Judgment 1. After having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considering the grounds stated in the application for condonation of delay, we are satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time. The application for condonation of delay, therefore, shall stand allowed and the delay in filing the appeal shall stand condoned. 2. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute. No costs. 3. This Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.8.2004 in C.W.J.C. No. 3235 of 2000 by invocation of the provision of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 4. The appellants are the original writ petitioners who initiated a legal battle by filing the writ petition by invocation of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, contending that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Vaishali at Hajipur dated 29.10.1996 under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, is illegal and the order of revision under Section 35 of the said Act which was allowed by the impugned order dated 10.2.2000, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Headquarters), Bihar, Patna in Revision Case No. 348 of 1996, should be quashed and set aside. 5. It is, therefore, clear that the appellants, original petitioners challenged the legality and validity of the orders passed by the appellate authority, as well as, the revisional authority, contending that they are Officers of the same rank, namely, Deputy Director of Consolidation and, therefore, it was pleaded to be impermissible. 6. The learned Single Judge, upon hearing and considering the facts found that the rank of Deputy Director of Consolidation is impermissible in law and under the scheme of the Act since powers of revision primarily are assigned and delegated to an Officer not below the rank of a Joint Director. While holding that the impugned order is bad in law the learned Single Judge has not chosen it expedient to exercise the discretionary writ jurisdiction on the premise that writ jurisdictions should never be exercised even in such case when prima facie or otherwise the order is illegal which on being quashed gives revival to another illegal order. The criticism against this proposition propounded in the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge is misplaced. We find no substance in this submission. 7. The criticism against this proposition propounded in the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge is misplaced. We find no substance in this submission. 7. It is settled principles of law that powers of the writ court in terms of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India are discretionary, plenary, equitable and extraordinary in nature. It has to be exercised to promote justice, not to defeat it. It has to be enjoyed to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it even in a case of either an illegal or invalid order in a facts situation like one in the present case, on hand where quashing or setting it aside will generate revival or rejuvenation of another illegal order. The law courts are at loathe to exercise such discretionary, plenary, extraordinary and equitable writ jurisdiction because by quashing an illegal order the resultant impact and the factual ramification would be revival of another illegal order which has to be avoided which is, precisely, done by the learned Single Judge. 8. It will be interesting to note at this stage that the decision of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of "Mohammad Swalleh & Ors. V/s. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut and Anr.": (1988)1 Supreme Court Cases 40, which is subsequently followed by this Court in the case of "Sri Prakash Singh and Anr. V/s. State of Bihar & Ors.": 2002(1) Patna Law Journal Reports 600, clearly supports the proposition which we propose to affirm and confirm propounded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. Therefore, it cannot be again said that the aforesaid jurisprudential perception and philosophy propounded is quite justified and the learned Single Judge has rightly applied in the facts of the case which we uphold. 9. In the result, this appeal shall stand dismissed with costs.