Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner for setting aside the order dated 15.1.2003 passed by the Additional District Judge, Mansa, whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was dismissed and consequently the appeal preferred by him against the judgment and decree dated 18.7.2001 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mansa, was also dismissed as barred by limitation. 2. The plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit for possession of land measuring 24 kanals 12 marlas, as detailed and described in the head-note of the plaint. The plaintiff also challenged the sale deed dated 18.3.1994 as illegal and null and void. The trial Court dismissed the suit for the petitioner while holding that the defendants-respondents are bona fide purchasers. 3. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the petitioner preferred an appeal along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 25 days in filing the appeal. In the application, it was alleged that judgment and decree of the trial Court was passed on 18.7.2001 and on the next day the application for obtaining the certified copy was submitted. The copy was prepared and the same was ready for delivery on 8.8.2001. It was further alleged that the petitioner is a truck driver and had gone to Gujarat where he fell ill and, hence, could not file the appeal within limitation. As such, there is a delay of 25 days in filing the appeal. 4. The first Appellate Court framed the issue on the aforesaid application to the effect whether the delay in filing the appeal is liable to be condoned. After taking evidence on the said issue, the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay was dismissed while holding that no sufficient grounds have been made out to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Hence this revision. 5. I have heard the counsel for the parties and gone through the contents of the petition as well as the impugned order passed by the first Appellate Court. In my opinion, the first Appellate Court has adopted a hyper-technical approach in the matter whereas the petitioner has properly explained the delay of 25 days in filing the appeal. 6. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. In my opinion, the first Appellate Court has adopted a hyper-technical approach in the matter whereas the petitioner has properly explained the delay of 25 days in filing the appeal. 6. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, the Hon ble Apex Court has held that the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals should be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. Again in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1999-1)121 P.L.R. 642 (S.C.), the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that in absence of anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactics, court should normally condone the delay. It has been further observed that the primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Similarly, in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (2000)9 S.C.C. 94, the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. In this regard, liberal approach is to be preferred in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits, as dismissing of the appeal on technical grounds of limitation would not, in any way, advance the interest of justice. Again in another judgment in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001-3)129 P.L.R. 25 (S.C.), the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that a distinction should be made between cases in which delay is inordinate, thus, giving rise to question of prejudice to the other side and requiring a more cautious approach, and a case where delay is of a few days only. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. Similarly in Apangshu Mohan Lodh and Ors. v. State of Tripura and Ors., the Hon ble Apex Court has observed that the power of condonation of delay is discretionary and has to be liberally construed. 7. In this case, there is a delay of 25 days in filing the appeal, The explanation given by the petitioner for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, in my opinion, is reasonable and satisfactory. In no way it can be said that the delay caused in the instant case was due to gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner had sufficiently explained the delay in filing the appeal. Thus, the impugned order is liable to set aside. 8. For the reasons above, this revision petition is allowed subject to payment of costs of Rs. 2,000/- and the order dated 15.1.2003 passed by the Additional District Judge, Mansa is set aside and delay of 25 days in filing the appeal is condoned. Keeping in view the fact that the matter has already been delayed, therefore, the Additional District Judge is directed to decide the appeal on merits expeditiously.