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2006 DIGILAW 1582 (RAJ)

Mathura Lal v. Union of India

2006-05-10

J.R.GOYAL, S.N.JHA

body2006
Judgment S.N. Jha, CJ.-This special appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge dated 14.08.1998 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3780/1998 dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. The appellant had challenged the order dated 30.06.1998 by which his services on the post of peon in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF for short) were terminated in terms of Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 read with Rule 16 of the CRPF Rules and the Recruitment Manual. 2. On 18.02.1998 the appellant was appointed as peon in the CRPF. On 29.05.1998 notice for termination of services was served on him by the respondents when they came to know that a criminal case was pending against him. The fact that a criminal case was pending against the appellant is not in dispute. Case of the appellant is that the cases were petty in nature relating to rash and negligent driving under Sections 279 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code and under a belief that the case does not involve allegation of assault or moral turpitude, he bona fide did not disclose this fact at the time of his recruitment. In any view, he was acquitted in the criminal case later on 12.06.1998. 3. We are not concerned with the nature of offence allegedly committed by the appellant. The ground on which his services were terminated was that he suppressed the fact that a case was pending against him. As mentioned above, it is not in dispute that criminal case pending against the appellant and he did not disclose this fact. According to the Counsel, being a layman the appellant could not appreciate the implications of the non-disclosure of the pendency of the criminal case as the case related to petty offence. 4. The only point for consideration is whether suppression of the fact that criminal case pending against the appellant at the time of his recruitment was a relevant ground to terminate his services. 5. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. 4. The only point for consideration is whether suppression of the fact that criminal case pending against the appellant at the time of his recruitment was a relevant ground to terminate his services. 5. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. vs. Ram Ratan Yadav, 2003 (3) SCC 437 , the respondent had suppressed the fact that a criminal case under Sections 323, 341, 294, 506B/34 IPC, was pending against him on the date of filing the attestation form which contained specific columns to the effect “Have you ever been prosecuted/kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a Court of law of any offence?” and “Is any case pending against you in any Court of law at the time of filling up this attestation form?” The respondent wrote “no” against both the columns. Defending his act he contended that he had failed to understand the meaning of “prosecution” or “conviction” and under misconceived notion did not take proper note of the columns in the attestation form. Rejecting the contention, and upholding the termination of his services, the Supreme Court observed as under :- “The object of requiring information in Columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitability to continue in service. A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service. The employer having regard to the nature of the employment and all other aspects had the discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear in Para 9 of the offer of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per Columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the offence or the result of a criminal case ultimately. The information in the said columns was sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to continue in service or not?” 6. In A.P. Public Service Commission vs. Koneti Venkateswarulu & Ors., 2005 (7) SCC 177 , a similar view was expressed in these words :“. . . . .As to the purpose for which the information is called, the employer is the ultimate judge. It is not open to the candidate to sit in Judgment about the relevance of the information called for and decide to supply it or not. . . . .As to the purpose for which the information is called, the employer is the ultimate judge. It is not open to the candidate to sit in Judgment about the relevance of the information called for and decide to supply it or not. There is no doubt that application called for full employment particulars vide Column 11. Similarly, Annexure III contained an express declaration of not working in any public or private employment. We are also unable to accept the contention that it was inadvertence which led the first respondent to leave the particulars in Column 11 blank and make the declaration of non-employment in Annexure III to the application . . . ” 7. The above decisions squarely cover the instant case. It is well settled that no person can claim right to appointment; he can claim only right of consideration. It is for the employer to consider whether a person facing trial in a criminal case should be employed or not, and the candidate cannot be the judge of his suitability for appointment on the basis of his own suppositions and notions about the nature of the case being petty or not. He cannot withhold facts which may have bearing on his suitability for employment. It is for this purpose that the candidate is required to make true declaration of facts. Suppression of pendency of criminal case apart from other things impinges on one’s character, and the right of the employer to dispense with services of a person on account of pre-appointment mis-conduct cannot be denied. 8. The fact that the appellant was acquitted in the case is of little consequence. Acquittal was on the ground that two witnesses examined by the prosecution had turned hostile, and three charge-sheet witnesses were not examined at the trial. The acquittal in the circumstances cannot be construed as giving a clean chit. Be that as it may, it is well settled that even where the person is acquitted in the criminal case, departmental action is not barred. In any view, the termination of services was not on account of conviction or pendency of the case but on account of suppression of that fact. 9. In the above premises, we find no error in the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.