S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal, under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage, the correctness of an order of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 10-11-2004 on an application moved under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereafter ?the act?) has been challenged. ( 2 ) THE parties to the proceedings, viz the Appellant and the first respondent, were married to each other on 29-5-1985 in accordance with Hindu rites, in Delhi. The appellant was working as a Scientific Officer with the rajasthan Power Station, Rawalbhata, Rajasthan. The second respondent, Ms. Jyotsna, was born to the first respondent during the subsistence of the marriage, on 21-4-1987. The appellant instituted divorce proceedings, on grounds of cruelty and desertion, before the District Judge, Chittorgarh, Rajasthan. The appellant levelled allegations of adultery against the first respondent, and these apparently influenced the District Judge to dismiss an application for maintenance filed by her. Criminal proceedings too were initiated by the first respondent, and ultimately she approached the Supreme Court, for transfer of the divorce proceedings pending in Rajasthan. ( 3 ) THE transfer petition was disposed off on 11-4-1991, recording agreement of the parties to end the disputes, and seek dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. During the course of the order of the Supreme Court, it set aside/ deleted the findings of the District Judge, Chittorgarh, regarding the allegations of adultery, and directed the appellant to pay an amount of Rs. 500/- to the first respondent and the child, Jyotsna; liberty was reserved to either party to seek variation of the order, on that score. Another order was passed on 3-10-1991, by the Supreme Court, inter alia, directing deletion of allegations that the child was born out of the living together of the parties. The petitioner appears to have declined to pay the maintenance amounts; this led to initiation of contempt proceedings, before the Supreme Court. On 8th August, 1994, the Court recorded a concession on his behalf the amount would be paid, and that he was not justified in refusing to pay the amounts on the ground that the first respondent had re-married. The appellant again approached the court, for modification of the direction in so far as it pertained to the direction to continue to pay the amount of Rs. 500/- per month. That application was rejected by order dated 24-8-1998. The appellant again approached the court, for modification of the direction in so far as it pertained to the direction to continue to pay the amount of Rs. 500/- per month. That application was rejected by order dated 24-8-1998. Earlier, another application had been rejected by the supreme Court in 1996. ( 4 ) IN the above background, the appellant filed an application under section 25 (2) for vacation of the order requiring him to pay the sum of Rs. 500/ -. The principal allegations were that the first respondent had remarried, and that the daughter did not bear the appellant's name, and that there was a discrepancy about the date of birth shown in the records, which justified the appellant's being relieved of the obligation. It was also averred that the appellant was no longer employed, as he had to leave the services on account of the humiliation faced due to his being implicated in criminal proceedings. It has was also contended that the appellant had re-married, and had two children, who had to be taken care. With his meagre means, the obligation of having to pay rs. 500/- is oppressive. ( 5 ) DETAILED proceedings were held before the Additional District Judge. Two reasoned orders were made, upon applications filed by the appellant, who also sought amendment. Eventually, after recording evidence, the learned additional District Judge passed the impugned order, declining the relief claimed. He reasoned that no change in the circumstances had been made out by the appellant, warranting decrease in the amount, or recall of the direction to pay Rs. 500/- to the respondents. ( 6 ) THE appellant had urged that Ms. Jyotsna had not disclosed him as her father, and instead, the maternal grandfather had been shown in the school certificate as the father. It was also urged that the first respondent had remarried, and had two children; therefore, the child was well looked after. The trial court, however, repelled these contentions. ( 7 ) MR. Prem Prakash, the appellant appeared and argued the case himself. He relied on copies of the school certificate of Ms. Jyotsna, to say that he has not been shown as the father; instead the first respondent's husband is shown to be Mr. Brij Mohan Gola, and her own (adoptive) father is shown as Jai Chand gola. ( 7 ) MR. Prem Prakash, the appellant appeared and argued the case himself. He relied on copies of the school certificate of Ms. Jyotsna, to say that he has not been shown as the father; instead the first respondent's husband is shown to be Mr. Brij Mohan Gola, and her own (adoptive) father is shown as Jai Chand gola. These, coupled with some discrepancy about the date of birth, establish that it is not the intention of the respondent's to even acknowledge him to be the father of Jyotsna. He urged that the child had not met him for the last 14 years or more, and the entire conduct of the respondents was to negate his relationship. Under these circumstances, it was iniquitous to insist that the appellant should continue to pay the sum of Rs. 500/- to Ms. Jyotsna. ( 8 ) THE appellant also urged that his own financial circumstances had deteriorated, and that he had, like the first respondent, got remarried. He had two children out of the second wedlock; being presently unemployed, the obligation to continue paying amounts directed by the court, was onerous. Therefore, the court ought to have exercised the discretion under Section 25 (2)and allowed his application. ( 9 ) MR. Taneja, learned counsel reiterated the submissions taken in the counter affidavit, in support of the findings of the trial court. It was submitted that the application of the appellant was part of a series of repeated attempts to wriggle out of the obligation created by the Supreme Court. It was evident that the appellant was bent upon denying the parentage of the daughter, with entirely mala fide motives. The Supreme Court, in its order of April, 1991, and the subsequent clarificatory order, had categorically ruled out such attempts. It was therefore, not open to the appellant to resusticate those issues. ( 10 ) COUNSEL submitted that there have been no change of circumstances to warrant a change or variance in the direction under Section 25 (2 ). It was submitted that the appellant is not uneducated, or unemployed; he is highly qualified, being an engineer, working in the Rajasthan Power Station. It was further submitted that the allegations of his being hard off financially are unsupported by materials. It was submitted that the appellant is not uneducated, or unemployed; he is highly qualified, being an engineer, working in the Rajasthan Power Station. It was further submitted that the allegations of his being hard off financially are unsupported by materials. ( 11 ) SECTION 25 (2) of the Act empowers the court to vary an order directing payment of maintenance, if the court is satisfied that there is change in circumstances of either party at any time after the making of the order. What can be the circumstances that can impel exercise of this power, cannot, of necessity, be put in a straight jacket. The circumstances would vary from case to case, and the considerations have to be largely subjective to the facts of each case. It has however, been held that the conduct of one or the other party would be one of the factors on the order to be passed. ( 12 ) THE direction to pay Rs. 500/- per month has been subsisting for about 15 years; the appellant had refused to pay the amounts, till a direction was issued in 1994. The rationale for not paying was that the first respondent had remarried. Thereafter, he made two more attempts, but unsuccessfully, to have the order varied by the Supreme Court. He subsequently moved the court, under section 25 (2) for variation of the direction. The application has been rejected. ( 13 ) EVEN in the appeal, in para 11, the appellant has persisted in levelling the allegation questioning the paternity of the child. This clearly is unacceptable; it is in fact contumacious. Besides, the ground for variation made out is that according to the school particulars of the child, there is no jyotsna, with his name as the father, and the first respondent, as the mother. This aspect was clarified in the pleadings, and contentions before the trial court, which were found acceptable, that the child's father's name was shown to be different due to the constant harassment, of the first respondent by the appellant, in order to conceal the identity of the child. There appears to be a ring of truth in this. ( 14 ) SO far as the appellant's not possessing sufficient financial resources is concerned, the trial court noticed that as per his showing, he was earning Rs. There appears to be a ring of truth in this. ( 14 ) SO far as the appellant's not possessing sufficient financial resources is concerned, the trial court noticed that as per his showing, he was earning Rs. 3000/- per month; however, it noted that he is a Chemical Engineer and had claimed in an advertisement to be a Senior Scientist, having two telephones, one in his office, and one in his residence. It was concluded that the allegation about his earning only Rs. 3000/- was false, and that the amount of Rs. 500/- directed to be paid to the respondents, was not even sufficient to pay for the education needs of the child. ( 15 ) THE scope of an appeal under Section 28 is somewhat circumscribed. Although the court has to examined the materials and evidence, while seeing whether interference is required, the content of the present appellate exercise is not the same as in the case of an appeal against the primary determination under section 25 (1 ). The court has to see whether the trial court appreciated all the pleadings, facts and circumstances correctly, while returning its findings, and whether such findings are supportable by evidence. ( 16 ) IN this case, the appellant made repeated attempts to have the order varied, by the Supreme Court. His refrain, notwithstanding the order dated 11-4-1991, of the Supreme Court, has been caluminous, in constantly questioning the parentage and legitimacy of his child. He has persisted with that course, in this appeal too. This is a conduct that can be hardly appreciated. ( 17 ) AS far as the grounds made out for variation are concerned, the trial court, in my opinion, rightly agreed with the contention of the first respondent that the child's father was shown as the maternal grandfather, in the records, since there was threat of constant harassment, by the appellant. That possibility cannot be ruled out, having regard to the history of this case. The issue of wrong date of birth, in my opinion, has been unnecessarily highlighted; the trial court rightly held it to be a mistake. As regards the ground of change in circumstances in the appellant's finances are concerned, the trial court was rightly skeptical of his claim to be possessed of meagre resources. I may also add that the appellant has not disclosed his assets, or adduced any documentary evidence whatsoever. As regards the ground of change in circumstances in the appellant's finances are concerned, the trial court was rightly skeptical of his claim to be possessed of meagre resources. I may also add that the appellant has not disclosed his assets, or adduced any documentary evidence whatsoever. ( 18 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, I find no infirmity with the impugned order of the trial court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.