S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ proceeding the petitioner has challenged the impugned action of respondents/dda in demanding an amount of Rs. 3,43,000/-, by its communication dated 26th November, 1991 on account of the request for change of allotment to a different floor which was acceded to by it. ( 2 ) THE facts are narrow and undisputed. The DDA had formulated the New pattern Registration Scheme in 1979. The petitioner got himself registered in the scheme and on 3rd July 1990, he was held entitled to a flat in the second floor in Block C, Pocket , for a MIG flat in Shalimar Bagh. The allotment price indicated in the demand-cum-allotment letter dated 1st October, 1990 was Rs. 1,84,100/ -. The petitioner was unable to deposit the amount; he requested for extension and modification of the payment terms which was apparently acceded to. ( 3 ) THE petitioner's wife was apparently unwell and, therefore, he found it difficult to accept the said second floor flat. Accordingly, he requested the vice-Chairman for change of the floor from second to first floor on 29th october, 1990. The request was acceded to on 22nd October, 1990 and subsequently a demand-cum -allotment letter was issued on 26th November, 1991. This demand-cum -allotment letter indicated a new cost, namely, Rs. 3,43,000/ -. The differential has been challenged in these proceedings. ( 4 ) THE DDA in its response relied upon a circular dated 9th July, 1990 whereby it had indicated a policy that wherever change of floor was requested and acceded to, the disposal cost as on the date of the subsequent allotment ought to be applied. This policy has been relied upon for the purpose of justifying the price differential of about Rs. 1,59,000/ -. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of this court by learned Single Judge ( S. K. Kaul, J) in Smt. Renu Bali Vs. DDA 108 (2003)DLT 392 where the legality of the circular dated 9th July, 1990 dealing with the specific issue of costing to be applied in case of change of allotment vis-a-vis floor was concerned, had been considered. The Court held the policy itself to be arbitrary in the following terms:"another category of costing cases arise where there has been a request for change of floors. The circular of 09. 07. The Court held the policy itself to be arbitrary in the following terms:"another category of costing cases arise where there has been a request for change of floors. The circular of 09. 07. 90 was referred to in this behalf. However, the said circular is applicable only in respect of costing of left out flats and no case has been made out that the present flats allotted are in the said category. The resolution dated 13. 09. 91 was also referred to in this behalf in view of the fact that the revised land rates had come into force from 06. 12. 90. The revised land rates were made applicable in cases of change of floors at request of the allottees. Further no interest on their deposit against the earlier flat was to be allowed, which was being done earlier. Admittedly, other than issuance of these circulars, nothing was done to put the allotees to notice that in cases of change of floors, such new pricing system would come in vogue. In fact, a reference was made to the policy dated 15. 03. 93 resolving the ban on change of location under SFS (s) in terms of resolution No. 108 of 1992 to continue giving discretion to the Lieutenant Governor/ Chairman of DDA to permit change of floor in suitable cases. The suitable cases were also further explained and qualified, which were cases of handicapped persons with certain disabilities or elderly family members. I fail to appreciate how mere change of floor can result in the current cost being charged in the same area. There was a ban on change of floor. It was only in medical cases or of old persons that this change could be permitted taking into consideration the bona fide and suitabilities for the requirement of such change. Once the change was permitted, it has to be assumed that the same was after due scrutiny and based on the said parameters. If that be the position, the only charge which could have been levied was the differential in the price which would have been applicable as a consequence of the change of floor and based on the price of the ground floor for successful allocatees of such floor. An important aspect, which has to be considered, is that at the stage of such change of allocation, the allottees were never informed of this consequence. An important aspect, which has to be considered, is that at the stage of such change of allocation, the allottees were never informed of this consequence. The mere passing of a resolution in the records of DDA cannot be said to be a notice to such allottees. Thus, the allottees may or may not have accepted to change the floor if they had known that the consequences would have been so harsh. This is apart from the fact that there seems to be no basis for such a policy. The policy, thus, requiring current cost to be charged in cases of change of floor is also hereby quashed. " ( 6 ) MR. Mahajan, appearing on behalf of the DDA submitted that the judgment in Renu Bali was carried in appeal; the Division Bench referred the issues to the Full Bench which answered the same by its judgment reported as DDA Vs. Renu bali. It was also contended that the issue of validity of circular dated 9th july, 1990 went unnoticed and the judgment to that extent is sub silentio. Counsel further contended that the matter has been carried in appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. ( 7 ) HAVING considered the materials on record and the contentions of the parties, it is evident that the only issue raised in these proceedings is identical to the issue discussed by the learned Single Judge in Renu Bali's case. Although the DDA has contended that the reasoning was neither accepted nor disapproved by the Full Bench, I am not inclined to take a different view from that taken in Renu Bali by the learned Single Judge. The reasoning in that case, was that the mere change of floor, could not by itself result in imposition of current costs upon the allottee who is given another floor. I am not persuaded that there is any flaw in the reasoning which requires me to depart from it or refer the issue to the Division Bench. ( 8 ) IN these circumstances, the writ petition requires to be allowed. If any balance payments are to be made by the petitioner in terms of the original allotment letter, the same shall be deposited with the DDA within six weeks from today. Writ petition allowed. Rule made absolute in the above terms.