Judgment :- F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. In W.P. No. 2028 of 2004, the petitioner seeks for the issuance of writ of certiorari, calling for the records relating to the proceedings of the first respondent District Elementary Educational Officer, Nagercoil in Na.Ka.No.3723/A3/2004 dated 31.8.2004 settling the staff fixation for the petitioner school for the year 2004-2005, quash the same in so far as it renders one post of Secondary Grade Teacher as surplus. 2. In W.P. No.2064 of 2004, the petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of certiorari, calling for the records relating to the proceedings of the first respondent District Elementary Educational Officer, Nagercoll in Na.Ka.No.3723/A3/2004 dated 31.8.2004 settling the staff fixation for the petitioner school for the year 2004-2005 and the consequential proceedings of the second respondent AAEEO, Kuzhithurai in Na. Ka. No. 2170/EO4 dated 23.9.2004, quash the same in so far as it renders three posts of Secondary Grade Teachers as surplus. 3. W.P. No.2028 of 2004 was admitted by the learned single Judge on 6.10.2004 and in W.P.M.P. No.2090 of 2004 an interim stay of the impugned order was granted on 18.10.2004 while directing the writ petition itself to be posted for final disposal on 8.7.2004. Subsequently, when the writ petition came before the learned single Judge on 16.12.2005, the learned single Judge considering the importance of the question involved, directed the Registry to post the writ petition before the Division Bench for final disposal. Thereafter, on 4.1.2006, the Division Bench thought it fit to implead respondents 4 and 5 as parties to the writ petition in W. P. No. 2028 of 2004 by passing suo motu orders. That is how the writ petitions came up for final disposal before this Division Bench. 4. Briefly the facts which are required to be stated are, that both the petitioners are primary schools run by recognised and aided minority institutions. It is stated to be owned and administered by the Trust of the Diocese of Thuckalay. The Correspondent of the Syro Malabar Catholic Schools is the Correspondent of all the 9 schools under the Diocese of Thuckalay in Kanyakumari District. The petitioner school in W.P. No. 2028 of 2004 was stated to have been established in the year 1978. The other school run by the petitioner in W.P. No. 2064 of 2004 was stated to have been established in the year 1969 itself. The petitioner school in W.P. No. 2028 of 2004 was stated to have been established in the year 1978. The other school run by the petitioner in W.P. No. 2064 of 2004 was stated to have been established in the year 1969 itself. Both the schools offered education from standards I to V and it is claimed that mostly, the children of farm workers, rubber tappers, and coolies collecting forest produce are studying in the schools and thus catering to the needs of rural mass. It is also claimed that both the schools provide education free of cost except collecting a small sum specified by the State Government and that admission is open to all, irrespective of caste, creed or religion. 5. The issue relating to staff fixation is governed by the revised norms announced by the Government of Tamil Nadu based on the teacher-student ratio under G. 0. Ms. No. 5 25 (School Education) dated 29.12.1997 with effect from 1. 6.1998. The norms relating to elementary schools as prescribed in the Government Order is as under: "I. Elementary School (Standards Ito P9 a) The teacher-pupil -ratio of 1:40 will be followed. Minimum of 2 Secondary Grade teachers up to a strength of 80 will be sanctioned. In respect of new schools, first post will be created in the first year and second post in the second year. One of the two posts will be in the grade of Headmaster. b) For every additional strength of 40, one post of Secondary Grade teacher will be sanctioned i.e., the third post at 100,- the fourth post at 140, the fifth post at 180 and so on. c) Regarding the bifurcation of a standard, additional sections will be created when the strength exceeds 60 and so on in slabs of 40.” 6. The above referred to Government Order was the subject matter of challenge in a batch of writ petitions and writ appeals which was covered by a common order of a Division Bench of this Court dated 9.11.2000 in W.A. Nos. 1768 of 1998 etc. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Division Bench order is to the following effect: "29. The contention that the prescription of 1:40 and the second teacher at 80 is, according to them, unworkable and impossible. The Government Order states as follows: "The teachers-pupil ratio of 1:40 will be followed. 1768 of 1998 etc. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Division Bench order is to the following effect: "29. The contention that the prescription of 1:40 and the second teacher at 80 is, according to them, unworkable and impossible. The Government Order states as follows: "The teachers-pupil ratio of 1:40 will be followed. Minimum of 2 Secondary Grade teachers up to a strength of 80 will be sanctioned. For every additional strength of 40, one post of Secondary Grade teacher will be sanctioned, i.e., the third post at 100, the fourth post at 140, the fifth post at 180 and so on.” In an additional counter affidavit dated 21.7.2000 filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated as follows: "It is the policy of the Government, that there shall not be a single teacher school in the State. As far as elementary and middle schools are concerned, the minimum strength of 20 pupils is considered as economic strength. However, from the average attendance of 290 and above and up to 80, two teacher posts are eligible. It is further submitted that in the process of re-deployment of surplus teachers to the needy schools along with the posts held by them, the respondents will take steps to transfer surplus teachers from non-minority schools to needy non-minority schools and as well as from minority schools to needy minority schools as far as possible after getting consent from the concerned management to avoid retrenchment of surplus teachers. 30. It is further stated by the Special Government Pleader that there will be a minimum of one teacher for 40 pupils and that there will be two teachers exceeding 40 up to 80 and that there will be three teachers exceeding 80 up to 100 and thereafter in the slab of 40 pupils per teacher i. e., when the school gets the 41st pupil, the school is eligible to get a second teacher post and not at 79 as argued. Similarly, at 81 it is entitled for a third teacher up to 100 and thereafter for a slab of 40 pupils. Therefore, the grievance of the appellants that there will be one teacher up to 79 students cannot be sustained. The primary schools have got standards upto V i.e. minimum of five standards. The average attendance of all the standards I to V are taken together for the purpose of sanctioning the posts. Therefore, the grievance of the appellants that there will be one teacher up to 79 students cannot be sustained. The primary schools have got standards upto V i.e. minimum of five standards. The average attendance of all the standards I to V are taken together for the purpose of sanctioning the posts. That means, even if in some standards the student strength is less than 40, an average will be taken and posts are sanctioned accordingly. The projection made by some of the appellants is as though they are dealing with single-teacher schools which are very rare and as a policy the Government has decided to have a minimum of two teachers for every school." 7. Subsequently, at the instance of the State Government a clarification was sought for in W.A.M.P. No.5667 of 2003 in W.A. No.1768 of 1998 and the Division Bench by its order dated 12.5.2004 has held in Paragraph 11 as under: "11. On a fair consideration of the entire matter, we come to the conclusion that as per G.O.Ms.No.525 School Education (DI) Department dated 29.12.1997, the teacher-pupil ratio is 1:40 and only when the pupils' strength is at 80, second teacher's post will be sanctioned and likewise when the strength is at 100, third teacher's post will be sanctioned and the 4th teacher's post at 140 and fifth teacher's post at 180 and so on." 8. Again in paragraph 13, the Division Bench stated as under: "13. In the result, paragraph 30 of the judgment is clarified as referred in para 11 above. If the appellants have got any difficulty in teaching their pupils without having proper teacher strength, as contended by them, it is for them to approach the Government and on such approach, the Government is directed to consider the requests that would be made by the appellants in order to provide quality education.” 9. The petitioner, therefore, contended that according to the norms prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.525, dated 29.12.1997, the school is eligible for 5 secondary grade teachers on the basis of standard wise strength as well as the total strength and the act of the first respondent in fixing the eligibility as four secondary grade teachers in W.P.No.2028 of 2004 and only 5 secondary grade teachers in W. P. No. 2064 of 2004 therein is not in consonance with the Government Order itself and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 10. Mr.Issac Mohanlal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, by making a detailed reference to the Government Order as extracted above contended that even accepting the prescription of teacher-pupil ratio at 1: 40, it will have to be held that such ratio should be related to each standard for which education is provided in the elementary school and it cannot be related to the total student strength irrespective of the various standards for which education is provided in the school. According to the learned counsel, the application of the ratio of 1:40 by the respondents with reference to the total number of students studying in all the standards put together and dividing the same by 40 would make the fixation of norms as an illusory one and will not serve the purpose for which the State Government came forward to provide the required number of teachers in each school. 11. The learned counsel would state that the prescription in Clause I(a) of the G.O. to the effect "in respect of new schools, first post will be created in the first year and second post in the second year. One of the two posts will be in the grade of Headmaster" would show that in a new school while in the first year the school may start with the first standard while in the next year there has to be necessarily the starting of the second standard by virtue of the first standard student getting promoted to the second standard and thereby the requirement of the second teacher arising in the second year. 12. The learned counsel would further state that the ratio of 1:40 should be maintained in consonance with the students' strength in each standard reaching the level of 40 and for every additional strength of 40 in each standard the sanction of additional posts shall be made subject to the stipulation contained in Clause I(a). 13. On the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, we heard the learned Government Pleader Mr. Janakiramulu, who on the other hand contended that the ratio prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.525, dated 29.12.1997 is referable only to the total strength of the school and the contention to the contrary made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 14. 13. On the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, we heard the learned Government Pleader Mr. Janakiramulu, who on the other hand contended that the ratio prescribed in G.O.Ms.No.525, dated 29.12.1997 is referable only to the total strength of the school and the contention to the contrary made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader we find force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. When we test the argument put forth on behalf of the petitioner, we find that if the stand of the respondents is to be accepted, in a school where standards I to V exist and the total stu­dent strength remains at 143, sanction of two teachers-for first 80, one other teacher for the strength of 100 and another teacher for the next 40 namely 140 would result in the total sanction of only four teachers, even though, the existence of 5 standards namely standards I to V would mandatorily require the sanction of a fifth teacher to handle all the five standards in the school. Such a position would be highly incongruous and if the prescription of ratio provided under G.O.Ms.No.525 dated 29.12.1997 is to be construed and implemented in the said manner that would work against the interest of the pupils and the school and the very object of promotion of education will be defeated. 15. In other words, if there are five standards namely standards I to V in an elementary school with the economic strength of not less than 20 in each standard, and each standard reaching 40 or 80 or 100 or 140 or 180 as the case may be, the fixation of the teacher-pupil ratio as prescribed in the said Government Order will have to be made and that would provide necessary teaching faculty to man each standard/class. To put it differently or to cite an analogy, if in an elementary school there exists standards I to V and in each standard the students strength is not less than 60, the bifurcation of standards as prescribed under Clause I(c) will have to be made and the required teacher-pupil ratio at the rate of 1: 40 with a minimum of two secondary grade teachers upto a strength of 80 for each standard will have to be maintained. If the ratio as prescribed in the G.O.Ms.No.525 dated 29.12.1997 is not applied in the abovesaid manner, that would result in total lack of required number of teachers to man the minimum number of pupils in each standard, which would ultimately result in great fall in the standard of education and such a position can never be acknowledged or accepted as claimed by the respondents. 16. It is a well known canon of construction that while interpreting a provision of a statute or for that matter even a statutory notification, the purposive interpretation should be made and an interpretation which would defeat ft purpose should never be the rule. It is also the cardinal rule of construction of statutes to read the statute and give effect to therein, the ordinary the words therein, the ordinary, the natural and grammatical meaning and if by any chance such a reading leads to an ambiguity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the meaning that would fulfil the purport of the legislation should be made. We are of the view that the interpretation which we have placed on the reading of clause I(a to c) of G.O. Ms. No.525 dated 29.12.1997 would alone serve the purpose for which the norms came to be fixed and while giving such a reading to the above referred to clauses, ambiguity if any, gets ironed out and the Object and purport of the notification gets fulfilled. 17. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the decisions wherein the rule in Hey­don's case, which is also known as “purposive construction” or “mischief rule" has been succinctly set out. In the earliest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar and others AIR 1955 SC 661 in Paragraph 22 the Hon'ble Supreme Court set out the principle in Heydon's case which reads as under: "(22) It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when 'Heydon's case' 1584 (1) Co Rep 7a (V) was decided that “......for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive Or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be dis­cerned and considered: 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as it shall Suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.” In a subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated as under in paragraph 14: "14 .... It is Only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice (Per Lord Ashbourne in Nairn v. University of St. Andrews, 1909 A. C. 147 (B), in the I after event the following observations of Lord Lindley M.R., in Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris, 1900-1 Ch 718, at p. 725 would be apposite: "In construing any statutory enactment, regard must be had not only to the words used but to the history Of the Act and the reason, which led to its being Passed. You must look at the mischief which had to be cured as well as at the cure Provided. " (See also the observations of GODDARD C. J., in 'R. V. pad dington and St Maryleborne Rent Tribunal. You must look at the mischief which had to be cured as well as at the cure Provided. " (See also the observations of GODDARD C. J., in 'R. V. pad dington and St Maryleborne Rent Tribunal. 1949 (65) TLR 200 at p. 203(D)…….” In an English decision reported in 1985 (2) All ER 355, the very same rule has been succinctly set out by Lord Rokill in the following words: "It is, therefore, important that the question of construction should be approached by reference to well-known principles ignoring that which is irrelevant however interesting, but remembering that statutes should be given what has become known as a purposive construction, that is to Say that the Courts should, where possible, identify the mischief which existed before the passing of the statute and then if more than one construction is possible, favour that which will eliminate 'the mischief' so identified." In the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court D. Saibaba v. Bar Council oflndia and another AIR 2003 SC 25 02: 2003 (6) SCC 186 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraphs 9, 18 and 19. "9. ………Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so con­strued in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy, practical, and the exercise of power conferred on the author­ity, meaningful and effective. A construc­tion which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart. (Emphasis added) 18. Reading word for word and assigning a literal meaning to Section 48AA would lead to absurdity, futility and to such consequences as the Parliament could have never intended. The provision has an ambiguity and is capable of being read in more ways than one. We must, therefore, assign the provision a meaning, and so read it, as would give life to an otherwise lifeless letter and enable the power of review conferred thereby being meaningfully availed and effectively exercised. (Emphasis added) 19. On the same principle, the provision has to be interpreted from the point of view of exercise of the power by the Bar Council. (Emphasis added) 19. On the same principle, the provision has to be interpreted from the point of view of exercise of the power by the Bar Council. The interpretation, ought to be directed towards giving the expression a meaning which will carry out the purpose of the provision and make the remedy of review conferred by the provision meaningful, practical and effective." In yet another decision of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal AIR 1976 SC 331 : 1975 (2) SCC 671 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph 26. "26 .... If there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things." 18. In other words, a plain reading of the language of Clause I(a to c) would only result in an interpretation as has been placed by us in paras 14 and 15 and we are convinced that the manner in which it was sought to be interpreted by the first respondent while passing the order impugned in these writ petitions would result in an unworkable of to put it bluntly, chaotic situation in the educational institutions which cannot be permitted to be made. We therefore hold that the norms applied by the respondents under the impugned order passed on the total strength of the pupils in the school without particular reference to the student strength in each of the standards I to V would defeat and frustrate the very purpose of the fixation of the ratio and the corresponding number of posts to be ascertained and consequently, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 19. Therefore, while setting aside the orders impugned in the writ petitions we direct the first and second respondents to apply the ratio prescribed in Clause I(a to c) of G.O.Ms.No. 525 dated 29.12.1997 in the manner set out in paras 14 and 15 and fix the total number of posts for the school for the academic year 2004-2005 and for the subsequent years and pass appropriate orders. The writ petitions are allowed with the above directions. No costs. 20. Consequently, connected W.P.M.P. is closed.