Judgment :- (Civil Revision Petition under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 against the order dated 29.8.2005 made in R.C.A.No.71 of 2001, passed by the VIII Judge of Small Causes Court (Appellate Authority), Chennai, confirming the order dated 31.10.2000 passed in R.C.O.P.No.1198 of 1997 on the file of XIV Judge of Small Causes Court, Chennai.) The Revision Petitioner is the tenant, who was originally ordered to be evicted under Section 10(2)(vi) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960, on the ground of disuse of the tenement; that order was passed on 29.8.2005 in R.C.A.No.71 of 2001 by the VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, confirming the earlier order dated 31.10.2000 passed in R.C.O.P.No.1198 of 1997 by the Rent Controller, XIV Judge, Small Causes Court. 2. The petition mentioned premises is Shop No.3 at No.9, Block A Bharathi Nagar I Street, Madras-17, which was originally occupied by the petitioner/tenant for running business of iron and wooden articles, which even according to him was shifted for the purpose of running a sweet stall with effect from 14.12.1997. 3. Both the Courts below found in favour of the contention of the Respondent/landlord that between November 1996 to February 1997 the shop was under disuse by the petitioner/tenant. 4. Section 10(2)(vi) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960, is as follows:- "the landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied, that where the building is situated in a place other than a hill-station, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause,..." 5. The petitioner/tenant resisted the contents of the petition by pleading in the counter to the main R.C.O.P. as if his stocks were stationed in the premises; and that using as godown for stocking the articles of trade envisages "carrying on business" and therefore the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant submitted that it cannot be said that between November 1996 and February 1997, the premises was in disuse. But in the petitioner's reply notice dated 6.6.1997, the factum of stocking trade in articles in the tenement was not specifically mentioned. But in the petitioner's reply notice dated 6.6.1997, the factum of stocking trade in articles in the tenement was not specifically mentioned. What that reply notice contended was that they still retained the premises as lawful tenant for the showroom. Whether they have kept as a showroom or stock in trade, was also not very much established. Thus, there is an inconsistency in the case of the petitioner regarding his alleged usage of the premises between November 1996 and February 1997. 6. The Respondent/landlord on the contrary produced some evidence probablising the disuse of the premises by the petitioner. This was manifestly shown by comparing the Electricity consumption charges for the premises in October 1996 which went to Rs.334/- and in February 1997 it was only Rs.80/-. 7. The advertisement through Ex.R4 and the Electricity Consumption Card (Ex.R6) produced on the side of the Respondent would relate to a period, different from November 1996 and February 1997 alleged period of disuse. Therefore those documents serve no purpose. As a matter of fact, the Respondent/Landlord has produced some documents to show that the Electricity Consumption that was made in the premises between 21.10.1996 to 21.4.1997 only 30 units, suggesting that it was in disuse. Further in Ex.P.17 the Court notice the endorsement of service was "always door locked". This is in respect of this tenement. 8. It is for the above reasons, both the Courts below found in fact that the tenement was in disuse between November 1996 and February 1997 and based that as the ground for passing order of eviction. 9. Reliance was placed by the petitioner in A. Gulam Mohamed v. A.K.Pichai Maracair (1981 I MLJ 99) as well as case law in R.M.Solai Nadar v. M/s.A.T.A.V.Guruswami Nadar & Co., (1969 I M.L.J. 629). In the second case at page 633 it is observed that, 'Carrying on business' is essentially a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law and each case has to be decided on its own facts and no general proposition of law can be evolved. Again in the above cited another case it is observed that, two elements that are to be proved on the side of the tenant is that (i) keeping the articles in the tenement (ii) carrying on business. Again in the above cited another case it is observed that, two elements that are to be proved on the side of the tenant is that (i) keeping the articles in the tenement (ii) carrying on business. It was held that when these two elements are proved that is sufficient to hold that the tenant is still in occupation. Although an endeavour was made on the side of the petitioner that he had used the premises as store house, no element of "carrying on business," was made out. Further the mere averment of usage as godown itself was improbablised by virtue of the inconsistency between petitioner's statement in reply notice dated 6.6.1997 and his counter to the R.C.O.P. 10. As was held in A.K.S.Habib Mohammed Sultan v. Nainsukhdas Baldevdas and others (1999 I M.L.J.665) burden lies heavily upon the tenant to explain the reason for not using the premises. This was affirmed in M.R.M.Duraiappa Nadar v. P.Thirupurasundariammal (1989 I M.L.J. 89, wherein it was held that landlord, in addition, to prove that the conduct of the tenant in ceasing to occupy the building is without a reasonable cause. When once it was established by the landlord, the burden shifts to the tenants to explain reasons of disuse. In the case on hand, there is no proper explanation made; there was only a bare denial and that was also found not supported by cogent evidence. 11. It is not purposeful for the petitioner to rely upon a case law in Bhagwati Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Bhalotia (AIR 1981 3 SCC 329 ) because, in that case on a direction to inspect the building disuse was established like the case on hand, where the petitioner/tenant did not explain the reason for his disuse. Similarly Messrs.Abdul Rahim & Bros. and another v. R.K. Selvam Bros. & others (...) the fact that the tenant a dealer in liquor was not able to carry on his business in the premises due to change in policy of Government and therefore his usage for keeping furniture in the premises and payment of rent was accepted as a proper explanation. But similar situation does not arise in this case. 12. The learned counsel for the Respondent/landlord would contend that when both Courts below found on facts in favour of the landlord, a revision may not be entertained when no question of law was rised. But similar situation does not arise in this case. 12. The learned counsel for the Respondent/landlord would contend that when both Courts below found on facts in favour of the landlord, a revision may not be entertained when no question of law was rised. In fact this question was dealt with in a case law in Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy, (1980)4 S.C.C. 259,where, a two Judge Bench has observed that, "despite wide language employed in the section, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with the findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority." 13. Again, it was held in a case law reported in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1999, I L.W. 698 (SC) in the following lines:- "In legal parlance distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a re-hearing of the whole case for enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by the conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course, the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on the contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of law. Expnsion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. In some Legislations revisional jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court. Learned single Judge of the High Court in the present case has reassessed and re-appraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt, even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact finding court is wholly unreasonable." 14. In a later judgment in Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai, (1999)1 S.C.C. 133 ) the scope of revisional jurisdiction was considered and it was held as follows:- "The application given to the section makes it unmistakably clear that the power conferred thereunder is revisional which means, it is a power of supervision. It is well neigh settled that a revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters. It is well neigh settled that a revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appeal powers in all its parameters. The power to call for and examine the records is for the purpose of the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality, regularity or propriety" of the order of the lower authority. Even such a widely worded frame of the Section may at best indicate that the revisional powers are not so restricted as in the enactments wherein the words are not so widely framed. Nonetheless, they remain in the realm of supervisory jurisdiction." 15. Besides distinguishing the word "occupy" and 'possession' it was held in Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004(4) L.W. 231 SC) that possession means holding it as an owner and that occupying is to actually possess; besides which, it was further held that High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, entered into re-appreciation of evidence which is not open to it. Thus, it is made clear that it is only in the course of exercising of supervisory jurisdiction, if the finding is well grounded even there arises no necessity for re-appraisal of evidence. 16. In the case on hand, as mentioned earlier, the result arrived upon facts of the case by both the Courts below appear to be acceptable and no defect in that process was found and as such the revision requires no reversion of the orders of the Courts below. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this Civil Revision, and is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.16946 of 2005 is closed.