JUDGMENT :- Heard learned advocate Shri. N. V. Gaware, appearing for the applicant. 2. By prefering this application, complainant Society seeks leave to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal of respondent No.1 for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, "the Act"), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karjat in S.T.C. No.91512005. 3. The applicant/complainant lodged a complaint with allegations that the complainant Society advanced loan of Rs.32,664/- to the accused on 11-02-2002. The accused did not repay that loan amount and the dues outstanding were Rs.55,990/-. On consistent demand from the complainant Society, the accused drew a cheque dated 31-07-2005 in favour of the complainant Society. Said cheque was presented in the bank on 09-08-2005. However, it was dishonored on account of insufficient funds. The complainant received the intimation of dishonor of the cheque on 11-08-2005 and then, issued a notice on the same day demanding the amount from the accused. Accused received this notice on 24-08-2005, but did not make payment. Within stipulated time, the complaint came to be filed. 4. At the trial, the accused put forth a defence of denial. 5. The complainant to prove his case, examined himself and according to him, the cheque was issued to discharge the legal liability. The defence suggested on behalf of the accused was that the cheque in question was obtained for time-barred debt. He has denied that he had borrowed the loan on 11-02-2000 and it was to be repaid within two years which period expired on 11-02-2002. Thereafter, the cheque in question was obtained on 31-07-2005. In view of the admission of the complainant that this loan was advanced in 2000 and the cheque being issued on 31-07-2005, the trial court observed that the cheque in question was obtained for a time-barred debt. The case made out by the complainant in its complaint and at the trial is contradicting each other. The debt being found to be a time-barred debt and the cheque being issued for time-barred debt, the finding is recorded that the cheque cannot be said to have been issued for discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability and on that count, the accused came to be acquitted. Against the said order of acquittal, the complainant intends to prefer an appeal, hence, prayed for grant of leave to prefer appeal. 6. Against the said order of acquittal, the complainant intends to prefer an appeal, hence, prayed for grant of leave to prefer appeal. 6. On behalf of the complainant, learned advocate Shri. Gaware advanced submission that even if the cheque is found to have been issued for a time-barred debt, the provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In this case, issuance of cheque being admitted and same being dishonoured, the complaint came to be filed. There is, therefore, presumption of issuance of cheque for debt or liability to the complainant as per provisions of section 139 of the Act. It. is submitted that in rebuttal of presumption arising out of section 139 of the Act, the accused did not enter into witness box. Hence, the presumption cannot be said to have been rebutted. Learned advocate Shri Gaware also advanced submission that the provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted to the criminal case. In support of this submission, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.S.K. Krishnappa Chettiar and others Vs. S.V.V. Somiah @ Navniappa I. Chettiar and another, reported in AIR 1964 d S.C. 227. In the said case, the plaintiff had d obtained a decree against the defendants and had d filed Execution Petition, but the Execution o Petition proved to be in-fructuous because first d defendant was adjudicated to be insolvent. Thereafter, there was some compromise between 'I son of the plaintiff and defendant No.2. Defendant No.2 was not found adjudicated as g insolvent. Under the terms of composition arrangement, the entire property of defendants was to vest in four trustees. Said composition scheme was accepted by the Insolvency Court. The last execution application was dismissed in 1946 and fresh application was moved on 1306-1952. In paragraph 13 of the reported judgment, The Apex Court observed as under: "(13)...................The Limitation Act is a consolidating and amending statute relating to the limitation of suits, appeals and certain types of applications to courts and must, therefore, be regarded as an exhaustive Code. .................... They cannot be extended by analogy or reference to proceedings to which they do not expressly apply or could be said to apply by necessary implication. .................... They cannot be extended by analogy or reference to proceedings to which they do not expressly apply or could be said to apply by necessary implication. ............" In the present case, placing reliance on these observations of the Apex Court, learned advocate Shri. Gaware advanced submission that present proceeding being a criminal proceeding, the provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted and the debt cannot be said to be time-barred debt. He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and others Vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha, reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 1815 , wherein the Apex Court held that even if the debt is barred by limitation, adjustment of securities deposited by guarantor towards debt after the debt becomes time-barred, is permissible. The adjustment made by adjusting securities of the guarantors towards the debt, as held by the Apex Court, does not constitute an offence punishable under sections 109, 114 and 409 of IPC. The ratio in the reported case of Punjab National Bank (supra) is not attracted to the facts of present case. The Apex Court held that the adjustment of securities does not amount to an offence punishable under section 409 of IPC. The ratio in the earlier case reported in AIR 1964 S.C. 227 (supra) that the provisions of the Limitation Act are attracted to the proceedings referred in the schedule only, cannot be disputed. For filing criminal cases, particularly complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, limitation is prescribed in the special statute and for computing the period of limtiation; the provisions of the Limitation Act are not attracted. The question relevant in the present case is as to whether the provisions of Section 138 of the Act are attracted to the case when the cheque was issued for a time-barred debt. The Explanation of Section 138 of the Act clearly mentions that for the purpose of Section 138, the "debt or other liability must" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. The time-barred debt cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. Hence, considering these provisions incorporated in the Explanation, it can be sad that the time-barred debt cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. Thus, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act will not be attracted in the present case. 7. The time-barred debt cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. Hence, considering these provisions incorporated in the Explanation, it can be sad that the time-barred debt cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. Thus, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act will not be attracted in the present case. 7. Another submission advanced by learned advocate Shri. Gaware is that unless the accused examines himself to rebut the presumption arising under section 139 of the Act, the presumption cannot be said to be rebutted even though there is other material on record. In support of this submission, he tried to place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of K. N. Beena Vs. Muniyappan & another, reported in 2002(1) Born.C.R. 342 (Supreme Court) : [2002(1) ALL MR 277 (S.C.)]. In the said case, considering the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, Their Lordships of the Apex Court observed thus:......... Under Section 118, unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the Negotiable Instrument (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. Under section 139, the Court has to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. Thus, in complaints under section 138, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issued for a debt or liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burden of proving that a cheque had not been issued for a debt or liability is on the accused." In the case before Their Lordships of the Apex Court, the respondent in that case had led no evidence except some formal evidence. Their Lordships observed that such denial in his reply to the notice is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the appellant to prove that the cheque was issued for debt or liability. 8. Another decision relied upon by learned advocate Shri Gaware is the decision of Apex Court in the case of Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Their Lordships observed that such denial in his reply to the notice is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the appellant to prove that the cheque was issued for debt or liability. 8. Another decision relied upon by learned advocate Shri Gaware is the decision of Apex Court in the case of Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee, reported in (2001)6 SCC 16 : [2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1497 (S.C.)], wherein the Apex Court held that the presumption under section 139 of the Act is a 'presumption of law' as distinguished from 'presumption of fact', which describes the provisions by which the court "may presume" a certain state-of-affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 9. Reliance has also been placed by the learned advocate for the applicant on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh in the case of V. Munikrishnaiah Vs. C. Janakirama Naidu & another, reported in 2005 ALL MR (Cri) JOURNAL 117, wherein it has been held that in case of failure of the accused to adduce any evidence to rebut the presumption under section 139 of the Act in favour of the complainant, the court has to presume that the cheque was issued for legally enforceable debt or liability. Thus, the ratio in these cases make it clear that the burden is on the accused/drawer to prove that the cheque has not been issued for debt or Apr. liability. This legal position is settled one and cannot be disputed. The accused in the present case put forth a defence that the debt for which this cheque was obtained by the complainant was a time-barred debt. Admittedly, the accused did not enter into witness box to give evidence on this point, nor any other witness is examined. However, the complainant himself found to have concealed material facts. In his complaint, he alleged that the loan was advanced on 12-022002, which was to be repaid within two years and the accused issued a cheque on 31-07-2005. However, at the trial, when cross-examined, he has admitted that he had advanced loan to the accused on 11-02-2000. It was to be repaid before 11-02-2002. The cheque was issued on 31-07-2005. In his complaint, he alleged that the loan was advanced on 12-022002, which was to be repaid within two years and the accused issued a cheque on 31-07-2005. However, at the trial, when cross-examined, he has admitted that he had advanced loan to the accused on 11-02-2000. It was to be repaid before 11-02-2002. The cheque was issued on 31-07-2005. Thus, the fact of disbursement of loan in the year 2000 was suppressed by this complainant. However, his admission proved advance of loan in 2000 and his allegations in the complaint and statement in Examination-in Chief that the loan was advanced on 11-02-2002 are found to be false. Admittedly, on the date of issuance of that cheque dated 31-07-2005, the debt was found to be a time-barred debt. In view of Explanation to Section 138 of the Act, the penal liability under section 138 arises in case the cheque was found to have been issued for discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability. Time-barred debt cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. In view of these facts, this liability being found not a debt legally enforceable, the accused came to be acquitted. 10. In view of above discussion, the order of acquittal passed by the trial court was not found suffering from any infirmities and there being no arguable point, this is not a fit case to grant leave to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal. Accordingly, this application for grant of leave to prefer appeal against the acquittal of the respondent No.1, preferred by the original complainant is hereby rejected and the appeal filed by it, therefore, stands disposed of. Order accordingly.