DAMODAR s/o JAGANNATH LOKHANDE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
2006-02-03
B.R.GAVAI
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) HEARD Shri A. P. Mundergi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing in Criminal Application No. 3331/2005, Shri R. N. Dhorde, learned counsel, appearing in Criminal Application No. 298/2006 and Shri Pramod C. Patel, learned A. P. P. for respondent State. ( 2 ) RULE. RULE made returnable forthwith. Heard by consent. ( 3 ) SINCE the facts and the questions of law, involved in both these applications are common, both these applications are disposed of by common judgment. ( 4 ) THE facts in brief, giving rise to the present applications, are as under : that, on 21st September, 2005, one Mahendra Mahajan lodged a FIR with zillha Peth Police Station, narrating therein that, at about 7 Oclock in the morning, he witnessed that, two unidentified persons assaulted and murdered one vishram G. Patil and then flee on a motor cycle. It was stated that, he could not know the number of the motor cycle, as the number-plate was covered with mud. Hence, Crime No. 242/2005 came to be registered by Zillha Peth Police Station, jalgaon, against unidentified assailants. That, subsequently, two persons; namely, raju Mali and Raju Sonawane surrendered to the Zillha Peth Police Station and, confessed to the crime. Thereafter, the present applicants are also implicated in the crime, on the basis of statement of Ravindra Patil. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 are charged with offences punishable under section 304 read with section 34b of indian Penal Code whereas, the present applicants are charged with offence under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. ( 5 ) THE applicants have approached this Court for quashing and setting aside the FIR, to the extent that, it involves the present applicants in the said crime, for an offence punishable under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. ( 6 ) SHRI A. P. Mundergi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for applicant damodar Lokhande, submitted that, the only material on which the present applicants are sought to be roped in the crime is the statement of one witness, namely, Ravindra Ramkrishna Patil. In the said statement, it is stated that, the accused No. 1 Raju Pundlik Mali had used the telephone from the coin box phone of said Patil and, had uttered the following words : (English translation) "narkhede, I completed the "game" and our mission is successful. You inform to Lokhande and, as agreed, send remaining goods.
In the said statement, it is stated that, the accused No. 1 Raju Pundlik Mali had used the telephone from the coin box phone of said Patil and, had uttered the following words : (English translation) "narkhede, I completed the "game" and our mission is successful. You inform to Lokhande and, as agreed, send remaining goods. " learned Counsel submits that, no details, regarding which Narkhede was spoken to, are given in the said statement. It is submitted that, on the basis of such vague allegation, the present applicant cannot be implicated in the crime in question. ( 7 ) SHRI R. N. Dhorde, learned Advocate, appearing for the applicant liladhar Narkhede, submits that, apart from the aforesaid statement, the material, which is sought to be used for implicating the present applicants, is statement of one Sunil Supdu Mahajan. The said Sunil Mahajan, in his statement, has stated that, he knows Leeladhar Purushottam Narkhede. It is stated in the said statement that, said Sunil Supdu Mahajan had given an amount of Rs. 3,80,000/- to narkhede and Raju Mali for getting permission for running unaided secondary school. It is further stated that, he had given one Mobile of B. S. N. L. company bearing No. 94231-87054 prior to six months, for use by said Shri Narkhede. Another statement, which is being relied upon, is that of one Firoz Sahebkha tadvi. He has stated in his statement that, he knows Raju Pundlik Mali and leeladhar Purushottam Narkhede and that, he was having Motor Cycle bearing no. MH-15/ap 1341 and that, he was using the mobile No. 94231-78054. To the same effect is the statement of one Madhukar Deoram Chaudhari. The prosecution is also relying on the statement of one Deoprakash Ramkisan Pawar who says that, he has sold the Motor Cycle bearing No. MH-15-AP-1341 to narkhede. ( 8 ) SHRI R. N. Dhorde, learned Counsel, submits that, in order to prima facie establish the complicity of the present applicants, for an offence under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code, there must be some material to establish an unlawful agreement. He submits that, there is no material to establish an unlawful agreement between the accused Nos.
( 8 ) SHRI R. N. Dhorde, learned Counsel, submits that, in order to prima facie establish the complicity of the present applicants, for an offence under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code, there must be some material to establish an unlawful agreement. He submits that, there is no material to establish an unlawful agreement between the accused Nos. 1 and 2 and the present applicants, so as to prima facie establish their involvement for an offence punishable under section 120-B. He, therefore, submits that, the only charge that is levelled against the applicant is wholly without basis and, the proceeding, in so far as the applicants are concerned, are liable to be quashed and set aside. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court, in the cases of: 1) G. Sagar Suri and another vs. State of U. P. and another, 2000 (5) bom. C. R. 694, 2) M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another vs. Special Judicial magistrate and others, 1998 Mh. L. J. (SC) 599 = AIR 1998 SC 128, 3) K. R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala, 2005 AIR SCW 5437. and the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of 4) Shri Srinivasa Cut Pieces Cloth Shop and another vs. State of maharashtra and another, 2005 (1) Bom. C. R. (Cri.) 465. ( 10 ) AS against this, Shri P. C. Patel, learned A. P. P. , has submitted that, the charge-sheet is already filed and, the applicants can very well file an application for discharge before the learned Sessions Judge. He submits that, this Court, in its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, would not go into the question of sufficiency or, otherwise of the material so as to establish complicity of the present applicants with the offence charged for. ( 11 ) INSOFAR as the first contention of the learned A. P. P. , regarding availability of alternative remedy is concerned, I am not inclined to accept the same.
( 11 ) INSOFAR as the first contention of the learned A. P. P. , regarding availability of alternative remedy is concerned, I am not inclined to accept the same. The Apex Court, in the case of M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra), has observed thus, "no doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under section 482 of the code or Art. 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. " ( 12 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of G. Sagar Suri and another (supra), has further held that, filing of an application for discharge does not preclude the court in entertaining application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code to prevent abuse of process. ( 13 ) IN peculiar facts of the present case, since I find that there is no evidence, worth the namesake, to establish thecomplicity of the present applicants for an offence punishable under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code, I do not find any merit in the objection of non-entertaining the present applications, on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. ( 14 ) INSOFAR as the merits of the matter are concerned, the applicants are charged with an offence under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. For the purposes of framing charge of conspiracy, it is necessary for the prosecution at least to show some connecting link or, some connecting factors somewhere in the chain of events. An unlawful agreement is the foundation on which the charge under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code can be based. The Apex Court, in the case of K. R. Purushothaman (supra), has observed thus :". . . . . . The unlawful agreement is sine qua non for constituting offence under Indian Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the Plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of agreement.
Conspiracy consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the Plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of agreement. "in the light of the aforesaid observations, let us examine as to what is the material available with the prosecution so as to implicate the present applicants with the crime in question. The prosecution is heavily relying on statement of one ravindra Patil. The statement of said Ravindra Patil, which is recorded on 3rd of october, 2005, states that, the accused No. 1 Raju Mali had come to his shop for using the coin box telephone and, has uttered the following words : "narkhede, I completed the "game" and our mission is successful. You inform to Lokhande and, as agreed, send remaining goods. " ( 15 ) INSOFAR as the applicant (accused) Damodar s/o Jagannath Lokhande is concerned, this is the only material which the prosecution finds sufficient to implicate him for a charge for the offence punishable under section 120-B of indian Penal Code. Insofar as the accused Narkhede is concerned, apart from the statement of Ravindra Ramkrishna Patil, the other material, which is sought to be used against him, are the statements of one Sunil Supdu Mahajan and the statement of one Firoz Sahebkha Tadvi, which are recorded on 6-10-2005 and 17-12-2005, respectively. These statements only are used to show that, the applicant was in possession of Hero Honda Motor cycle bearing No. MH-15/ap- 1341 and Mobile No. 94231-87054. To the same effect is the statement of madhukar Deoram Chaudhari, which is also recorded on 17-12-2005. The statement of Deoprakash Ramkisan Pawar is dt. 17th December, 2005 shows that, aforesaid Hero Honda Motor cycle was purchased from the said witness by the accused Narkhede. Shri P. C. Patel, learned A. P. P. , in his usual fairness, has submitted that, apart from this material, there is no other material, so as to connect the applicants with the offence in question. The question that would have to be answered is whether the averments in the aforesaid statements, at their face value, even prima facie disclose an unlawful agreement, leave aside connecting chain.
The question that would have to be answered is whether the averments in the aforesaid statements, at their face value, even prima facie disclose an unlawful agreement, leave aside connecting chain. In my view, the statements taken per se as they are, also do not show any of the ingredients so as to establish, even prima facie, an offence under section 120-B of Indian Penal code. It is not the case of the prosecution that, the aforesaid Motor cycle or, mobile, are used by the accused in the crime in question. I, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that, there is no material so as to prima facie connect the applicant for an offence punishable under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. ( 16 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 , after surveying various provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and the earlier decisions of the Apex Court, has laid down following categories of cases, by way of illustration, wherein this Court, may exercise its extraordinary powers under Art. 226 and inherent powers under section 482 of the Code, for quashing the proceedings:"1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. , do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155 (2) of the Code. 3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code.
4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. 5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. " ( 17 ) THE Apex Court, in the case of M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another (supra) and in the case of Union of India and another vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and another, (2003) 6 SCC 195 has also held that, when the complaint makes out no case against the accused, the complaint is liable to be quashed and set aside. This view is reiterated by the Apex Court, in various pronouncements, so also by this court. Since, in the present case, I find that, the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR and, the evidence collected, in support of the same, does not disclose commission of any offence and, make out a case against the accused, I find that, this is a fit case wherein this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the FIR, as against the present applicants. ( 18 ) HENCE, the Criminal Applications (Nos. 298/2006 and 3331/2005) are allowed. The FIR registered vide Crime No. 242/2005 and, the subsequent proceedings, insofar as they pertain to the present petitioners are concerned, are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms. Criminal applications allowed.