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2006 DIGILAW 156 (JHR)

Deoki Nandan Kejriwal v. Gaya Prasad Gond (Sah) And Kedar Prasad Gond (Sah)

2006-02-27

N.N.TIWARI

body2006
JUDGMENT Narendra Nath Tiwari, J. 1. This Second Appeal, by the defendants/appellants/appellants has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 3 of 1999, whereby learned lower appellate court has dismissed the appellants appeal affirming and upholding the judgment and decree of learned trial court passed in Title Suit No. 23 of 1995. 2. The plaintiffs/respondents had filed the Suit praying a decree for specific performance of contract and confirmation of possession of the suit land. The plaintiffs case was that the defendants father late Satyanarain Kejriwal, by virtue Page 969 of an agreement dated-11.09.1980, had contracted to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs. 36,000/- and out of which had taken Rs. 17,050/- by way of advance. The balance amount was payable at the time of the execution and registration of the sale deed. The plaintiffs in part performance of the said contract, were also put in possession of the suit property and they had been in continuous possession of the same since then. The plaintiffs requested several times to execute and register the sale deed but the same was not heeded upon. The plaintiffs then sent a legal notice but the defendants father even thereafter did not perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff then wrote a letter to the then Chief Minister of Bihar and on his direction, the Deputy Commissioner, Sahebganj initiated a proceeding being K.M.P. Case No. 9 of 1984-85. By order dated-08.04.1999, the Deputy Commissioner directed the defendants father to adhere to the terms of the contract and to execute the sale deed. However, a proceeding under Section 4(H) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act was initiated being Case No. 4 (H) 1 of 1985-86, in which both the parties of the case i.e. the plaintiff and the father of the defendant, appeared and in the said proceedings, the defendants father admitted to have accepted a further advance of Rs. 1,000/- on 06.12.1989 and undertook to execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance consideration amount. On 03.11.1993, the defendants father Satyanarain Kejriwal died. The suit was filed against the defendants, who are the heirs and the legal representatives of said Satyanarain Kejriwal. 3. 1,000/- on 06.12.1989 and undertook to execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance consideration amount. On 03.11.1993, the defendants father Satyanarain Kejriwal died. The suit was filed against the defendants, who are the heirs and the legal representatives of said Satyanarain Kejriwal. 3. The defendants appeared and filed their written statement denying the plaintiffs claim and stating, inter alia, that there was no contract to sale between the parties rather there was only proposal to sell the suit property by the defendants father in order to get his daughter married and for that purpose he had taken advance of Rs. 17050.00 and the sell was proposed only on payment of the balance amount of Rs. 18,950/- within four months but the plaintiffs failed to pay the balance amount and, as such, the proposal was cancelled and the money was forfeited. The defendants never delivered possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs and that the suit property is still in their possession. 4. The suit was mainly contested on the ground that there was only proposal to sell and the said proposal was cancelled for non-payment of the balance amount within four months and that the money given in advance was forfeited. On the basis of the said pleadings of the parties, learned trial court framed several issues. Both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidences. Learned trial court on thorough appraisal of the evidences and the materials on record found, inter alia, that there was agreement to sell between the parties which is still subsisting and the same is not cancelled and the sum of Rs. 17050.00 given to the defendants has not been forfeited. The trial court further held that the suit is not barred by limitation. Other issues were also decided in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed. The defendants then filed a regular appeal before the learned District Judge, Sahebganj, which was ultimately heard and decided by the Additional District Judge, First, Sahebganj. In view of the grounds taken in appeal, learned lower appellate court himself independently scrutinized the evidences and the materials available on record and after thorough discussion and consideration upheld the findings recorded by learned trial court, holding that the agreement for sale was not cancelled and the Page 970 amount given in advance was not forfeited. In view of the grounds taken in appeal, learned lower appellate court himself independently scrutinized the evidences and the materials available on record and after thorough discussion and consideration upheld the findings recorded by learned trial court, holding that the agreement for sale was not cancelled and the Page 970 amount given in advance was not forfeited. Learned lower appellate court while deciding Issue No. 7, distinctly on appraisal of evidences and materials on records has held that the defendants were in possession of the suit property. The lower appellate court, however, decided the remaining issues in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents, holding, inter alia, that the suit is not barred by limitation and though the plaintiffs, being the members of the Scheduled Tribe, are exempted from paying the court fee. They had not obtained certificate to that regard from the Legal Aid Committee, which was necessary for passing order for exemption of court fee. Learned lower appellate court though dismissed the appeal, directed the plaintiffs to pay the requisite court fee of Rs. 2998.15 and the same was made condition for operation of the judgment and decree. 5. Mr. Shamim Akhtar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, sought to assail the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court mainly on two grounds: (i) as the court fee was not paid on the valuation of the suit mentioned in the plaint, there was no plaint in the eye of law and the same was liable to be rejected and the judgment and decree based thereon is vitiated in law; (ii) the agreement between the parties was dated 10.09.1980 and the suit was filed in the year 1985 and the same was barred by law of limitation and the suit was liable to be dismissed on that ground also. The subsequent payment of Rs. 1,000/- in the year 1989 cannot extend the period of limitation as before the said payment, the prescribed period of limitation had already expired. Learned Counsel in support of his submission relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Shakuntala v. Narayan Gundoji Chavan and Ors. and in the case of Manjunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hansi v. Tammanasa and Ors. . Learned Counsel in support of his submission relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Shakuntala v. Narayan Gundoji Chavan and Ors. and in the case of Manjunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hansi v. Tammanasa and Ors. . He further referred to a decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of K. Narayana Reddy v. Ramakrishna Reddy reported in [2005 Civil Law Time (Vol 3) 530] in which a single Judge of the Karnataka High Court has held that for specific performance and for any payment after the expiry of the period of limitation cannot extend the period any further and the contract is deemed to have been terminated. 6. In their judgments and the decrees the courts below have held that performance of the contract, execution of the sale deed and in agreement the time was not the essence of the said contract. It has come on record (Exhibit 2 [A]) that the father of the defendants had taken further payment of Rs. 1,000/- on 06.12.1989. The said statement was made before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector in a legal proceeding (Exhibit 3), under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, which also goes to show that there was no prescribed period for performance of the contract and for execution of the sale deed. Considering the terms of the contract and other evidences on record, learned trial court as well as the lower appellate court have come to the concurrent finding that the agreement was subsisting and it was not cancelled and that the money taken as advance by the defendants was not forfeited and in that view also both the courts below have held that the suit was not barred by limitation. So far as the payment of court fee is concerned, learned lower appellate court has considered the circumstances inasmuch as there is no denial that the plaintiff/respondents are the members of the Scheduled Tribe. However, in the appeal, which is the continuation of the suit, the appellate court has directed to pay the requisite court fee in the suit only Page 971 because there was no certificate of Legal Aid Committee on record. The judgment and decree of the trial court has been affirmed on merit by the lower appellate court in which the required court fee was paid on the memorandum of the appeal. The judgment and decree of the trial court has been affirmed on merit by the lower appellate court in which the required court fee was paid on the memorandum of the appeal. Both the courts below on thorough appraisal of the facts, evidences and materials on record and on due consideration of factual and legal aspects have concurrently recorded their findings in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. The said concurrent findings of facts are binding on this second appellate court. The decision cited by learned Counsel are rendered on different facts and are not applicable to the facts of this case. The grounds urged by learned Counsel for the appellants do not give rise to any substantial questions of. law to be formulated and decided in this second appeal. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. I.A. No. 1696 of 2004 In view of the order passed in the appeal, this I.A. becomes infructuous, and, as such, accordingly, dismissed. I.A. stands disposed of. I.A. No. 369 of 2006 In view of the order passed in the appeal, this I.A. becomes infructuous, and, as such, accordingly, dismissed. I.A. stands disposed of.