JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. The appellant was convicted for the offence under Section under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 besides Section 161 of the Indian penal Code, by the 7th Addl. Sessions Judge cum Special Judge (Vigilance) Ranchi, in Spl. Case No. 11 of 1988 / Vig. Case No. 33 of 1988 and accordingly sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year and a fine of rupees two thousand for offences under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and separately sentenced for the same period besides fine of rupees three thousand imposed on him for the offence under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 though no separate sentence was passed under Section 161 IPC. 2. The facts of the case, stated briefly, is that the complainant Shiv Nath Prasad (PW7) had vide an agreement undertook to supply gunny bags to the Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation, at its factory at Daltonganj. The appellant at that time was the Project Manager of the factory. The complainant had supplied 15,000 gunny bags but the appellant with alleged mala fide intention, rejected two thousand gunny bags out of the supplied quantity thereby passing the bill for payment to the limited extent of Rs. 22,100/- in stead of the full amount of the bill submitted by the complainant On request by the complainant to accept the two thousand bags and release payment for the same, the appellant demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 1,000/-. The complainant lodged a complaint before the Additional Superintendent of Police, Vigilance. The complaint was inquired into by SI Lakshmi Narain Singh (PW2) of the vigilance department who in course of inquiry, accompanied the complainant to a hotel at Ranchi where in his presence, the accused had received Rs. 500/- from the complainant and on the basis of the report submitted by PW2, a trap was laid, the details whereof were pre- rehearsed with the complainant and the decoy witnesses. The currency notes, each of Rs. 100/- denomination amounting to Rs. 500/-, were handed over to the complainant after noting the numbers in a pre- trap memorandum and spraying them with chemical. Thereafter, the complainant met the appellant and on the alleged demand made by the appellant, the complainant gave Rs. The currency notes, each of Rs. 100/- denomination amounting to Rs. 500/-, were handed over to the complainant after noting the numbers in a pre- trap memorandum and spraying them with chemical. Thereafter, the complainant met the appellant and on the alleged demand made by the appellant, the complainant gave Rs. 5,00/- On a signal made by the complainant, the decoy witnesses promptly came and the stained currency notes of rupees five hundred were recovered from the trouser pocket of the appellant. Thereafter, the numbers of the currency notes were tallied with the earlier pre-trap memorandum and the hands and fingers of the appellant was tested chemically. On the basis of the confirmation made by the chemical test, as also the statement of witnesses that the appellant had received the money by way of illegal gratification, he was promptly arrested and thereafter the instant case was registered against the appellant. 3. At the trial, altogether 12 witnesses were examined by the prosecution while the defence also examined four witnesses. Placing reliance on the testimony of the complainant (PW7) and that of the PW2 Lakshmi Narain Singh, Inspector (vigilance) and also on the evidence of decoy witnesses PWs 8,12 and that of the investigating officer S.K. Deo (PW10), the trial court had convicted the appellant for the offences as aforesaid. 4. The appellant has assailed the impugned order of conviction and sentence on several grounds, prominent amongst which is the ground that the sanctioning authority has not applied his mind before grant of sanction for prosecution of the appellant for the offence he was charged with. Elaborating his arguments, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that according to the prosecution case, complaint to the vigilance department was made by the complainant on 16.7.1998. The allegation of the complainant was subjected to verification by the PW2 who submitted his report on 18.7.1998 and the case was registered on 19.7.1998. The trap was laid on 22.7.1988. However, FIR was received in court on 23.7.1988 after delay of about 4 days from the date of registration of the case. The case was initially registered for offence under Section 161 IPC only. Later on, the investigating officer had suo motu added Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trap was laid on 22.7.1988. However, FIR was received in court on 23.7.1988 after delay of about 4 days from the date of registration of the case. The case was initially registered for offence under Section 161 IPC only. Later on, the investigating officer had suo motu added Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After prolonged period of investigation, sanction was purportedly obtained from the Chairman of the Corporation as being the competent authority, on 15.3.1989 and charge sheet was submitted against the appellant followed by taking of cognizance of the offence under Sections 7, 13(2), 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Learned Counsel explains further that on the alleged date of occurrence, it was the previous Act, namely the Prevention of corruption Act, 1947, which was in force and, whereas sanction for prosecution of the appellant was given for offence under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Yet, charge, sheet was submitted by the investigating officer for offence under the provisions of the new Act (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) and likewise the charge against the appellant was framed for offences under the provisions of the new Act. Learned Counsel explains further that though the offence which was earlier punishable under Section 5(2) of the Repealed Act of 1947 corresponds to Section 13(2), 13(1)(d) of the new Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, there is a basic difference in as much as whereas the new Act provides for minimum punishment, there was no such provision of minimum punishment in the Repealed Act. Learned Counsel adds further that the sanctioning authority had granted sanction for prosecution under Section 161 IPC initially, but later on, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was also added, but while doing so, the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind independently, and had passed a mechanical order on the basis of enquiry report without perusal of the documents regarding the allegations against the appellant. Learned Counsel in this context refers to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2000(2) SC 2399 and submits that charges framed without sanction for prosecution for offences under the new Act and the conviction of the appellant under the provisions of the now Act cannot be sustained as because the accused cannot be deemed to have been charged with for offences under the new Act. To buttress his argument on the point that sanction was illegal and improper, learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of the supreme Court reported in 1978 SC 677. Further ground advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that, though the prosecution has examined several witnesses on the point of alleged recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the appellant, but the evidence of the witness is essentially lacking on the point of demand of money. Learned Counsel explains that none of the witnesses has come forward to support the statement of the complainant that the appellant had demanded money and that in response to any such demand, the money was given to him. Adverting to certain purported contradictions in the evidence of the witness, learned Counsel points out that whereas the contention of the investigating officer is that the tainted currency notes were handed over to the appellant in an envelop, indicating thereby that the appellant had touched and received the envelop and not the currency notes, yet, a contradictory evidence is also projected claiming that the same currency notes, earlier stained with chemicals, were recovered from the possession of the appellant and that the hands of the appellant had thus tested positive on chemical test, though he had touched the envelope only. Learned Counsel adds further that the learned court below has committed serious error in totally ignoring the evidence adduced by the defence witnesses all of whom affirm that the appellant had an unblemished service record and had received Presidents medal for his sincere and honest services. The contention of the learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, is that the evidence of independent witnesses who had constituted part of the trap team amply confirms that the tainted currency notes were recovered from the possession of the appellant and that after recovery of the currency notes, its numbers were tallied with the numbers earlier noted down in the pre-trap memorandum and when the hands of the appellant were dipped in sodium carbonate solution, his hands turned pink confirming thereby that the appellant had received the tainted currency notes. Learned Counsel adds further that since the prosecution has clearly established that the recovery of tainted currency notes from the possession of the appellant, the presumption is that the appellant had received the money not by way of any legal remuneration, but by way of illegal gratification for his services, from the complainant and it is for the appellant to rebut the presumption, which, in the instant case, the appellant has failed to do. Learned Counsel further submits that at the time when the offence was committed, the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 was in force and the offence was punishable under Section 5(2) of the said Act, but on the date of cognizance of the offence, the new Act of 1988 came into force. Under the clause relating to repeal and saving under the new Act, anything done or my action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed Act, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the New Act. Learned Counsel explains further that the offence under Section 5(2) of the old Act correspondents to the offence under Section 13(2), 13(i)(d) of the new Act, cognizance for the aforesaid offence taken under the New Act does not suffer from illegality, nor does the trial suffer from any such infirmity so as to vitiate the trial. 6. For better appreciation of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, reference to different dates commencing from the date on which the complaint was lodged by the complainant PW7) to the Supdt. of Police (Vigilance ) has to be noted. From the records, it appears that the complainant had lodged the complaint on 16.7.1988 on the basis of which the case was registered against the accused for offences under Section 5(2) of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 which was then in force. The vigilance department had verified into the allegation of the complainant on 18.7.1988. The case against the accused was registered on the basis of FIR lodged on 19.7.1988 which was received in the court after delay of 4 days. The vigilance department had verified into the allegation of the complainant on 18.7.1988. The case against the accused was registered on the basis of FIR lodged on 19.7.1988 which was received in the court after delay of 4 days. Prior to that, a trap was laid on 22.7.1988 and on the basis of the purported recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the appellant, investigation had proceeded and sanction for prosecuting the appellant was obtained from the competent authority on 15.3.1989. The sanction order indicates that sanction was accorded initially for prosecuting the accused only for the offence under Section 161 IPC. In the later part of the sanction order, (Ext.-9) the offence under Section 5(2) of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was added. Thus the investigation was conducted and sanction for prosecution was obtained against the appellant for offences under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 161 IPC. However, charge sheet was submitted by the investigating officer after concluding the investigation on 13.4.1989 for offences under Section 7 and Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. From perusal of the lower court records, it appears that the trial court had taken cognizance of the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(2), 13((i)(d) of the new Act of 1988. Yet charge against the accused was framed for the aforesaid offences along with offence under Section 161 IPC also, besides the offence under Section 5(2) and 5(1) of the Prevention of corruption Act, 1947. It may be -noted the offence under Section 161 IPC stood repealed by the new Act of 1988 which came into force on 9.9.1988. 7. Referring to the provisions relating to the repeal and saving in the new Act, 1988, it clearly points out that anything contained or any action taken or purported to have been taken under or in pursuance of the, repealed Act, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the new Act, but only if it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the new Act. 8. Admittedly, the alleged acts of the accused relate to offences under the old Act. It is apparent therefore that the trial of the accused for the offences under the new Act was totally impermissible and unwarranted. 8. Admittedly, the alleged acts of the accused relate to offences under the old Act. It is apparent therefore that the trial of the accused for the offences under the new Act was totally impermissible and unwarranted. It further appears from the impugned judgment that the learned trial court had recorded its finding of guilt against the appellant for the offences both under the old Act as well as under the new Act. The appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 161 I.P.C. besides Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Apparently, no conviction was recorded for the offence under Section 5, 2 and 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1946. It also appears that the learned trial court had proceeded to impose the sentence for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, but had not awarded any sentence for the offence under Section 161 I.P.C. Considering the fact that the offence was allegedly committed at the time when the previous Act i.e. the Act of 1947 was in force, the trial of the appellant in respect of offence under the previous Act only could have been conducted. Learned Counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed out that under Section 5 of the Repealed Act, no minimum punishment was provided, whereas under the corresponding provisions of new Act i.e. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, a minimum punishment is prescribed and as such, there is inconsistency in both the provisions of the old Act as well as the new Act and as such, the trial of the appellant could not have been conducted for offences under the new Act. It further appears that the learned court below had merely relied upon the charge sheet submitted by the investigating officer and had proceeded to take cognizance of the offences under the new Act only without referring to the corresponding provisions of the previous Act. Yet, trial of the appellant was conducted for the offence under the old Act without cognizance being taken for such offences. Learned Counsel for the appellant points out that the sanction accorded by the concerned authority for prosecuting the appellant was improper, since the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind for according the sanction. Yet, trial of the appellant was conducted for the offence under the old Act without cognizance being taken for such offences. Learned Counsel for the appellant points out that the sanction accorded by the concerned authority for prosecuting the appellant was improper, since the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind for according the sanction. From perusal of the sanction order, which has been adduced in evidence as Ext.9, it appears that initially, sanction was accorded for the offence under Section 161 I.P.C. only. In the later part of the order, reference to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 appears to have been made, but the same does not indicate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind independently. The contents of the sanction order does not indicate that the sanctioning authority had before him the necessary documents and materials to enable him to apply his mind nor is there any reference whatsoever to such materials constituting the facts and circumstances alleged against the appellant. It appears as though, the sanctioning authority had signed on the proforma of the sanction order mechanically. The said order of sanction cannot be said to be valid, as it does not make any reference whatsoever to the facts constituting offence and the grounds of satisfaction arrived at by the sanctioning authority. Any cases, therefore, instituted must have prior sanction and this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceeding void-abmsio. 9. Even on facts of the case, there appears serious inconsistency in the evidence of the witnesses in respect of the manner of recovery of the currency notes from the possession of the appellant. The exact place of occurrence where the alleged trap was laid and the tainted currency notes were handed over to the appellant and later recovered from him, does not appear to have been clearly fixed. Furthermore, even according to the allegation of the complainant (PW7), it does not stand to reason that the appellant after having once rejected the 2000-gunny bags as defective material, he could be left with any scope to accept the very same bags even against illegal consideration. Furthermore, even according to the allegation of the complainant (PW7), it does not stand to reason that the appellant after having once rejected the 2000-gunny bags as defective material, he could be left with any scope to accept the very same bags even against illegal consideration. As per evidences on record, the fact that the rejected gunny bags were defective, was within the knowledge of other officers of the appellants concern including the technical advisor and stores keeper besides the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation and it is, therefore, highly improbable that the appellant could impress upon the complainant that the defective gunny bags would be-accepted on payment of any illegal gratification. 10. From the evidence of the four witnesses examined on behalf of the defence, it appears that being a senior officer of his concern, he had unblemished service record and was nominated for the Presidents Award for his diligent and sincere services. From perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the trial court had totally ignored the above aspects of the case without examining as to whether the allegation could be probable and believable. 11. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmity and illegality and, therefore, it cannot be sustained. I do find merit in this appeal and accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence as imposed by the trial court against the appellant, is hereby set aside. The appellant is on bail, he is absolved from the liability of his bail bond.