Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This is plaintiffs appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) challenging concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below holding that the suit filed by them was barred by the principles of res-judicata as the same property was subject matter of dispute in the previous suit which was dismissed by the then Addl. Senior Sub Judge, Faridabad vide judgment and decree dated 21.8.1986. The appeal was also dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court on 13.12.1986 and R.S.A. No. 1654 of 1987 against the aforementioned judgments and decree was also dismissed by this Court on 29.9.1987. In the earlier suit, it has been categorically held that the suit property was not a Muslim burial ground. It is further pertinent to mention that the earlier suit was filed by Irshad etc. in their representative capacity and various documents have been placed on record to prove the afore-mentioned facts which are Exs.D.1, D.3 and D.4. The suit has been filed on behalf of the entire Muslim community of village Sarai Khawaja. The Courts below have further placed reliance on a copy of the judgment Ex.D.5 showing that another suit was filed by the Punjab Wakf Board on the Muslim community of village Sarai Khawaja. 2. Brief facts of the case which have led to the filing of the instant appeal are that Shri KaIuta (since deceased) and others instituted civil suit No. RBT 244 of 1987 on 8.1.1987/5.4.1996 seeking permanent injunction against the defendant-respondents. It was claimed that they were Muslims and were permanent residents of village Sarai Khawaja, Tehsil Ballabgarh and there is an old grave yard in the afore-mentioned village as per jamabandi for the year 1954-55. It was further alleged that the suit land was recorded in the ownership of Ghisa son of Ram Dutt but in fact was in actual possession of the Muslim community of village Sarai Khawaja having been dedicated by the owner for its use as grave yard since times immemorial. In view of the long, continuous and uninterrupted user, dedication in favour of Muslim community was to be presumed and the suit land became the lost grant of the recorded proprietors. A declaration was sought that the proprietors were left with no right, title or interest in the afore-mentioned land. In view of the long, continuous and uninterrupted user, dedication in favour of Muslim community was to be presumed and the suit land became the lost grant of the recorded proprietors. A declaration was sought that the proprietors were left with no right, title or interest in the afore-mentioned land. The afore-mentioned piece of land was the only place where the members of the Muslim community could bury their dead and there were graves of their deceased members. The heirs of Ghisa claiming themselves to be the owners are alleged to have executed some conveyance deed on 10.10.1969 in favour of defendant-respondents. A declaration in respect of the afore-mentioned sale deed has been sought that the same did not confer any right, title or interest on the defendant-respondents as the possession of the suit land continued uninterruptedly with the Muslim community. The defendant-respondents on the basis of the conveyance deed have continuously changed the nature of the land and have converted into plots for the purposes of development of residential colony. Eventually, a settlement is alleged to have taken place on 7.7.1995 between the parties. The defendant-respondent had agreed to keep intact an area of 11 kanals out of total land mentioned in para 1 of the plaint solely for the purposes of Kabristan which is depicted in the site plan in red colour. It is claimed that the afore-mentioned agreement is binding on both the parties but the defendant-respondent in breach of the obligation tried to demolish the graves even from the reserved area of 11 kanals. The defendant-respondent despite request of The plaintiff-appellants have been continuously interfering in the afore-mentioned land which led to the filing of the suit. 3. The defendant-respondents resisted the suit on the ground that the same is barred by the principle of res-judicata as the earlier civil suit No. 44 of 6.4.1983 was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Faridabad on 21.8.1986. In the appeal the judgment and decree dated 21.8.1986 was upheld by the learned appellate Court on 13.12.1986 and R.S.A. No. 1654 of 1987 was dismissed by this Court on 29.8.1987. It is claimed that the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. The ownership and possession of the Muslim Community or the existence of old grave yards has been denied. It is claimed that the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. The ownership and possession of the Muslim Community or the existence of old grave yards has been denied. It is claimed that the land was never dedicated by its owner Ghisa or his heirs for use as grave yard by the members of the Muslim community or it is being used as such since times immemorial. After the year 1947 there is said to be no grave in the suit land and the same has not been used as a grave yard. The suit land alongwith other big chunk of land was purchased by defendant-respondents 20 years ago and they had carved out a big residential colony by laying Pucca Mettaled Roads, Sewerage, water channels, electric connections etc. The Muslim community belonging to village Sarai Khawaja migrated to Pakistan in the year 1947 and a claim is sought to be made by some labourers from U.P. who have settled in this village. The existence of grave yard in the nearby revenue estate of Palia has also been pointed out. 4. After framing of issues and adducing evidence by the parties, the trial Court recorded the finding that the suit land was held by the Hindu Proprietor and this was not dedicated by him to the Muslim community. It was further found that even otherwise no dedication by the Hindu to the Muslim community could be accepted by them, as gift by a non Muslim to a Muslim is not permissible for a religious and charitable purpose. The trial Court also held that the controversy raised in the suit is in respect of the same property which was subject matter of suit filed by Irshad Ahmed and others on behalf of the Muslim community in Civil Suit No.44 dated 6.4.1983, A copy of the plaint in the afore-mentioned suit has been placed on record as Ex.D.2 and a copy of the judgement as Ex.D.3, Ex.D.l is copy of the judgment dated 13,12,1986 in the suit filed by Irshad Ahmed. Ex.D.4 is a copy of the judgment passed by the High Court in R.S.A. No. 1654 of 1987 decided on 29.4.1987. Accordingly, it has been held that the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. The views of the lower appellate Court on the issue of resjudicata reads as under: 18... Ex.D.4 is a copy of the judgment passed by the High Court in R.S.A. No. 1654 of 1987 decided on 29.4.1987. Accordingly, it has been held that the suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. The views of the lower appellate Court on the issue of resjudicata reads as under: 18... It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the defendant that the suit land was the same. The proposition of facts and law involved in the present appeal was also the same was the matter has already been heard and finally decided by the competent court. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs is clearly barred by the principle of resjudicata. It is not denied that the earlier suit by Irshad etc. was filed by them in a representative capacity and therefore, the present plaintiffs would be deemed to be parties to the earlier suit. 19. XXXX xx xx xx 20... the earlier suits by a person belonging to Muslim community was filed by him in a representative capacity. The title of the defendant by virtue of sale deed was also involved and therefore, it had become crystal clear that the judgment and decree of the earlier suits also binds the present plaintiffs/appellants. The principle of resjudicata clearly applies to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and therefore, learned trial Court has heard and considered this plea at length and has reached to a reasoned finding that principle of resjudicata apply to the case in hand. The correct conclusion reached on by the learned trial Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. The application filed by the plaintiff-appellants for spot inspection was also dismissed by observing that no useful purpose would be served by inspection of spot by the Local Commissioner to ascertain whether the grave yard existed on the land in dispute or not. It was observed that the case of the plaintiff-appellants could be decided without inspection of the spot as the question involved was the application of principles of res-judicata to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even otherwise the power of the Court to ascertain physical possession of the parties could not be delegated to a Local Commissioner. For the afore-mentioned reason, the appeal of the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed. 6. Even otherwise the power of the Court to ascertain physical possession of the parties could not be delegated to a Local Commissioner. For the afore-mentioned reason, the appeal of the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed. 6. Shri Sanjeev Walia, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has raised before me only two arguments. Learned Counsel has firstly argued that after the filing of the earlier suit on 6.4.1983 a compromise between the plaintiff-appellants and defendant-respondent has been entered into on 7.7.1985 (Ex.Dl). According in the learned Counsel, this compromise has never been subject matter of a adjudication in the earlier suit and therefore, the principles of resjudicata as envisaged by Section 11 or Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code would not be attracted to the facts of the present case. Learned Counsel has then argued that the parties in the earlier suit were entirely different than the one who have sought adjudication on various issues in the present proceedings and therefore, the principles of resjudicata would not apply. 7. Shri M.L.Sarin, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent has vehemently controverted the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and argued that the earlier suit filled by Irshad Ahmed and other was- admittedly filed on behalf of the Muslim community of village Sarai Khawaja and the suit has been held to be filed under Order 1 Rule 8 read with Section 92 of the Code. According to the learned Counsel a perusal of Explanation VI of Section 11 of the Code would categorically show that the subsequent suit by any other member of the village community would be hit by the principles of resjudicata as envisaged by Section 11 and Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.* In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on two judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of R. Venugopala Naidu and Ors. v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities and Ors. and Shiromani Gurdwara Parband-hak Committee v. Mahant Harnam Singh. Learned Counsel has maintained that even another suit was filed by the Wakf Board which was dismissed on 20.12.1986 (Ex.D.5). The afore-mentione,d suit was also filed on behalf of the Muslim community of village Sarai Khawaja. The judgment and decree passed against the Wakf Board was upheld in appeal vide order dated 20.5.1989. 8. Learned Counsel has maintained that even another suit was filed by the Wakf Board which was dismissed on 20.12.1986 (Ex.D.5). The afore-mentione,d suit was also filed on behalf of the Muslim community of village Sarai Khawaja. The judgment and decree passed against the Wakf Board was upheld in appeal vide order dated 20.5.1989. 8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the judgments of both the Courts below I am of the considered view that no interference of this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code would be warranted. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the principles of resjudicata would apply to a dispute which stands already settled in an earlier representative suit filed on behalf of the same community asserting same rights in respect of the same property. The controversy has been rightly answered by the Courts below. There are concurrent findings of fact that the property in the earlier suit filed in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 read with Section 92 of the Code is the same and the controversy cannot be reopened. It is appropriate to mention that in the earlier suit it has been categorically found that the suit property was not a Muslim Kabristan. Even another suit filed by the Wakf Board has been dismissed on 20.12.1986 (Ex.D.5) and the decision of the trial Court has been upheld by the learned appellate Court as the appeal was dismissed on 20.5.1989. The controversy is squarely covered by the view taken by the Supreme Court in paras 9 and 10 of the judgment in R, Venugopala Naidus case (supra) which reads as under: The legal position which emerges is that a suit under Section 92 of the Code is a suit of a special nature for the protection of Public rights in the Public Trusts and Charities. The suit is fundamentally on behalf of the entire body of persons who are interested in the trust. It is for the vindication of public rights. The beneficiaries of the trust, which may consist of public at large, may choose two or more persons amongst themselves for the purpose of filing a suit under Section 92 of the Code and the suit title in that event would show only their names as plaintiffs. It is for the vindication of public rights. The beneficiaries of the trust, which may consist of public at large, may choose two or more persons amongst themselves for the purpose of filing a suit under Section 92 of the Code and the suit title in that event would show only their names as plaintiffs. Can we say that the persons whose names are on the suit-title are the only parties to the suit?. The answer would be in the negative. The named plaintiffs being the representatives of the pubiic at large which is interested in the trust all such interested persons would be considered in the eyes of law to be parties to the suit. A suit under Section 92 of the Code is thus a representative suit and as such binds not only the parties named in the suit title but all those who are interested in the trust. It is for that reason that explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code constructively bars by res-judicata the entire body of interested persons from reagitating the matters directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit under S.92 of the Code. 10. Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has argued that only the two persons who filed the original suit can be considered as panics in terms of Clause 14 of the scheme-decree and according to him since the appellants were not the plaintiff they have no locus standi to file any application under Clauses 13 and 14 of the same decree. According to the learned Counsel Section 92 of the Code brings out a dichotomy in the sense that there are parties to be suit and persons interested in the trust. According to him persons interested in the trust cannot be considered parties to the suit although the judgment/decree in the suit is binding on them. He has also argued that a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is different from a suit filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code. We do not agree with the learned Counsel. A suit whether under Section 92 of the Civil P.C. or under 0.1 R.8 of Civil P.C. is by the representatives of large number of persons who have a common interest. The very nature of a representative suit makes all those who have common interest in the suit as parties. We do not agree with the learned Counsel. A suit whether under Section 92 of the Civil P.C. or under 0.1 R.8 of Civil P.C. is by the representatives of large number of persons who have a common interest. The very nature of a representative suit makes all those who have common interest in the suit as parties. We, therefore, conclude that all persons who are interested in Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities which is admittedly a public trust are parties to the original suit and as such can exercise their rights under Clauses 13 and 14 of the scheme-decree dated September 9, 1910. (emphasis added). 9. The afore-mentioned view has received whole hearted approval of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Harman Singhs, (supra) as is evident from the perusal of para 19 of its judgement which reads as under: As observed by this Court in R. Venugopala Naidu and Ors. v. Venkataryulu Naidu Charities and Ors. a suit under Section 92, CPC is a suit of special nature for the protection of public rights in the public trust and charities. The suit is fundamentally on behalf of the entire body of persons who are interested in the trust. It is for the vindication of public rights. The beneficiaries of the trust, which may consist of public at large, may choose two or more persons amongst themselves, for the purpose of filing a suit under Section 92, C.P.C. and the suit-title in that event would show only their names as plaintiffs. Can we say that the persons whose names are in the suit title are the only parties to the suit?. The answer would be in the negative. The named plaintiffs being the representatives of the public at large which is interested in the trust, all such interested persons would be considered in the eyes of law to be parties to the suit. A suit under Section 92, C.P.C. is thus a representative suit and as such binds not only the parties named in the suit title but all those who share common interest and are interested in the trust. It is for that reason that Explanation VI to Section 11 of C.P.C. constructively bars by resjudicata the entire body of interested persons from re-agitating the matter directly arid substantially in issue in an earlier suit under Section 92, C.P.C. 10. It is for that reason that Explanation VI to Section 11 of C.P.C. constructively bars by resjudicata the entire body of interested persons from re-agitating the matter directly arid substantially in issue in an earlier suit under Section 92, C.P.C. 10. In view of the enunciation of afore-mentioned law there is no escape from the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff-appellant is barred by the principles laid down in Section 11 Explanation VI read with Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code as the earlier suit is deemed to have been filed on behalf of every member of Muslim community in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 read with Section 92 of the Code. Therefore, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 11. The argument of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that during the pendency of the earlier suit a compromise had taken place between the parties (Ex. D.1) on 7.7.1985 would not require any detailed examination because the earlier suit was dismissed on 21.8.1986 on merits. No amendment was sought under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code by pleading the compromise dated 7.7.1985. It is also well settled that a representative suit could not be compromised without the leave of the Court. In this regard, reference may be made to Rule 3B of Order 23 of the Code which reads as under: Order XXIII. Withdrawal and adjustment of suits, Rule. 30. No agreement or compromise to be entered in a representative suit without leave of Court.- (1) No agreement or compromise in a representative suit shall be entered into without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings; and any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be void. (2). Before granting such leave, the Court shall give notice in such manner as it may think fit to such persons as may appear to it to be interested in the suit. Explanation. (2). Before granting such leave, the Court shall give notice in such manner as it may think fit to such persons as may appear to it to be interested in the suit. Explanation. In this rule, "representative suit" means,- (a) a suit under Section 91 or Section 92, (b) a suit under Rule 8 of Order I, (c) a suit in which the manager of an individual Hindu family sues or is sued as representing the other members of the family, (d) any other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of the provisions of this Code or of any other law for the time being in force, bind any person who is not named as party to the suit. 12. It is no bodys case that the compromise dated 7.7.1985 was presented before the Court and the same constitute a basis for compromising the suit. Obviously no permission of the Court has been obtained with regard to the compromise dated 7.7.1985 which was entered into during the pendency of the earlier suit titled as Irshad Ahmed v. Greater Ashoka Finance Company Ltd., In any case, the plea raised on the basis of compromise dated 7.7.1985 cannot now be taken as the same was available to the plaintiff-appellant in the earlier suit. Therefore, such a plea would be barred by the principle of constructive resjudicata as envisaged by Order 2 Rule 2 read with explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code. Thus the argument raised on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant is devoid of any merit and I have no hesitation to reject the same. 13. For the reasons afore-mentioned this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.