Shameem Baig D/o Dilawar Baig v. Najmunnisa Begum W/o Shameem
2006-09-13
J.H.BHATIA
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. Perused the record. 3. The Respondent No.l filed Misc. Cri.Application No.49/1983 U/s 125 Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance from the petitioner. It was her contention that about 8/9 months prior to her marriage with the petitioner, he had committed rape on her. She had reported this fact to her parents. She became pregnant from this relationship and later on the petitioner also accepted the paternity and responsibility of the child yet to be born. As the Respondent No.l was in advanced stage of pregnancy and expecting delivery shortly, parties agreed that the marriage of the petitioner and Respondent No.l be performed. Accordingly, as per tradition and customs of Muslim religion, marriage was performed on 8.10.1982. On the same day, she gave birth to a male child, who was applicant No.2 in the maintenance application but pending that application, the child expired. The Respondent No.l claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs.300/- p.m. Application was opposed by the petitioner. He denied that he had any sexual relations with the respondent No.l and that she had become pregnant from him. According to him when she was shown to him, she was fully covered by Parda and was sitting. Therefore, he and his relatives could not know that she was pregnant. By deceiving them, consent for marriage was taken. However, at the time of marriage ceremony i.e. Nikah she suffered pains and therefore, marriage could not be performed nor the marriage was ever consummated. Consent for the marriage was taken by concealing the true facts and therefore, even if it was performed, it was a void marriage. He also showed his financial difficulties to pay maintenance. After hearing evidence of both the parties, learned J.M.F.C. Ambajogai, allowed the application and directed him to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.100/- p.m. to Respondent No.l. That order was challenged by the petitioner in Cri.Revision Application No.69/1986. Pending that Revision Application, he claimed that even if it is found that marriage was actually performed, he had given divorce to her by giving a notice dated 24.10.1986 by Registered Post A.D. and thus at least from that date the marriage had come to an end.
Pending that Revision Application, he claimed that even if it is found that marriage was actually performed, he had given divorce to her by giving a notice dated 24.10.1986 by Registered Post A.D. and thus at least from that date the marriage had come to an end. He also deposited Rs.551/- towards Meher amount in the Court and he pleaded that in view of the divorce given by him with effect from 24.10.1986, she could not claim maintenance U/s 125 Cr.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge, Beed dismissed the petition and rejected the plea of the petitioner that he had given divorce by issuing the above referred notice. He found that the notice was not actually served nor the divorce was pronounced nor there was any witness for the same. 4. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the Courts below, the petitioner has preferred the present Writ Petition, wherein he has challenged the findings of the Courts below that he had actually married Respondent No.l and is liable to pay maintenance. He also challenges the finding of the Sessions Judge, Beed to the effect that he had failed to prove that the divorce was given by issuing notice. 5. With the help of the learned counsel for the parties, I have carefully gone through the evidence led by both the parties before the trial Court as well as the judgments delivered by the Courts below. It was consistent plea of the Respondent No.l that when she had been to her field about 8/9 months prior to the date of marriage, the petitioner had forcibly pulled her in the field and committed rape on her and due to that she had become pregnant. She had informed this fact to her parents. The petitioner and his parents were also informed. According to her, the petitioner accepted responsibility for the pregnancy and he and his parents agree for the marriage. Admittedly, she gave birth to a male child on 8.10.1982 i.e. a day on which the marriage was allegedly performed. P.W.No.2 Bashirujuma S/o Sk.Fajar is the author of the document in the form of agreement for marriage. This document was reduced into writing. Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in that document the petitioner had admitted responsibility of the pregnancy and had agreed to marry her. Father of the Respondent No.l agreed to bear expenses of the marriage.
This document was reduced into writing. Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in that document the petitioner had admitted responsibility of the pregnancy and had agreed to marry her. Father of the Respondent No.l agreed to bear expenses of the marriage. This settlement of marriage took place 2/3 days prior to the marriage. P.W.No.3 Sk.Faruk also supported this document. P.W.No.4 Mohd.Abdul Sk.Karim deposed that father of the petitioner had also signed the document. It may be noted that P.W.No.4 Mohd.Abdul also deposed about execution of Siyanama about performance of marriage. Petitioner, though denied the sexual relationship with the Respondent No.l, resulting in the pregnancy and also the marriage, admitted in his evidence that on 6.10.1982 an agreement had taken place. He admitted that on 8.10.1982 a function was held for the purpose of marriage. Siyanama was prepared and read over. He also signed it. His Vakil also signed Siyanama. Sy. Masiuddin, a witness for the petitioner also admitted that Siyanama was prepared but according to him it was not read over because the marriage was disturbed due to certain whisper. 6. Dilawar Baig is the father of the petitioner. He admitted that he and his wife had been to the house of parents of Respondent No.l. At that time, they had seen her and admittedly they had agreed for marriage. The Courts below rightly pointed out that the Respondent No.l was in such advanced stage of pregnancy that she delivered a child on 8.10.1982, therefore, it was impossible to conceal pregnancy about 6 days prior to delivery. It is impossible to believe that mother of the petitioner could not find that the girl was pregnant on that day. Taking into consideration the circumstances, it is clear that before the marriage the petitioner was aware that she was pregnant. According to her she had become pregnant out of the relationship with him and this fact was recognised by him in the document which was executed on 6.10.1982. Taking into consideration the evidence on record, I do not see any reason to dis-agree with the concurrent findings of both the Courts below that marriage was actually performed and the Respondent No.l is lawfully wedded wife of the petitioner. It may be noted that in Amina Vs. Hassn Koya, 2003 AIR SCW 2496, question of validity of marriage came up before the Supreme Court.
It may be noted that in Amina Vs. Hassn Koya, 2003 AIR SCW 2496, question of validity of marriage came up before the Supreme Court. In that case at the time of marriage the girl was running 5th month of pregnancy. The Supreme Court held that at such stage of pregnancy it was difficult to conceal the same and it cannot be believed that husband was not aware about the pregnancy at the time of marriage. With full knowledge of the pregnancy he had entered into the marriage and therefore, he could not later on challenge the validity of the same. This authority is equally, rather with greater force, applicable to the facts of the present case. 7. During pendency of the Revision Application the petitioner took a plea that on 24.10.1986 he had sent a written notice to the Respondent No.l clearly stating that by the said notice he was giving divorce to her and he also deposited the Meher amount in the Court. According to him this notice was sent by Registered Post A.D. but the learned Sessions Judge found that the petitioner had not produced the original postal acknowledgment to prove that the notice was actually served. He only produced xerox copy of the same but the xerox copy being secondary evidence could not be admitted unless a ground was made out to lead secondary evidence before the Court. No such reason for giving secondary evidence was given. Further on the point of divorce, no oral evidence was placed before the Court. In absence of any evidence that divorce was pronounced or it was given in writing and that it was communicated to her, the learned Sessions Judge refused to accept the contention of the petitioner that he had given divorce. Taking into consideration the circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner had actually given divorce to the respondent. 8. It may be noted that in Dagdu Chotu Pathan Vs. Rahimbi Dagdu Pathan and others, 2002 (3) Maharashtra law Journal 602, Full Bench of this Court had an opportunity to consider the legal position about the circumstances in which and the manner in which Talaq or divorce can be given by a Muslim husband.
8. It may be noted that in Dagdu Chotu Pathan Vs. Rahimbi Dagdu Pathan and others, 2002 (3) Maharashtra law Journal 602, Full Bench of this Court had an opportunity to consider the legal position about the circumstances in which and the manner in which Talaq or divorce can be given by a Muslim husband. It was held that it is not that the husband is at his free will to resort to any of the modes of Talaq at any time and without assigning any reason. The Talaq must be for reasonable cause and must be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between husband and wife by the arbitrators, one from the wife’s family and the other from the husband’s. If the attempts failed, Talaq may be effected. In other words an attempt at reconciliation by two relations, one each of the parties, is an essential condition precedent to Talaq. It is not the case of the petitioner that any attempt was made for reconciliation and after the failure of the attempts, he had pronounced Talaq in presence of witnesses or Kazi or that he had executed any Talaqnama in presence of the witnesses. In view of these circumstances, it is difficult to disagree with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that Talaq is not proved. In view of the circumstances, noted above, I find no merit in the present Writ Petition. 9. In the result, the petition stands dismissed. Rule discharged.