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2006 DIGILAW 1593 (PNJ)

Raju v. Union Of India

2006-04-21

AJAI LAMBA, S.S.NIJJAR

body2006
Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. The petitioner was offered an appointment as a Group D employee i.e. Safai Karamchari in Kendriya Vidhyalaya, I.T.B.P., Sarhan on 30.7.1997. He applied for earned leave on 4.7.2002 for three days. He however did not report back for duty till 27.7.2002. In the meantime, a show cause notice had been issued to him on 25.7.2002. The petitioner did not submit any reply to the same. Thereafter, another show cause notice was issued to him on 12.8.2002. Thereafter, an ex parte enquiry was conducted against him. The ex parte enquiry was conducted on the basis of the report of the post office that the show cause notice could not be served on the petitioner. The remarks made by the postal authority are "IS NAAM KA HAZIR NAHI HAI". Relying on the ex parte enquiry report, the services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 3.9.2002. It was observed that the petitioner had lost the lien on the post, under Article 81(d)(6) of the Education Code for Kendriya Vidhyalaya. 2. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted an appeal which has been dismissed vide order dated 22.1.2003. The petitioner also submitted a representation on 25.1.2003 seeking reconsideration of the decision. The request was repeated by the petitioner on 30.1.2003. Ultimately, when no decision was taken by the respondents, the petitioner moved the Central Administrative Tribunal on 3.9.2005. Alongwith the Original Application, the petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay of 621 days in filing the Original Application. The O.A. has been dismissed by the CAT, Chandigarh Bench on the ground that the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It has been held that each and every days delay has to be explained. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the claim of the petitioner was meiitorious and would have been accepted only on the ground that the petitioner had not been supplied a copy of the enquiry report before the order of punishment was passed. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar A.I.R. 1993(5) S.C. 533. 4. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar A.I.R. 1993(5) S.C. 533. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid authority, the learned Counsel submits that had the Tribunal given the opportunity to the petitioner to represent his case on merits, the petitioner could have been granted the relief. 5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. We are of the considered opinion that the order of the Tribunal is unsustainable as not only is it against the settled law laid down by the Supreme Court but also against equity and good conscious. The pleaded case of the petitioner indicates that he is a poor Class IV employee. His services had been terminated on account of misconduct and ex-parte enquiry has been held against him. Copy of the enquiry report was never supplied to him before the order of punishment was passed. Clearly therefore, the petitioner was entitled to be heard on merits. We may also notice that the petitioner had been in service of the respondents since 30.7.1997. This apart, it has been settled by the Supreme Court that the cause of substantial justice should not be sacrificed at the alter of the law of limitation. The aforesaid principle of law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. 6. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has specifically considered the expression "sufficient cause" as it appears in the Limitation Act. In the opening paragraph of the judgment, Hon ble M.P. Thakkar, speaking for the Supreme Court has observed as follows: To condone, or not to condone, is not the only question. Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality in the said context is another. xx xx xx xx xx 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. xx xx xx xx xx 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. In our opinion, if the aforesaid observations had been kept in mind by the Tribunal, the impugned order dated 7.10.2005 dismissing in limine the O.A. of a Class IV employee would not have been passed. 7 The Central Administrative Tribunal was set up as a substitute for the High Court for dispensing speedy justice to the poor and needy employees who could ill-afford the expensive litigation in the normal course. The Tribunal was set up to dispense speedy justice, it was not set up to dispense with justice speedily. 8. In view of the aforesaid observations, we allow the writ petition. The impugned order, Annexure P-10 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the O.A. in accordance with law. The Tribunal will also consider the desirability of granting interim relief Petition allowed. No costs.