RAJES KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) BY means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the order of the Prescribed Authority. Labour Court dated 07. 05. 2003 passed on a reference made by the Labour Commissioner. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that that the petitioner was working on the post of labour since 1968 with respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and according to him has been retrenched w. e. f. 31. 07. 1998. It is claimed that as per High School Certificate, the date of birth of the petitioner is 10. 07. 1947 and he was aged about 25 years when he joined the service and as per Rules the age of superannuation is 60 years, thus, the petitioner is to retire on 3 1. 07. 2007, while he has been removed from service on 31. 07. 1998. According to the petitioner, he has been removed without complying the procedure of Section 6 N and 2 P of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. ( 3 ) THE case of the respondent is that the petitioner has not been removed from service, but he has been retired on 31. 07. 1998 after completing the age of 60 years. The petitioner has not filed any high School Certificate. In the year 1993 he has been medically examined by the Chief Medical officer before whom he told his age as 60 years, but on medical examination his age was found 55 years and then he himself submitted the certificate of the Chief Medical Officer dated 14. 07. 1993 in which his age was certified at 55 years and, therefore, he was retired on 31. 07. 1998 on completion of 60 years. It is the case of the respondent that after the retirement, he received his all retiral benefit and no objection whatsoever has been raised at that stage and subsequently, on the basis of the High School Certificate, which has been admittedly obtained on 21. 11. 1998 a dispute has been raised. Thus, the Prescribed Authority has rightly not accepted the claim of the petitioner that his date of birth is 10. 07. 1947 and he has been illegally removed from service on 31. 07. 1998. 11. 1998 a dispute has been raised. Thus, the Prescribed Authority has rightly not accepted the claim of the petitioner that his date of birth is 10. 07. 1947 and he has been illegally removed from service on 31. 07. 1998. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri N. K. Dutta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri P. K. Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and perused the impugned award, petition, counter affidavit etc. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per The Uttar Pradesh Distillery Industry ( Employment of Workmen and Conditions of Service) Standing Orders, 1986, the date of birth has to be decided on the basis of the High School Certificate. He further submitted that this court in the case of Rajeshwar Prasad v. The District Magistrate/ District Deputy Director, consolidation and Anr. reported in 1997 (88) RD 290 held that the petitioner is entitled to continue in service treating the date of birth recorded in the certificate issued for his passing the high School Examination as per Rule 2 of the U. P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of date of Birth) Rules, 1974. Thus, on the basis of the certificate of the date of birth his removal from service on 31. 07. 1998 was not justified. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner has not tiled the High School certificate during the course of his service. Admittedly, it has been obtained on 21. 11. 1998 and the petitioner has himself got medically examined by the Chief Medical Officer and submitted the certificate dated 14. 07. 1993 in which the age on that day was certified as 55 years and on that basis his age was recorded in the service book and he has been retired on 31. 07. 1998. Thus, the claim of the petitioner raising dispute about the date of birth is unjustified. ( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsel for the parties. I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 8 ) ORDER 19 of The Uttar Pradesh Distillery Industry ( Employment of Workmen and Conditions of Service) Standing Orders, 1986. which according to the counsel for both the parties is applicable. According to it. I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 8 ) ORDER 19 of The Uttar Pradesh Distillery Industry ( Employment of Workmen and Conditions of Service) Standing Orders, 1986. which according to the counsel for both the parties is applicable. According to it. the age of retirement is 60 years and it provides that the date of birth recorded in the Provident Fund and service book of the workman will be deemed to be final. However, if a particular workman disputes his date of birth as recorded in the service book, then he may make a representation to the Management within six months of the date of receipt of service book by him, Admittedly, the High School Certificate which has been obtained on 21. 11. 1998 had not been filed by the petitioner during the course of his service. The petitioner was examined by the Chief Medical Officer on 14. 07. 1993 and his age was found at 55 years. The said certificate was provided by the petitioner and on the basis of which age was recorded in the service book. Therefore, it was not open to the petitioner to raise the issue with regard to the date of birth or about his age subsequently. When the age was recorded in the year. 1993 and if the petitioner was not satisfied, then in accordance to the Order 19, representation should be made within six months, but no such representation has been made. In the counter affidavit it has been averred in paragraphs 11 and 16 that the petitioner did not raise any objection at the time of his superannuation on 1. 8. 1998 and received all the retiral benefit and gratuity without any protest. The averment has not been specifically denied by the petitioner in the rejoinder affidavit, it has also not been denied by the petitioner that the petitioner himself submitted medical certificate dated 14. 07. 1993 showing his age at 55 years. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the writ petition has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. . .