Judgment : This writ petition is filed for a direction to quash the order of the second respondent dated 16.7.2004 and for the consequential relief. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Maistry Grade-I in Public Works Department and he was made permanent in the year 1971. He was promoted as Work Inspector Selection Grade-I on 24.11.1980 and subsequently made as Work Inspector Special Grade-I on 24.11.1990. On the re-fixation of pay the monetary benefits were fixed as Work Inspector Grade-I, Selection Grade and Special Grade. Annual increments were also given to him. However, as per the impugned order of the second respondent dated 16.7.2004 by stating that movement of Work Inspector Grade-I of the petitioner from 24.11.1970, Selection Grade-I from 24.11.1980 and Special Grade from 24.11.1990 were wrongly done and accordingly the said movements were cancelled, on the basis that the petitioner was made Work Inspector as Grade-I only from 24.11.1990, and therefore, the excess salary paid was sought to be recovered. 3. The second respondent has filed counter affidavit. While admitting the fact that the petitioner was moved as Work Inspector Grade-I from 1971, as Selection Grade Work Inspector from 24.11.1980 and as Special Grade Work Inspector from 24.11.1990, it is stated that the petitioner was brought under regular establishment with effect from 14.1.1977 and it was only thereafter his post was designated as Work Inspector Grade-II with effect from 1.10.1977. It was also the case of the second respondent that before provinciliation which was on 24.11.1970, the petitioner was qualified as Work Inspector Grade-II and therefore, the authorities while granting the earlier benefits as stated above have taken by mistake as if the petitioner was Grade-I Inspector from 24.11.1970. 4. It is also the case of the second respondent that the mistake was found out only in the proceedings of the Accountant General dated 20.10.2000 who has pointed that the petitioner cannot be taken as a First Grade Work Inspector with effect from 24.11.1970 and was entitled to the pay on the basis of Grade-II. Therefore, according to the respondents, it is only a rectification of mistake. 5. Mr. Therefore, according to the respondents, it is only a rectification of mistake. 5. Mr. S. Meenakshisundaram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placing reliance on the proceedings of the second respondent dated 19.1.1998 would contend that even as per the said second respondents proceedings, the petitioner was Work Inspector Grade-I as on 24.11.1970, Work Inspector Selection Grade as on 24.11.1980, and the Work Inspector Special Grade from 24.11.1990 and it was based on that the refixation of pay depending upon the pay commission recommendations have been effected. At no point of time, from 1970 till the date of passing of the impugned order any objection was raised about the position of the petitioner. While so, taking advantage of some objections raised from the Accountant-General and especially for no fault on the part of the petitioner and putting blame on some of the officers stating that a mistake have been committed by them, the benefits which have been given to the petitioner from 1970 onwards till date is sought to be withdrawn in a most arbitrary manner without even giving notice which is totally opposed to the basic principles of natural justice. 6. He would also rely upon the judgment rendered in Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur and Others v. L.N. Kashri and Others Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur and Others v. L.N. Kashri and Others Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur and Others v. L.N. Kashri and Others AIR 1974 SC 1889 : (1975) 3 SCC 1 : 1974-II-LLJ-372 to show that reduction of scale without hearing the person on whom the confirmation has been given long back is unlawful and such persons are entitled for right to the post and to the scale of pay already fixed. 7. He has also placed reliance on another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others (2006) 1 MLJ 143 to show that fault committed by the Department and their officers cannot be a ground to penalise an employee after long lapse of number of years that too after retirement. 8. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others (2006) 1 MLJ 143 to show that fault committed by the Department and their officers cannot be a ground to penalise an employee after long lapse of number of years that too after retirement. 8. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader, placed reliance on the counter affidavit would submit that the impugned order is only a rectification of mistake and merely for the reason that for many years, the petitioner has been enjoying the benefits which has been conferred on him wrongly that will not give any right over the said benefits, while fairly submitting that factually it is true that from 1970 onwards the benefits were conferred on the petitioner. 9. I have considered therival contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents and also perused the entire records. 10. At the outset, in this case, it is admitted that the petitioner was given all the benefits of services by treating him as Work Inspector Grade-I as on 24.11.1970 and thereafter, Selection Grade as on 24.11.1980 and the Special Grade as on 24.11.1990 and the petitioner has also retired from service on 30.4.1999. Even after the retirement on 30.4.1999, there was no objection raised for a longer period of nearly five years till the impugned order came to be passed which was on 6.7.2004. 11. A reference to the impugned order would show that it is on the basis of some objections raised by the Accountant-General Department, the impugned order came to be passed. Very strangely, the reference to the impugned order shows that the benefits which have been conferred from 24.11.1970 continued, on 24.11.1980 and further continued on 24.11.1990 and continued till the date of retirement of the petitioner on 30.4.1999 was sought to be withdrawn for the first time under the impugned order after the lapse of nearly 24 years that too abruptly in a most arbitrary manner without giving any notice to the petitioner. 12. A further reading of the order shows that by abruptly passing the order it proceeds to recover such benefits from the petitioner. 12. A further reading of the order shows that by abruptly passing the order it proceeds to recover such benefits from the petitioner. Even without going to the other aspects, in my considered view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the basis of the violation of the principles of natural justice. While admittedly, the benefits have been given and the person has been retired even on 1999, such an order has been passed cancelling the benefits after 24 years cannot be accepted as legal on all canon of law or approved under any concept of justice. When once the pay has been fixed especially after the lapse of such a long time, the petitioner has got a vested right and interest to the post and also to the scale of pay which was fixed and paid to him. While so, such confirmation cannot be taken away abruptly and arbitrarily without giving notice to the petitioner as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur v. L. N. Kashri (supra) has categorically laid down the law in paragraph 6 as follows; “The respondents were confirmed in the scale of Rs. 110-180. The appellants having fixed the scale and confirmed the respondents, could not reduce the scale without giving any opportunity to the respondents to be heard. Furthermore, the respondents on confirmation became entitled to rights to the post and to the scale of pay fixed by the Board.” 13. That apart, even on the merits of the case, I do not think that the impugned order can be sustained. The second respondent who has chosen to pass the impugned order, himself by his proceedings dated 19.1.1998, while passing orders regarding re-fixation of pay fixing the same based on the recommendations of various pay commissions has categorically stated that the petitioner was Work Inspector Grade-I as on 24.11.1970, Work Inspector Selection Grade-I as on 24.11.1980 and the Work Inspector Special Grade as on 24.11.1990. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the second respondent has re-fixed the pay in the year 1998 relating to the services of the petitioner from 1970 under the mistaken impression. Therefore, the letter of the second respondent dated 19.1.1998 is a clear estoppel against the second respondent from passing the impugned order. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the second respondent has re-fixed the pay in the year 1998 relating to the services of the petitioner from 1970 under the mistaken impression. Therefore, the letter of the second respondent dated 19.1.1998 is a clear estoppel against the second respondent from passing the impugned order. That apart, even assuming that there has been some mistakes on the part of the officers of the respondent Department in re-fixing the pay and also conferring the status on the petitioner on 24.11.1970, 24.11.1980 and 24.11.1990, that cannot be reopened now after a lapse of 24 years especially when the petitioner has retired from service on 30.4.1999. In this regard, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others D. Palavesamuthu v. Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar, Chennai and Others (supra) lays down the law. The Division Bench while considering a similar situation (has categorically held placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana 1995 AIR SCW 1780: (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 18 in the following terms: “Even if it is accepted for the argument sake that salary of the petitioner is fixed in a wrong scale of pay, it is the fault committed by the Department and their Officers, for which the petitioner should not be penalised after a lapse of number of years that too after retirement of the petitioner.” 14. In the present case, it is not the case of the second respondent that the petitioner has made any misrepresentation about his service status. 15. In view of the same and applying the dictum laid down by this Court, there is no difficulty to come to the conclusion that the impugned order is not sustainable even on merits. 16. There is one another aspect. When admittedly, the petitioner has retired from service as early as on 30.4.1999, the impugned order passed by cancelling the earlier orders of 1970, 1980, 1990 was passed on 16.7.2004 nearly after five years from the date of retirement and the same is not only shocking but also unjustifiable. 16. There is one another aspect. When admittedly, the petitioner has retired from service as early as on 30.4.1999, the impugned order passed by cancelling the earlier orders of 1970, 1980, 1990 was passed on 16.7.2004 nearly after five years from the date of retirement and the same is not only shocking but also unjustifiable. Therefore, looking into any angle, I am of the considered view that the impugned order suffers from illegality and liable to be set aside. 17. In the result, the impugned order of the second respondent dated 16.7.2004 is quashed and the writ petition stands allowed with cost of Rs. 5000/-(Five thousand only) to be paid by the second respondent to the petitioner. Consequently, connected W.P.M.P., is closed.