JUDGMENT NIRMAL YADAV, J. 1. This is tenant’s revision against the judgment and decree dated 22.1.2003 passed by the appellate authority affirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller dated 20.12.2001. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondents-S.K. Jain his wife Chitra Jain, who are owners and landlords of Shop- cum-office No. 14, Sector 26, Chandigarh, rented out the demised @ Rs. 6000/- per month excluding water and electricity charges to the petitioner-National Textile Corporation. They filed petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in short ‘the Act’), mainly, on two grounds that the premises was required by them for their personal use as well as for the use of their son Nikhil Jain who was going to complete the degree in Electronics Engineering from Chandigarh in the year 1998. They wanted to start their own business for which they had sufficient funds to invest. It was further averred that neither landlords nor their son was in occupation of any other suitable commercial or residential premises in the urban area of Chandigarh nor they vacated any premises after the commencement of the Rent Act. The second ground pleaded was that tenant had changed the user of the premises. The tenant contested the petition, mainly, on the ground that petition was not maintainable as it had not been filed against the proper person or functionary of the firm. The rate of rent was admitted. It was further pleaded that petition had been filed in order to enhance the rate of rent. The tenant denied having changed the user of premises. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:- “1. Whether the petitioners require the demised premises for their personal use and occupation? OPP 2. Whether the respondent has changed the user of the demised premises without the consent of the petitioners, if so its effect? OPP 3. Whether the instant petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR 4. Whether this petition has not been filed by the authorised persons? OPR 5. Relief.” 3. The Rent Controller after taking the facts and evidence into account, decided issues No. 1,3 and 4 in favour of the respondents-landlords while issue No. 2 against them. The appellate authority affirmed the order of the Rent Controller. OPR 4. Whether this petition has not been filed by the authorised persons? OPR 5. Relief.” 3. The Rent Controller after taking the facts and evidence into account, decided issues No. 1,3 and 4 in favour of the respondents-landlords while issue No. 2 against them. The appellate authority affirmed the order of the Rent Controller. Aggrieved by the orders of both the Courts below, the petitioner- tenant has challenged the order mainly, on the ground that commercial/non-residential property situated in Union Territory, Chandigarh, cannot be got vacated by the landlord on the ground of personal necessity. This argument of the learned counsel does not survive in view of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi and others, (2005) 8 SCC 504, wherein it has been held that Rent Act purporting to completely deprive a landlord of his right to seek eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building on the ground of his bona fide personal necessity would be highly unjust and inequitable. Such a interpretation would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been further held that such a ground is available both in respect of residential and non-residential buildings under the Act in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. 4. Now the only ground available to petitioner-tenant to challenge the orders of the Courts below, is that need of the landlords is not bona fide and demised premises is not required by them for their personal use and the petition has been merely filed for enhancement of rent. However, both the Courts below have returned a concurrent finding that need of the respondents- landlords is bona-fide and they require the premises for their own use. To challenge the plea of bona-fide requirement for personal use of the landlords and for use of their son Nikhil Jain, who was doing Engineering in Electronics, the learned counsel argued that from the evidence on record, it is not proved that Nikhil Jain is going to establish the business, as stated in the petition. It is not even proved that Nikhil Jain has gone to Canada for his studies and has thereafter come back to India to settle the business. The plea that the tenanted premises are required for Nikhil Jain is totally incorrect, false and mala fide. It is not even proved that Nikhil Jain has gone to Canada for his studies and has thereafter come back to India to settle the business. The plea that the tenanted premises are required for Nikhil Jain is totally incorrect, false and mala fide. On the other hand, the tenant is a Central Government Public Undertaking. It has its Divisional Office at the first floor, showroom and central distribution depot on the ground floor while the godown is in the basement of the demised premises. The Divisional Office is controlling the showrooms of the Corporation situated in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir as well as at Chandigarh. It would be difficult for the Corporation to have similar premises in the same or adjoining locality for running its distribution centre, showroom and place for storage. The learned counsel argued that the ejectment petition cannot be allowed if the personal necessity does not continue to exist at the time of passing of decree and, therefore, the Court should take into account the subsequent events to mould the relief. In support the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in Baba Kashinath Bhinge vs. Samast Lingayat Gavili, 1995(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 518; Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999(2) R.C.R. (Rent) 141 and Akbar Basha vs. B. Maruthi, 2000(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 188. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents argued that landlord is the best judge with regard to the personal necessity and his/her requirements. The learned counsel argued that expression as occurring is Section 13(3) (a)(i) of the Act ‘for his own use’ cannot be narrowly construed. It must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement would not only be his own requirement alone, but it must mean the requirement of a member of the family who is dependent on the landlord, which can well be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In support, the learned counsel referred to certain decision of the Apex court in Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 Supreme Court Cases 397 and Ramkubai since deceased by Lrs. Vs. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak, 1999(2) RCR 213j. 6. In support, the learned counsel referred to certain decision of the Apex court in Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 Supreme Court Cases 397 and Ramkubai since deceased by Lrs. Vs. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak, 1999(2) RCR 213j. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents furhte argued that there is concurrent finding of both the Courts below with regard to bona fide need of the landlords and High Court is not to re- appreciate the evidence in regular second appeal. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 Supreme Court 100 and Vaneet Jain vs. Jagjit Singh, (2000) 5 Supreme Court Cases 1. 7. Consideration of the rival submissions and law cited by both the parties, I find no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded on the Courts below. It is proved from the evidence on record that the landlords or their son do not own any other non-residential premises to establish their business nor have they vacated any premises after the commencement of the Act. In such circumstances, no mala fide can be attributed to the landlords with regard to their requirement of premises for establishing business for their son and themselves. The petitioner has not brought anything on record showing that Nikhil Jain son of the respondents is employed or has established his business in any other premises. The expression ‘for his own use’ as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. It has to be assigned a wider and liberal meaning. It is not the requirement of law that he should himself physically occuppy the premises. The requirement of any dependent of the landlord can also be considered to be his own requirement. Keeping in view the social practice prevalent in the region, it is normally the obligation of parents to settle their son and make him economically independent so as to support himself and to discharge such obligation, the landlords would be requiring the tenanted premises. As such, their requirement would be considered as a bonafide requirement. There is nothing to prove that the landlords are going to let out the premises to their own son or to anyone else. In fact, it is landlords themselves who require the premises for their own son. As such, their requirement would be considered as a bonafide requirement. There is nothing to prove that the landlords are going to let out the premises to their own son or to anyone else. In fact, it is landlords themselves who require the premises for their own son. In sum and substance, the users would be the landlords themselves for establishing business for their son and themselves. 8. I am of the view that there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence that landlords intend to establish business for themselves and their son in the tenanted premises. Moreover, as has also been observed by the appellate authority, if the premises in question is sold or again rented out by the landlords to some other person within 12 moths after obtaining the possession, the tenant would be entitled to restoration of possession in view of the provision of Section 13(4) of the Act. 9. Accordingly, the revision petition stands dismissed in the above terms.