Judgment ( 1. ) PETITIONER bank has challenged the imposition of property tax vide different notices contained in Annexures P-3, P-4, P-5, P-12 and P-13. It is stated that the petitioner is an Apex Society duly registered under the provisions of the madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. It comes under the federal society as classified by the Registrar, under Section 10 of the said Act. The Bank society has a control over all the District Cooperative Central Banks and the primary societies affiliated to it. It is also engaged in the development and expansion of cooperative movement. With a view to make rapid development it imparts training to its various employees of different cadres. The main objective of training is to provide knowledge and skill to bring about changes in advancing loans and behaviour along with professionalism. With a view to provide such training a building for an educational training centre was constructed in the year 1994. The college building so constructed consisted of Lecture Hall, Library, reading Room, Hostel, Hostel Mess, Computer Room, Principal Room, separate chamber for all faculties etc. The construction has been made on plot no. 4, Kotra Sultanabad, Bhopal, after due sanction. It is further stated that the municipal Corporation, Bhopal issued demand notices contained in Annexures p-3, P-4 and P-5 demanding thereby property tax to the tune of Rs. 10,59,103/-, rs. 12,03,274/- and Rs. 13,84,282/-, for the years 1995 to 2002,1995 to 2003 and for the year 1995 to 2004 respectively. Replies were submitted to the demand notices. The petitioner bank also made an application to the Secretary, department of Co-operation, Government of Madhya Pradesh, seeking exemption from imposition of property tax over the college building. The secretary in his turn informed vide Annexure P-10 that the college building was not a commercial complex but an institute and it would not be proper to impose tax upon such buildings. The petitioner Bank, thereafter, wrote to the Municipal corporation, Bhopal for cancellation of demand notices which was not acceded to but on the contrary, Municipal Corporation again issued demand notices vide annexures P-12 and P-13, demanding thereby the property tax to the tune of rs. 13,84,282/ -. The petitioner Bank, thereafter, wrote to the Municipal corporation, Bhopal for cancellation of demand notices which was not acceded to but on the contrary, Municipal Corporation again issued demand notices vide annexures P-12 and P-13, demanding thereby the property tax to the tune of rs. 13,84,282/ -. It is contended by Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Counsel for the petitioner that no property tax under Section 136 (c) of the the Municipal corporation Act may be imposed over the college building owned by the petitioner Bank. ( 2. ) SHRI Ajay Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, denied the claim of the petitioner by submitting a return. He raised a preliminary objection that in view of an alternative remedy being available, the petition is liable to be dismissed. On merits he justified the imposition of property tax on the said building. ( 3. ) PERUSED the record and relevant provisions of Madhya Pradesh municipal Corporation Act, 1956. ( 4. ) SUBJECT of property tax is contained in Sections 135 to 159 of the said Act. Shri Ajay Mishra, learned Senior Counsel urged that alternative remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner by virtue of Section 149 of the said act. This provision is reproduced below:- "149. If any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment or as to the basis or principle of assessment or as to the amount of tax assessed, an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court, whose decision shall be final. " In order to examine the position of availability of alternative remedy it is necessary to look into various other provisions of the Act. Sub-section (4) of section 149 lays down that no appeal shall be admitted under this section unless an objection has been preferred under Section 148. Sub-section (1) of Section 148 of the said Act obliges to maintain a register containing entries of "all such objections". The word "such" occurring in sub-section (1) obviously relates to preceding provisions. The Commissioner is required under Section 145 (1) to cause the respective valuation to be entered in a list and give public notice of the place where such list may be inspected. The word "such" occurring in sub-section (1) obviously relates to preceding provisions. The Commissioner is required under Section 145 (1) to cause the respective valuation to be entered in a list and give public notice of the place where such list may be inspected. Sub-section (2) of Section 145 provides that the Commissioner shall at the same time and in the same manner, give public notice of a date, not being less than thirty days from the publication of such notice by which objections to the amount of any annual value or other particulars entered in the assessment list may be delivered at his office. Section 146 of the said Act requires that the Commissioner shall in all cases in which any land or building is for the first time valued, or in which the valuation of any land or building previously valued is increased under Section 143 give special notice thereof to the occupier of the same. Section 147 of the Act further enables a person, dissatisfied with a valuation made under this chapter to deliver a written notice stating the grounds of his objection to such valuation. Thus, the word such employed in Section 148 of the Act relates to the objection to valuation made by the Commissioner for the purposes of property tax. In the instant case the petitioner has obviously no objection to the valuation made by the commissioner. His objection is about the alleged powers of the Municipal corporation, Bhopal to impose the property tax on the building in question. Thus, the petitioner was not required to submit objection to the valuation under section 148 of the Act. Consequently, by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 149, the remedy of appeal cannot be said to be available to the petitioner who has merely challenged the imposition of property tax without objecting to the valuation made by the Municipal Corporation, Bhopal. ( 5. ) WHILE considering the submission of Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner on merits it is important to reproduce the relevant provision of the said Act, which is as under:- "136. ( 5. ) WHILE considering the submission of Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner on merits it is important to reproduce the relevant provision of the said Act, which is as under:- "136. Exemptions.- The property tax levied under Section 135 shall not be livable in respect of the following properties, namely:- (a) *** *** *** *** *** (c) buildings and land or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes including schools, boarding houses, hostels and libraries if such buildings and lands or portions thereof are either owned by the educational institutions concerned or have been placed at the disposal of such educational institutions without payment of any rent," ( 6. ) PERUSAL of the aforesaid provision goes to show that buildings and lands or portions thereof are exempted from the property tax livable under section 145, if the buildings and lands or portions thereof are either owned by the educational institution concerned or have been placed at the disposal of such educational institutions without payment of any rent. This provision does not grant exemption from property tax to the buildings and lands if they are owned by other than educational institutions or they are not placed at the disposal of educational institutions without payment of any rent. The word owner has been defined in Section 5 (43) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 as under:-"owner" when used with reference to any land or building includes the person for the time being receiving the rent of the land or building or of any part of the land or building whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any person or society or for any religious or charitable purpose, or as a receiver, who would receive such rent if the land, building or part thereof were let to a tenant, or a manager or mortgage in possession. ( 7. ) ACCORDING to the averments contained in the petition, the petitioner Bank is imparting training in the subject property. Accordingly, it constructed the building for educational training centre in the name and style of agriculture Co-operative Staff Training Institute. The building for the said training institute is said to have been constructed in the year 1994 with the financial assistance of National Co-operative Development Corporation (N. C. D. C.) and also the petitioner Bank. The sanction for construction placed on record is contained in Annexure P-1. The building for the said training institute is said to have been constructed in the year 1994 with the financial assistance of National Co-operative Development Corporation (N. C. D. C.) and also the petitioner Bank. The sanction for construction placed on record is contained in Annexure P-1. It was granted for construction of hostel and staff quarters for the training institute. The sanction Annexure P-l was granted to the M. P. State Co-operative Bank Ltd. who happens to be the petitioner in the present case. The sanction contained in Annexure P-l is a financial sanction granted by the Additional Registrar of Co-operative societies, Bhopal on 14th June, 1985. Post construction sanction further for rs. 142 lacs was granted vide Annexure P-2 dated 24th February, 1994 and a permission to spend Rs. 31. 764 lacs apart from the financial assistance of rs. 110. 236 lacs from N. C. D. C. was also granted vide Annexure P-2. The petitioner has not placed on record any document to show that the sanction was granted to the institute. The petitioner has also failed to place on record any document showing that the municipal sanction for erection on the subject property was accorded to the school. Moreover the notice of demand contained in Annexure P-3 to P-5 was also issued to the Manager of the Bank and not to the alleged school. Letters contained in Annexure/p-6 andp-7 were not submitted by the institute, but were submitted by the Manager of the petitioner Bank for seeking copies of bye-laws in relating to imposition of property tax on the educational institutions. Replies to the demand notices were sent again by the manager of the petitioner Bank and an exemption from the property tax in respect of subject property was claimed vide Annexure P-8 and P-9. The representation contained in Annexure P-9 was made to the Secretary of co-operative Department, who, in turn requested the Secretary, Local Self government, Govt, of Madhya Pradesh to issue the necessary directions for granting exemption on the property tax. Thereafter, again the Managing director of the petitioner Bank made a representation dated 15-3-2004 contained in Annexure P-4 with a request to cancel the demand notice and grant exemption from the property tax. The Municipal Corporation, Bhopal vide annexure P-12 and P-13 informed the petitioner that the property tax in respect of the subject property is not liable to be exempted. The Municipal Corporation, Bhopal vide annexure P-12 and P-13 informed the petitioner that the property tax in respect of the subject property is not liable to be exempted. Accordingly, again an amount of Rs. 13,84,282/- was demanded from the petitioner vide Annexure p-13. Thus, the training institute did not claim exemption from the property tax at any point of time and, instead, it was the petitioner Bank who was requesting for grant of exemption from the property tax on the ground that the subject property is being utilised for training centre. The ownership of the subject property has never been asserted by the school. On the contrary, the petitioner bank is stated to be the owner of the subject property. ( 8. ) WHILE dealing with the word owned, the Supreme Court of India in the case of M/s. Mysore Minerals Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Income-tax, banglore, reported as AIR 1999 SC 3185 has asserted a wider meaning:-"any one in possession of property in his own title exercising such dominion over the property as would enable others being excluded therefrom and having right to use and occupy the property and/or to enjoy its usufruct in his own right would be the owner of the buildings though a formal deed or title may not have been executed and registered in his favour. " ( 9. ) OBVIOUSLY, the training centre is not holding the property in its qwn title. On the contrary, the petitioner Bank is holding the title as mentioned in the writ petition. Thus, obviously, the Agriculture Co-operative Staff Training institute is not the owner of the subject property. ( 10. ) THE word "at the disposal of has not been defined in the said Act. As per the Chambers Dictionary, 1998 edition, the word "at ones disposal" convey the meaning that "under ones management or control. " From the various averments contained in the writ petition and the accompanying documents, it is clear that the subject property is neither owned by nor is at the disposal of the Agriculture Co-operative Staff Training Institute. It is clear from the averments contained in the petition that the petitioner society in the name of Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sahkari Bank Maryadit is the owner of the subject building which is used by it for imparting training. The subject property is not owned by any educational institution. It is clear from the averments contained in the petition that the petitioner society in the name of Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sahkari Bank Maryadit is the owner of the subject building which is used by it for imparting training. The subject property is not owned by any educational institution. On the contrary, it is admitted by Shri sanjay Agrawal, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner enjoys full control in relation to the property used by it for imparting educational training. There is no averment in the petition that the alleged educational institution in the name ofthe Agriculture Co- operative Staff Training Centre is possessed of any legal entity and owns the subject property in its own name. It has also not been averred or substantiated by any document on record that the subject property has been placed at the disposal of the Agriculture Co-operative staff Training Centre. Clause (c) of Section 136 of the Act speaks about the ownership of the subject property by the educational institution. In order to hold that a property is owned by an educational institution, it must have a legal entity under law. Even for placing any property at the disposal of an educational institution such an educational institution shall have an independent legal existence. The petitioner has failed to plead as well as to substantiate that the subject building is owned by the alleged educational institution within the meaning of Clause (c) or it has been placed at the disposal of such an educational institution (having independent legal existence ). In view of this the learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to establish the applicability of clause (c)to the property in question. Since, Clause (c) of Section 136 does not get attracted to the present case, for the reasons stated herein above, it is concluded that the impugned demand notices contained in Annexures P-3, P-4, P-5, P-12 and P-13 are quite valid and the petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 11. ) IN the result, the petition is hereby dismissed, however, without order as to costs. Writ Petition dismissed.