ORDER Dipak Misra, J. The Petitioner, an advocate by profession was appointed on the post of Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the cases of Special Courts constituted u/s 14 of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. He was appointed for a period of three years as evincible from order dated 14-12-2004 contained in Annexure P-1. The Petitioner took over the charge of the office of the Special Public Prosecutor as per Annexure P-2. While he was performing his duties with sincerity and with utmost diligence, to his utter surprise, he received a communication dated 5-3-2005 by which he had been removed from the post of Special Public Prosecutor after one month from the date of passing of the said order contained in Annexure P-3. It is urged in the petition that he was appointed for a period of three years and hence, he had the right to continue and the same could not have been curtailed as has been done vide Annexure P-3 without ascribing any reasons. It is put forth that such an extinction of appointment amounts to stigma. It is further put forth that certain Government Pleaders had been removed without show cause notice and they had approached to this Court in W.P. No. 4539 of 2004 and this Court pleased to quash the order of removal as per decision dated 16-12-2004 contained in Annexure P-4. It is set forth that in the absence of any complaint and in view of the satisfactory work, the removal of the Petitioner from the post of Special Public Prosecutor smacks of arbitrary action and, therefore, there is warrant to lancet the same. In this backdrop, a prayer has been made for quashing of the aforesaid order passed by the Respondent No. 1 by issue of writ of certiorari and further to command the Respondents to allow him to continue and complete his term on the post of Special Public Prosecutor. A counter affidavit has been Tiled by the answering Respondents contending, inter alia, that there is no service conditions prescribed for the Special Public Prosecutor and the appointment is governed as per the terms of appointment order. Reliance has been placed on the Law Department Manual. A counter affidavit has been Tiled by the answering Respondents contending, inter alia, that there is no service conditions prescribed for the Special Public Prosecutor and the appointment is governed as per the terms of appointment order. Reliance has been placed on the Law Department Manual. It is also urged that as the Petitioner was involved in a political activity canvassing for a candidate belonging to a particular party in the 'Lok Sabha' election and thereafter elections held for Municipal Council, therefore, his appointment order was cancelled. Additionally, it is highlighted that the Petitioner was appointed ignoring the Panel of names of advocates forwarded by the District Magistrate and, therefore, the removal is justified. It is also contended that after removal of the Petitioner, one Dhaniram Vishwakarma, Advocate has been appointed on the said post as per order dated 28-3-2005 contained in Annexure R-2. A return has been filed by the Intervenor, Dhaniram Vishwakarma, stating, inter alia, that the Petitioner had no right to the post. It is further put forth that there was vacancy in the post of Public Prosecutor, in the said Court at Raisen. The District Magistrate, Raisen called for the list of Bar Association. Thereafter, the District Magistrate in consultation with the District and Sessions Judge, Raisen sent Panel of names of advocates but the name of the Petitioner was not reflected in the Panel. Despite the same he was appointed. It is urged that the Petitioner had come through the back door and hence, his claim for adherence of the principles of natural justice is not acceptable. I have heard Mr. Manikant Sharma, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. P.N. Dubey, learned Deputy Advocate for the State. It is submitted by Mr. Manikant Sharma, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner was appointed for a period of three years, and therefore, he should not have been removed by issue of notice for one month. It is further submitted that such a removal is stigmatic. Learned Counsel also submitted that the removal on the basis of cancellation of order goes to the very root of the stigma and, therefore, the Petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity of hearing. He has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , State of U.P. and Anr. He has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , State of U.P. and Anr. v. Johri Mal, AIR 2004 SCW 3888 and a Division Bench decision rendered by this Court in the case of Debiprasad Sharma v. State of M.P. and others in M.P. No. 3325 of 1990 decided on 16-9-1992 and the order passed in the case of Vijay Khare v. State of M.P. and another in W.P. No. 4539 of 2004. Mr. P.N. Dubey, learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that the Petitioner's appointment was a conditional one that he could be terminated with one month's notice and one month's notice having been given, there is no error in the same. It is further urged that the Petitioner's name did not reflect in the names sent by the Collector and the due procedure was not followed and therefore, the question of violation of principles of natural justice does not arise. It is further canvassed by him that some complaints were received against the Petitioner and taking note of that, requisite notice was issued and ergo, the order is impregnable. To appreciate the submission raised at the bar, I have carefully perused the order of appointment. On a scrutiny of the same, it is evincible that the Petitioner's term was for a period of 3 years but his appointment could be put an end to by giving one month's notice. It is not disputed that one month's notice had been given. The question that arises for consideration is whether such an order could be passed. In the case of Rajendra Tiwari (supra) and in W.P. No. 4522 of 2004 and other connected matters, the learned Single Judge of this Court has taken note of the dissatisfactory work mentioned in the order of termination, the tenure as per the Manual of the Law Department, the entitlement of the Petitioner to know the reason, and placed reliance upon the decisions rendered in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), Johri Mal (supra) and Debiprasad (supra), adverted to Sections 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and came to hold that the appointment or termination of a public prosecutor involves the public element and, therefore, the State Government has to support the order passed on reason and provision contained in Law Department Manual. On the aforesaid foundation, learned single Judge has expressed the view as under: ... The appointment of a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor has a complete procedure. A mandatory requirement for the appointment is, recommendation by the District Magistrate after due consultation with the Sessions Judge. Normally a person of unsatisfactory performance will never be recommended by the aforesaid authorities. When an advocate of performance, knowledge and ability is appointed as Public Prosecutor or Additional Prosecutor, it means that the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate both were confident about his integrity, ability and performance. Initially appointment was made on probation, and after due performance, on the recommendation of Sessions Judge, the Public Prosecutor or the Additional Prosecutor continues to hold the office. In theses circumstances, when a complaint is received, natural consequence must be either a show cause notice to the Advocate or some enquiry from the Sessions Judge or from the District Magistrate, and until and unless such procedure is adopted, removing Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor on the ground of complaints and using word 'unsatisfactory' is apparently stigmatic. An Advocate having 7 years standing in the profession is entitled to be appointed as Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor. The aforesaid criteria is very important and only a person having 7 years practice will be eligible to be appointed as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor. After appointment he enjoys the office having faith of the District Administration and of the State. In aforesaid circumstances if the services of the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor is dispensed with the reason that his performance was unsatisfactory, naturally it will cause stigma on his entire career or his further appointment as Government Advocate or Public Prosecutor. The Petitioner enjoys a reputation in the society and works on the faith of the society that he will plead the case of the public on behalf of State in the Court of law i.e. with ability and performance. If this message goes to the public that certain person has been removed from the office of Government Pleader or Public Prosecutor because of his unsatisfactory performance, it will cause serious stigma on his entire career. It will affect reputation, grace, and imputation, shame in the society. In aforesaid circumstances, the order dispensing with the service of the Petitioner with stigma cannot be sustained under the law. It will affect reputation, grace, and imputation, shame in the society. In aforesaid circumstances, the order dispensing with the service of the Petitioner with stigma cannot be sustained under the law. All the petitions based on similar facts and involve similar question of law, deserve to be allowed. The impugned orders dispensing with services of the Petitioners because of unsatisfactory performance by issuance of one month's notice, are hereby quashed. In this context, I may refer with profit to a two Judge Bench decision by the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of U.P. and others Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association and others, . In the aforesaid case, the law laid down in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) was dealt with. In paragraph 20, their Lordships have held as under: 20. As the facts narrated earlier show, out of 26 Respondents-law officers, the period of contract of nine of them had expired and they were continued till further orders. The remaining seventeen had continued after the expiry of their initial term without even formal orders of extension. In other words, none of the 26 officers had any right to hold the office on the date of their removal, even under the initial terms of appointment which stipulated the contractual period. This is apart from the fact that the terms of the contracts also provided that the appointment could be terminated at any time without assigning reason. The reliance placed by the Respondents in this behalf on Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. is misplaced for the obvious reason that the decision relates to the appointment of the District Government Counsel and the Additional/Assistant District Government Counsel who are the law officers appointed by the State Government to conduct civil, criminal and revenue cases in any Court other than the High Court. Their appointments are made through open competition from among those who are eligible for appointment and strictly on the basis of merit as evidenced by the particulars of their practice, opinions of the District Magistrate and the District Judge and also after taking into consideration their character and conduct. Their appointment is in the first instance for one year. It is only after their satisfactory performance during that period that a deed of engagement is given to them, and even then the engagement is to be for a term not exceeding three years. Their appointment is in the first instance for one year. It is only after their satisfactory performance during that period that a deed of engagement is given to them, and even then the engagement is to be for a term not exceeding three years. The renewal of their further term again depends upon the quality of work and conduct, capacity as a lawyer, professional conduct, public reputation in general, and character and integrity as certified by the District Magistrate and the District Judge. For the said purpose, the District Magistrate and the District Judge are required to maintain a character roll and a record of the work done by the officer and the capacity displayed by him in discharge of the work. His work is also subject to strict supervision. The shortcomings in the work are required to be brought to the notice of the Legal Remembrancer. It will thus be seen that the appointment of two sets of officers, viz., the Government Counsel in the High Court with whom we are concerned, and the District Government Counsel with whom they said decision was concerned, are made by dissimilar procedures. The latter are not appointed as a part of the spoils system. Having been selected on merit and for no other consideration, they are entitled to continue in their office for the period of the contract of their engagement and they can be removed only for valid reasons. The people are interested in their continuance for the period of their contracts and in their non-substitution by those who may come in through the spoils system. It is in these circumstances that this Court held that the wholesale termination of their services was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The ratio of the said decision can hardly be applied to the appointments of the law officers in the High Court whose appointment itself was arbitrary and was made in disregard of Article 14 of the Constitution as pointed out above. What is further, since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merits and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interest. What is further, since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merits and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interest. We are, therefore of the view that the High Court committed a patent error of law in setting aside the order dated July 23, 1990 terminating the services of the Respondents-law officers. In the case at hand, the name of Petitioner was not in the Panel. The names were sent by the Collector after due consultation with the District Judge. But a significant one, the name of the Petitioner did not feature in the list. Hence, there can be no scintilla of doubt, he was appointed in an arbitrary manner dehors the procedure. A person who comes through without adherence to the procedure, he can be terminated in terms of the appointment. In the case of Rajendra Tiwari (supra), there was recommendation by the District Judge. The present case, as has already been indicated, is not similar. As far as the complaint is concerned, the letter of termination does not so reflect. That apart, the same would be in the compartment of motive and can never be incriminated to the phase of foundation. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any illegality in the order of termination and hence, there is no warrant for quashment of the same. Ergo, the inevitable result would be dismissal of the writ petition, which I direct. There shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed