not been challenged, on the basis of material on record before us, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. However, we may not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the merit of the allegations made in the written statement dated 31.5.2000 in Civil Suit No. 20/99 and its effect on the applicants right to claim dissolution of marriage in an independent proceedings, if so advised. We have only indicated that without making investigation into correctness of such allegations at least in the circumstances whether such allegations are founded on reasonable ground to believe on them. Respondent shall get cost of this appeal, which is quantified at Rs. 5000/-.