JUDGMENT : - Heard the learned advocate Mr. Patil for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. Khandeparkar for the respondent. Petitioner is the tenant and Respondent is the landlord/owner of the residential property. The respondent/owner filed proceedings for eviction of the petitioner/tenant on the ground of bona fide need. The Respondents case is that he purchased the suit house consisting of four tenements and started eviction proceedings against all the tenants because he requires the premises for his bonafide need and occupation. So far as his case against the present petitioner/ tenant is concerned, the trial Court i.e. the Civil Judge Junior Division, Kudal dismissed the suit by the judgment and order dated 22nd March, 1984. The respondent/plaintiff had filed an appeal to the Additional District Judge, Sindhudurg at Sawantwadi. The said appeal was allowed and the suit of the respondent/plaintiff was decreed. It is against this judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Sindhudurg at Sawantwadi, the present petition is filed by the petitioner/defendant. 2. Admittedly, this is a writ petition and not the first appeal. The counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, therefore, contended that the jurisdiction of the Court exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the jurisdiction of the Court exercising the powers as First Appellate Court are bound to be different. The First Appellate Court has all the powers to appreciate the evidence afresh and come to a different conclusion. But according to him, when exercising writ jurisdiction, the petitioner in such case must point out that there is a perversity in the judgment or the error manifested on record. Article 227(4) and (5) provides thus : - "(4). The power would not be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own judgment whether on a question of a fact or of law in place of that of the subordinate Courts or to correct an error not being an 'error' of law apparent on the face of the record. " "(5). This means that the High Court can interfere, under Art. 227 , in cases of (a). Erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction. (b). Refusal to exercise jurisdiction. (c). Error of law apparent on the face of the record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or error of law relating to jurisdiction. (d). Violation of the principles of natural justice. (e). Erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction. (b). Refusal to exercise jurisdiction. (c). Error of law apparent on the face of the record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or error of law relating to jurisdiction. (d). Violation of the principles of natural justice. (e). Arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or discretion. (f). Arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material. (g). A patent or flagrant error in procedure. (h). Order resulting in manifest injustice." 3. The advocate for the petitioner/tenant firstly contended that the respondent/landlord was not at all in need of any premises. He tried to point out that the landlord was in the habit of purchasing the premises even though they were occupied by different tenants; then sell those premises, may be at higher price, and even though on the date of filing of the application or suit for eviction against the present petitioner/tenant, the respondent/ landlord was himself living in tenanted premises, the need of the respondent/landlord was not genuine nor bonafide. The advocate for the petitioner took me through the evidence of the plaintiff/landlord in this regard. 4. In his evidence, the plaintiff/landlord admitted that he has purchased the suit house in the year 1976, there were four tenants and, he has filed different proceedings against each of the tenants. He admitted that he got possession of the premises from one tenant Kasimkhan. The plaintiff/landlord in para 3 admitted that he purchased one building comprising of five rooms from one Hazirabi Rajaguru in the year 1975, but he did not get vacant possession of that house as it was in possession of tenants. Further he stated that he owned one house No.223 at Kudal. He sold it to one Yakub Mujawar in 1981 and that house was also in possession of that tenant. The plaintiff/landlord stated that he has no other house owned except the suit premises. It was also in possession of the tenants. There are six members in his family. The defendant is married and stays at Devarukh and the defendant is in possession of two rooms to the south side and, therefore, he requires the suit house from the petitioner/defendant for his bonafide occupation. 5. After pointing out the aforesaid portion of the evidence of respondent/landlord, my attention was also drawn by the advocate for the petitioner/tenant to certain admissions given by the landlord. 5. After pointing out the aforesaid portion of the evidence of respondent/landlord, my attention was also drawn by the advocate for the petitioner/tenant to certain admissions given by the landlord. In para 10 the landlord/ owner has stated that he had one premises to the north side of the suit premises; it was in possession of one Pedanekar; that premises were vacated by Pedanekar. The landlord denies the suggestion that he pulled down that building and ultimately that suit house was collapsed due to rain and, thereafter he constructed one big building for use of State Bank of India. 6. From these admissions and the aforesaid portion of the evidence of the landlord the advocate for the petitioner contended that at least three instances have been brought on record to show that the landlord used to purchase the premises and sell them. It was also suggested from the aforesaid admissions that the landlord is in the habit of making capital gain out of such transactions and if at all he was bonafide requiring the accommodation for occupation, then after vacating the premises from one Pedanekar, he would have gone to live there and would not have considered to construct a building for the State Bank of India. Further admission was also shown to the effect that the landlord had kept rafters in the vacant rooms in his possession and that there is scarcity of accommodation at Kudal. 7. So far as keeping the rafters in the vacant rooms is concerned, they are stored in three rooms which the plaintiff/landlord got from Kasimkhan. If the description of those rooms is seen, as given by the landlord in his evidence, the rooms are 4' x 5', 5' x 5' and 4' x 6', it shows that these rooms are not habitable and they are only used as storing place. They are absolutely small and no one can live in such rooms. Therefore, possession of these three vacant rooms and their user by keeping rafters does not affect the case of the respondent/ landlord at all. 8. Further it is a fact that when the suit was filed, the landlord was living in the tenanted premises. He purchased these premises and then started eviction proceedings against all the tenants on the ground of bonafide requirement. 8. Further it is a fact that when the suit was filed, the landlord was living in the tenanted premises. He purchased these premises and then started eviction proceedings against all the tenants on the ground of bonafide requirement. The tenant may oppose any such plea of bonafide requirement on whatever grounds available to him, but the tenant cannot say that the landlord, through out his life, should occupy rented or tenanted premises and should never claim his own premises from the tenant. Such a plea, if raised, has to be rejected, because it is a choice of the landlord as to where he should stay. 9. Therefore, even if the entire cross - examination is seen, the admission by the landlord on couple of occasions that he purchased tenanted premises and sold them does not show or does not mean that it was his business to purchase the premises and sell them. On earlier two occasions he sold the premises without getting the vacant possession from the tenants. If he really wanted to do same thing in respect of the present property, he would have directly sold the premises and would not have filed any suit against the tenants. 10. There are six members in the family of the respondent/landlord and as against this, the trial court held that the defendant has eight members in his family and the plaintiff can accommodate himself in three rooms considering the scarcity of tenanted premises. If the reference to three rooms is in respect of the three rooms given to the landlord by Kasimkhan, then these findings of the trial court are perverse, because those rooms are not at all habitable. If the reference to these three rooms is in respect of the three tenanted rooms in possession of the plaintiffs, then also the findings is also perverse. Because the Court can not say that the landlord should reside in tenanted premises. It is altogether different whether the landlord succeeds in proving his need or not. The entire approach of the trial court is, therefore, perverse, wrong and contrary to the facts on record. 11. As against this, my attention was drawn by the advocate Mr. Khandeparkar to the evidence of the petitioner/tenant wherein the petitioner has admitted in cross examination that the suit summons was served upon him at Devarukh address. Devarukh and Kudal are different villages or districts. 11. As against this, my attention was drawn by the advocate Mr. Khandeparkar to the evidence of the petitioner/tenant wherein the petitioner has admitted in cross examination that the suit summons was served upon him at Devarukh address. Devarukh and Kudal are different villages or districts. From this admission, the learned advocate Mr. Khandeparkar wanted the Court to accept that the petitioner/tenant was not living at Kudal at all. One more important fact brought to my notice by advocate Mr. Khandeparkar is that in the cause title of this petition the petitioner has stated that he is residing in 1992 at Sadoli Saptlingi Falodhyan, Sadili, Tal. - Deorukh, Dist. Ratnagiri. Advocate Mr. Khandeparkar also brought to my notice the compromise entered into by both the petitioner/tenant and the respondent/landlord and filed before the District Judge, Sawantwadi in the appeal which ultimately came to be decided in favour of the respondent/landlord. In that settlement the petitioner/tenant has agreed that the respondent/landlord has purchased some vacant land at Kudal for constructing his own house and after he constructed the house, he has agreed to give back vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner/tenant. This document is coming from the record of the appellate court. It appears that this was filed after the appeal was decided in favour of the respondent/landlord. It is pertinent to note that even after filing this consent terms or this compromise, the petitioner/tenant has filed this petition. There is absolutely no merit in this petition. It is dismissed with costs through out and compensatory costs of Rs.2,500/ - . Rule is discharged. Ad - interim stay stands vacated. The costs are saddled upon the petitioner/tenant for misusing the judicial process when he himself filed the compromise before the District Judge, Sawantwadi after the respondent/landlord succeeded. He should have thought twice before filing this petition, but he not only filed the petition but obtained the Stay for last more than 14 years. Therefore, the costs are necessary in this matter. Petition dismissed.