Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 1644 (ALL)

RAJ KUMAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2006-07-12

TARUN AGARWALA

body2006
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—The petitioner Raj Kumar Shukla was appointed as a Lecturer in a minority institution and his services were terminated by an order dated 4.7.1988. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 13428 of 1988 which was allowed by a judgment dated 16.3.1999 and the order of termination was set aside. The Committee of Management filed a Special Appeal No. 298 of 1999 which was allowed by a judgment dated 15.9.1999 holding that previous approval of an order of termination passed by the Committee of Management of a minority institution was not required from the District Inspector of Schools. The Division Bench in its judgment, consequently, approved the order of termination. The petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was dismissed by a judgment dated 10.8.2001. The order of the Supreme Court is quoted herein below : “The view taken by the High Court appears to be correct. Therefore, no interference is called for with the same. The special leave petitions are dismissed. It is made clear that neither the orders of the High Court nor our order will come in the way of the petitioner pursuing any other remedy that may be permissible under law.” 2. The Supreme Court in its order while dismissing the special leave petition observed that the order of the High Court as well as of the Supreme Court would not come in the way of the petitioner in pursuing any other remedy that is “permissible” under the law (emphasis is mine). Based on the aforesaid observation, it transpires that the petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education under Section 16-G(3)(c) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The said appeal was entertained and notices were issued to the Committee of Management asking them to file a reply. The Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No. 43611 of 2001 praying for the quashing of the appeal filed before the Deputy Director of Education. The writ petition was entertained and an interim order was passed staying further proceedings in the appeal. 3. During the pendency of the appeal, the Committee of Management issued an advertisement inviting applications for filling up the post of Lecturer in Chemistry, i.e., the post which was previously occupied by the petitioner. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the issuance of the advertisement and the selection proceedings. 3. During the pendency of the appeal, the Committee of Management issued an advertisement inviting applications for filling up the post of Lecturer in Chemistry, i.e., the post which was previously occupied by the petitioner. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the issuance of the advertisement and the selection proceedings. Since no interim order was granted, one Prashant Sharma was selected and appointed as a Lecturer. The petitioner filed an amendment application which was allowed and the writ petition was amended and a prayer was also included for the quashing of the appointment of Sri Prashant Sharma as a Lecturer in the institution concerned. 4. Heard Sri Manish Goel, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.N. Saxena, the learned senior Counsel for the Committee of Management. 5. A strong reliance has been made by the petitioner with regard to the observation made by the Supreme Court in its order dated 10.8.2001. The petitioner submitted that he had filed the writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of termination on the sole ground that no previous permission under Section 16-G (3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was taken by the Committee of Management from the District Inspector of Schools and therefore, the order of termination was ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel submitted that the High Court held that previous approval was not required to be obtained by a minority institution from the District Inspector of Schools and to that aspect the matter was affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, since the order of termination was not challenged on merits, the Supreme Court left the matter open to the petitioner to pursue such remedy as permissible under the law. Consequently, the petitioner filed the statutory appeal under Section 16-G(3)(c) before the Deputy Director of Education. The petitioner, therefore, submitted that the appeal filed by the petitioner was maintainable and that the petitioner had a right to challenge the order of termination on merit. 6. Sri P.N. Saxena, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the Committee of Management, urged that the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 16-G(3)(c) of the Act was not maintainable since the said provision was not applicable to a minority institution. 6. Sri P.N. Saxena, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the Committee of Management, urged that the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 16-G(3)(c) of the Act was not maintainable since the said provision was not applicable to a minority institution. The learned Counsel further submitted that the appeal before the Deputy Director of Education was against the order of termination, whereas no appeal lies against the order of termination and that an appeal could only be filed against the order of approval or disapproval of the District Inspector of Schools. 7. In the opinion of the Court, it is not necessary for the Court to decide the questions raised by the Committee of Management since the controversy can be decided on other grounds. In the opinion of the Court, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is bereft of merit. The petitioner challenged the order of termination in Writ Petition No. 13428 of 1988. The relief claimed in the said writ petition is quoted below : “(a) issue a writ of certiorari order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 4.7.1988 (Annexure XIX); (b) issue a writ of mandamus order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere in any manner with the petitioner’s functioning as Lecturer in Chemistry in A.B. Vidhyalay Inter College, Kanpur. (c) issue such writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) award the cost of the writ petitions to the petitioner throughout.” 8. It is a settled law, that if the petitioner is aggrieved, he can straightaway file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of termination and can bye-pass the remedy of an appeal. The petitioner can challenge the impugned order on a variety of grounds and can also pursue his remedy on any one of the grounds, but it is not open to the petitioner to pursue his remedy before one forum on a particular ground and thereafter pursue the alternative remedy of an appeal, at a later stage, on a different ground. This cannot be permitted otherwise the finality of the litigation will never come to an end and it would allow a litigant to litigate endlessly. This cannot be permitted otherwise the finality of the litigation will never come to an end and it would allow a litigant to litigate endlessly. Such an effort cannot be allowed nor can be permitted to a litigant. Consequently, once a petition is filed, whether on a sole ground or on a variety of grounds, the matter comes to an end upon a decision given by a Court of law and the same cannot be reopened before another forum. In the present case, the petitioner has challenged the order of termination. The order became final upto the stage of the Supreme Court. The order of termination cannot be reopened on any other ground by the petitioner before the appellate authority as contemplated under Section 16-G(3(c) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. The Supreme Court in its order did not allow the petitioner to file an appeal before the appellate authority. It only directed that it was open to the petitioner to pursue any other remedy that was permissible under the law. In the opinion of the Court, filing of the appeal was no longer permissible to the petitioner. Consequently, in the opinion of the Court, the initiation of the proceedings by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Education after the dismissal of his writ petition which was affirmed by the Supreme Court was barred. Consequently, the appeal filed by the petitioner was liable to be quashed. 9. There is another aspect of the matter. It has come on record that the petitioner again filed Writ Petition No. 2972 of 2002 challenging the order of the termination but subsequently the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. 10. In so far as the writ petition filed by the petitioner is concerned, in my view, upon the order of termination, a vacancy arises and it was open to the Committee of Management to fill up the said post. The petitioner had no legal right to question the advertisement or the selection process or to challenge the appointment of Sri Prashant Sharma. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition No. 43611 of 2001 filed by the Committee of Management is allowed. The appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 16-G(3)(c) of the Act before the Deputy Director of Education, is quashed. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition No. 43611 of 2001 filed by the Committee of Management is allowed. The appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 16-G(3)(c) of the Act before the Deputy Director of Education, is quashed. The writ petition No. 6577 of 2005 filed by the petitioner challenging the selection process and the appointment of Prashant Sharma is dismissed. 12. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own cost. Order Accordingly. ———