MUKUL MUDGAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition, filed on 19. 1. 1987, challenges a notification dated 5. 11. 1980 issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('act') and a declaration dated 20. 5. 1985 issued under S. 6 of that Act in respect of certain lands measuring 7 bighas and 18 biswas in Village Said-ul-ajaib, Tehsil mehrauli, New Delhi. As indicated in para 2 of the writ petition, at the time of filing of the writ petition there were already a large number of similar writ petitions challenging the very same notifications which were pending in this court. Therefore, at the very first hearing on 20. 1. 1987 Rule was issued and dispossession of the petitioners was stayed on the condition that they do not alienate the land in any manner, and not make any construction thereon. ( 2 ) NO counter affidavit was filed by the respondents for many years and finally this Court was informed on 7. 2. 2006 that respondents do not wish to file counter affidavit. Thereafter the matter was directed to be listed for final hearing on 16. 5. 2006. When the matter was heard on 16. 5. 2006 counsel for the petitioners sought liberty to file an additional affidavit and copies of certain judgments he wished to rely upon. This permission was granted and the matter was listed for final hearing on 23. 8. 2006. The learned counsel for the petitioners requested for a further adjournment to the following date and, therefore, the matter was listed on 24. 8. 2006. ( 3 ) ON 24. 8. 2006, the learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the matter stood covered by the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1987 Del 239 which had been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhey Ram (dead, by LRs.) v. Union of India (1997)5 SCC 421 . Learned counsel for the petitioners thereupon sought time to examine this Full Bench judgment and requested for one more day's adjournment. At his request, the matter was listed on 25. 8. 2006. ( 4 ) TODAY the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on 24. 8. 2006 he had filed an additional affidavit pursuant to the liberty granted on 16. 5. 2006. However, the said affidavit is not on record. At his request, the matter was listed on 25. 8. 2006. ( 4 ) TODAY the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on 24. 8. 2006 he had filed an additional affidavit pursuant to the liberty granted on 16. 5. 2006. However, the said affidavit is not on record. Nevertheless, in the interests of justice the said affidavit is taken on record and examined. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners submits that, notwithstanding the fact that the very same notification which is under challenge in this writ petition, has been upheld in the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, present case would stand on a different footing because, as shown in the affidavit now filed on 24. 8. 2006, the petitioners herein had filed objections under Section 5a of the Act and, therefore, the matter stood covered by the Full Bench judgment in Balak Ram Gupta's case (supra) in which the very same notification had been quashed in regard to 73 persons. ( 6 ) WE find that the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta's case (supra), as affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhey Ram's case (supra), has been expressly restricted to the 73 writ petitioners in that case. This has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdeep Singh Uban (I) AIR 1999 SC 3822 and further in Delhi Administration v. Gurdeep Singh Uban (II) AIR 2000 SC 3737 . In para 34 of the last mentioned judgment in Gurdeep Singh Uban (II) (supra), it was categorically held by the hon'ble Supreme Court that the order dated 14. 10. 1988 of the Full Bench of this court in Balak Ram Gupta's case (supra) would apply only in each of the 73 writ petitions before this Court and did not have the effect of quashing the acquisition proceedings in their entirety. ( 7 ) IN Gurdeep Singh Uban (II) (supra), it was made clear that where no objections have been filed under Section 5a of the Act, the benefit of the judgment in Balak Ram Gupta's case (supra) could not be extended. It is perhaps with this in mind that the petitioners have chosen to place on record by way of an additional affidavit as late as on 24. 8. It is perhaps with this in mind that the petitioners have chosen to place on record by way of an additional affidavit as late as on 24. 8. 2006, a photocopy of a two- Page objection stated to have been filed by the petitioners on 1. 12. 1980 under section 5a of the Act. The counsel for the petitioners has also sought to rely, in this regard, on a short order dated 9. 3. 1989 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in CWP 2567-2568/1987 (Smt. Sudha Jajodia and Mahendra Kumar Jajodia v. Union of India) where the very same notification was quashed on the ground that the objections filed by the writ petitioners had been disposed of on one day by the Lt. Governor and that therefore there was non-application of mind. It is submitted that the present case is also covered by the said order of the division Bench. ( 8 ) TO examine the above contention, we may turn to the judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdeep Singh Uban (II) (supra) where the Hon'ble supreme Court dismissed the types of objections that could be filed under section 5a of the Act. It was observed in paras 54-57 as under:-"54. Now objections under Section 5a, if filed, can relate to the contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is not a public purpose (ii) that even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the public purpose could be served by other land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer or (iii) that in any event, even if this land is necessary for the public purpose, the special fact-situation in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from the acquisition. Objection (ii) is personal to the land and objection (iii) is personal to the objector. 55. Now in the (ii) and (iii) type of objections, there is a personal element which has to be pleaded in the Section 5a inquiry and if objections have not been filed, the notification must be conclusive proof that the said person had "waived" all objections which were personal and which he could have raised. 55. Now in the (ii) and (iii) type of objections, there is a personal element which has to be pleaded in the Section 5a inquiry and if objections have not been filed, the notification must be conclusive proof that the said person had "waived" all objections which were personal and which he could have raised. However, so far as objection (i) is concerned, even in case objections are not filed, the affected party can challenge in Court that the purpose was not a public purpose. 56. Learned Solicitor General Sri Salve rightly argued that in respect of each land owner whose land is acquired the Section 4 notification if it is sought to be avoided on personal grounds as stated in (ii) and (iii) above, it is necessary that objection be filed to avoid a voidable notification. Otherwise, the notification which is not avoided on any personal grounds, remains operative and personal objections are deemed to be waived. 57. In the extracts from the Division Bench judgment set out earlier, it will be seen that two different concepts are unfortunately mixed up. Satisfaction regarding public purpose, it was said that must be expressed in respect of each 'particular land'. This view, as already stated, is not correct. If the entire land is needed for a public purpose, it is not necessary for the Government (or here the Lt. Governor) to say in the Section 6 declaration that each piece of land is required for the public purpose. The Division Bench then mixed up this question with individual objections in each writ petition. Obviously, these individual objections of the type (ii) and (iii) mentioned above can only be personal to each writ petitioner or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. In that event, the rejection of the objections by the land acquisition officer and the "satisfaction" of the Government/lt. Governor can relate only to each of these pieces of land and to the whole. Therefore, there is no question of the Division Bench holding in its order dated 18-11-88 that the satisfaction of the Lt. Governor in respect of the entire land is vitiated. As already stated, the satisfaction regarding public purpose was never in issue. "two things are clear from the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. One is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the public purpose for which notification dated 5. 11. Governor in respect of the entire land is vitiated. As already stated, the satisfaction regarding public purpose was never in issue. "two things are clear from the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. One is that the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the public purpose for which notification dated 5. 11. 1980 which is assailed in the present writ petition was issued. It held that it is not necessary for the Lt. Governor to say under section 6 declaration that each piece of land was required for public purpose since the entire land was needed for the public purpose. Secondly even if the objection is either personal to the land or to the objector, the absence of the satisfaction of the Lt. Governor in respect of the necessity to acquire the particular piece of land cannot vitiate the entire land acquisition. ( 9 ) IN view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of the very same lands which upholds the satisfaction of the Lt. Governor under the Section 6 declaration, the short order dated 9. 3. 1989 of the division Bench of this Court in CWP 2567-2568 of 1987 can no longer survive. At this distance in time, where the entire acquisition has been held to be valid, it is not possible to invalidate it in respect of a relatively small parcel of land. Nevertheless, we have examined the objections stated to have been filed by the petitioners herein under Section 5a of the Act. We are satisfied that the rejection of these objections by the authorities and the making of the Section 6 declaration in respect of these lands on 20. 5. 1985 cannot be said to be vitiated and does not call for any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 10 ) THERE is yet another ground why this writ petition ought to be dismissed. It was filed in 1987 long after the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications had been issued. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again held that if the challenge is not made in time, that would disentitle the writ petitioners to relief in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. For all the above reasons, we find no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. The interim orders stand vacated.