MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) THE present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3rd november, 2004 passed by the learned Single Judge in OMP No. 273/2004, rejecting the petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking an interim injunction pending arbitration against encashment / remittance of the performance bank guarantee at 10% of the contract value furnished to the respondent or any one acting on its behalf. ( 2 ) AN agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent on 10th may, 2000, whereunder the respondent agreed to buy UPS Systems from the appellant for a consideration value of Rs. 1,68,12,400/ -. Payment term in clause 15 (a) to (d) thereof provided for phased payments linked with supply of equipment with performance bank guarantee of 10% to be provided at 15 (b) stage. At the stage when the appellant demanded payment of the balance amount, the respondent agreed to pay the same provided appellant furnished performance bank guarantee so agreed to by the appellant and in terms of the aforesaid agreement the appellant furnished a conditional bank guarantee for Rs. 16,81,238. 50p. The aforesaid conditional bank guarantee furnished on 10th August, 2001 was amended on 20th August, 2001. At this stage, we may point out the principal amendment, which was brought in by the amendment dated 20th August, 2001. The following paragraph appearing in the bank guarantee dated 10th August, 2001 reads as follows:"therefore, we, the Bank, hereby affirm that we are Guarantors and responsible on behalf of the Supplier upto a total of Rs. 16,81,238. 50 (Rupees Sixteen lacs eighty one thousand Two hundred Thirty Eight and paise fifty only) and we undertake to pay any sum or sums within the limit of Rs. 16,81,238. 50 (Rupees sixteen lacs Eighty one thousand Two hundred Thirty Eight and paise fifty only)as aforesaid upon receipt of written demand from the purchaser and Company within the validity of this Bank Guarantee establishing the Supplier to be in default for the performance of their warranty obligations under the Contract. 16,81,238. 50 (Rupees sixteen lacs Eighty one thousand Two hundred Thirty Eight and paise fifty only)as aforesaid upon receipt of written demand from the purchaser and Company within the validity of this Bank Guarantee establishing the Supplier to be in default for the performance of their warranty obligations under the Contract. " ( 3 ) THE aforesaid stipulation in paragraph 4 of the bank guarantee dated 10th august, 2001 came to be substituted under the amendment dated 20th August, 2001 and paragraph 4 of the bank guarantee, which was amended, reads as under:"therefore, we, the Bank, hereby affirm that we are Guarantors and responsible on behalf of the Supplier upto a total of Rs. 16,81,238. 50 (Rupees Sixteen lacs eighty one thousand Two hundred Thirty Eight and paise fifty only) and we undertake to pay any sum or sums within the limit of Rs. 16,81,238. 50 (Rupees sixteen lacs Eighty one thousand Two hundred Thirty Eight and paise fifty only)as aforesaid upon receipt of written demand from the Company within the validity of this Bank Guarantee. " ( 4 ) A comparative reading of the aforesaid two clauses would make it clear that the earlier stipulation of the liability of the company to establish that the supplier is in default for the performance of their warranty obligations under the contract now stands deleted in the amended bank guarantee, which was furnished by the appellant herein. ( 5 ) THE case of the appellant before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant had supplied all equipment to the respondent by 2nd of August, 2000 and that the respondent had defaulted in making the stipulated payment consequent upon which, a balance sum of Rs. 49,99,338/- remained unpaid. The respondent upon a demand made by the appellant only agreed to pay the same provided the performance bank guarantee of 10% of contract value was furnished. Finally, the bank guarantee as sought for was furnished, which was amended on 20th August, 2001. It is the case of the appellant that even after furnishing the aforesaid bank guarantee in the terms as pointed out herein before, the respondent made a payment of only Rs. 30 lacs on 22nd August, 2001 and a false allegation of payment of Rs. 11,99,335/- was made. It was also alleged that a sum of Rs. 8 lacs still remained unpaid. 30 lacs on 22nd August, 2001 and a false allegation of payment of Rs. 11,99,335/- was made. It was also alleged that a sum of Rs. 8 lacs still remained unpaid. It was stated that the invocation of the bank guarantee by the respondent without paying the balance amount of rs. 11,99,335/- or even Rs. 8 lacs, which is admitted to be due, is illegal as the bank guarantee had become inoperative, lifeless and still born as the conditions precedent for its invocation were not complied with. The aforesaid issues raised before the learned Single Judge were considered also in the light of the submissions of the counsel appearing for the respondent and in the light of the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court and various cases dealing with encashment / enforcement of bank guarantee. ( 6 ) AFTER going through the facts of the case and the various judgments referred to and relied upon by the counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge held that the bank guarantee in question while reciting the history of the supply which was made by the appellant and the payment required to be made, eventually affirmed that the bank guarantee was payable upon the receipt of the written demand from the company within the validity of the bank guarantee and that no other condition was specified for the invocation of the bank guarantee. It was also held that the amended bank guarantee which undisputedly govern the present contractual relations between the parties, specifically struck out the requirement of supplier to be in default of warranty obligations so as to enable the invocation of the bank guarantee and consequently, the bank guarantee was payable only upon the written demand from the respondent company during the validity of the bank guarantee. The learned Single held that such a demand having been made, the court cannot contrary to the well settled principles relating to invocation of bank guarantee, permit collateral questions of breach of contract including non-payment of the sum of Rs. 49,99,355/- in full to be agitated. As a fall out of the said findings, the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was dismissed. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are under challenge in this appeal on which we have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 49,99,355/- in full to be agitated. As a fall out of the said findings, the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was dismissed. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are under challenge in this appeal on which we have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the records of the case as also the judgments on which reliance was placed by both the parties as also the synopsis of arguments, which are placed on record by the parties. ( 8 ) HAVING considered the said submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid findings and the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single judge do not suffer from any infirmity. The learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the facts, and the laws settled by the Supreme Court have been correctly applied by the learned Single Judge to the facts of the case. We have already made reference to the stipulations in the bank guarantee dated 10th august, 2001, which were later on amended on 20th August, 2001. ( 9 ) THE law relating to encashment and/or enforcement of the bank guarantee is well settled by a long catena of judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court and this court. The principles have been authoritatively laid down, which the court is to apply when a request is made for grant of an injunction restraining encashment of a bank guarantee. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and another reported in 1997 (2) Arbitration law Reporter 350, the Supreme Court has summarised the said principle in paragraph 22. While summarising the said principle the Supreme Court also held that in order to make out a case of fraud, the petitioner has to establish that the said fraud is an established fraud. In respect of the second exception to the Rule of granting injunction in case of a bank guarantee it was stated that resulting irretrievable injury has to be such a circumstance which would make it impossible for the guarantor to reimburse himself if he ultimately succeeds and the same shall have to be decisively established and it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that there would be no possibility whatsoever of the recovery of the amount from the beneficiary by way of restitution. ( 10 ) IN U. P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. v. Singh Consultants reported in (1998) 1 scc 174, the Supreme Court while explaining the kind of fraud that might absolve a bank from honouring its guarantee quoted the following passage from the judgment of Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhatan Bank reported in (1984) 1 All e. R. 351:-"the wholly exceptional case where an injunction may be granted is where it is proved that the bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. But the evidence must be clear both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank"s knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on the uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a bank"s credit in the relatively brief time which must elapse between the granting of such an injunction and an application for the bank to have it charged. " ( 11 ) IN our considered opinion, for establishing fraud on the part of the respondent specific pleadings will have to be there to indicate that in fact fraud had been committed by the respondent which is by nature an established fraud. No such pleading apparently is on record and, therefore, the first exception to the general Rule is not available to the appellant. ( 12 ) ON the question of irretrievable injury which is the second exception of the rule against grant of injunction when unconditional bank guarantees are sought to be realised, it is held by the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. State Sugar corporation v. Sumac International Ltd. reported in (1997) 1 SCC 568 , that the irretrievable injury must be of the kind which was the subject matter of decision in ITEK Corporation Case. The Supreme Court in the said case discussed the nature of the case in ITEK Corporation and observed thus:"on the question of irretrievable injury which is the second exception to the rule against grant of injunctions when unconditional bank guarantees are sought to be realised the court said in the above case that the irretrievable injury must be of the kind which was the subject-matter of the decision in the Itek corporation Case. In that case an exporter in US entered into an agreement with the Imperial Government of Iran and sought an order terminating its liability on stand by letters of credit issued by an American Bank in favour of an Iranian bank as part of the contract. The relief was sought on account of the situation created after the Iranian revolution when the American Government cancelled the export licences in relation to Iran and the Iranian Government had forcibly taken 52 American citizens as hostages. The US Government had blocked all iranian assets under the jurisdiction of United States and had cancelled the export contract. The Court upheld the contention of the exporter that any claim for damages against the purchaser if decreed by the American Courts would not be executable in Iran under these circumstances and realisation of the bank guarantee/letters of credit would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff. This contention was upheld. To avail of this exception, therefore, exceptional circumstances which make it impossible for the guarantor to reimburse himself if he ultimately succeeds, will have to be decisively established. Clearly, a mere apprehension that the other party will not be able to pay, is not enough. In itek case there was a certainty on this issue. Secondly, there was good reason, in that case for the Court to be prima facie satisfied that the guarantors i. e. the bank and its customer would be found entitled to receive the amount paid under the guarantee. " ( 13 ) IN Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. Tarapore and Co. and Another reported in 1996 (5) SCALE 186 , it was held by the Supreme Court that a bank guarantee is an independent and distinct contract between the bank and the beneficiary and is not qualified by the underlying transaction and the primary contract between the person at whose instance the bank guarantee is given and the beneficiary. It was also held in the said case that in the case of an unconditional bank guarantee, the nature of obligation of the bank is absolute and the not dependent upon any dispute or proceeding between the party at whose instance the bank guarantee is given to the beneficiary. It was also held in the said case that in the case of an unconditional bank guarantee, the nature of obligation of the bank is absolute and the not dependent upon any dispute or proceeding between the party at whose instance the bank guarantee is given to the beneficiary. ( 14 ) WE may also appropriately refer at this stage to a very recent decision of the Supreme court in BSES Ltd. (now Reliance Energy Ltd.) v. Fenner India Ltd. and another reported in (2006) 2 SCC 728 . In the said decision, the Supreme court has reiterated the earlier principle laid down by it that to the rule that a bank guarantee must be honoured in accordance with its terms, there are, however, two exceptions. The first is when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice and a fraud of the beneficiary from which it seeks to benefit. But with a condition that the fraud must be of an egregious nature as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction. The Supreme Court held that the second exception to the general rule of non-intervention is when there are "special equities" in favour of injunction, such as when "irretrievable injury" or "irretrievable injustice" would occur if such an injunction were not granted. ( 15 ) IN the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and the well settled position of law, let us examine the facts of this case. ( 16 ) THE bank guarantee, which was furnished by the appellant on 10th August, 2001, came to be amended on 20th August, 2001. It could not be disputed before us that in the present case and to the facts and circumstances of this case, the stipulation in the amended bank guarantee would apply. Ex facie the aforesaid stipulation in paragraph 4 of the amended bank guarantee makes it crystal clear that the bank guarantee is of the nature of an unconditional bank guarantee. In such a bank guarantee given by a party, which is unconditional and irrevocable, the bank was obliged to honour its guarantee. The bank has to invoke the bank guarantee in terms of the stipulation in the bank guarantee. Although fraud is pleaded in the present case, the same appears in the petition only as a bald statement without any supporting materials to prove and establish fraud. The bank has to invoke the bank guarantee in terms of the stipulation in the bank guarantee. Although fraud is pleaded in the present case, the same appears in the petition only as a bald statement without any supporting materials to prove and establish fraud. It is only alleged that the respondent was seeking to unjustly enrich itself by fraudulently invoking the bank guarantee. As held hereinbefore, the appellant has failed to prove that there is any established fraud in the present case. Certain disputes are sought to be raised by the appellant but even the said disputes which arise out of a different and separate contract are not of the nature which could be brought into play within the concept of special equities and cannot in our considered opinion, amount to a case of irretrievable injury of exceptional nature. Even if the claims of the appellant are found to be valid and justified, the appellant would be entitled to compensation thereof for loss suffered, if any, or may be entitled to some damages, which are always retrievable and could be reimbursed and thus the present case does not fall within the ambit of the second exception. Justice can always be rendered to the appellant, if it succeeds before the arbitrators. No special equity in favour of the appellant could be claimed when there was in fact a dispute that performance was prima facie not satisfactory, which enabled the respondent to encash the bank guarantee. ( 17 ) ONE of the submissions of the appellant was that the bank guarantee was not unconditional. We have extracted paragraph 4 of the bank guarantee in question hereinbefore. A bare look at it would make it crystal clear that the bank guarantee was unconditional. The written stipulations of the bank guarantee are what matter and are relevant and not any other circumstance. The said submission is also found to be without any merit. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed. The interim order stands vacated.