Judgment 1. I. A. No. 91 of 2006 The respondent has filed the application under consideration under part II, Chapter IIIA, Rule 13 of Patna High Court Rules read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure (In short "CPC") for vacating the order dated 31.7.1992 passed by this Court staying the order of injunction granted by learned Additional District Judge VII, Gaya in Title Appeal No. 2 of 1979/9 of 1978 till the hearing of the appeal. 2. Case of respondent is that it is Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Gaya and it filed a suit praying for permanent injunction restraining Gaya Municipal Corporation, defendant/appellant from collecting tolls or settling by auction in the Kedar Nath Market as well as other markets in Gaya Town within Gaya Municipal Area on the grounds that vide Government notification, market area of the Gaya town has been declared as principal market yard and after compliance of provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Agriculture Produce Markets Act (In short "the Act"), plaintiff acquired absolute right to issue licences to the traders and levy the market fee and realise the same and regulate the market in the interest of agriculturist and by operation of law, the Municipality has ceased to have any right to collect toll and settle market with any person and realise the market fee from sellers and buyers. The further case of plaintiff was that by virtue of operation of law, the Municipality is not authorised to carry on business of agriculture produce in the market area and in spite of several notices served and acknowledgement by respondent Municipality, it went on advertising for settlement by auction. The defendant Municipality appeared and contested the suit which was dismissed and against the judgment and decree, plaintiff preferred Title Appeal No. 2 of 1979/9 of 1988 and the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree passed in original suit. Against that judgment and decree of lower Appellate Court, defendant has preferred the present appeal and on 31.7.1992, order was passed by this Court staying the order of injunction passed by lower Appellate Court till the hearing of this case. Against that judgment and decree of lower Appellate Court, defendant has preferred the present appeal and on 31.7.1992, order was passed by this Court staying the order of injunction passed by lower Appellate Court till the hearing of this case. According to plaintiff/ appellant/respondent, the Act is a special Act and its provisions shall prevail over other Acts and the lower Appellate Court has passed the judgment and decree correctly restraining the defendant/respondent/appellant to set up hat/bazar and holding auction of agricultural produce in the market area and stay against this judgment and decree has put the plaintiff/ appellant/respondent in irreparable loss and a prima facie case, balance of convenience and question of irreparable loss are all in favour of plaintiff/appellant/respondent. Prayer has been made for vacating the order dated 31.7.1992 passed by this Court. 3. The defendant/respondent/appellant, by filing counter-affidavit has opposed the prayer of plaintiff/appellant/respondent on the ground that it filed Memo of Appeal alongwith stay petition on 10.4.1992 and on 8.5.1992, notice to respondent in stay matter was issued and when respondent appeared and filed counter petition to the stay petition of appellant, after hearing both the parties, stay order was passed on 31.7.1992. The further case of defendant/ respondent/appellant is that instant writ petition is repetition of earlier grounds taken by plaintiff/appellant/respondent and present petition amounts review of earlier order dated 31.7.1992 passed by this Court which is not permissible in absence of any legal and valid grounds. It is further stated that during the pendency of appeal preferred by respondent before the lower Appellate Court, the respondent filed a writ petition numbered as CWJC No. 1170 of 1986 before this Court for the same relief sought in the suit and appeal by suppressing the entire facts of the suit and appeal and when a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of appellant, the said writ petition was allowed to be withdrawn (Annexure-1). Appellant has prayed for rejecting the prayer of respondent. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant, by relying upon decisions of Supreme Court reported in the cases of Y.B.Patil and Ors. V/s. Y.LPatil, (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 392) and Satyadhyan Ghosal and Ors. Appellant has prayed for rejecting the prayer of respondent. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant, by relying upon decisions of Supreme Court reported in the cases of Y.B.Patil and Ors. V/s. Y.LPatil, (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 392) and Satyadhyan Ghosal and Ors. V/s. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Anr., (AIR 1960 Supreme Court 941) has submitted that once a matter has been decided in one way the parties will not be allowed to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of same proceeding and principle of res judicata is attracted in such cases. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent/petitioner has argued that under Section 3 of the Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare its intention of regulating the produce, sale, storage and processing of such agricultural produce and in such area, as may be specified in the notification and under Section 4 of the Act after the expiry of the period specified in the notification issued under Section 3 and after considering such objection and suggestions as may be received before such expiry and after holding such enquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may by notification, declare the area specified in the notification under Section 3 or any portion thereof to be a market area for the purposes of this Act, in respect of all or any of the kinds of agricultural produce specified in the notification under Section 3. It is further argued that under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act it is provided that on and after the date of publication of the notification under subsection (1), or such later date as may be specified therein, no Municipality or other local authority, or other person, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, shall, within the market area, or within a distance thereof to be notified in the official gazette in this behalf set up, establish, or continue, or allow to be set up, established or continued, any-place for the purchase, sale, store or processing of any agricultural produce so notified, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Rules and bye-laws. An another decision reported in 1994(1) PLJR 407 has also been relied upon by learned counsel of respondent by which Section 4A of the Act has been declared ultra vires. 5. An another decision reported in 1994(1) PLJR 407 has also been relied upon by learned counsel of respondent by which Section 4A of the Act has been declared ultra vires. 5. The admitted position is that respondent filed Title Suit No. 381 of 1975 for permanent injunction restraining the appellants from collecting tolls or from settling by auction any portion of principal market yard and sub-market yards. It is also admitted that suit was dismissed and appeal against the judgment and decree of Court below was filed which was allowed and against the judgment of lower Appellate Court, appellant who was defendant in original suit and respondent in lower Appellate Court, has filed this appeal. When appellant filed the stay petition, after hearing the parties, stay was granted by order dated 31.7.1992. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent submits that there are two grounds in favour of respondent in making the prayer for vacating the stay order. According to him, first ground is that notifications issued by State Government under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act have been implemented in all other areas except Gaya town and another ground is that no doubt stay by this Court was granted after hearing the parties but it was granted on 31.7.1992 meaning thereby about fourteen years ago and since then hearing of appeal has not been taken up and in this way stay has remained for a considerable long time which was not expected by respondent when the stay order was passed. So far the first ground is concerned, that is a matter to be decided at the time of final hearing considering the materials on record. Since stay was granted after hearing both the parties, it cannot be vacated on the ground that appeal has not been listed for hearing. For early hearing of appeal, the respondent may make prayer before the Hon ble the Chief Justice for fixing early date of hearing of this appeal. The order of stay, as stated above, was passed after hearing both the parties and, thereafter, it was not challenged by respondent. 6. I, therefore, find no merit in the petition which is, accordingly, dismissed. 7. I.A. No. 91 of 2006 stands disposed of.