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2006 DIGILAW 1480 (DEL)

YASH MEHRA v. ARUNDHATI MEHRA

2006-08-28

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL

body2006
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. ( 1 ) ADMIT. ( 2 ) AT request of learned counsel for the parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal. The parties filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The statement of the parties were recorded on 21. 04. 2003 and orders were passed on the first motion. The parties thereafter filed a petition for second motion after the lapse of six months' period of time. This application was duly supported by affidavits of both the parties. The statement of the parties were recorded and thereafter the judgment was reserved and was fixed for pronouncement of orders. ( 3 ) THE two applications were filed by the respondent / wife under Order XXIII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the Code') on 15. 09. 2003 and another one under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code on 22. 07. 2004 in the applications, it is stated by the respondent / wife that the petitioner / husband had agreed to make payment of Rs. 70 lakhs towards permanent alimony and to return Istridhan, but the petitioner had failed to keep a compromise. It is not in dispute that there are no such terms recorded in the settlement. The respondent has stated that she was put under pressure and that is why she had signed the application. The trial court came to the conclusion that in view of withdrawal of the consent by the respondent, the divorce decree could not be passed and allowed the applications on 22. 12. 2004 The applications for review filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 10. 09. 2005. Both these orders are impugned by the petitioner in the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) THE limited question raised in the present petition arises from the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Additional District Judge in allowing the applications of the respondent after the judgment was reserved at the stage of second motion. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to judgment of the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 993 to contend that once a judgment is reserved, nothing more is to be done other than pronouncement of judgment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to judgment of the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 993 to contend that once a judgment is reserved, nothing more is to be done other than pronouncement of judgment. The hearing of the suit has been completed in its entirety and the suit is adjourned merely for purposes of pronouncing judgment under Order XX Rule 1 of the Code. The said provision reads as under :"order XX judgment AND DECREE 1. Judgment when pronounced. "- (1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in an open Court, either at once, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders: provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to pronounce the judgment within thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day beyond sixty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. " ( 5 ) THE Supreme Court had further observed that once a hearing starts, the Code contemplates only two stages in the trial of the suit " (i) where the hearing is adjourned; or (ii) where the hearing is completed. Thus, where hearing is completed, the parties have no further rights or privileges in the matter and it is only for the convenience of the Court that Order XX Rule 1 of the Code permits the judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed. ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and I am in agreement with the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and I am in agreement with the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. The provision of mutual consent divorce was introduced with the object of providing for dissolution of marriage where both parties agreed without faults being attributed to one side or the other. However, there are two stages envisaged for the dissolution of such a marriage. There has to be a hiatus period of one year before the first motion for divorce is filed. Even thereafter the parties are given time to think over the matter and a second motion has to be filed on a date after six months from the first motion. ( 7 ) THE judicial view earlier was that there was no option available unilaterally to one of the parties to withdraw the consent given at the first motion stage, but that judicial view was subsequently over-ruled and it was held that any one of the parties is also at liberty to withdraw the consent. ( 8 ) IN the present case, the consent was available at the first stage and statements of parties were recorded. The parties took a conscious step of filing the second motion and even the statement of the parties were recorded at the second motion stage. Thus, the respondent was present before the Court to say whatever she wanted and she consciously gave consent to the second motion. It was open for the trial court to have pronounced a decree for dissolution of marriage immediately, but the Court reserved orders and, thus, the provisions of order XX Rule 1 of the Code came into play. All that had to be done by the trial court was to pronounce judgment in the matter. It was not permissible at that stage for the respondent to have moved the applications seeking to withdraw the consent. In view of the consent, the decree ought to have followed and in case the respondent was of the view that the fraud had been played on her, it was open for the respondent to seek to challenge the said decree limited to those grounds of fraud. However, the pronouncement of the decree for divorce could not have been recalled in view of the applications filed by the respondent. However, the pronouncement of the decree for divorce could not have been recalled in view of the applications filed by the respondent. ( 9 ) IN view of the aforesaid, I consider appropriate that the applications filed by the respondent, which have been allowed in terms of the impugned orders, be dismissed and the trial court should proceed to pronounce judgment on the basis of the arguments already concluded prior to those applications being filed. ( 10 ) THE petition is allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. List for directions before the trial court on 11. 09. 2006. CM No. 15244/2005 no further directions are called for in this application in view of disposal of the main petition. Application stands disposed of.