Judgment :- F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. The appellant, who was a successful bidder in respect of the tender relating to collection of parking fees for Commercial Vans in the area called Palam Station Road, has come forward with this Appeal challenging the order of the learned single Judge, dated 7.4.2006, passed in W.P. No. 2381 of 2006. The said Writ Petition came to be filed at the instance of the first respondent, for the issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for records of the first respondent pertaining to tender/public auction notices for the period of 2006-2007, as per the resolution of the first respondent Corporation, bearing No.486, dated 28.12.2005, for the period from 1.4.2006 to 31.3.2007, so far as parking of vans at Palam. Station Road, Madurai collecting fee of Rs.15 for 12 hours instead of Rs.10 per day i.e., 24 hours and quash the said proceedings. 2. The learned single Judge took the view that there was discrimination in so far as it relates to fixation of rates for parking of Vans in Palam Station Road, and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 3. Assailing the said order, Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the Appellant contended that in the first place, since the rates for parking of Vans has nothing to do with the rates of parking prescribed for other types of Vehicles, the question of discrimination did not arise. 4. The learned counsel then contended that for the very same contract, the appellant was the successful bidder for the previous terms and that by proceedings dated 16.5.2005, the first respondent, permitted the Appellant to collect parking fee at the rate of Rs.15 for 12 hours and Rs.30 for one full day, which was accepted by the Members of the Second Respondent Association. 5. The learned counsel, however, pointed out that only in February 2006 i.e., at the fag end of the contract period, the collection at the rate of more than Rs.10 was stayed at the instance of the second respondent by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum and the said proceedings in M.P. No. 47 of 2006 in C.C. No. 31 of 2006, was also subsequently, disposed of as having become in fructuous, since the period itself came to an end. 6. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner therefore contended that the Members of the second respondent having accepted the rate even as from 16.5.2005, cannot now be heard to say that the rate prescribed by the first respondent was on the higher side. 7. The learned counsel further contended that as far as the price fixation in such matters are concerned are within the realm of the respective Government and its agents concerned and there is every little scope for the Courts to interfere with such fixation of rates. 8. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., 2000 (1) CTC 594 : 2000 (2) SCC 617 ; Pallavi Refractories v. Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd., 2005 (2) SCC 227 , and Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datantatics Ltd, 2004 (2) CTC 221 : 2004 (4) SCC 19 , in support of his submissions. 9. As against the above submissions, Mr. Venkatraman, learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the very decision to make an increase in respect of the parking fees came to be made pursuant to the memorandum dated 30.9.2004, which primarily relates to scrapping of parking fee for Cycles, two wheelers and three wheelers as well as the Tourist Vehicles, but, nevertheless, while, in respect of the Commercial Vans parking alone such an increase in rates came to be made for the period from 1.4.2006 to 31.3.2007, while, the same yardstick was not applied to other Vehicles i.e., the Lorry, for which also the rate was sought to be increased from Rs.30 to Rs.50. 10. The learned counsel then contended that under Section 355 of the Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, though the Commissioner was vested with the power of fixing the rates, he was bound to follow the Standing Committee's Resolution and the second respondent-Corporation failed to, produce the resolution of the Standing Committee before the learned single Judge, in order to show that the same was followed by the second respondent, while fixing the rates and, therefore, the learned single Judge was fully justified in interfering with the impugned proceedings. According to the learned counsel there vas no resolution by the Standing Committee for enhancing the parking fee for Commercial Vans in the Palam Station Road and that such an enhancement notified in the Tender Notification dated 9.1.2006, was solely with a view to show favoritism to the appellant. The learned counsel would therefore contend that there was arbitrariness and discrimination in the fixation of the rates by isolating the Commercial Vans, and, therefore, the impugned notification called for interference, which was rightly set aside by the learned single Judge. 11. Having heard the respective parties, at the out set, we wish to set out the scope of interference in such matters, which has been clearly set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the decision reported in Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datantatics Ltd, 2004 (2) CTC 221 : 2004 (4) SCC 19 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has set out the principles as under in paragraph 9: "It is well settled now that the Courts can scrutinise the award of the contracts by the Government, or its agencies in exercise of their powers of judicial review to prevent arbitrariness of favoritism". Again in paragraph-13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly stated the legal position as under: "The Courts would not interfere with the terms of the tender notice unless it was shown to be either arbitrary or discriminatory or actuated by malice. While exercising the power of judicial review of the terms of the tender notice the Court cannot, say that the terms of the earlier tender notice would serve the purpose sought to be achieved better then the terms of tender notice under consideration and order change in them, unless it is of the opinion that the terms were either arbitrary or discriminatory or actuated by malice. The provision of the terms inviting tenders from firms having a turnover of more than Rs.20 crores has not been shown to be either arbitrary or discriminatory or actuated by malice." In the decision reported in Pallavi Refractories v. Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd., 2005 (2) SCC 227 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: This Court in Union on India v. Cynamide India Ltd., 1987 (2) SCC 720 , has held that price fixation is generally a legislative activity. Ltd., 2005 (2) SCC 227 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: This Court in Union on India v. Cynamide India Ltd., 1987 (2) SCC 720 , has held that price fixation is generally a legislative activity. It occasionally assume an administrative or quasi-judicial character it relates to acquisition or requisition of goods or property from individuals and it becomes necessary to fix the price separately in relation to such individuals. Such situations may arise when the owner of the goods in compelled to sell goods to the Government or its nominee and the price is to be determined according to the statutory guidelines laid down by the legislature. In such situations, the determination of price way acquire a quasi-judicial character but, otherwise, price fixation is generally a legislative activity. After observing thus, the Court held that price fixation is neither the function nor the forte of the Court. The Court is neither concerned with the policy nor with the rates. But in appropriate proceedings it may enquiry into the question, whether relevant considerations have gone in and irrelevant considerations kept out while determining the price. In case the legislature has laid down the pricing policy and prescribed the factors which should guide the determination of the price then the Court will, if necessary, enquire into the question whether policy and factors were present to the mind of the authorities specifying the price. The assembling of raw materials and mechanics of price fixation are the concern of the executive and it should be left to the executive to do SO and the Courts would not revaluate the consideration even if the prices are demonstrably injurious to some manufacturers and producers. The Court will however examine if there is any hostile discrimination. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd, Union of India, 1990 (3) SCC 223 : AIR 1990 SC 1277 (in Paras 57 & 58) has held that in judicial review the Court is not concerned with the matters of economic policy. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agent as to the matters within the province of either. The legislature while, the powers to its agent may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided, such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agent as to the matters within the province of either. The legislature while, the powers to its agent may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided, such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, the judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of facts are reasonably based on evidence to the question whether the findings of facts are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. The Court only examines whether the prices determined were with due regard to the provisions of the statute and whether extraneous makers have been excluded while making such determination. It was further observed that price fixation is not within the province of the Courts. Judicial function in respect of such matters stands exhausted once it is found that the authority empowered to fix the price has reached the conclusion on a rational basis. In the decision reported in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., 2000 (1) CTC 594: 2000 (2) SCC 617 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the legal position as under: The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayarant Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, 1979 (3) SCC 489 ; Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India 1981 (1) SCC 568 ; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., 1985 (1) SCC 260 ; Tata Cellular v. Union of India, 1994 (6) SCC 651 ; Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 (1) SCC 134 ; and Raunaq International Ltd. v. L.V.R Construction Ltd., 1999 (1) SCC 492 . The award of contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept, the offer even though it happens to be the highest, or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision making process the Court must exercise it discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, question the Court should intervene. 12. From the above decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we could deduce that any award of contract, whether it is by a private party or a public, body or a State in their commercial transaction the concerned body can chose its own method to arrive at its rates to be charged for the terms to be fixed. The scope of interference with such fixation of rates and terms is very limited and borrowing the expression of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court themselves that only in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that extreme arbitrariness or the decision is based on mala fides or in case of hostile discrimination, the Writ Court exercising its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could be arbitrariness invoiced. It has also been held that even when some defect in the decision making process is found, the Court should act with great caution and should not interfere in a casual manner. It has also been held in the above decisions, that public interest should be paramount and the Writ Court should always, keep in mind the larger public interest in order to decide whether any interference is called for. 13. Keeping the above principles in mind, when we examine the case on, hand we find that the appellant 'herein was a successful bidder in the tender called for by the second respondent pursuant to the corporation decision No. 486, dated 28.12.2005. The relevant clause, which related to the prescription of parking fees for the van is concerned, the same has been set out as under in Para 6 of the tender: and as under in Para 12: 14. It was argued that any deviation from the prescription made in the Tender Notification should not be made without the approval of the general council of the Corporation. It is not in dispute that the tender granted 'in favour of the appellant was strictly as per the rates prescribed in the above referred to clause 12 of the Tender Notification. As per the said clause, different rates have been prescribed for commercial lorries and vans. As far as the Commercial Vans, who are represented by the first respondent is concerned, the rate has been fixed as Rs.15 for 12 hours, while for the Lorries it has been fixed as Rs.30 for one full day. In the absence of any arbitrariness shown to us, we do not find any illegality in the decision making process of the tender prescribing the above referred to rates. The only contention was based on the memorandum dated 30.9.2004, issued by the second respondent-Corporation, wherein, it was stated that as per the announcement of the Chief Minister dated 2.6.2004, it was decided to scrap the collection of parking fees for Cycles, two wheelers and three wheelers, while for tourist vehicles, the rates prescribed in the said memorandum are to be collected. Even in the said memorandum as far as the Tempo, Vans are concerned, the rate has been mentioned as Rs.15 for 12 hours and Rs.30 for 24 hours. Even in the said memorandum as far as the Tempo, Vans are concerned, the rate has been mentioned as Rs.15 for 12 hours and Rs.30 for 24 hours. In the same memorandum for Lorries the rate has been shown as Rs.25 for 12 hours and Rs.50 for 24 hours. Though it was sought to be contended that for the Lorries, the said rate was not ultimately fixed in the main impugned Notification for the Vans alone, the higher rate has been fixed, on that basis, the allegation of discrimination can never be countenanced. When the Lorries and vans are two different classes of vehicles, there is absolutely no scope for comparing the vehicles in order to consider the plea of discrimination, much less hostile discrimination. 15. Therefore, the submission made based on the said memorandum dated 30.9.2004, can never be countenanced. The other contention is that in the previous year only Rs. 10 was collected for the whole of the day for the van and suddenly the rate has been hiked by three fold as Rs.30 for 24 hours. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commercial matters it is not for this Court to decide the basis based on which the rates were fixed unless extreme case of arbitrariness and unreasonableness was demonstrated before this Court. 16. A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition as well as based on the submission made before us, we are not persuaded to, hold that any extreme case of arbitrariness, having been played by the second respondent herein, in the matter of fixation of parking rates in the Commercial Vans in Clause 12 of the impugned notification. 17. The contention based on Section 355 of the Municipal Corporation Act, also does not impress us in order to hold that the second respondent acted in an arbitrary manner. A perusal of the said Section discloses that even while fixing the rates, the second respondent may be guided by the resolution of the Standing Committee. Therefore, a reading of the said provision also does not disclose any mandatory direction for the second respondent to mandatorily follow the rates to be fixed by the Standing Committee, while prescribing the rates in the Tender Notification. 18. Therefore, a reading of the said provision also does not disclose any mandatory direction for the second respondent to mandatorily follow the rates to be fixed by the Standing Committee, while prescribing the rates in the Tender Notification. 18. Therefore, in the absence of any arbitrariness or hostile discrimination satisfactorily demonstrated before this Court, we do not find any scope to interfere with the action of the second respondent in having prescribed the rates in the impugned Notification and the ultimate grant of tender in favour of the appellant herein. Further, from the material papers placed before us, we find that on 16.5.2005, the second respondent herein had passed an order permitting the appellant herein, to collect the parking fee for Commercial Vans at the rate of Rs.15 for 12 hours, end Rs.30 for 24 hours in the pervious year. The said fact has been brought out in the counter affidavit filed by the appellant in the Writ Petition. However, no reply affidavit was filed on behalf of the first respondent refuting the said statement. As far as the interim stay ordered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum is concerned, it could be seen from the copy of the order placed before us that it had been passed on 6.2.2006. The contract itself for the previous year came to an end by 31.3.2006. Therefore, for the period between 16.5.2005 and up to the date, when the interim order came to be passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (i.e.) on 6.2.2006, the appellant had an advantage of collecting the rate of parking fees of Rs.15 for 12 hours and Rs.30 for 24 hours. The first respondent cannot now be heard to say that the fixation of such rates in the impugned Notification for the period subsequent to 1.4.2006, was shockingly, unreasonable or an arbitrary fixation. 19. Therefore, looked at from any angle, we are satisfied that it is not an reduced extreme case, where, this Court should interfere with the Tender Notification of the second respondent as we do not find either arbitrariness or discrimination in the case of the first respondent in order to interfere with the New India commercial transaction of the second respondent with the appellant herein. 20. 20. For all the above reasons, we are not satisfied with the conclusions of the learned single Judge, and, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside. The Writ Appeal stands allowed and the Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected W.A.M.P. is closed. No costs.