Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 1645 (DEL)

MOTI LAL JAIN v. LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF DELHI

2006-09-14

MUKUL MUDGAL, S.MURLIDHER RAO

body2006
S. MURALIDHAR, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner claims to be the owner of land measuring 20 bighas 7 biswas situated in village Bahapur, New Delhi. By this writ petition he seeks to challenge an Award No. 7/97-98 dated 12. 12. 1997 issued by the Land Acquisition collector (LAC) pursuant to a notification dated 13. 11. 1959 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('act') and a declaration dated 9. 9. 1963 under Section 6 of the Act. The LAC followed the judgment of this Court in RFA no. 463 of 1969 (Chajju v. Union of India) in respect of the same notification and computed the compensation payable at the rate of Rs. 19,000/- per bigha. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's case is that on 10. 5. 1974 he had filed a writ petition being Civil Writ No. 621 of 1974 in this Court challenging the said notification dated 13. 11. 1959 under Section 4 of the Act. Following the judgment dated 5. 12. 1977 passed by this Court in a connected Civil Writ No. 721 of 1974, (Scindia Potteries Private Limited v. Union of India), the petitioner's writ petition was also allowed by the learned Single Judge on 5. 12. 1977. The petitioner contends that consequent upon the said judgment dated 5. 12. 1977, the land of the petitioner became free from the acquisition proceedings. Sometime in january 2003, since the Respondent No. 2 DDA had merged the land of the petitioner with their land, the petitioner moved an application before the tehsildar Kalkaji for making a demarcation " of the unacquired land of the petitioner". It is averred that thereafter in the last week of January 2004, the petitioner received an intimation from the Tehsildar Kalkaji that the land of the petitioner stood acquired by the award dated 12. 12. 1997 and therefore, the demarcation could not be made. In the petitioner's own words in Para 14 of the present writ petition, "the petitioner was shocked to learn about the alleged acquisition proceedings, as he had not received any notice of the same. " the petitioner claims that he engaged a counsel and got inspected the file of the Award No. 7/97-98, and obtained a copy which is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-12. " the petitioner claims that he engaged a counsel and got inspected the file of the Award No. 7/97-98, and obtained a copy which is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-12. The petitioner maintains that he was completely unaware of issuance of the said Award since no notice was issued to him under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. ( 3 ) INITIALLY by a judgment dated 20. 5. 2004, the Division Bench of this court allowed the petitioner's present writ petition and quashed the impugned award. Later, a Review Petition being RA No. 247 of 2004 was filed by the respondents, and the said order dated 20. 5. 2004 was recalled and the present writ petition was restored to file. ( 4 ) WE have heard the submissions of Mr. V. K. Singh, learned Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Sanjay Poddar, learned Advocate for the Land and Building department and Ms. Jhum Jhum Sarkar, learned Advocate for the DDA. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submits that since no notice under sections 9 and 10 were issued by the LAC, and further since the award had not been made within two years of the notification under Section 4 in terms of section 11a of the Act, the impugned award deserved to be set aside by this court. In reply, Mr. Sanjay Poddar, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 submits that against the order dated 5. 12. 1977 of the learned Single Judge allowing the petitioner's earlier writ petition, an appeal LPA No. 14 of 1978 was filed and, along with an entire batch of other similar LPAs, was referred to the Full bench of this Court. All the LPAs were allowed on 14. 12. 1995 by the judgment in Roshanara Begum v. Union of India 67 (1996) DLT 206. Thus the acquisition proceedings in respect of the petitioner's land were upheld. He submitted that petitioner has deliberately suppressed these facts in the present writ petition and this led to an erroneous order dated 20. 5. 2004 which had to be recalled later by this Court. He further submits that the point regarding the failure to serve notice under Sections 9 and 10 has already been considered and rejected by the Full Bench. 5. 2004 which had to be recalled later by this Court. He further submits that the point regarding the failure to serve notice under Sections 9 and 10 has already been considered and rejected by the Full Bench. As regards the time limit under Section 11-A of the Act, he submits that after the judgment of the Full Bench dated 14. 12. 1995, the award was announced on 5. 7. 1997 and a corrigendum was also issued on 12. 12. 1997 within the statutory period of two years. He accordingly submitted that the writ petition was without merit. Ms. Jhum Jhum Sarkar, learned counsel for the DDA adopting the arguments of Mr. Sanjay Poddar, learned counsel for Land and building Department, also prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. ( 6 ) AT the outset, we must express our dismay that the petitioner has in this writ petition has deliberately suppressed the fact that against the judgment dated 5. 12. 1977 of the learned Single Judge allowing his earlier writ petition No. 621 of 1974, the Respondent had filed LPA No. 14 of 1978 which came to be allowed by the Full Bench of this Court on 14. 12. 1995. The petitioner was a party to the appeal and was fully aware of the proceedings before the Full bench. From the text of the judgment of the Full Bench in Roshanara Begum it is clear that the petitioner's Writ Petition No. 621 of 1974 was also covered by the said judgment. In fact, a separate mention is to be found in this regard in para 174 of the said judgment in the following words:-"in view of the reasons already given with regard to interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, the judgments given in the Writ Petitions Nos. 621/74, 721/74 and 1347/73 dated December 5, 1977, of the Single Judge are liable to be set aside. " ( 7 ) FURTHER, in the impugned award, annexed as Annexure P-12 to the writ petition, it has been mentioned correctly by the LAC, that the High Court had dismissed the petitioner's Civil Writ Petition No. 621 of 1974 on 14. 12. 1995. Therefore, there appears to be no justification whatsoever for the petitioner to have suppressed the vital fact in his present writ petition. 12. 1995. Therefore, there appears to be no justification whatsoever for the petitioner to have suppressed the vital fact in his present writ petition. The petitioner having been a party to LPA No. 14 of 1978 which came to be allowed by the Full bench of this Court on 14. 12. 1995 clearly knew that the immediate consequence of the said judgment was that the acquisition proceedings would revive from the stage where they had stopped. Since the petitioner had himself challenged the notification under Sections 4 and 6 in his Writ Petition No. 621 of 1974 which, as noticed hereinbefore, was dismissed by the Full Bench on 14. 12. 1995, he cannot be possibly heard to plead ignorance of the next logical step following the upholding of this notification by the Full Bench. Therefore, we reject the plea of the petitioner that he was completely taken by surprise by the impugned award of the Collector. We find no illegality whatsoever in the Collector having made the impugned award dated 12. 12. 1997 consequent upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Roshanara Begum. We may add here that the decision of the Full Bench in Roshanara Begum has been upheld by the Hon'ble supreme Court in Murari v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 15 . ( 8 ) AS regards the contention of the petitioner that the award is bad in law for want of service of notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act, we find that this very plea has been rejected by the Full Bench in Roshanara Begum in the following para:-"113. In some of the cases, the plea taken was that notices under Sections 9 and10 have not been served and thus the acquisition proceedings have become void. In the case of Jatan Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held that even if there has been no service of notices under Sections 9 and 10 which are meant only for taking proceedings for determining compensation even then the same would not affect the acquisition proceedings. "the above decision has been rendered by the Full Bench while dismissing the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner himself. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be permitted to raise this plea all over again, particularly since the decision of the Full Bench has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Murari as noted hereinabove. "the above decision has been rendered by the Full Bench while dismissing the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner himself. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be permitted to raise this plea all over again, particularly since the decision of the Full Bench has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Murari as noted hereinabove. ( 9 ) IN any event the purpose of a notice under Section 9 of the Act, coming as it does after the making of the declaration under Section 6, is only to enable the petitioner to claim appropriate compensation. As noticed in the impugned award, the LAC has only followed the judgment of this Court in Chhaju v. Union of India (supra) enhancing the compensation in respect of the other lands acquired very same notification dated 13. 11. 1959 to Rs. 19,000/- per bigha. The petitioner could not have claimed any compensation higher than this for his lands which are covered by the same notification. Therefore, even on merits, there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of non-issuance of the notice under Section 9 of the Act. ( 10 ) AS regards the submission that the award was not made within the time stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act, we again find no merit in this submission. The acquisition proceedings which earlier stood quashed by the judgment dated 15. 12. 1977 of the learned Single Judge, were revived by the judgment of the Full Bench on 14. 12. 1995. Thereafter, the impugned award made on 5. 7. 1997 with a corrigendum issued on 12. 12. 1997 before the expiry of two years thereafter. Therefore, there is no violation of the statutory time limit stipulated by Section 11-A of the Act. For all these reasons we find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.