JUDGMENT T.N.K. Singh, J. 1. By this writ petition the order of the Executive Committee of the Gauhati Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., dated 30.1.2003 and order of the General Manager, Gauhati Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd. dated 9.5.2003 have been put to challenge. For the reasons being discussed below, this Court is interfering the impugned orders dated 9.5.2003 for the limited purpose of directing the Respondents 3 and 4 to re-consider the ultimate penalty of termination from service imposed to the Petitioner under the impugned orders for the purpose of imposing any penalty to the Petitioner other than termination from service. 2. The Petitioner was working as Assistant Cashier in the Gauhati Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. and he was asked to show cause for the charge that: (i) On 30.03.2002 a full working day he opened the receipt counter before the schedule time and close the counter before the schedule time without any prior permission from the authority, he also instigated some employees of the said Bank not to work full day on 30.03.2002 and ask them to leave the office is violation of the instruction of the reserve Bank of India; (ii) That the Petitioner created a disorderly atmosphere on 30.03.2002 in the Guwahati Branch since 12.00 Noon effecting the normal working of the bank. (iii) That the Petitioner took the cash deposit of the day into his own hand and entered into the General Manager's chamber without his prior permission in a disorderly manner and thrown away the keys of the cash box on the table of the General Manager. Under a show cause notice dated 20.9.2002 issued by the disciplinary authority. For the said charge, one Shri S.N. Sarma, retired Judge/Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct an inquiry. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report and findings on 8.1.2003 and subsequently, the Executive Committee in its meeting held on 24.1.2003 perused all the connected papers, charge sheets, inquiry report, etc. and resolved that: i) Shri Hemendra Nath Thakuria, Assistant Cashier be reinstated in service with immediate effect. ii) His three annual increments in future be stopped with effect from 01.01.2003 as a measure of punishment for the misconduct committed by him. and resolved that: i) Shri Hemendra Nath Thakuria, Assistant Cashier be reinstated in service with immediate effect. ii) His three annual increments in future be stopped with effect from 01.01.2003 as a measure of punishment for the misconduct committed by him. iii) Before resuming his duties, Shri Thakuria shall have to give an undertaking stating that he shall always be obedient, faithful, shall not do anything which is detrimental to the interest of the Bank, abide the orders of his superiors, co-operate with all his colleagues, senior officers, members of the Board of Directors/Executive Committee, not divulge any secrecy of the Bank, not obstruct any employee of the Bank who are willing to work at any stage whatsoever. However, Shri Thakuria will get nothing except the subsistence allowance that he has already drawn during the period of his suspension. The Executive Committee by an order dated 30.1.2003 imposed penalty to the Petitioner as per the resolutions taken in its meeting held on 24.1.2003. 3. The Petitioner submitted a representation dated 28.2.2003 to the Chairman, Gauhati Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. requesting for cancellation of the impugned order dated 30.1.2003 and allowing him to join in his duty unconditionally. Again, on 26.4.2003, the General Manager of the Gauhati Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. issued a letter asking the Petitioner to report for his duty on or before 30.5.2003, otherwise the management will cease the provisions for further accommodation of the Petitioner in the Bank. As the Petitioner did not join for duty on or before 3.5.2003, the General Manager of the Bank issued the termination order dated 9.5.2003 to the effect that the Executive Committee after due consideration and threadbare discussion was of the opinion that the Petitioner should not be allowed to join after 3.5.2003 and on his failure to report for duty on or before 3.5.2003 his service had been terminated w.e.f. 3.5.2003. The Petitioner also filed a representation dated 8.8.2003 to the Chairman, Gauhati Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. for reinstatement of the service. The Petitioner also filed a representation dated 8.8.2003 to the Chairman, Gauhati Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. for reinstatement of the service. The Chairman, Gauhati Co-operative Bank Ltd. under his letter dated 30.1.2004 informed the Petitioner that his prayer could not be considered and disposed of till date due some unavoidable circumstances, but necessary action in this regard will be initiated as per rules as a departmental officer had joined the Bank recently as General Manager as deputed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Assam, a copy of which is available at Annexure-30 to the present writ petition. 4. It appears that the Petitioner is quite meltdown due to passage of time and ready to accept the minor penalty imposed to him under the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Bank in its meeting held on 24.1.2003 which has been quoted above in entirety. In this background the case of the Petitioner in the present writ petition for challenging the impugned termination order dated 9.5.2003 is that the ultimate penalty of termination from service imposed to the Petitioner is disproportionately harsh to the charge levelled against the Petitioner. 5. The Respondents No. 3 and 4 had filed their affidavit-in-opposition and in their affidavit-in-opposition it is specifically mentioned that the Petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to report for duty with the minor penalty imposed under the said resolution of the Executive Committee of the Bank in its meeting held on 24.1.2003 and also that the inquiry against the Petitioner was proceeded with all fairness and the Petitioner had all the opportunities to represent and defence himself. As the inquiry was conducted by taking into all the aspects of this case and reply filed by the Petitioner, there can be no ground for raising any grievance challenging the decision of the Inquiry Officer. 6. It is a settled principle of law that if the disciplinary inquiry has been conducted fairly without any bias or predilection, in accordance with the relevant disciplinary rules and constitutional provisions, the order passed by such authorities cannot be interfered with in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, merely on the ground that it was based on evidence which would be insufficient for conviction of the delinquent on the same charge at the criminal trial. It is also equally well settled that in the departmental proceedings disciplinary authority is the sole judge. It is also equally well settled that in the departmental proceedings disciplinary authority is the sole judge. Once finding of facts based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings are based either on no evidence or that findings are wholly perverse. Judicial review of the findings of the departmental inquiry is very limited and judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charge as it is not an appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at Ref: Principal Secretary, Govt. of A.P. and Anr. v. M. Adinarayana, (2004) 12 SCC 579 . 7. Keeping in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court regarding the power of the judicial review of the findings of the departmental inquiry, this Court is not interfering with the findings of the inquiry against the Petitioner in the present case. The scope of interference to the quantum of punishment has been the subject matter of various decisions of the Apex Court. It is too late for the day to re-examine the scope of interference of the quantum of punishment and Justice Arijit Pasayat [Judge of the Apex Court] in a number of classic judgments had settled the scope of interference of the quantum of punishment in exercising the powers for judicial review of the superior courts. 8. Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service (called CCSU case) summarized the principle of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or the other of the following, viz. legality, procedural, irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that "proportionality" was a "future possibility". According to my opinion, Lord Diplock for the first time opened the window of "proportionality" in the judicial review of administrative action. Now, the Apex Court in a catena of cases held that "proportionality" is one of the basis for judicial review of the quantum of punishment imposed on the delinquent/employee by the disciplinary authority. While exercising the power of judicial review of the quantum of punishment basing on "proportionality" the court is applying Wednesbury Principle as secondary reviewing authority and also the court will not apply "proportionality" as a primary reviewing court. While exercising the power of judicial review of the quantum of punishment basing on "proportionality" the court is applying Wednesbury Principle as secondary reviewing authority and also the court will not apply "proportionality" as a primary reviewing court. Therefore, the court could exercise right of secondary review based only on Wednesbury Principle. Lord Bridge explained the primary and secondary review in Brind Case (1991) 1 ACC 696 : (1991)1 All ER 720 : (1991) 2 WLR 588 (HL) as follows: The primary judgment as to whether the particular competing public interest justifying the particular restriction imposed falls to be made by the Secretary of State to whom parliament has entrusted the discretion. But, we are entitled to exercise a secondary judgment by asking whether a reasonable Secretary of State, on the material before him, could reasonably make the primary judgment. The Constitution Bench E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L & S) 165 held that where a punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged, question will be whether the administrative order is "rational" or "reasonable" and the test then is the Wednesbury Test. The Apex Court in Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) SCC 1806 had summed up position relating to "proportionality" in paras-31 and 32 which read as follows: 31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and India can be summarized as follows: (1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was done on which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not however go to the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not however go to the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out These are the CCSU (1985) ACC 374 principles. (3) (a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith as long as the Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3) (b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4) (a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4) (b). Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Article 19, 21, etc. are involved and not for Article 14. 32. Finally, we come to the present case. It will be then necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Article 19, 21, etc. are involved and not for Article 14. 32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of 'proportionality'. There is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to 'irrationality', there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in 'outrageous' defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain 'Ranjit Thakur'. 9. The Apex Court in Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 held that unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. Para-12 of the judgment in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 (supra) is quoted as under: 12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. Again, the Apex Court in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321 had discussed the scope of judicial review of the quantum of punishment on the basis of "proportionality". Paras 21, 22 and 23 of the judgment in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (supra) are quoted as under: 21. Again, the Apex Court in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321 had discussed the scope of judicial review of the quantum of punishment on the basis of "proportionality". Paras 21, 22 and 23 of the judgment in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (supra) are quoted as under: 21. Coming to the question whether the punishment awarded was disproportionate, it is to be noted that the various allegations as laid in the departmental proceedings reveal that several acts of misconduct unbecoming of a bank official were committed by the Respondent. 22. It is to be noted that the detailed charge-sheets were served on the Respondent employee who not only submitted written reply, but also participated in the proceedings. His explanations were considered and the inquiry officer held the charges to have been amply proved. He recommended dismissal from service. The same was accepted by the disciplinary authority. The proved charges clearly established that the Respondent employee failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. In the appeal before the prescribed Appellate Authority, the findings of the inquiry officer were challenged. The Appellate Authority after analyzing the materials on record found no substance in the appeal. 23. The scope of interference with the quantum of punishment has been the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court. Such interference cannot be a routine matter. 10. The Apex Court in the Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy (supra) and in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 (supra) is of the view that a bank officer is required to exercise higher standard of honesty and integrity. Coming back to the case in hand, as stated above, the charge against the Petitioner is not for lack of honesty and integrity but the charge was for minor disobedience of the higher authority and also for creating minor disorderly atmosphere effecting to normal working of the bank. 11. Coming back to the case in hand, as stated above, the charge against the Petitioner is not for lack of honesty and integrity but the charge was for minor disobedience of the higher authority and also for creating minor disorderly atmosphere effecting to normal working of the bank. 11. This Court as stated above, is not interfering the minor penalty imposed to the Petitioner under the resolution of the Executive Committee in its meeting held on 24.1.2003 inasmuch as this Court is also of the considered view that the minor penalty imposed under the resolution of the Executive Committee meeting held on 24.1.2003 would be the punishment appropriate for the charge levelled against the Petitioner. But because of the failure of the Petitioner to report for duty with minor penalty on or before 3.5.2003, extreme penalty of termination from service to the Petitioner has been imposed under the impugned order dated 9.5.2003. This Court by applying the principle of judicial review on the quantum of punishment on the basis of "proportionality" enunciated by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above and also by applying the Wednesbury Test is of the considered view that the ultimate penalty of termination of service imposed to the Petitioner under the impugned order dated 9.5.2003 is too harsh and shockingly disproportionate. 12. For the reasons discussed above, the impugned order dated 9.5.2003 is quashed for the limited purpose of allowing the Respondents No. 4 and 5 to re-consider the ultimate penalty of termination of service imposed to the Petitioner for the purpose of imposing any penalty other than termination of service to the Petitioner. The writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned above. Parties have to bear their own costs. Petition allowed