Jayanta Kumar Biswas, JJ. ( 1 ) THE three petitioners in these three writ petitions have raised a common question of law regarding interpretation of a provision of the Chartered accountants Regulations, 1988, Regulation 12 (4), which is : " (4) Every complaint, other than a complaint made by or on behalf of the Central or any state Government, shall be accompanied by a deposit of one hundred rupees which will he forfeited if the Council, after considering the complaint, comes to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out and moreover that the complaint is either a frivolous one or is made with mala fide intention. " ( 2 ) THREE complaints were made against the petitioners under Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. On August 16, 2005 they were registered by the Institute, It then took steps to serve copies thereof in terms of provisions of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988, Regulation 12 (6 ). The petitioners received the copies on August 27, 2005. They were given opportunity of filing written statement. By letters dated September 19, 2005 they prayed for three months to file written statement. By letters dated september 29, 2005 the institute extended time to file written statement by forty-five days. On November 19, 2005 they submitted three applications seeking dismissal of the complaints. They contended that in view of provisions in Regulation 12 (4) the Council of the Institute was under the obligation to consider the complaints for ascertaining whether they made out any prima facie case. ( 3 ) BY letters dated December 9, 2005 the Institute informed the petitioners that there was no scope to dismiss the complaints at that stage. They were further informed that they were free to file their written statements. Further notices dated December 27, 2005 were given to them reminding them of their right to file written statement. By letters dated December 28, 2005 they once again pointed out to the Institute that they wanted the complaints to be considered by the Council in terms of provisions in Regulation 12 (4 ). By letters dated January 3, 2006 and January 25, 2006 they were given further opportunities to file their written statements. Feeling aggrieved they took out these writ petitions dated February 8, 2006. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioners has been argued by Mr. Mukherjee and mr. Mitra. By letters dated January 3, 2006 and January 25, 2006 they were given further opportunities to file their written statements. Feeling aggrieved they took out these writ petitions dated February 8, 2006. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioners has been argued by Mr. Mukherjee and mr. Mitra. According to them, provisions in Regulation 12 (4) cast a duty on the council of the institute to consider a complaint for ascertaining whether having not disclosed a prima facie case,, and being a frivolous complaint, or being made mala fide, it is liable to be dismissed in limine, and at the threshold. Their contention is that provisions in Regulation 12 contemplate three distinct stages at which a complaint, before it is referred to the disciplinary committee, is to be examined. Their argument is that while the first examination is to be made by the president of the Council in terms of the proviso to Regulation 12 (1), the Council has to examine it twice for two distinctly separate things : (i)to ascertain whether it makes out prima facie case and moreover it is frivolous or made mala fide; (ii) to form a prima facie opinion whether the member is guilty of professional or other misconduct. ( 5 ) ON the strength of the decisions in Dr. Amaijit Singh Ahluwalia v. The State of Punjab and Ors. , AIR 1975 SC 984 , Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Anr. , AIR 1975 SC 1331 , Ramana dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors. , AIR 1979 SC 1628 , State of Punjab v. V. K. Khanna and Ors. , AIR 2001 SC 343 , and vitarelli v. Seaton, 3l ed 2d 1012, Mr. Mukherjee has argued that having professed the standards to be followed while dealing with a complaint against a member of the institute, the Council is bound to follow them in letter and spirit. He has said that it an elementary proposition of law that a complaint received is not to be automatically entertained and admitted by authorities employers etc. , and particularly by an authority of the nature in question. ( 6 ) MR. He has said that it an elementary proposition of law that a complaint received is not to be automatically entertained and admitted by authorities employers etc. , and particularly by an authority of the nature in question. ( 6 ) MR. Mitra's contention is that since registration of a complaint against a member of the institute is itself sufficient to cause irreparable prejudice to the member, provisions were made in Regulation 12 (4) that before admitting a complaint and proceeding further with the matter the Council must consider it to find out whether it made out a prima facie case. His argument is that the applications filed, seeking rejection of the complaints, should have been decided by the Council after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. His contention is that principles of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should apply to such a case as this. For this he cited to me the decision in saleem Bhaiand Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , (2003)1 SCC 557 : (2003)1 wblr (SC) 305. His further contention is that fundamentals of discharge of duties by any adjudicative tribunal warrant that it exercises its inherent power to reject a complaint at the threshold, if on examination it is found that no prima facie case is made out by it. He referred me to Haisbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn), vol. 36, para. 75, page 60 ; and also to the Rules of the Supreme court, 1965, Order 18, Rule 19 ( 7 ) CASE of the authorities has been argued by Mr. Ray and Mr. Gupta. Their contention is that provisions in Regulation 12 (4) do not contemplate consideration of the complaint by the Council for any purpose whatsoever. According to them, they only speak of the fate of the deposit that is to accompany the complaint. Their argument is that for ascertaining whether there is a prima facie case, the Council is to examine the complaint only once, and that is when the stage mentioned in Regulation 12 (11) is reached. Mr. Ray has said that there is no provision for threshold dismissal of the complaint. His submission is that the authorities have been strictly following the provisions of law. Mr. Gupta has pointed out that prior to the stage mentioned in Regulation 12 (11) the things to be done are essentially ministerial in nature. Mr. Ray has said that there is no provision for threshold dismissal of the complaint. His submission is that the authorities have been strictly following the provisions of law. Mr. Gupta has pointed out that prior to the stage mentioned in Regulation 12 (11) the things to be done are essentially ministerial in nature. He says that that Regulation 12 (4) did not contemplate any situation as seen by the petitioners is clear from the provisions in Regulation 13. ( 8 ) HE has referred me to Kishorilal Dutta v. P. K. Mukherjee, 67 Cal wn 772, and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. P. K. Mukherjee and anr. , AIR 1968 SC 1104 (that was from the Division Bench decision of this court), and has said that the question of consideration of the complaint by the council will arise only after submission of written statement, rejoinder, etc. by the parties. He says that the statute is a self-contained Code. He also gave me two unreported decisions: the Council of the Institute and Ors. v. R. Ayyavoo and ors. (dated December 30,2003 in Writ Appeal No. 1322 of 1997) of the Madras high Court and D. N. Desai and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors. (dated April 4, 2005 in W. P. L. No. 2905 of 2004) of the Bombay High Court. According to him the procedure starts only from the stage mentioned in Regulation 12 (6) when the machinery is actually set in motion. He has commented that the petitioners suppressed the facts regarding their prayer for extension of time to file written statement and the responses sent by the authorities. ( 9 ) THE persons who lodged the complaints were added as respondents in the cases. Their cases have been argued by Mr. Kapoor, Mr. Chakraborty and Mr. Panja. They have adopted the arguments made by Counsel for the authorities. Mr. Kapoor has said that the Council being not a Court the question of its exercising any inherent power cannot arise. According to him, deposit accompanying a complaint is to be forfeited in terms of provisions in Regulation 12 (4), if occasion arises for that, only after due consideration of the complaint at the appropriate stage, and from the sequence of the stages indicated in regulation 12 no other conclusion can emerge. According to him, deposit accompanying a complaint is to be forfeited in terms of provisions in Regulation 12 (4), if occasion arises for that, only after due consideration of the complaint at the appropriate stage, and from the sequence of the stages indicated in regulation 12 no other conclusion can emerge. Pointing out the word "perusal" used in Regulation 12 (11), he has contended that the provisions in Regulation 12 require the Council to consider the complaint only once, and that is at the stage mentioned in Regulation 12 (11 ). His contention is that even at that stage there is no scope to give an opportunity of hearing to any of the parties. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Panja, for ascertaining the scope and ambit of the provisions in Regulation 12 (4) a conjoint reading of all the relevant provisions, and especially of the ones in Section 21, is necessary. His contention is that nothing is there in Section 21 that requires anything to be done by the Council at the threshold. He has explained the purport of the words "perusal, "consideration," and "opinion," used at various places of the regulations. He has questioned the motive of the petitioners by saying that they did not disclose full facts; that they approached the writ Court only for protecting their image; and concluded by opining that having not come with clean hands they are not entitled to any relief. Mr. Chakraborty has said that keeping in mind that the issue arises out of the provisions of a special Statute meant for professionals, it is to be seen whether the petitioners are correct in their interpretation of the provisions in Regulation 12 (4 ). ( 11 ) IN reply, Mr. Mukherjee and Mr. Mitra have said that provisions in regulation 12 (4) came to be inserted because of the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kishorilal Dutta. They say that the observations regarding primary duty of the Council to examine the complaint for ascertaining the existence of a prima facie case were made by the Division bench at a point of time when the provisions in Regulation 12 (4) were not there. According to them, previous sub-regn. (3a), identical with present sub-regn. They say that the observations regarding primary duty of the Council to examine the complaint for ascertaining the existence of a prima facie case were made by the Division bench at a point of time when the provisions in Regulation 12 (4) were not there. According to them, previous sub-regn. (3a), identical with present sub-regn. (4), was inserted because of the observations made by the Division bench that being a quasi judicial body the Council was under the primary duty to examine the existence of a prima facie case before referring a complaint to its disciplinary committee for inquiry. According to Mr. Mukherjee the alleged suppression is absolutely insignificant ( 12 ) REGARDING the effect of material and immaterial suppression he has cited to me the decisions in S. J. S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004)7 SCC 166 , and Sri Balaram Mukherjee v. The State of West bengal and Ors. , (1980)2 Cal HN 371, Mr. Mitra has referred me to the provisions of the present regulations regarding repeal of the previous regulations. By citing to me the decision in Sm. Ratu Datta v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (1989)1 Cal HN 274, he has repeated that it is an elementary principle of law that a quasi judicial body, even when not specifically conferred by the statute, would enjoy inherent power. He has read out to me Section 21 (8) and regulation 12 (6 ). As to the expression "ordinarily within 60 days" used in regulation 12 (6), his comments are that such a long period was fixed obviously for the reason that consideration of the complaint at Regulation 12 (4) stage would very likely take some time. ( 13 ) FROM the cases of the parties and the arguments of their Counsel it is apparent that the question for decision in the cases is whether by making the provisions in Regulation 12 (4) the Council incurred an obligation to consider a complaint for ascertaining whether it discloses a prima faciecase. A complaint alleging misconduct against a member of the institute is to be filed under Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. Provisions in Section 21 indicate, how the complaint is to be dealt with by the Council, and what steps it can take against the member, if the allegations made against him are found to be correct. A complaint alleging misconduct against a member of the institute is to be filed under Section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. Provisions in Section 21 indicate, how the complaint is to be dealt with by the Council, and what steps it can take against the member, if the allegations made against him are found to be correct. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 says, " (1) Where on receipt of information by, or of a complaint made to it. The Council is prima facie of opinion that any member of the Institute has been guilty of any professional or other misconduct, the council shall refer the case to the Disciplinary Committee, and the Disciplinary committee shall thereupon hold such inquiry and in such manner as may be prescribed, and shall report the result of its inquiry to the Council. " ( 14 ) THE regulations were made by the Council for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Act. In Regulation 12 a detailed procedure was prescribed indicating how the complaint should be processed and examined. The President of the Council is the first person to examine it for forming an opinion whether it is to be filed without any further action, on the ground that it contains substantially the same allegations as were made in a previous complaint. While provisions in regulation 12 (2) mention its form, those in 12 (3) specify the matters which it must contain. Regulation 12 (5) mentions when the Secretary of the Council shall return it for representation after removing the objections. Provisions in its sub-Regulations (6), (7), (8) and (9) mention how written statement, rejoinder, etc. shall be filed. Regulation 12 (10) empower the President of the Council to peruse the complaint, and the written statement, rejoinder, comments thereon, if any. He is to peruse these things for ascertaining whether any additional particulars or documents would be necessary ( 15 ) PROVISIONS in Regulation 12 (11) say, " (11 ) (i ). shall be filed. Regulation 12 (10) empower the President of the Council to peruse the complaint, and the written statement, rejoinder, comments thereon, if any. He is to peruse these things for ascertaining whether any additional particulars or documents would be necessary ( 15 ) PROVISIONS in Regulation 12 (11) say, " (11 ) (i ). If on a perusal of the complaint, the written statement, if any, the Complainant's rejoinder to the written statement, if any, and the respondent's comments on the Complainant's rejoinder, if any, and other relevant documents, the Council is prima facie of opinion that the respondent is guilty of professional and or other misconduct, the Council shall cause an enquiry to be made in the matter by the Disciplinary committee, (ii) If, on the other hand, the Council is prima facie of opinion that the respondent is not guilty of any professional or other misconduct, the complaint shall be filed and the Complainant and the respondent shall be informed accordingly. " It is therefore clear that in Regulation 12 there are two stages where the complaint can be directed to be filed. This means that if at either of the stages the complaint is filed, then it is not to go to the disciplinary committee for inquiry. ( 16 ) THE duty of the Council cast by provisions in Section 21 is intended to protect the member concerned against a frivolous complaint or a complaint made mala fide. An inquiry is not to be made as a matter of course. The Council is not to proceed mechanically. It is to consider all the materials before deciding to refer the matter to the disciplinary committee. For carrying out this object of section 21 the provisions in Regulation 12 were made by the Council, not for casting further duty or obligation on itself. I do not see how the authorities i have been referred to and the provisions regarding rejection of plaint can be applied to these cases. The concept of existence of an inherent power and exercise thereof by the Council seems to me to be misplaced. What a particular provision means is not to be ascertained by applying the concept of inherent power, when it does not deal with such power. The concept of existence of an inherent power and exercise thereof by the Council seems to me to be misplaced. What a particular provision means is not to be ascertained by applying the concept of inherent power, when it does not deal with such power. Here the question of existence and exercise of an inherent power should not arise, since a precise duty has been cast on the Council by the provisions of the statute for the purpose in question. ( 17 ) THE question is on how many occasions it is to form its prima facie opinion in the context of the allegations made in the complaint According to the petitioners it is to examine the complaint twice, and for two separate purposes According to the respondents it is to consider the complaint only once, and for one purpose, It has been argued that the expressions "prima facie case" and "pnma facie of opinion that the respondent is guilty of professional and or other misconduct" have to be given appropriate meanings according to the context they have been used in the regulations. According to counsel for the petitioners provisions in Regulation 12 (4) should be interpreted for the benefit of a member in that by them a threshold safety valve has been created with a view to arresting and nipping in the bud a frivolous complaint or a complaint made mala fide. ( 18 ) IT seems to me that Counsel for the respondents are right in what they say. In my reading and understanding of the provisions in Regulation 12 (4), they did not create a duty or obligation of the Council to consider the complaint, even before its form is examined by its Secretary, for coming to the conclusion whether it made out a pnma facie case for admission There is no doubt that the Council is under the obligation to consider the complaint and form an opinion about the existence of a pnma facie case, and that only thereafter it can send the complaint to its disciplinary committee for inquiry. This is the mandate of the provisions in the statute. The expressions "pnma facie case" and "prima facie of opinion that the respondent is guilty of professional and or other misconduct", used in sub-Regulation (4) and (11) respectively, do not denote creation of two separate obligations of the Council. This is the mandate of the provisions in the statute. The expressions "pnma facie case" and "prima facie of opinion that the respondent is guilty of professional and or other misconduct", used in sub-Regulation (4) and (11) respectively, do not denote creation of two separate obligations of the Council. In my opinion, the regulations made for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the statute cannot admit of an interpretation which does not emerge from a plain reading of the provisions in the statute. The statute contemplated examination of the complaint by the Council only once. ( 19 ) NEEDLESS to say that in the absence of a pnma facie case the complaint is to be tiled; that is to say, no further action is to be taken on the basis thereof. This particular consequence is conspicuously absent in the provisions in Regulation 12 (4), It is not said there that consequently the complaint shall be filed. The consequence is only regarding forfeiture of the deposit. There is no dispute that at times the deposits are refunded to the complainants. If it is to be held that provisions in Regulation 12 (4) contemplate the first examination of the complaint by the Council for forming an opinion about the existence of a prima facie case, then they have to be rewritten to some extent by the Court. The consequence of the opinion of the Council against the complainant should lead to the filing of the complaint, and this part has to be inserted by the Court in them. This is simply not permissible; and there is no reason to do this. ( 20 ) IN my opinion, provisions in Regulation 12 (4) do not contemplate a stage where the Council has to examine the complaint for any purpose whatsoever. They dealt purely with the fate of the deposit accompanying the complaint filed by any one except the central or any State Government. If the complaint is not ultimately found to be frivolous or made mala fide, the deposit is not to be forfeited; and this is the only thing contemplated by those provisions. There is absolutely no reason to see such a safety valve in them as is seen by (he petitioners. If the complaint is not ultimately found to be frivolous or made mala fide, the deposit is not to be forfeited; and this is the only thing contemplated by those provisions. There is absolutely no reason to see such a safety valve in them as is seen by (he petitioners. The safety valve for them is available at the sub-Regulation (11) stage, I am, however, unable to agree with Counsel for the respondents that the petitioners suppressed any material fact, or that they did not approach the writ Court with clean hands. ( 21 ) FOR these reasons 1 hold that the authorities have proceeded with the matter in accordance with provisions of the regulations. I do not find any merit in the contentions of the petitioners. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order for costs in them.