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2006 DIGILAW 152 (GAU)

Sobha Biswas v. Ranjit Lodh

2006-02-14

B.S.REDDY, H.N.SARMA

body2006
JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. These two revision petitions have been referred by the learned single Judge to the Division Bench for resolving the conflict that was noticed in the judgment of this Court rendered in Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala and Ors. v. Sohanlal Garodia and anr, reported in 1991 (GHC) 26A(NOC) and in Abdul Matin Choudhury and anr, v. Nityananda Dutta Banik, reported in 1997 (2) GLT 590. The conflict that was noticed by the learned single Judge relates to the requirement to pay the monthly rent by a tenant to the landlord during the pendency of an ejectment suit filed by the landlord against the tenant failure of which the Appellant would entitle eviction, even though the default relates to period after filing of the eviction suit. In case of Abdul Matin Choudhury and Anr. (Supra) it has been held that such a liability to pay the monthly rent to the land lord subsists even the eviction suit is pending and in case of default the land lord may bring the same to the notice of the Court by a prudent manner for getting decree of ejectment against the tenant. In the case of Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala and Ors. (supra) it has been held that in an ejectment suit on the ground of default filed by the land lord, the period of default is specified in the plaint and default for other subsequent period is not entitled to be considered by the Court in session of the eviction proceeding as it gives rise to separate cause of action. C.R.P. No. 34/2000 2. We have heard Mr. S.S. Sharma learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners/Plaintiffs and Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party/Defendant in C.R.P. No. 34/2000. We have also heard Mr. N. Choudhury learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. B.R. Dey, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party in C.R.P. No. 295/2002. 3. Instead of confining ourselves only in answering the reference, as agreed to by both the learned Counsel for the parties in C.R.P. No. 34/2000, we propose to dispose of the revision petition also on merit, in view of the undisputed facts. 4. B.R. Dey, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party in C.R.P. No. 295/2002. 3. Instead of confining ourselves only in answering the reference, as agreed to by both the learned Counsel for the parties in C.R.P. No. 34/2000, we propose to dispose of the revision petition also on merit, in view of the undisputed facts. 4. To put in short the relevant facts for disposal of the revision petition inter alia are as follows: The suit premises described in the schedule of the plaint was rented to the predecessor in interest of the opposite party on monthly rent of Rs. 251/- as per Bengali Calendar Month to be payable within the 1st week of the next months. An agreement was also executed between the parties to that effect and an amount of Rs. 5001/- was paid in advance to the landlord by the tenant to be adjusted at the rate of 100/- P.M. against the monthly rent. The tenant having defaulted to pay the rent from the month of Kartik 31st B.S. and the suit house also being required for bonafide use and occupation of the land lord for carrying on business of his son, and the tenant having refused to vacate the same on demand, the land lord/Petitioner filed Title Suit No. 23/85 in the Court of the learned, Munsiff, Goalpara for ejectment of the tenant. In due course, the said suit was transferred to the Court of the learned Munsiff, Bongaigaon. At the close of the trial the learned trial Court vide judgment and order dated 14.8.89 decreed the suit holding the tenant to be defaulter in payment of rent as well as on the ground of bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the land lord. The said decree was assailed by the Defendant/opposite party in Title Appeal No. 25/93 and the learned District Judge, Bongaigaon vide judgment and order dated 3.10.94 dismissed the appeal inter alia holding that the suit premises are required bonafide by the landlord, however, setting aside the finding of the learned trial Court on defaulter. The said judgment was further assailed by the tenant before the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 544/94 and vide judgment and order dated 2.9.97 setting aside the appellate judgment, the matter was remanded back by the High Court to the learned appellate Court for reconsideration. The said judgment was further assailed by the tenant before the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 544/94 and vide judgment and order dated 2.9.97 setting aside the appellate judgment, the matter was remanded back by the High Court to the learned appellate Court for reconsideration. After remand the parties examined one witness each and after hearing the parties, the learned appellate Court allowed the appeal setting aside the decree passed by the learned Munsiff vide judgment and order dated 14.8.89. Challenging the same, the present revision petition is filed by the landlord. In the meantime, original landlord/Plaintiff having expired his legal heirs have been substituted in the proceeding. 5. Mr. S.S. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that the Opposite party having failed to pay the monthly rent during the pendency of the eviction suit brought against him committed further default in payment of the monthly rent in respect of the suit premises entailing eviction on that count under the provision of the Act. It is further submitted that the findings relating to the bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the Petitioners/Plaintiffs is also vitiated by perversity and the learned appellate Court reversed the finding on a totally wrong approach and wrong test not supported by law. It is categorically submitted that the land lord having been able to prove the bonafide requirement of the suit premises for the business of his unemployed son as well as default in payment of the monthly rent by the opposite party, the impugned judgment and decree is to be set aside. 6. Per contra, Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has submitted that the finding of bonafide requirement is a finding of fact and the same is not entitled to be disturbed in exercise of the powers of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Per contra, Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has submitted that the finding of bonafide requirement is a finding of fact and the same is not entitled to be disturbed in exercise of the powers of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is further submitted that the subsequent fact relating to the default in payment off monthly rent during the pendency of the eviction proceeding is not to be considered in the present case, in as much as, the Petitioners/Plaintiffs filed the suit on specific ground of default for a specific period or specific cause of action and accordingly without amending the plaint by resorting to procedural requirement as envisaged by Code of Civil Procedure, such subsequent event cannot be considered so as to hold the tenant as defaulter. 7. The learned Single Judge having noticed some conflict in two earlier decisions rendered by this Court, as indicated herein above, has Referred for adjudication of the same by Bench of this Court. In the aforesaid background of facts, we are to resolve the conflict as noticed in the aforesaid cases, namely, Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala and Ors. and Abdul Matin Choudhury and Anr. (Supra), by the learned Single Judge as well as to test the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court. 8. In support of his argument, Mr. S.S. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners/Plaintiffs has referred to the following decisions: (1994) 5 SCC 14 (K.S. Sundararaju Chetiar v. M.R. Rama Chandra Nath AIR 1997 SC 628 (K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal) AIR 1998 SC 1183 (K. Urmila and Ors. v. Ram Kumar Verma) (2000) 2 SCC 32 (Mammu v. Hari Mohan and Anr.) (2000) 1 SCC 679 (Ragavendra Kumar v. Fire Prem Machinery and Co. AIR 2000 SC 1757 (Panpoi Dharmal Sansthan Dhoterkheda v. Bhagwan and Ors.) (1988) 2 SCC 372 (S. Appuhuttan v. Thundiyil Janake Amma and Anr.), (1996) 5 SCC 353 (Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan) AIR 1978 SC 955 (Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde) 9. Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party/Defendant has relied on the following decisions: (2003) 1 SCC 472 (Ram Nibas Gagar (Dead) By LRS v. Debojyoti Das and Ors.) (2002) 3 SCC 98 (J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd and Ors. Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party/Defendant has relied on the following decisions: (2003) 1 SCC 472 (Ram Nibas Gagar (Dead) By LRS v. Debojyoti Das and Ors.) (2002) 3 SCC 98 (J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd and Ors. v. M.R. Murali and Anr.), (1994) 2 SCC 289 (Kranti Swaroop Machine Tools Pvt. Ltd and Anr. v. Kanta Bai Asawa (Smt.) and Ors.). 10. Before rendering our findings on the point agitated by the learned Counsels, we deem it proper to have a glance at the relevant provisions of the related statute, namely, Assam Urban Area Rent Control Act, under which the present proceeding arises. 11. Section 5 of the Act puts an obligation upon the tenant to pay the monthly rent and also provides protection to the tenant from arbitrary eviction by the land lord. 11. Section 5 of the Act puts an obligation upon the tenant to pay the monthly rent and also provides protection to the tenant from arbitrary eviction by the land lord. Section 5 is quoted herein below: 5, Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejection: (1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy: Provided that nothing in the Sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house: (a) Where the tenant has done anything contrary to the provisions of Clause (m), Clause (o) or Clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of 1882) or to the spirit of the aforesaid clause in areas where the said Act does not apply, or (b) where the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to the occupiers of the adjoining or neighbouring houses, or (c) where the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court, or (d) where the tenant sublets the house or any part thereof or otherwise transfers his interest in the house or any part thereof without permission in writing from the landlord, or (e) where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due, or (f) where the tenant has built acquired or been allotted a suitable residence. (2) The transfer of the interest of the landlord in the house shall not affect the right of the tenant provided the tenant pays rent allowable under this Act to the transferee. (2) The transfer of the interest of the landlord in the house shall not affect the right of the tenant provided the tenant pays rent allowable under this Act to the transferee. (3) Where the landlord recovers possession of a house from a tenant on the ground that the house is bonafide required by him for purpose of repairs or rebuilding or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, and the repairs or the rebuilding of the house is not commenced or the house is not occupied by the landlord or such person within fifteen days of the date of vacation of the house by such tenant or the house having been so occupied is within six months of the said date re-let to or allowed to be possessed by any other person, the Court may, on the application of the evicted tenant made within seven months of his vacating the house, direct the landlord to put the evicted tenant in possession of the house within such period as the Court may fix and to pay him such compensation as appears to the Court to be reasonable and proper. Such a direction shall be deemed to be a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) and to be capable of execution as such under the provisions of that Code. 12. An analysis of Section 5 of the Act brings out that so long as the tenant pays the rent in question to the landlord and performs his condition of tenancy, he shall not be evicted. But this protection is not available when the tenant commits certain mischief within the meaning of Clause (m) (o) or (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or when the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to the occupiers of the neighbouring house or the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for the purposes of repairs/rebuilding or for his own occupation or where the tenant sub-lets the house or any part thereof or where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within the fortnight of its falling due, or where the tenant has built, acquired or allotted a suitable residence. The right of protection from eviction of a tenant is coupled with the obligations and duties referred to above, and is not in isolation to such obligation and duties put by the Act. 13. In the instant case, while remanding the matter by this Court on 2.9.97 it was also observed that "a tenant who does not pay the rent regularly and is defaulter in payment of rent is certainly not entitled to protection". It was further observed that "a tenant can enjoy protection under the Rent Control Act only when he performs his duty and obligation regarding payment of rent and other obligation required by the statute". Once a tenant fails to perform the duty as provided in the statute he will lose the protection and this aspect of the matter also directed to the considered by the appellate Court. After remand, the learned appellate Court while deciding the Issue No. 3 has found that the tenant has not paid/deposit any house rent after 24.7.89. But taking note of the fact that there was an advance deposit of Rs. 5001/- in the Court without adjustment of the same, the tenant would not be held as defaulter. We find that the learned Munsiff vide judgment and order dated 14.8.89 held the tenant to be a defaulter and decided the Issue No. 3 in favour of the Petitioners/Plaintiffs. Accordingly it was also decreed that the Petitioners/Plaintiffs are entitled to recover arrears of rent as claimed in the plaint and at the same time to return back the advance amount of Rs. 5001/- to the contesting Defendant within a month. Thus the aforesaid amount of Rs. 5001/- having been refunded by the Petitioners/Plaintiffs, it was kept in deposit in the Court. In such a situation, the finding of the learned appellate Court that in view of the aforesaid deposit of advance amount of Rs. 5001/- the tenant is not a defaulter cannot be said to be valid in law and the said amount cannot be treated as advance house rent deposited by the tenant and the finding to that effect is vitiated by perversity. 14. Now we propose to enter into the point referred by the learned Single Judge. 5001/- the tenant is not a defaulter cannot be said to be valid in law and the said amount cannot be treated as advance house rent deposited by the tenant and the finding to that effect is vitiated by perversity. 14. Now we propose to enter into the point referred by the learned Single Judge. Relating to the consideration of subsequent events the Apex Court in the case of Ram Nibas Gagar (Dead) by LRS (Supra) approving to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in (2002) 2 SCC 256 (Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal) (2002) 3 SCC 98 (J.J. Lal (P) Ltd. v. M.R. Murali) held as follows: 3. The law as to subsequent events has been examined in detail and summed up in a recent decision of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, a decision to which both of us are a party. The law has been reiterated by a subsequent Division Bench in J.J. Lal (P) Ltd. v. M.R. Murali. It has been held: The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties, and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law of founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the later case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17Code of Civil Procedure. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. Similar view has also been expressed in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal and Ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 762 by the Apex Court. 15. It is always open to a party to a civil litigation to bring to the notice of the Court any subsequent fact or event having relevance to the issue involved in a lis for just, proper, and effective disposal of the dispute and to do complete justice between the parties. There is an underlying public policy behind it that a litigation must come to its finality resolving the disputes raised in the litigation. An ejectment suit under the Assam Rent Control Act is tried as civil suit as per the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and there is no specific Rent Control Court in the State of Assam. Court is defined under Section 2(a) of Act as Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. As discussed herein above, the scheme of the Act provides that it is the duty and obligation of a tenant to pay the lawful rent due to the landlord so long as the tenant occupies the premises. During the continuation of the eviction proceeding the tenant is not absolved from paying the rent due. Accordingly, in the event there occurs any default at such stage, it is always open to the land lord to bring this fact to the notice of the Court by proper application and manner, for its due consideration. During the continuation of the eviction proceeding the tenant is not absolved from paying the rent due. Accordingly, in the event there occurs any default at such stage, it is always open to the land lord to bring this fact to the notice of the Court by proper application and manner, for its due consideration. On putting on record such subsequent facts or events the land lord will certainly get an opportunity to rebut the same. The decision of the learned Single Judge rendered in Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala (supra) to the effect that the cause of action of the suit on default in payment of rent for a particular period having been pleaded specifically, default for subsequent period cannot be taken into consideration for characterizing the tenant as a defaulter, is a finding per in curium, the learned Single Judge came to the said finding inter alia on the basis that the land lord of that case having claimed damage @ 25/- per day for subsequent period such a plea will not be available to him and the non payment of monthly rent for such period is not to be considered for determining the point of defaulter. In our considered opinion, the said decision does not lay down any specific law to the effect that subsequent events cannot be considered. Accordingly, the said decision has no binding force as a precedent or otherwise. 16. The other decision of this Court as rendered in Abdul Matin Choudhury and Anr. (supra) to the effect that the liability to pay the rent by a tenant shall subsist all through the proceeding even when the matter is pending before the highest Court and if at any point of time the land lord by prudent manner can bring to the notice of the Court that even during the pendency of the proceeding the tenant has failed to discharge his liabilities and right to pay rent in favour of the land lord to get the decree for ejectment under the Act, is arrived at gaining support from the decisions rendered in L.P.A. 11/76 (R.C. Basak v. D.N. Pandit). In our considered opinion the said principle declared by the learned single Judge is in consonance with the scheme and object of the Act and has laid down the correct proposition of law in this regard. In our considered opinion the said principle declared by the learned single Judge is in consonance with the scheme and object of the Act and has laid down the correct proposition of law in this regard. Accordingly, answering the referred question, we hold that a land lord can bring on record by proper method the subsequent event or facts such as default in payment of rent by the tenant during the pendency of the eviction of proceeding against him and on making such prayer the tenant would be entitled to object the same, if so desire. If the learned Court finds that the tenant has defaulted in payment of such rent during the pendency of the ejectment proceeding, the Court would be within its jurisdiction to pass an order of ejectment treating the tenant as a defaulter and pass appropriate orders thereon in the same suit. The land lord cannot be subjected to file successive suits for ejectment on the occasion of every default of the tenant, committed during the pendency of the eviction proceeding. 17. Assailing on the second ground i.e. the finding on the bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the Petitioners/Plaintiffs, it is submitted by Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel that the decision thereon is manifestly unjust, improper and against the purport of the term. While dealing with the Issue No. 4, the learned appellate Court noticed that during the pendency of the suit the Plaintiffs Dhiren Biswas died and his legal heirs were substituted vide order dated 9.2.88. Son of the original Plaintiff examining himself as an witness deposed inter alia that suit premises is required for the personal occupation for his brother Sri Ratan Biswas, who is out of employment to carry out business for his livelihood. But the learned appellate Court did not consider the same to be bonafide requirement as it was not deposed by the witness whether he would carry old family business of Hardware or a new Welding business and he is not obtained any trade license from the municipality to this effect. The said Sri Ratan Biswas is a I.T.I. Certificate holder in Welding and is unemployed. Obviously a trade license in respect of a business is to be obtained only after having a premises just before the starting the business and without getting the possession of the premises, no occasion arises for obtaining such a license. 18. The said Sri Ratan Biswas is a I.T.I. Certificate holder in Welding and is unemployed. Obviously a trade license in respect of a business is to be obtained only after having a premises just before the starting the business and without getting the possession of the premises, no occasion arises for obtaining such a license. 18. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions has laid down the test for bonafide requirement of the land lord, to refer some of them. (1994) 5 SCC 14 (supra) : AIR 1997 SC 628 (Supra): AIR 1998 SC 1188 (Supra) : (2002) 2 SCC 32 (Supra): (2000) 1 SCC 679 (Supra) : (1996) 5 SCC 353 (Supra) : (2005) 8 SCC 252 (Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. v. Vimalahai Prablnilul and Ors.). 19. Upon consideration and application of the test required to be applied in arriving at a decision on bonafide requirements, we find that the said finding of the learned appellate Court on the point of bonafide requirement is manifestly unreasonable and unjust in the context of the proved facts of the case. 20. Although Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party/Defendant has submitted that the finding of bonafide requirement is being the concurrent finding of fact it should not be disturbed by the revisional Court, we find that the said finding on Issue No. 4 is not concurrent finding. In fact, the learned trial Court also in deciding the said issue inter alia held that there is no reason to disbelieve the fact for bonafide requirement of the suit house and accordingly decided the issue in favour of the Plaintiffs/Petitioners. The said finding was reversed by the learned appellate Court by putting a wrong test and without having any cogent and acceptable reason supported by law. Accordingly, the decision on the said Issue No. 4 arrived at by the learned appellate Court reversing the finding of the learned trial Court is set aside and the finding of the learned trial Court is restored holding that the suit premises is necessary for the bonafide requirement of the Plaintiffs/Petitioners. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we set aside and quash the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Bongaigaon in Title Appeal No. 25/93 dated 21.12.99 and restore the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Bongaigaon in Title Suit No. 28/97. 22. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we set aside and quash the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Bongaigaon in Title Appeal No. 25/93 dated 21.12.99 and restore the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Bongaigaon in Title Suit No. 28/97. 22. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. C.R.P. No. 295/2002 23. This revision petition has also been referred to the Division Bench by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 8.11.05 for resolution of the conflict notice by the learned Single Judge in the decisions rendered in Abdul Matin Choudhury and Anr. v. Nityananda Dutta Banik, reported in(1997) 2 GLT 590 and Mahadeo Prasad Agarwala and Ors. v. Sohanlal Garodia and Anr. reported in(1991) GHC 26 (NOO like of the C.R.P. No. 34/2000. 24. Heard Mr. N. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. B.R. Dey, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents. In view of the detail discussions on facts made by the learned single Judge and no differences on the basic facts having been raised by the learned Counsels for the parties, we propose not to burden the judgment by repetition of the facts. 25. In the C.R.P. No. 34/2000 we have held that the subsequent event relating to the default in payment of monthly rent due to the land lord by the tenant/Petitioner can be brought on record by proper application by the land lord. However, in such an event the tenant should be provided an opportunity to rebut the allegation of such subsequent default. To this extent there is no dispute between the learned Counsels relating to the consideration of subsequent events or facts having vital bearing in the matter in dispute as held above. The said subsequent event involved in this case, namely, non payment of rent for the month of January and May, 1996 in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act which is regarded to be the logical consequences of the dismissal of R.D. Case No. 44/96 and 224/96 for failure to take steps for service of notice as per mandatory requirement of Section 5(4) of the Act. The land lord may bring those facts in proper manner by filing proper application before the learned appellate Court, on which the tenant/Petitioner would be entitled to submit his objection. The land lord may bring those facts in proper manner by filing proper application before the learned appellate Court, on which the tenant/Petitioner would be entitled to submit his objection. Therefore the learned appellate Court shall decide the entitlement of the land lord to get a decree of eviction provided the land lord succeeds in proving the fact that the tenant committed default in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act, during the pendency eviction suit against him. 26. Accordingly, this case is remanded back to the learned Lower Appellate Court for disposal in the manner indicated herein above. Since the dispute relates to an eviction suit filed in the year 1988 i.e. Title Suit No. 279/88, the learned appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and not later than 4(four) months from the date of receipt of the records. For expeditious disposal the parties are directed to appear before the learned appellate Court on 28.2.2006 for receiving further instructions from the learned appellate Court. 27. Office is directed to send down the Lower Court Record forthwith to the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Karimganj.