Judgment :- (Revision Petition filed against the order dated 27.10.2004 made in I.A.No.110/2004 in O.S.No.308/2002, on the file of the Sub-Judge, Kallakurichi.) The 1st defendant in the suit is the Revision Petitioner herein. 2. A suit in O.S.No.308/2002 was filed by the respondent herein against the petitioner/1st defendant and two others praying for a decree and judgment for recovery of a sum of Rs.3,73,012.81 together with subsequent interest at 12% per annum. 3. The Revision Petitioner as 1st respondent filed a written statement resisting the suit claim and in paragraph 8 of the written statement it was specifically pleaded by the Revision Petitioner that the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the entire cause of action arose at Pondicherry only. It was further averred in the same paragraph that as per a specific clause in the schedule of exhibition of contract, all disputes arising out of the agreement shall be settled in and considered within the jurisdiction of courts at Chennai city. The Revision Petitioner has filed I.A.No.110/2004 under Order XIV, Rule 2(2)(a) of Code of Civil Procedure to decide the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and the Sub-Judge by order dated 21.8.2004 dismissed I.A.No.110/2004 by holding that the Sub-Court, Kallakurichi is having territorial jurisdiction. Hence the Revision Petitioner/1st defendant has filed the above Revision Petition against the order dated 27.10.2004. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the contract dated 27.10.2001 was signed by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant at Pondicherry and not at Kallakurichi as falsely alleged by the plaintiff. He further submitted that all the defendants are residing at Pondicherry and the advance amount was paid by the plaintiff at Pondicherry and therefore the entire cause of action arose only at Pondicherry. The learned counsel further drew my attention to the schedule of exhibition of contract entered into between the parties, wherein in clause 16 of the terms and conditions, it was stipulated that all disputes arising out of this contract shall be settled in and considered within the jurisdiction of the courts at Chennai city. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi is not having territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi is not having territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. He relied on the following judgments:- (1) 1980-II M.L.J. 398 (Madhavakrishnan v. Sami) and (2) (2004) 4 SCC 671 (Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd. Excepting this, no other ground was raised to assail the order of the trial court by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Chennai city and in such circumstances, even when there is a condition in clause 16 of schedule of exhibition of contract stipulating that the disputes shall be settled within the jurisdiction of courts at Chennai city, that clause is not binding on the party as the parties by agreement cannot vest jurisdiction in a place where there is no cause of action at all. He further submitted that even otherwise the words 'only', 'alone' are not stated in clause 16 and therefore the courts where the cause of action arose have got jurisdiction to try the suit. He further submitted that the film was screened at Kallakurichi and the advance amount was paid at Kallakurichi and hence the plaintiff has the liberty to file the suit either at Kallakurichi or at Pondicherry where the agreement was entered into between the parties. He relied on the following judgments in support of his contentions:- (1) AIR 1971 S.C. 740 (Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd.). (2) 1998(II) CTC 492 (Premium Industries India Ltd. v. Quality Fabricators) and (3) 2004(3) CTC 154 (New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd.) 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. I have also perused the documents relied on by them and the judgments referred to by them. 7. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that they entered into a contract for the release and exhibition of the Tamil Movie "Aalavandhaan" for which the Revision Petitioner/1st defendant had the distribution rights. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, a sum of Rs.3,33,698.25 is due and payable by 1st defendant to plaintiff. As it was not paid, the suit was filed by the plaintiff before the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi for the recovery of the above said amount with interest. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, a sum of Rs.3,33,698.25 is due and payable by 1st defendant to plaintiff. As it was not paid, the suit was filed by the plaintiff before the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi for the recovery of the above said amount with interest. In para 10 of the plaint it is averred that cause of action for the suit arose at Kallakurichi where the agreement for screening the film was made, the film itself was screened at the theatre at Kallakurichi and the demand notice dated 23.9.2002 was also sent from Kallakurichi. 8. The 1st defendant in the written statement in para 8 denied that the contract was signed at Kallakurichi and according to 1st defendant the contract itself was signed at Pondicherry. It is the case of the 1st defendant that either the courts at Pondicherry where the entire cause of action took place or the courts at Chennai as per clause 16 of the schedule of contract will have jurisdiction to try the suit and not the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi. 9. In 1980(2) MLJ 398 , a Division Bench of this court held as follows:- "14. The general rule of law is that a party of full age and understanding is normally bound by his signature to a document whether he reads it or understands it or not. Equity does not save people from the consequences of their own folly but will save them from being victimised by other people. Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R. has observed in Tufton v. Sperni (1952) 2 T.L.R. 515 at 519, as follows: "Extravagant liberality and immoderate folly do not of themselves provide a passport to equitable relief." But, if however, party has been misled in executing a deed or signing a document essentially different from that which he intended to execute or sign, he can plead non est factum in an action against him and the deed or writing is completely void in whomsoever hands it may come. As Byles, J., said in Foster v. Mackinnon (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 704 at 711: "It is invalid not merely, on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signor did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended". The doctrine of non est factum does not apply unless there is a misrepresentation inducing a mistaken belief as to the class of the supposed document and not a misrepresentation simply as to its contents. On the other hand, a mistake as to the contents of a deed or document is not sufficient." 10. Relying on this judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that having signed the terms and conditions contained in the schedule of exhibition of contract, knowing fully well that all the disputes shall be settled within the jurisdiction of courts at Chennai city, the plaintiff is bound by the clause 16 of the terms and conditions of the schedule of exhibition of contract and ought to have filed the suit only in Chennai. 11. In 2004(4) SCC 671 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even though the words like, "alone", "only" are exclusively absent in a clause, still it has to be seen whether on facts and in the circumstances of the case, it can be inferred that that the jurisdiction of all other courts is excluded. 12. Relying on the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even though the words "alone", "only" are exclusively absent in clause 16 of the terms and conditions of the schedule of exhibition of contract, still it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of all other courts except the court in Chennai are excluded. 13. In AIR 1971 S.C. 740 (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not open to the parties by agreement, to confer jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the CPC. But where two courts or more under CPC have jurisdiction to try a suit on agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. 14. But where two courts or more under CPC have jurisdiction to try a suit on agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent on the basis of the law laid down by the Apex Court submitted that as no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Chennai city, even if clause 16 stipulates that the disputes shall be settled within the jurisdiction of courts at Chennai city, the courts in Chennai city do not have jurisdiction to try the suit. 15. In 1998(II) CTC 492 (Premium Industries India Ltd. v. Quality Fabricators), this court held that in the absence of an exclusion clause in the agreement, a suit can be filed in a court where cause of action arose partly or fully. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as there is no exclusive clause in clause 16 of the terms and conditions, even assuming without admitting that courts in Chennai city have jurisdiction, it does not exclude the jurisdiction of other courts. 17. In 2004(3) CTC 154 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even if on facts of a given case, more than one court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit jurisdiction to one of the two courts, but by an agreement, parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. The intention of the parties can be culled out from the use of the expressions 'only', 'alone', 'exclusive', but the intention to exclude a court's jurisdiction should be reflected in clear, unambiguous, explicit and specific terms. 18. In the case on hand, strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on clause 16 of the terms and conditions of schedule of exhibition of contract to contend that courts at Chennai city alone will have jurisdiction to try the suit. 19. I am unable to accept this contention for the simple reason that no cause of action took place within the jurisdiction of Chennai city and in such circumstances, clause 16 cannot confer jurisdiction on a court in Chennai which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 20. 19. I am unable to accept this contention for the simple reason that no cause of action took place within the jurisdiction of Chennai city and in such circumstances, clause 16 cannot confer jurisdiction on a court in Chennai which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 20. Moreover, the plaintiff is a theatre represented by its proprietor which was situated at Kallakurichi and in that theatre only the film was screened by the parties after entering into an agreement. There was a part of cause of action that has arisen at Kallakurichi and hence as rightly decided by the court below, the Sub-Court at Kallakurichi has got jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 21. In the result, I do not find any merits to interfere with the findings of the trial court and consequently the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Connected C.M.P.No.2151/2005 is also dismissed.