SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. ( 1 ) (ORAL)DISPUTE in the present case relates to the allegation of subletting by the petitioner-landlord against the respondent-tenant and the consequent relief of eviction sought under Section 14 (1) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (herein-after referred to as the said Act ). The eviction petition was filed on more than one grounds, but the controversy survives only in respect of this ground. The Additional Rent Controller on appraisal of the evidence came to the conclusion that though there was presence found of M/s Pritam Singh and Co. for a short period of time, the petitioner had failed to make out a case of subletting and prove the same. It may be noticed that the premises were let out by petitioner to late Sardar Mehar Singh and his legal heirs are now on record since he passed away. Respondent no. 2 is M/s Pritam Singh and Company while respondents no. 3 to 6 are the sons and daughters-in-law of late Sarder Mehar singh to whom the premises is alleged to have been sublet. ( 2 ) THE petition was dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller on 29. 10. 1986 and the petitioner aggrieved by the same filed an appeal before the Rent Control tribunal. The appeal was also dismissed on 01. 08. 1997. The appellate court however found that even the presence of outsiders in the premises is not borne out from the record and thus reversed the findings of the Additional Rent controller even on that account. The petitioner has impugned both the orders in the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) THE present proceedings cannot be converted into a second appeal. At the time when the first appeal was filed, the unamended section of 38 of the said Act provided for an appeal both on the questions of law and of fact. Thus it cannot be doubted that the appellate court was within its rights to re-appraise the evidence. The jurisdiction of this court does not extend to once again re-appraise the evidence since only a patent error or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction can be a reason for this court to interfere with the impugned orders. ( 4 ) THE substratum of the controversy is the allegation of the presence of the outsiders. The jurisdiction of this court does not extend to once again re-appraise the evidence since only a patent error or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction can be a reason for this court to interfere with the impugned orders. ( 4 ) THE substratum of the controversy is the allegation of the presence of the outsiders. These outsiders are only the sons and daughters-in-law of the respondent though the name of the firm is also given which was alleged to be present in the tenanted premises. ( 5 ) THE partnership is stated to have come into being on 29. 03. 1968. It is claimed that Sh. Mehar Singh was a partner in this partnership and thus there can be no question of sub letting in any case. The deed produced before the trial court RW3/1 is dated 20. 07. 1968 which is a copy obtained from the income tax department. The original is stated to be not available. The plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notice alleging subletting was issued on 27. 05. 1968 and this deed has been manufactured only thereafter. It is submitted that this is the reason why no deed of partnership was produced. The petitioner had moved an application on 16. 01. 1985 seeking production of this partnership deed dated 29. 03. 1968 by filing an application under Order 11 Rules 12 and 14 of the said Code but in terms of the order dated 25. 02. 1985 it was held that since the matter is at a final-hearing stage the application could not be allowed and it was open to the petitioner to plead for drawing any adverse inference if permissible in law. ( 6 ) A reading of the impugned order shows that the only relevant period is 29/3/1968 to 20/7/1968 which is the period of the alleged original partnership deed and the partnership deed produced before the trial court. It is not disputed that the presence of the firm is alleged to be only for a short period of time. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that there was no such deed of 29/3/1968. ( 7 ) A perusal of the appellate court order however shows that in para 8 this aspect has been discussed. The respondent had referred to the partnership deed of 29. 03. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that there was no such deed of 29/3/1968. ( 7 ) A perusal of the appellate court order however shows that in para 8 this aspect has been discussed. The respondent had referred to the partnership deed of 29. 03. 1968 in the list of reliance and it was because of the respondent that the original was not available. The deed was stated to have been lost. The material fact is that the deed of partnership produced dated 20/7/1968 specifically states that the firm had started functioning in the adjoining premises from 29/3/1968. The trial court thus held that the material produced did not satisfy that there was subletting during this period of four months. ( 8 ) I am in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the extent that if the presence of an outsider is noticed in the premises, burden no more remains with the landlord and it is for the respondent to show in what capacity such presence arose. The material fact in the present case however is that the allegation of the presence of the firm is one where the sons and daughters-in-law of the tenant were the partners in the firm. Not only that the tenant produced the deed to show that he was also a partner in the firm. It is thus not permissible for this court to now to re-appraise the whole evidence once again to reach a different conclusion then what is arrived at by the appellate court. It is difficult to accept the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the partnership deed dated 20. 07. 1968 was manufactured subsequently. The respondent cannot be said to contemplate that the petitioner would initiate litigation. It cannot be lost sight of that the partnership deed produced is a copy of what was filed with the income tax authorities at the relevant stage of time and is a contemporaneous document. The document itself mentions the factum of the partnership being created with effect from 29. 03. 1968 in which Sardar Mehar Singh was a partner. ( 9 ) IN my considered view, there is no patent error or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court so as to call for interference by this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Dismissed.