( 1 ) ONE Sivagangulamma @ Sivamma ayoung woman - aged 24 years (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) committed suicide on 3-6-1999 by jumping into an irrigation well near kattakinda village fields of Thavanampalll mandal. afterthrowing her three children viz. , bharath Kumar, Yamini and Thulasi Prasad into the said well, within seven years of her marriage. Alleging that the said death of deceased is a dowry death, her husband and parents-in-law, who are appellants herein were tried as A-1 to A-3 in S. C. No. 173 of 2000 on the file of the Court of the VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chittoor, for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the Indian penal Code, 1860. On trial, learned Additional sessions Judge found A-1 to A-3 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of ipc and accordingly convicted and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years each. As against the said judgment, dated 9-11 -2001, appellants have preferred this criminal appeal. ( 2 ) CASE of prosecution, in brief is that A-1 is the son of A-2 and A-3. The marriage between A-1 and deceased was performed on 12-11-1992 at Mogileswaraswami temple, mogili, Bangaripalem Mandal as per Hindu rites and customs. Prior to the said marriage, there were marriage talks and at that time A-1 to A-3 demanded a dowry of rs. 25,000. 00 and gold jewels, such as two-rows gold chain weighing about 30 grams; one pair of gold ear studs with jumkees about 10 grams; gold vanki ring about 6 grams; gold ring 4 grams; gold minor chain 10 grams; gold ginne-bottu about half a gram, from the father of deceased, who was examined as P. W. 3. P. W. 3 agreed to give all the gold jewels, except one pair of jumkees and instead, he agreed to pay a cash of Rs. 10,000. 00 only in the presence of P. W. 5 and one B. Ramamurthy (LW-8 ). Atthetimeof marriage, P. W. Sgaveall gold jewels, except cash of Rs. 10,000. 00, as promised, and agreed to pay the same at a later point of time. After marriage, deceased went to the house of her parents-in-law i. e. at govindareddipalli village and was leading marital life with A-1. While so, A-1 to A-3 started harassing deceased to bring rs. 10,000. 00, vessels and other articles from her parents. 10,000. 00, as promised, and agreed to pay the same at a later point of time. After marriage, deceased went to the house of her parents-in-law i. e. at govindareddipalli village and was leading marital life with A-1. While so, A-1 to A-3 started harassing deceased to bring rs. 10,000. 00, vessels and other articles from her parents. Subsequently, parents of deceased paid an amount of Rs. 10,000. 00 to a-1. In spite of that A-1 to A-3 continued to harass the deceased to bring a television set and almirah etc. , and in those circumstances, deceased went to her parents house at neelapalle with her children and stayed there. ( 3 ) IT is the further case of prosecution that on 21-1-1995, P. W. 11 and two others held a mediation regarding the dispute between deceased and A-1 and on the same day A-1 executed a document promising that he would not cause any harm to the deceased. Thereupon, deceased went to the house of accused at Govindareddipalli along with her children. However, A-1 to A-3 continued to harass the deceased, and unable to bear the said harassment, deceased threw her three children viz. , Bharath Kumar, Yamini and thulasi Prasad into an irrigation well of accused and she also jumped into the same well with a view to committing suicide and all the four drowned and died. Later, on 3-6-1999, based on a complaint given by the Village administrative Officer, Gajulapalle, who was examined as P. W. 1, the Station House Officer, thavanampalli Police Station, registered a case in Crime Nos. 25 to 28 of 1999 under section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the Code ). On 4-6-1999, on receipt of complaint from P. W. 3, Sub Inspector of Police, Thavanampalli Police Station, who was examined as P. W. 14, altered the section of law from Section 174 of the Code to one under Section 304-B of IPC. The Mandal revenue Officer, Thavanampalli, who was examined as P. W. 10 conducted inquest over the dead bodies of deceased and her three children. P. W. 6 conducted autopsy over the dead body of deceased-wife and issued ex. P-11 postmortem certificate opining that deceased would appear to have died due to asphyxia due to drowning. P. Ws. 7 to 9 conducted autopsy overthe dead bodies of the children of deceased and issued Exs. P. W. 6 conducted autopsy over the dead body of deceased-wife and issued ex. P-11 postmortem certificate opining that deceased would appear to have died due to asphyxia due to drowning. P. Ws. 7 to 9 conducted autopsy overthe dead bodies of the children of deceased and issued Exs. P-12 to p-14 postmortem certificates opining that they would appear to have died of asphyxia due to drowning. After completion of investigation, p. W. 15 filed charge sheet. ( 4 ) ON appearance of A-1 to A-3 and after hearing both sides, learned Additional sessions Judge framed a charge under section 304-B of IPC, read overand explained to them in Telugu, for which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 5 ) IN order to bring home the guilt of accused, prosecution examined P. Ws. 1 to 15 and got marked Exs. P-1 to P-19 and M. Os. 1 to 15. On behalf of defence, D. W. 1 was examined and Exs. D-1 to D-16 were marked. ( 6 ) AS already stated, on an analysis of both oral and documentary evidence, learned additional Sessions Judge found A-1 to A-3 guilty of the offence punishable under section 304-B of IPC and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as stated supra. Assailing the said conviction and sentence, A-1 to A-3 preferred this criminal appeal. However, it is reported that during the pendency of appeal, a-2 died, therefore, the case against him is abated. ( 7 ) HEARD Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for appellants, learned Additional Public prosecutorand perused impugned judgment and other material on record. ( 8 ) IT is mainly contended by learned senior counsel that simply because a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage, it cannot be said that it is an offence falling under Section 304-B of IPC, unless and until prosecution establishes the fact that soon before her death there was harassment as provided for under Section 304-B of IPC read with Section 113-Bof the Indian Evidence act, 1872 (for short, the Act ). According to learned senior counsel Exs. P-4, P-5 and P-6 are of the years 1995 and 1996 and hence, trial court ought not to have taken them into consideration at all to convict appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of ipc. According to him, except the interested and discrepant testimony of P. Ws. According to learned senior counsel Exs. P-4, P-5 and P-6 are of the years 1995 and 1996 and hence, trial court ought not to have taken them into consideration at all to convict appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of ipc. According to him, except the interested and discrepant testimony of P. Ws. 3 and 4, whoare none otherthan the father and brother of deceased, there is absolutely no evidence worth mentioning to hold that appellants are guilty of the offence punishable under section 304-B of IPC. It is further contended by learned senior counsel that even the evidence of P. Ws. 5 and 11, who are the alleged mediators, in regard to their mediation was of the years 1995 and 1996 and if at all there was any harassment, the said harassment was before 1996, for which appellants cannot be convicted forthe offence under Section 304-B of IPC and it is, therefore, contended that appellants are entitled for acquittal. ( 9 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor while supporting the impugned judgment of trial Court contended thatthere is no limitation and the alleged harassment is a continuing offence and the suicide by deceased along with her three children, is solely on account of the said harassment and hence, trial Court is perfectly justified in convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under section 304-B of IPC. ( 10 ) TO constitute an offence under section 304-B of IPC, the essential ingredients are: (1) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) such death must have been occurred within seven years from the date of her marriage (3)soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relative of her husband for, or in connection with demand for dowry. ( 11 ) LOOKING at the case on hand, keeping the above principles in mind, it is clearthat the death of deceased is unnatural, as she committed suicide by jumping into the well, after throwing her three children into the said well, and her death occurred within seven years of her marriage, as her marriage was performed on 12-11-1992 while her death occurred on 3-6-1999. So, prosecution has to establish the third requirement by way of cogent evidence as to whether the alleged suicide of deceased with her three children is solely on account of the harassment meted out to her at the hands of appellants soon before her death as provided under section 304-B of IPC. ( 12 ) THE phrase soon before her death as defined, under Section 304-B of IPC was discussed by various High Courts and the apexcourt. In Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab\ it was held at paragraphs 21 and 22, as follows- 21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is at any time after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are in connection with the marriage of the said parties. This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties. There can be many other instances forpayment of money orgiving property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of achildorotherceremoniesare prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of dowry, Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304-B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. 22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened soon before her death. The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words soon before her death is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry-related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words soon before her death is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry-related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval which elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the harassment orcruelty would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particularcase was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept soon before her death ( 13 ) YET again in Hira Lal v. State (Government of NCT), Delhi, it was held as follows: "the expression soon before her death used in the substantive Section 304-B ipc and Section 113-B of the Evidence act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression soon before is not defined. A reference to the expression soon before used in Section 114 illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term soon before is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression soon before would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become state enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequences. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become state enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequences. " ( 14 ) IN the following judgments also, the same opinion was expressed by the Apex court: in Kaliyaperumal v. State of T. N, in kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar and State of A. P. v. Raj Gopalasawa. ( 15 ) IN the light of the above law, it is clear that no straightjacket formula can be evolved in coming to the conclusion that soon before her death within the meaning of section 304-B of IPC means a specific period. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Keeping the above principles in mind, when we look at Exs. P-4 to P-6, it is clearthatthey would not render any assistance to the case of prosecution. As the alleged agreement, dated 21-1-1995, marked as ex. P-4; letter dated 13-3-1996, marked as ex. P-5, alleged to have been written by deceased to herfatherand brother; and another (un-dated) letter, marked as Ex. P-6, addressed again by deceased to her father and brother, would definitely establish that there was harassment. Butas Exs. P-4 to P-6 were of the years 1995 and 1996 and as they have become stale, it cannot be said that the said harassment was soon before her death a defined under section 304-B of IPC, as the said suicide of deceased along with herthree children was on 3-6-1999. Hence, this Court is of the view that this Court cannot accept Exs. P-4 to P-6 to base conviction of appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC. ( 16 ) WHEN once Exs. P-4 to P-6 are eschewed from consideration there remains the evidence of P. Ws. 3,4,5 and 11. As stated above, P. W. 3 is the father and P. W. 4 is the brother of deceased. As rightly contended by learned senior counsel, theirevidence is totally inconsistent. For instance P. W. 3 in his evidence deposed that he and his son i. e. P. W. 4 went to the house of the accused with a cash of Rs. 10,000. 00 and handed over the cash to A-1. As rightly contended by learned senior counsel, theirevidence is totally inconsistent. For instance P. W. 3 in his evidence deposed that he and his son i. e. P. W. 4 went to the house of the accused with a cash of Rs. 10,000. 00 and handed over the cash to A-1. He further stated that he also gave gold ear studs with jumkees and also purchased household utensils worth rs. 5,000. 00 at Chittoor and gave them to accused. He further deposed that he went to thavanampalli Police Station, in the same lorry, whereat his eldest son i. e. P. W. 4 gave complaint. However, the evidence of the brother of deceased, who was examined as P. W. 4 is to the effect that twenty days after deceased gave birth to a male child, he went to the house of accused with a cash of Rs. 15,000. 00 and paid Rs. 10,000. 00 to A-2 and with the remaining rs. 5,000. 00 he purchased household utensils for his sister. He further deposed that after some time he went to the house of accused and in his presence A-1 beat his sister and asked herto inform himtopurchasea television, a steel cupboard and big cauldrons. He further deposed that whenever he and his family visited the house of accused they were not talking with them and were beating his sister in their presence. In fact, according to him he is the person who gave a report at the Police station, Thavanampalli on 3-6-1999, which was supported by one of the investigating officer, who was examined as P. W. 14. Thus, there are major discrepancies in the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 and apart from that nowhere in their evidence they have stated that just priorto the death of deceased i. e. on 3-6-1999 there was harassment for dowry, on account of which only the deceased committed suicide. ( 17 ) AS discussed above, prosecution shall prove that soon before her death there was harassment. When once Exs. P-3, P-4 and p-5 are eschewed from consideration and p. Ws. ( 17 ) AS discussed above, prosecution shall prove that soon before her death there was harassment. When once Exs. P-3, P-4 and p-5 are eschewed from consideration and p. Ws. 3 and 4 deposed inconsistently and do not state that there was harassment soon before the death of deceased, it is not possible to hold that accused are guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and accordingly the conviction and sentence imposed on appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC is liable to be set aside. ( 18 ) THOUGH this Court is of the view that prosecution miserably failed to bring home the guilt of accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC, that is not the end of the matter. The point now to be considered is whetherthe evidence on record would come within the meaning of cruelty as defined under Section 498-A of IPC. Before proceeding to considerthe above question, it would be apt to refer to Section 498 of IPC, which reads as follows- "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty:-Whoever, being the husband orthe relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman, to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, cruelty means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or heath (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property to valuable security or is on account of failure by herorany person related to her to meet such demand. " ( 19 ) IT is difficult rather impossible, to enumerate acts amounting to cruelty orto put cruel conduct into a straight jacket or to make cruel conduct conformable to any inflexible standard. The danger of any attempt at giving a comprehensive definition of cruelty that may embrace all cases and situations has been repeatedly emphasized by Courts. " ( 19 ) IT is difficult rather impossible, to enumerate acts amounting to cruelty orto put cruel conduct into a straight jacket or to make cruel conduct conformable to any inflexible standard. The danger of any attempt at giving a comprehensive definition of cruelty that may embrace all cases and situations has been repeatedly emphasized by Courts. The term cruelty has been designedly left by the judicial authorities too, to an elastic form to meet the necessities of the changing requirements and concepts of the Society. Cruelty is not a fact isolated from the environment and background of the spouses, therefore, each case ought to be decided individually accordingtothepeculiarsetupof the case. Therefore, the conduct complained of must be decided to a certain degree by reference to the parties capacity or incapacity for endurance. So, in ordertoavoid speculation or ambiguity regarding any interpretation of the word cruelty the explanation to section 498-A of IPC provides as to what amounts to cruelty for purpose of section 498-A of IPC. For purpose of section 498-A of IPC, according to explanation (a) any willful conduct, which is of such nature, as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause any grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman, is cruelty. ( 20 ) THE very same evidence let in by prosecution i. e. Exs. P-4, P-5 and P-6 coupled with the evidence of the father and brother of deceased, who were examined as P. Ws. 3 and 4, and the conduct of deceased in committing suicide and making her children to die an unnatural death, clearly indicate that there is cruelty within the meaning of section 498-A of IPC and the same can be presumed by the Court as provided for under section 114 of the Act. In this context, it may not be out of place to mention the judgment of shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmeer, wherein referring to the applicability of section 106 of the Act to criminal prosecution, the Apex Court laid down in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Report as under: "section 106 is an exception to Sec. 101. Section 101 lays down the general rule about the burden of proof. Section 101 lays down the general rule about the burden of proof. "whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. " Illustration (a) says -a desires a Court to give judgment that b shall be punished for a crime which A says B has committed. A must prove that B has committed the crime (ii) This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. " ( 21 ) SIMILARLY in Collector of Customs, madras v. D. Bhoormulf, anotherbench of two learned judges of the apex court, while considering the offence under Sea Customs act, 1878 earmarked the scope of Section 106 of the Act in the following terms in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the Report. "31. The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered- to use the words of Lord Mansfield in blatch v. Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at p. 65 according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted. Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent orthe accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. 32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive department to unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar knowledge of the person concerned in it. 32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive department to unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar knowledge of the person concerned in it. On the principle underlying Section 106, evidence Act, the burden to establish those facts is cast on the person concerned and if he fails to establish or explain thosefacts, an adverse inference of facts may arise against him which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in the result prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best in law of evidence (12"1 Edn. Article 320, page 291), the "presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumption juris: but every days practice shows that it may be successfully encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property", though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the burden on the prosecution or the Department may be considerably lightened even by such presumption of fact arising in theirfavour. However, this does not mean that the special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the prosecution orthe Department altogether of the burden of producing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight evidence may suffice. " ( 22 ) SIMILARLY in anotherjudgment reported balram Prasad Agrawal v. State of Bihar3, tne Apex Court has taken the view that the courts can definitely presume certain things under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder- 12. It is also to be appreciated that evidenceoffatherof the deceased P. W. 6 shows that his daughters married life in the husband of the accused had undergone rough weatherall throughout. She was ill-treated both for not bringing dowry amount to the satisfaction of the accused and also for not giving birth to children. Accused No. 1, her husband, also was contemplating to remarry one lalo Devi as letters Ex. 4 and 4/1 showed. Complainant,sevidencefurther showed that his deceased daughter had earlier tried to commit suicide but was saved in the nick of time by neighbours. Accused No. 1, her husband, also was contemplating to remarry one lalo Devi as letters Ex. 4 and 4/1 showed. Complainant,sevidencefurther showed that his deceased daughter had earlier tried to commit suicide but was saved in the nick of time by neighbours. Even after birth of two sons ill-treatment of his deceased daughter and quarrels with her continued till thefateful night as deposed to by complainant P. W. 6 and as corroborated by even hostile witness p. W. 3 as seen earlier. It can, therefore, safely be presumed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the cruel treatment meted out to the deceased by the accused earlier had continued unabated till the very last when she was forced to commit suicide on that fateful night. Such a presumption of continuance of cruel treatment which is established on record necessarily points an accusing fingerto the accused. Such presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act has remained unrebutted on record. This is another clinching circumstance well established against the accused. In this connection we may refer to what this court said in two of its judgments. In ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal rai (Dead) by his L. Rs. , AIR 1966 SC 605 a three member Bench of this Court referring to illustration (d) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act has made the following pertinent observations in para 15 of the Report: "if a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed in illus. (d) to sec. 114. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things back wards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rulethatthe presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has be,en recognized both in India. This is rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards. The presumptionof continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of thething and the surrounding circumstances. The rulethatthe presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has be,en recognized both in India. This is rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards. The presumptionof continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of thething and the surrounding circumstances. " Another three member Bench of this court in the case of Kali Ram v. State of himachal Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 2773 speaking through Khanna, J. has made the following pertinent observations in paragraph 24 of the Report: "leaving aside the cases of statutory presumptions, the onus is upon the prosecution to prove the different ingredients of the offence and unless it discharges that onus, the prosecution cannot succeed. The Court may, of course, presume, as mentioned in section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The illustrations mentioned in that section, though taken from different spheres of human activity, are not exhaustive. They are based upon human experience and have to be applied in the context of the facts of each case. The illustrations are merely examples of circumstances in which certain presumptions may be made. Other presumptions of a similar kind in similar circumstances can be made under the provisions of section itself. Whether or not a presumption can be drawn underthe section in a particular case depends ultimately upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Human behaviour is so complex that room must be left for play in the joints. It is not possible to formulae a series of exact propositions and confine human behaviour within straightjackets. Theraw material here is far too complex to be susceptible of precise and exact propositions for exactness herein is a fake. " 13. It must, therefore, be held that the prosecution had fully established its case against the accused that on the fateful night between 30th October and 31st october 1988 deceased Kiran Devi was subjected to cruelty by her mother-in-law, her husband accused No. 1 and his elder brother accused No. 3 which forced her to commit suicide. " 13. It must, therefore, be held that the prosecution had fully established its case against the accused that on the fateful night between 30th October and 31st october 1988 deceased Kiran Devi was subjected to cruelty by her mother-in-law, her husband accused No. 1 and his elder brother accused No. 3 which forced her to commit suicide. It is easy to visualize the unbearable state of affairs on that night when a young house wife having two minor children, the younger only four and a half years of age, had to jump in the well to end her miserable existence in the about:blank ouse of the accused. Unless the torture to her had become unbearable in the common course of human conduct such a young housewife having commitments to life could not have taken the drastic step to end her life, leaving her infant sons in the lurch and at the mercy of the accused especially when her husband accused no. 1 was contemplating a remarriage. As the Special Leave Petition of accused no. 2 mother-in-law of deceased Kiran devi has been dismissed we need not say anything about her culpability. However, the aforesaid evidence clinchingly establishes beyond shadow of reasonable doubt that respondents, original accused Nos. 1 and 3 by their willful and persistent conduct of cruelty on Kiran Devi had driven her to commit suicide by jumping in the well in the compound of their house. It is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that she might have accidentally fallen in the well. It has to be kept in view that at 3. 00 o clock in winter night while the deceased would be sleeping in the house there would have been no occasion for her to go in the back verandah and fall accidentally in the well which was 25 ft away from the back door of the house as seen from the evidence of P. W. 8 the investigation Officer. On the contrary the prosecution evidence clearly indicated beyond shadow of reasonable doubt that because of the mistreatment by the accused and the consistent course of cruelty perpetrated on her, she had on the fateful night suffered from the last straw that broke the camels back. On the contrary the prosecution evidence clearly indicated beyond shadow of reasonable doubt that because of the mistreatment by the accused and the consistent course of cruelty perpetrated on her, she had on the fateful night suffered from the last straw that broke the camels back. Earlier she had jumped in the same well to put an end to her miserable existence but was saved by the neighbou rs. Yet the life for her in the household of the accused did notimprovesubsequently. She was, therefore, driven to once again try to commit suicide by falling in the very same well in which she had earlier fallen. But on the second occasion on that fateful night when shejumpedinthe well there was no neighbourtosaveherand her life got extinguished. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the accused were not responsible for bringing to a tragic end the life of this young housewife aged 28 years, mother of two children, who having suffered in such a drastic manner at the hands of the accused was driven to take the extreme step of committing suicide. This is neither the case of murder nor the case of accident. But it is only the case of suicide for which the persistent hostile conduct of the accused over years as deposed to by P. W. 6 complainant and also the act of cruelty perpetrated on her on the fateful night as revealed by the aforesaid well established clinching circumstances, were directly responsible. It is also pertinent to note that the learned trial Judge reached that conclusion in para 8 of the judgment. However in his view this was not a dowry death as contemplated by section 304-B IPC as the deceased had died more than seven years after her marriage. But unfortunately the learned trial Judge failed to examine alternative case under Section 498-A which got squarely attracted on the facts of the present case. It must, therefore, be held that on the facts of the present case the prosecution has been able to bring home to the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt offence under section 498-A, IPC read with Explanation (a ). When she was driven to take such a drastic step all the accused including acquitted accused mother-in-law were in the house and along with them resided the victim and her two minor children. When she was driven to take such a drastic step all the accused including acquitted accused mother-in-law were in the house and along with them resided the victim and her two minor children. Hence the accused alone must be held responsible for driving her to commit suicide by their misconduct which had led to a quarrel and shouting revealing the voice of a woman as admitted even by the hostile witness P. W. 3 who actually heard the same being the next door neighbour. All the circumstances proved by the prosecution clinchingly establish the culpability of the accused themselves and no one else. These established circumstances wholly rule out any reasonable possibility of innocence of the accused from any viewpoint. In other words the chain in the circumstantial evidence is so complete against the accused as to rule out any other hypothesis about their innocence. We accordingly convict respondent No. 2 paran Prasad Agrawal and respondent no. 3 Girbar Prasad Agrawal of offences punishable under Section 498-A, IPC. ( 23 ) THOUGH the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 is inconsistent with regard to the alleged payment of dowry etc. , it can definitely be construed from the said evidence that there was harassment within the meaning of cruelty as provided under Section 498-A of IPC. Similarly from a perusal of Ex. P-4 agreement executed by A-1, as well as Exs. P-5 and P-6 letters it is clear that A-1 harassed the deceased-wife at matrimonial home. A perusal of the evidence on record indicates that a case was made out against A-1 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. ( 24 ) SO far as the accusation against A-3, who is the mother-in-law of deceased, is concerned, nowhere in the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 it is stated that she had caused any harassment within the meaning of cruelty as defined under Section 498-A of IPC. Further, even in Exs. P-4, P-5 and P-6, it is not mentioned that A-3 was also harassing the deceased. For the foregoing reasons, this court is of the view that the appellant no. 3-A-3 cannot be found guilty even for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of ipc. Accordingly, she is entitled for acquittal. Further, even in Exs. P-4, P-5 and P-6, it is not mentioned that A-3 was also harassing the deceased. For the foregoing reasons, this court is of the view that the appellant no. 3-A-3 cannot be found guilty even for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of ipc. Accordingly, she is entitled for acquittal. ( 25 ) IN the result, criminal appeal is allowed in part as indicated hereunder- (i) the conviction and sentence imposed on A-1 and A-3 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of ipc is set aside and they are accordingly acquitted of the said offence. However, A-1 is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC and he is sentenced to undergo R. I. fora period of 18 months. (ii) the case against A-2 is abated as he died during the pendency of criminal appeal. (iii) bail bond of A-3 shall stand cancelled.