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2006 DIGILAW 1669 (DEL)

BANWARI LAL SHARMA v. UOI

2006-09-18

MUKUL MUDGAL, S.MURLIDHER RAO

body2006
S. MURALIDHAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner's agricultural lands admeasuring 13 Bhigas and 12 Biswa in village Shayoorpur, Delhi were notified for acquisition by a notification dated 25. 11. 1980 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("act") for the public purpose of the planned development of Delhi. This was followed by a declaration dated 27. 5. 1985 under Section 6 of the Act and an award No. 10/87-88 dated 19. 5. 1987. By this writ petition filed on 21. 4. 1994, the petitioner has sought the quashing of the aforementioned two notifications under s. 4 and s. 6 of the Act as well as the award. The other relief claimed is a writ of mandamus to the respondents "to reverse the entries in the Revenue records in favour of the petitioners. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner states in the writ petition that although other persons had filed writ petitions in this Court challenging the aforementioned notifications in relation to their lands in the same village Shayoorpur, the petitioner did not file any writ petition earlier seeking the reliefs now sought. The petitioner bases his claim essentially on the judgment dated 18. 11. 1988 of the Division Bench of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of india (1989) 38 DLT 243 whereby in relation to 73 petitions challenging these very notifications, the acquisition proceedings were quashed. The petitioner"s case is that after the order in Balak Ram Gupta there is "no manner of doubt that the notification, declaration and the award has been quashed in their entirety and not restricted to the cases of the writ petitioners before the court and that said quashing would enure to the benefit of land owners including those who have received the compensation. " Following the said judgment in Balak ram Gupta, another group of petitions came to be disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 15. 5. 1989 in C. W. No. 1373-1375 of 1989 (Balbir singh v. Union of India) whereby this Court permitted the land owners to return the compensation received with interest to the Government and have their lands returned to them free from acquisition. The petitioner claims that a similar order should be passed in this petition as well. ( 3 ) WHEN the writ petition was initially listed for hearing on 25. 5. The petitioner claims that a similar order should be passed in this petition as well. ( 3 ) WHEN the writ petition was initially listed for hearing on 25. 5. 1994, notice was directed to be issued. Later at a hearing on 19. 3. 1996 the Court directed that this writ petition should be listed on regular board along with c. W. No. 3611 of 1991. ( 4 ) CERTAIN subsequent developments may now be noticed. The said C. W. No. 3611 of 1991 (Jit Ram v. Union of India), with which the present writ petition was to be heard, came to be dismissed along with a batch of similar writ petitions on 24. 5. 2006 by a Division Bench of this Court. The lead case in the batch was w. P. (C) No. 809 of 1992 (Santosh Kumar v. Union of India ). In Santosh Kumar, the Division Bench formulated three questions for determination. The first two of these, which arise in the present petition as well, read as under: (i) Whether the judgment delivered by this Court in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, has the effect of quashing the acquisition proceedings qua the land owned by the petitioners in the present batch of cases" (ii) Whether the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioners" ( 5 ) AS regards question (i), the Division Bench followed the judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Gurdip Singh Uban (I) AIR 1999 SC 3822 and Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban (II) AIR 2000 SC 3737 where it had been conclusively held that the judgment in Balak Ram Gupta applied only to the 73 cases in which the said judgment was passed and therefore, it did not have the effect of quashing the acquisition proceedings in their entirety. Therefore, the Santosh Kumar bench answered the first question in the negative. ( 6 ) AS regards the question (ii), the Division Bench in Santosh Kumar noticed that the award had been passed and the possession already taken even by the time the writ petitions had been filed. In those circumstances, and that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings was held to be belated. ( 6 ) AS regards the question (ii), the Division Bench in Santosh Kumar noticed that the award had been passed and the possession already taken even by the time the writ petitions had been filed. In those circumstances, and that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings was held to be belated. After referring to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B. R. Laxmi (1996) 6 SCC 445 , Market Committee, Hodal v. Krishan Murati (1996) 1 scc 311 , and Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48 , the Division Bench in Santosh Kumar held that "the land owners cannot allow the proceedings to go on, accepting by their silence, the validity of the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and then turn around to challenge the same after the Collector has made his award or dispossessed the owners on the basis thereof. Even if the period post-Balak Ram Gupta's judgment is deemed to have been explained, there is no explanation for the pre-Balak Ram gupta period of three years, which is sufficient to justify the dismissal of these petitions on the ground of delay and laches. " ( 7 ) WE turn now to the present writ petition. It may be straightaway noticed that there is no explanation whatsoever as to why the present writ petition challenging the notifications of 1980 and 1985 and an award of 1987 was filed only in 1994. The only averment is in para 16 where it is stated that "recently the Government is taking an unsustainable stand that the judgments in balak Ram Gupta's case and other cases would apply only to the writ petitioners and not to other land owners. " This can hardly constitute a valid justification for the delay in approaching this Court. ( 8 ) AS regards the possession of the lands in question, the following averments were made in para 13 of the writ petition:"13. That it is significant to add that the Government did not physically take possession in regard to the entire lands in the said 13 villages and no development activity was ever carried out. Suffice it to say that only paper/formal possession was taken but in reality the possession remained with the land owners. The same is the position in this case also. Suffice it to say that only paper/formal possession was taken but in reality the possession remained with the land owners. The same is the position in this case also. "thus, in the present case it has been conceded by the petitioner that the respondents have taken possession, although formally. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Division Bench in Santosh Kumar on questions (i) and (ii), both of which squarely arise here, fully covers the present case as well. There can be no manner of doubt that the present writ petition is barred by laches. Further, the essential premise on which the writ petition is based, viz. , that the judgment in Balak Ram Gupta has the effect of quashing the entire acquisition proceedings including those in respect of the petitioner's lands, also stands decided against the petitioner. ( 9 ) MR. RAVINDER Sethi, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, sought to contend that the present case is not covered by Santosh Kumar since the facts here were different. He submitted that the judgments of the Hon'ble supreme Court in Gurdip Singh Uban (I) and Gurdip Singh Uban (II) do not preclude a challenge to the land acquisition proceedings where the land owners have filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act. ( 10 ) THE writ petition itself does not indicate whether the petitioner had filed objections under s. 5 A of the Act. When at the hearing on 28. 8. 2006, Mr. Sethi was asked whether the petitioner had filed objections under s. 5 A of the act with the Land Acquisition Collector (LAC), Mr. Sethi sought time to ascertain the factual position. Thereafter, on 30. 8. 2006, the petitioner filed an application being CM No. 10806/2006 wherein it was claimed for the first time that he had filed objections under Section 5 A of the Act and further that he had filed an amendment application earlier in this petition on 8. 9. 1997 to bring this fact on record. It is then stated in para 7 and 8 of this application as under:"7. That the present writ petition had come up for hearing on 28. 8. 9. 1997 to bring this fact on record. It is then stated in para 7 and 8 of this application as under:"7. That the present writ petition had come up for hearing on 28. 8. 2006 when during the course of hearing a question was raised as to whether the petitioner had filed objections under Section5-A of the Land Acquisition Act or not and the case was adjourned for hearing on 1st September, 2006. 8. That on inspection of the court file, it revealed that the aforesaid application for amendment as well as the amended writ petition are not forming part of the court record. The petitioner could not find them in the court file even though the office copy of the said application and the amended petition was found in the office file of the counsel for the petitioner. So far the petitioner recollects that the said application was filed alongwith several other writ petitions as mentioned hereinabove. The matters were always being heard together. The petitioner was under the bonafide impression that his application is also being heard along with the other petitions and the petitioner was never aware that the said application and the amended writ petition is not forming part of the court record. Further enquiries made from the office of this Hon'ble Court could also not reveal any further information about the said application. " ( 11 ) THE above explanation would have had some credence had the petitioner been able to produce any copy of the said objections stated to have been filed under Section 5-A. However, as is evident from para 9 of CM No. 10806/2006 the petitioner has not:"9. That the petitioner most humbly submits that the petitioner had filed objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and the same were not considered by the respondents and no opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner. The petitioner also submits that he had filed the said objections way back in the year 1981-82, however, copies of the same are not available with the petitioner. In support of his case, the petitioner is relying upon the records of the respondents, which would clearly reflect and show that the petitioner has filed the said objections under Section 5 of the said Act. In support of his case, the petitioner is relying upon the records of the respondents, which would clearly reflect and show that the petitioner has filed the said objections under Section 5 of the said Act. The record would also show that the objections filed by the petitioner has also not been considered by the respondents. " ( 12 ) ON the basis of above explanation, Mr. Sethi sought to contend that the present case was different from the other cases because the petitioner had filed his objections under Section 5-A of the Act. We are unable to accept this plea of Mr. Sethi. As already noticed, no such averment was made in the present writ petition filed in 1994. It is only after the Court enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on 28. 8. 2006 that the petitioner came up for the first time with his version of having filed such an objection under section 5-A and then again, without producing any copy of the same. In the circumstances, we see no valid justification for distinguishing the present case from the other writ petitions which have been dismissed by the judgment of this court in Santosh Kumar. We hold that the present writ petition is fully covered by both Santish Kumar as well as the judgments of the Hon"ble Supreme Court in gurdip Singh Uban (I) and (II ). ( 13 ) MR. Sethi then sought to contend that the present cases were not different from those disposed of by this Court in Balbir Singh v. Union of india, and therefore, the present petitioner also ought to be given the same relief. In the first place the judgment of the Division Bench in Santosh Kumar case also considered a similar plea and rejected it. The authoritative pronouncements of the Hon"ble Supreme Court in Gurdip Singh Uban (I) and (II)are binding on this Court. By a judgment in Chatto Devi v. Union of India (2005)120 DLT 9 a Division Bench of this Court found no infirmity in Section 5-A proceedings in relation to village Shayoorpur, which is where the petitioner's lands are situated. Therefore, even on merits there is no force in the contention of the petitioner that his case stands on a different footing. ( 14 ) MR. Therefore, even on merits there is no force in the contention of the petitioner that his case stands on a different footing. ( 14 ) MR. SETHI finally contended that the acquisition proceedings would not really serve any public purpose and in this regard he referred to an affidavit filed on 4. 8. 2006 in these proceedings by the petitioner, 12 years after the filing of the writ petition. In this affidavit the petitioner claimed that he owned a large chunk of agricultural land in village Shayoorpur and that in respect of certain lands he had filed writ petitions in this Court pursuant to which the land acquisition proceedings stood quashed. Thus these lands have thereafter been enjoyed by the petitioner as an absolute owner. The present lands which are contiguous to the lands in the present case form only a small portion of the total holding. By way of a rough plan attached to the said affidavit dated 4. 8. 2006 it was sought to be pointed out that the lands in question are scattered and constitute in small pieces and cannot be developed by the Respondents. Therefore, it was contended that no useful purpose would be served in the respondents persisting with the present acquisition proceedings. We do not find any force in this submission either. From the copy of the rough plan attached to the said affidavit dated 4. 8. 2006 of the petitioner, it is clear that in every part of the land in the petitioner"s possession there are farm houses. We would not like to comment on the use of the land in this manner. Suffice it to say that what would constitute a public purpose is not justiciable and it is not possible in the facts of the present to hold that no useful purpose will be served by proceeding with the impugned acquisition. For all of the above reasons we find no merits in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.