ORDER Vinod K. Sharma, J. - By way of present revision petition, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridabad vide which his application filed under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short the Act) for filing the award dated 29.3.1994 in the Court has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction with liberty to the petitioner to present the same in the competent Court in Delhi. 2. The brief facts leading to the case are that the petitioner is a private limited company having its registered office at G-13, Saket, New Delhi and Shri O.P. Chopra is the Managing Director of the said company. It is the case of the petitioner that an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 on 16.3.1999 and at that time respondent No. 1 was residing at 764, Sector 29, Faridabad. The petitioner in terms of the said agreement had agreed to construct a plot bearing No. G-13, Saket, New Delhi and Housing Complex and had agreed to further finance the entire construction and other ancillary expenses from his own resources. The relevant clauses of the said agreement which would require consideration in the present case are reproduced below for ready reference : "11. In case of any dispute arising between the parties in this respect, the matter shall be referred to the Sole Arbitrator for his valuable decision and his decision shall be final and binding on both the parties. 20. That in case of any dispute arising between the parties in respect of these presents, the same shall be referred for arbitration to the sole arbitrator Shri Damodar Sharma, 5-11/35, NIT Faridabad shall be the sole arbitrator and his decision shall be binding on both the parties. 21. The agreement has been entered into between the parties at Faridabad and the Faridabad Courts only shall have the jurisdiction in case of any dispute between the parties to the said agreement". 3. In terms of the said agreement, respondent No. 1 vide his letter dated 20.8.1992 requested for a reference to the named Arbitrator. It is also the case of the parties both the parties appeared before the named Arbitrator and sought time. The Arbitrator is said to have entered the reference on 20.2.1994 by notifying the hearing vide his letter dated 28.1.1994. It is also the case of the parties both the parties appeared before the named Arbitrator and sought time. The Arbitrator is said to have entered the reference on 20.2.1994 by notifying the hearing vide his letter dated 28.1.1994. However, as respondent No. 1 failed to appear before the Arbitrator, the award was signed and delivered at Faridabad on 29.3.1994. The petitioner had filed an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act for filing the award in the Court to make it rule of the Court. Notice of the said application was given to the respondents, and respondent No. 1 appeared and filed objection. Objection with regard to the jurisdiction was also taken. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that respondent No. 2 issued notices dated 24.8.1992 fixing the date of proceedings as 5.9.1992. However, when the counsel reached the residence of respondent No. 2 on the date fixed neither the petitioner nor respondent No. 2 had turned up at the appointed venue and no response was received from the respondents and it was also the case of the respondents that after the expiry of four months of entering the reference the Arbitrator had become functus officio. It was also the case of the respondents that an application under Section 20 of the Act for filing the arbitration agreement in Court has been filed in the High Court of Delhi and a request was accordingly made for not proceeding with the matter in view of the pendency of the proceedings in the Honble High Court of Delhi. It is the case of the respondents that in spite of above said letter having been issued to the Arbitrator he still chose to proceed ex parte. It was also the case of the respondents that the petitioner had filed a suit for permanent injunction in the Court of learned Senior Sub Judge, Delhi and sought intervention of the civil Court for adjudication and decision of the dispute. Thus the award being in violation of the provisions of law, the same could not be made rule of the Court. Reply to the objections was filed, where the stand taken in the objections was controverted by the petitioner. An application was also filed under Section 31(4) of the Act by respondent No. 1 for the transfer of the proceedings to the Court at Delhi to which reply was filed. Reply to the objections was filed, where the stand taken in the objections was controverted by the petitioner. An application was also filed under Section 31(4) of the Act by respondent No. 1 for the transfer of the proceedings to the Court at Delhi to which reply was filed. The learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed the following issues : 1. Whether the award dated 29.3.1991 (29.3.1994 ?) is to be made rule of the Court ? OPP 2. Whether Award dated 29.3.1994 is nullity as arbitrator had become functus officio ? OPP 3. Whether arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter as the matter was sub-judice before the Court of Delhi ? OPR 4. Whether arbitrator has mis-conducted himself and with the proceedings by passing the award dated 29.3.1994 ? OPR 5. Whether this Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this matter in view of pendency of matter between parties before the Court of Delhi ? OPR 6. Relief. The learned trial Court considered the preliminary Issue No. 5 as well as the application under Section 31(4) of the Act together and held the Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present application and the petition was ordered to be returned to the petitioner for presenting in the Court at Delhi. The learned trial Court took note of Section 31 of the Act to come to the conclusion that the award is to be filed in the Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. A notice was also taken of the provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act which reads as under : "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising our of that reference, and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court". 5. The Court also took into consideration the definition of the Court as given in Section 2(c) of the Act to come to the conclusion that the jurisdiction is to be vested in a Court which would have the jurisdiction in case of a subject-matter of suit. 5. The Court also took into consideration the definition of the Court as given in Section 2(c) of the Act to come to the conclusion that the jurisdiction is to be vested in a Court which would have the jurisdiction in case of a subject-matter of suit. Thereafter, reference was made to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) which is reproduced below for ready reference : "Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that suit to be instituted where subject-matter situate as under : (a) for the recovery of immovable with or without rent or profits, (b) for the partition of immovable property, (c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property, (d) for the determination of any right to or interest in immovable property, (e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property, (f) for the recovery of immovable property actually under distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate : Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain". 5. The Court came to the conclusion that for deciding the question of jurisdiction the merit and demerit of the case could not be seen. The Court took note of the fact that the property in question is situated at New Delhi and at the time of the institution of the application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act, the petitioner had its registered office at G-13, Saket, New Delhi and even the respondent was residing at Delhi. The Court, thus, found that though the agreement gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts at Faridabad but as the Faridabad Courts lacked inherent jurisdiction, the parties by consent could not confer the jurisdiction which did not vest in it. Reliance for the said purpose was placed on a judgment reported as M/s. Gulati Construction Co. The Court, thus, found that though the agreement gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts at Faridabad but as the Faridabad Courts lacked inherent jurisdiction, the parties by consent could not confer the jurisdiction which did not vest in it. Reliance for the said purpose was placed on a judgment reported as M/s. Gulati Construction Co. v. Betwa River Board and another, AIR 1984 Delhi 299. 6. The learned Trial Court after considering the respective contentions and by relying upon the provisions of Sections 16 of the Code came to the conclusion that the Courts at Faridabad had no jurisdiction in the matter in given facts. It also found as a matter of fact that as the application under Section 20 of the Act was filed in the High Court of Delhi, in view of provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act all subsequent proceedings could be filed in Delhi Court only and thus decided issue No. 5 against the petitioner. 7. Learned senior counsel Shri V.K. Jain, appearing for the petitioner argued that at the time of execution of the agreement the respondent was residing at Faridabad and therefore, the Faridabad Court had the jurisdiction at the time of execution of the agreement and therefore, the parties by agreement could confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts at Faridabad. He also submitted that part of cause of action had arisen at Faridabad as the agreement between the parties was executed at Faridabad and therefore, by applying the provisions of Section 20 of the Code, the Court at Faridabad had the jurisdiction to entertain and try the application filed by the petitioner and therefore, the finding of the learned Trial Court on issue No. 5 cannot be sustained. In support of his contention the petitioner placed reliance on Subramanya Ayyar v. Swaminatha Chettiar and another, AIR 1928 Madras 746, to contend that the Court trying a suit and passing a decree can execute the same though subsequently it loses territorial jurisdiction and thus it was contended that Faridabad Court which initially had the jurisdiction would be competent to entertain the application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act. He also placed reliance on a judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., AIR 1971 Supreme Court 740, to press the point that the parties though by agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on Court not possessed by it under the Code, however, agreement that one of the Courts having jurisdiction, alone shall try the dispute was not contrary to the public policy. He placed reliance on A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. A.P. Agencies, Salem, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1239, to contend that in case of breach of contract suit can be filed where it was made. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under : "The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. In the matter of a contract there may arises causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contact was made or at the place were it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation results in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a Court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have been performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears". 8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment of Delhi High Court reported as M/s. A.A. Construction (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Lifetime Medicare Ltd., 1995(1) Arbitration Law Reporter 75 to contend that Section 20 of the Code enables the plaintiff to institute a suit in a Court within whose jurisdiction the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit, actually or voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. As Section 41 of the Act has made the provisions of the Code applicable to all the proceedings before the Court to determine the question as to which Court would be competent to entertain the proceedings under the Act. He argued that on analysing of the provisions it would not be possible to contend that the Court competent to entertain the proceedings under the Act would only be the Court envisaged under Section 2(c) of the Act and that Section 20 of the Code would not be attracted in determining the forum to entertain the proceedings under the Act. Rather clauses (a) and (b) would also be attracted and the Court where the part of the cause of action arises would also be competent to entertain the petitions. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under : "8. Section 20 of the Code enables the plaintiff to institute a suit in a Court within whose jurisdiction the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit, actually or voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under : "8. Section 20 of the Code enables the plaintiff to institute a suit in a Court within whose jurisdiction the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit, actually or voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Section 41 of the Act has made the provisions of the Code applicable to all proceedings before the Court to determine the question as to which Court will be competent to entertain the proceedings under the Act. While dealing with this proposition, the Full Bench of this Court considered the question as to whether the provision of Section 2(c) of the Act and Section 20 of the Code are mutually destructive of each other and incapable of being harmonised so that only such Court will have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the Act which has jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of a suit. The Full Bench in Ram Rattan Bhatias case considered the ambit and scope of the provisions of the Code in its applicability to the proceedings under the Act. Relying on the Supreme Court in the case of Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd. (supra), wherein it was held that the Code in its entirety applies to proceedings under the Act and that the jurisdiction of the Courts under the Act to entertain a proceedings for filing an award was accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code. Hence, after analysing all the provisions this Court in Ram Rattan Bhatias case (supra), held that it would be futile to contend that the Court competent to entertain proceedings under the Act would only be the Court envisaged in Section 2(c) of the Act and provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 of the Code would not be attracted in determining the forum to entertain proceedings under the Act". Thus, the contention of the petitioner is that by applying the provisions of Section 20 of the Code and keeping in view the fact that the cause of action had also arisen at Faridabad it was wrong on the part of the learned Trial Court to hold that it has no territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the contention of the petitioner is that by applying the provisions of Section 20 of the Code and keeping in view the fact that the cause of action had also arisen at Faridabad it was wrong on the part of the learned Trial Court to hold that it has no territorial jurisdiction. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents in support of the judgment passed by the Trial Court placed strong reliance on the provisions of Section 16 of the Code to contend that the property in dispute was situated at Delhi and suit with regard to the determination of any right or interest in immovable property was to filed where the property is situate. It was further contended that proviso also would not be applicable in the present case as admittedly on the date cause of action arose to the parties the respondent was admittedly staying at Delhi and therefore, could not be said to carry on business or working for gain within the territorial of Faridabad Courts. He also contended that as the application under Section 20 of the Code was filed in the Court at Delhi, therefore, by applying the provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act it was only the Court at Delhi which would have the jurisdiction in the matter and therefore, no fault can be found in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court. 9. I have considered the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the agreement between the parties was executed at Faridabad and the parties by way of agreement had given exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts at Faridabad to entertain and try the suit. It was also not in dispute between the parties that a request was made by respondent No. 1 to respondent No. 2 to start the arbitration proceedings. The file further shows that award was made and delivered at Faridabad. It was also not in dispute between the parties that a request was made by respondent No. 1 to respondent No. 2 to start the arbitration proceedings. The file further shows that award was made and delivered at Faridabad. In this back-ground of admitted facts, if the matter is considered it would be seen that an application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act was filed to make the award rule of the Court and therefore, for the purpose of seeing the jurisdiction of the Court reference has be to made to Section 20 of the Code where the cause of action or a part of cause of action arose would have the jurisdiction. Honble Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, AIR 2004 SC 4286, has defined the cause of action as under : "The expression cause of action is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. Thus, it consists of a bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a Court of law. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. In the rest recited sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in cause of action". Compendiously, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in cause of action". The Honble Supreme Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd.s case (supra), has been pleased to hold that in case of a contract cause of action consists of making of the contract, of its breach so the suit can be filed at either of the place. This Court in Indian Oil Corporation v. Uppal Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and another has been pleased to hold as under : "6. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the trial Judge further shows that a reliance has been placed upon some observations made by this Court while deciding the revision petition with regard to an interim injunction. However, I have gone through the order dated February 7, 1991 passed by this Court in revision petition No. 2083 of 1990. The controversy with regard to jurisdiction was neither being examined by this Court in the revision petition nor any such observations, as have been stated by the learned trial Court had been made in the aforesaid order. It is clear that the learned trial Court has completely misconstrued and misread the aforesaid order passed by this Court. It is not in dispute that in a dispute arising between the parties more than one Court may have jurisdiction. If there is no agreement between the parties in this regard all the aforesaid Courts would have jurisdiction to entertain the controversy between the parties and in such a situation, the aggrieved party may approach any one of those Courts. However, by their voluntary act and agreement the parties can always agree that any one of the aforesaid Courts would have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. However, the parties by their consent cannot confer jurisdiction on any such Court which does not have the jurisdiction in the matter at all. But if there are more than one Court having the concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the controversy, then the parties can agree that only one of the Courts would have jurisdiction. However, the parties by their consent cannot confer jurisdiction on any such Court which does not have the jurisdiction in the matter at all. But if there are more than one Court having the concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the controversy, then the parties can agree that only one of the Courts would have jurisdiction. In the present case, the Courts at New Delhi obviously have the jurisdiction to deal the matter, since the contract in question had been signed between the parties at New Delhi. May be the Courts at Gurgaon have jurisdiction, as cause of action arose at Gurgaon also where the construction of residential houses were to be completed. However, since the parties had agreed and specifically conferred the jurisdiction upon the Courts at Delhi, obviously the Gurgaon Courts would have no jurisdiction". This Court in M/s. Goyal Rice Mills Sherpur v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., (1997-1) P.L.R. 6, has been pleased to hold that the Court where the arbitration proceedings are held and award made would have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the application under Sections 14 and 17 of the Act though one of the reasons given in the said judgment was that the respondent therein had raised no objection to holding the proceedings at Chandigarh. 10. The learned Trial Court wrongly pressed into service provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act on the ground that a petition under Section 20 of the Code had been filed in the Court in the year 1993 and therefore, due to the pendency of the said application, the application under Sections 41 and 17 of the Act could be filed in the said Court alone. The reliance was placed on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Surjeet Singh, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 189, as also a judgment of High Court of Orissa in the case of Niranjan Swain v. State of Orissa and other, AIR 1983 Orissa 10. Though on the face of it the argument looked attractive, however, on deep analysis it is to be concluded that provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act were not applicable to the facts of the present case. Though on the face of it the argument looked attractive, however, on deep analysis it is to be concluded that provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act were not applicable to the facts of the present case. The relevant portion of Section 31(4) of the Act deals with the factum that an application under the Act is required to be made in the Court competent to entertain it and it is thereafter that all subsequent applications have to be filed in the said Court. In the present case, the parties by agreement had given exclusive jurisdiction to Faridabad Courts within regard to the subject-matter and the jurisdiction of all other Courts were excluded. Once it is held that Faridabad Courts had the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present application it would also envisage that no other Court was competent to entertain and try the application with respect to the said agreement. Thus, prima facie provisions of Section 31(4) of the Act were not attracted to the present case. Even otherwise, the facts of the case reveal that it was on application of respondent No. 1, the Arbitrator had entered reference and therefore, there was no occasion for making an application under Section 20 of the Code for seeking reference. Thus, seen from any angle the application under Section 31(4) of the Act was not competent. In view of the findings recorded above, this revision petition succeeds and the findings of the learned Trial Court on issue No. 5 are reversed and the case is remanded back to the Trial Court for adjudication on merit. No costs. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 31.5.2006 for further proceedings. Petition allowed.

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