ORDER: The petitioner initiated proceedings for acquisition of an extent of Ac.838.13 guntas of land in Adrial Village of Manthani Mandal for undertaking the coal mining activity. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') was published on 28.61985 and it was followed by a notification under Section 6 of the Act on 1.8.1985. An award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 3.8.1987. . 2. The Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter under Section 30 of the Act to the Civil Court in respect of an extent of Ac.73.35 guntas. He doubted the title of one Mr. J. Gopal Rao, who figured as a claimant before him vis--vis the said land. The reference made by the Special Deputy Tahsildar, the second respondent herein under Section 30 of the Act was taken up by the court of Senior Civil Judge, Manthani as O.P.No.9 of 1988. The first respondent herein figured as one of the contestants. I.A.No.568 of 1988 was filed jointly by the first respondent herein, Mr.Gopal Rao and another person agreeing to share the compensation in respect of almost equal extents. The first respondent was held entitled to get the compensation in respect of Ac.24.35 guntas. The application was ordered on 22.11.1988. Inasmuch as the compensation was already deposited into the Court, the first respondent filed I.A.No.918 of 1988 with a prayer to permit him to take his portion of the compensation. The I.A. was allowed on 19.12.1988 and the amount was received by the first respondent on 22.12.1988 under protest. 3. The first respondent made an application on 21.1.1989 before the second respondent seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act. It was only on 21.1.2000 that he made a further application before the second respondent. Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act and it was taken up as O.P.No.42 of 2001. 4. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No.4989 of 2001 before this Court challenging the reference made by the second respondent at the instance of the first respondent by raising several grounds. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 10.4.2001 leaving it open to the petitioner to raise all the grounds before the trial Court. 4. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No.4989 of 2001 before this Court challenging the reference made by the second respondent at the instance of the first respondent by raising several grounds. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 10.4.2001 leaving it open to the petitioner to raise all the grounds before the trial Court. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an application, which was numbered as CF No.360 of 2003 raising an objection as to the very reference being made. It was urged that the application made by the first respondent was barred by limitation since it was filed after several years from the date of knowledge of the award and that there are serious suspicious circumstances as to the very reference made by the second respondent. The application was opposed by the first respondent and through its order dated 30.11.2005, the trial Court rejected the same. Hence, this revision petition. 5. Sri J.Prabhakar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act is to be calculated from the date of knowledge of the award i.e. 3.8.1987 and since the so called application of the petitioner was made only on 21.1.1989, it was barred by limitation. Learned counsel further submits that the very fact that the first respondent did not move in the matter for a period of 11 years throws any amount of doubt as to the submission of application under Section 18 of the Act on 21.1.1989. He contends that the view taken by the trial Court cannot be sustained in law or on facts. 6. Sri T.Ramulu, learned counsel for the first respondent on the other hand submits that the cause of action for a claimant to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act would arise only when the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is paid and not otherwise. He contends that such payment came to be made only on 22.12.1988 and the application under Section 18 of the Act was made within two months. As regards the second objection, the learned counsel submits that from a perusal of letter dated 14.11.2000 addressed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli, it is evident that the entire record relating to the matter was burnt by the extremists on 14.6.1989 and that gave rise to the inordinate delay of 11 years. 7. As regards the second objection, the learned counsel submits that from a perusal of letter dated 14.11.2000 addressed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapalli, it is evident that the entire record relating to the matter was burnt by the extremists on 14.6.1989 and that gave rise to the inordinate delay of 11 years. 7. After the Civil Court answered the reference under Section 30 as regards part of the land acquired by the petitioner, a further reference under Section 18 is pending before the trial Court. The facts that gave rise to the reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Civil Court have already been stated to be within the permissible limits of brevity. The petitioner raised two objections as to the very legality of reference. While the first relates to the question of limitation, the other is about the truthfulness of the submission of the application by the first respondent. 8. On a reading of Section 18 of the Act one would get an impression at the first blush that a reference can be sought under it, irrespective of the fact whether the claimant receives compensation or not. However, if it is read in conjunction with proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Act, it becomes clear that the cause of action to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act would arise, only on receipt of compensation, that too under protest. Receipt of the amount under protest is treated as a sine qua non to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act. It is difficult to imagine that reference can be sought, without receiving the amount at all. The period of two months, for seeking reference under Section 18 must be calculated from the date on which the amount of compensation was received, under protest. In the present case, the application was presented within two months from the date of receipt of the amount i.e. 22.12.1988. Therefore, the objection raised by the petitioner, in this regard, cannot be sustained in law. 9. The second objection is about the truthfulness of the submission of the very application under Section 18 of the Act. On his part, the petitioner stated that he submitted the application on 21.1.1989 and he submitted a reminder or a further application only on 21.1.2000. 9. The second objection is about the truthfulness of the submission of the very application under Section 18 of the Act. On his part, the petitioner stated that he submitted the application on 21.1.1989 and he submitted a reminder or a further application only on 21.1.2000. It is urged that the very fact that the first respondent did not take any follow up action for about 11 years would certainly throw doubt upon it. How so ever strong the suspicion that is surrounding the application of the first respondent may be, his statutory right to seek reference under Section 18 cannot be defeated on the basis of the same. The only authority, who can dispute the submission of the application is the first respondent. He did not raise any objection in this regard. Further, it is not denied that the second respondent addressed a letter to the first respondent as late as on 14.11.2000 stating inter alia that the application dated 21.1.1989 submitted by the first respondent was not traceable on account of the fact that the records in the office were burnt by the extremists on 14.6.1989. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the petitioner that the reference ought not to have been made. 10. One fact, which however impresses this Court is that the petitioner cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay the interest of different categories for about a decade during which the first respondent remained indifferent and inactive. Even if the delay on his part in pursuing the remedy cannot defeat his right, the petitioner cannot be made liable to pay interest for the said period. The first respondent cannot derive benefit of his own lapses. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of upholding the maintainability of the reference. It is however directed that the first respondent shall not be entitled to be paid the interest of different categories for the period between 1.1.1990 to 21.9.2000. For the remaining period, he shall be entitled for the same, in accordance with law.