ARUN KUMAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revisional application under section 401 read with section 482 Cr. PC is directed, against the order dated 23. 03. 94 passed by the ld. SDJM, Diamond Harbour, South 24-Parganas in G. R. Case No. 430/90 arising out of Pathar Pratima P. S. Case no. 15/90 under sections 302/201 IPC. ( 2 ) THE circumstances leading to the above application are that on the basis of a complaint that on 16. 04. 90 at about 2. 00 hrs. Bhabani Parua, wife of present petitioner No. 1 was missing from her matrimonial home and subsequently her deadbody was found on 17. 04. 90 at about 8. 40 hrs. floating in the adjoining pond in decomposed condition with throat-cut injury, Pathar pratima P. S. Case No. 15/90 under sections 302/201 IPC was started. Petitioner No. 1 on being arrested was produced on 20. 04. 90 while petitioner no. 2 surrendered before the ld. Court below on 24. 04. 90. After completion of investigation chargesheet being No. 50 dated 26. 09. 93 was submitted against the petitioners under section 201 IPC on 19. 01. 94. ( 3 ) SINCE the investigation was not completed within the statutory period i. e. 20. 04. 93, the petitioners filed an application under section 167 (5) praying for discharge which was rejected by the ld. Court below by the impugned order. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by, and dissatisfied with, the said order, the petitioners have come up before this Court for revision. ( 5 ) MR. Mondal, ld. Counsel for the petitioners, contended that since investigation was not completed within the statutory period of three years and chargesheet was submitted against his clients after a long time it was the bounden duty of the ld. Court below to discharge his clients, and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Mr. Mallick, ld. Counsel for the state, on the other hand, on referring the cases of Durgesh Chandra Saha vs. Bimal Chandra Saha, reported in 1996 C Cr. Court below to discharge his clients, and as such the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Mr. Mallick, ld. Counsel for the state, on the other hand, on referring the cases of Durgesh Chandra Saha vs. Bimal Chandra Saha, reported in 1996 C Cr. LR (SC) 203, Nirmal Kanti roy vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2322 , Full Bench decision of this Court in Kalyan Kumar Das vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1998 (II) CHN 136 and L. Rahaman vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2004 (2) Cal LT 285 (HC), submitted that, since chargesheet was submitted within the time as extended by the ld. Court below, there was no scope for discharge of the petitioners invoking the provisions of section 167 (5) Cr. PC. ( 6 ) UNDER sub-section (5) of section 167, as amended by the West Bengal act 24 of 1988, investigation in respect of a case exclusively triable by court of Sessions or a case under Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal code is not concluded within a period of three years from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance, further investigation into the offence is to be stopped and accused shall be discharged unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period mentioned in the sub-section is necessary. In the case of Durgesh Chandra Saha (supra), it was held that the language of section 167 (5) Cr. PC, as amended by the west Bengal Act is quite clear in indicating that the said section is applicable only in a case where the investigation was still pending but not in a case where investigation has been completed and chargesheet had been filed. The said section is intended to ensure speedy completion of investigation within the time frame specified therein otherwise to face an order of discharge of the accused against whom investigation without any just cause to the satisfaction of the Court has been kept pending. Where investigation has been completed, a different situation, not contemplated under section 167 (5), Cr. PC emerges. Where investigation has been completed, a different situation, not contemplated under section 167 (5), Cr. PC emerges. In the case of nirmal Kanti Roy (supra) it was held that a reading of sub-section (6)further shows that even in a case where the order stopping investigation and the consequent discharge of accused has been made that is not the last word on it because the sub-section opens another avenue for moving the Sessions Judge. If the Sessions Judge is satisfied that "further investigation into the offence ought to be made" he has the power to allow the investigation to proceed. Hence the time schedule shown in section 167 (5) of the Code is not to be treated with rigidity and it is not mandatory that on the expiry of the period indicated therein the magistrate should necessarily pass the order of discharge of the accused. Before ordering stoppage of investigation the Magistrate shall consider, whether, on the facts of that case, further investigation would be necessary to foster interest of criminal justice. Magistrate at that stage must look into the record of investigation to ascertain the progress of investigation thus for registered. If substantial part of investigation was by then over, the Magistrate should seriously ponder over the question whether it would be conducive to the interest of justice to stop further investigation and discharge the accused. Similar view was taken in other two cases. ( 7 ) IN the case on hand, the Investigating Officer submitted a prayer on 15. 04. 93 for extension of time for completion of investigation on certain grounds which was unfortunately entered in the order sheet on 13. 08. 93 and the ld. Magistrate granted time till 06. 12. 93 followed by further extension till 12. 02. 94 and the chargesheet was ultimately submitted under section 201 IPC on 19. 01. 94. Though it has been alleged by the petitioners that the above prayer for extension is ante-dated, no material was placed before the ld. Court below to substantiate the same. Therefore, when the chargesheet was submitted within the extended period so allowed by the ld. Court below and cognizance of the offence was taken, the question of setting aside the impugned order is out of the way. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, the present application being devoid of any merit, be dismissed. Application dismissed.