JUDGMENT L. MOHAPATRA, J. : This writ application is directed against the order dated 1.9.2001 passed by the 1st M.A.C.T., Puri in M.A.C. No.624 of 1999 on the application filed by the opposite party No.2 on 26.3.2001 for withdrawal from the conditional compromise that had taken place in the State Level Lok Adalat. 2. The petitioners are the claimants in M.A.C.T. 624 of 1999. they had filed an application claiming compensation on the ground that husband of the petitioner No.1 met with an accident caused by a trekker and succumbed to the injuries sustained in course of the accident due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. The matter was placed before the State Level Lok Adalat on 1.7.2000 and a compromise was arrived at between the petitioners and the opposite party No.2 and it was decided that the opposite party No.2 shall pay compensation of Rs.2,80,000/- to the petitioners subject to satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the memorandum of compromise. After the matter was disposed of in the State Level Lok Adalat a petition and an affidavit were filed before the Tribunal praying for permission to withdraw from the compromise on the ground that the deceased-husband of the petitioner No.1 did not die due to road accident as claimed but committed suicide by jumping in the front of the offending vehicle. In the impugned order prayer of the opposite party No.2 to withdraw from the compromise having been allowed the present writ application has been filed by the claim¬ants challenging the said order. 3. Shri Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the peti¬tioners challenging the impugned order submitted that once a compromise is arrived at between the parties, neither party can be allowed to commit breach of the terms of the compromise and it is the duty of the Court to see that the compromise arrived at between the parties in Court is honoured. In this connection, Sri Mishra also cited some decisions which shall be dealt with later on. Apart from the above it was contended by Sri Mishra that only ground on which the opposite party No.2 wanted to withdraw from the compromise is that their Investigating Officer upon investi¬gation found that there was no such accident and the deceased committed suicide by jumping infront of the moving vehicle and therefore there was no negligence on the part of the offending vehicle.
Since there is no other evidence available on record except the investigation report to show that the deceased commit¬ted suicide in the manner stated in the investigation report, there is no reason for the Tribunal to accept such a plea at a belated stage and permit the opposite party No.2 to withdraw from the compromise. 4. Shri Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the oppo¬site party No.2 contended that when the matter was placed before the State Level Lok Adalat the Insurance Company had not filed its written statement and investigation was not complete. In view of the above, the opposite party No.2- Insurance Company agreed for a compromise and the matter was settled in the Lok Adalat subject to verification of certain conditions. When it was found that there was no such accident and the deceased had committed suicide, a petition was filed before the Tribunal to permit the opposite party No.2 to withdraw from the compromise. Shri Mohanty further contended that the Tribunal being satisfied that fraud had been committed by the petitioners by filing a false claim case and getting it compromised before the Lok Adalat before written statement was filed by the Insurance Company, the oppo¬site party No.2-Insurance company was permitted to withdraw from the compromise. Shri Mohanty also relied on a decision to show that when the Court is satisfied that fraud had been committed on it by one of the parties for the purpose of compromise, it can always permit the party who has been a victim of the fraud to withdraw from the compromise. 5. There is no dispute that the petitioners are the claim¬ants and the matter was placed before the State Level Lok Adalat and a compromise was arrived at between the parties and in the compromise the opposite party No. 2 had agreed to pay compensation of Rs.2,80,000/- subject to certain conditions, such as (1) Disposal of case filed U/s 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, if any; (2) Confirmation of policy by the Insurer within three months; (3) Confirmation of Driving License by the Insurer within three months; and (4) Filing of affidavit that no other claim case is filed by the claimant or any other legal heir before any other MACT/WC Court for the same cause of action. There is no dispute that the said conditions are satisfied.
There is no dispute that the said conditions are satisfied. The only ground on which the opposite party No.2 filed an application for withdrawal is that the deceased never met with an accident and committed sui¬cide. The stand taken by the opposite party No.2 is based on the investigation report submitted by the Investigator who is an employee of the opposite party No.2. Shri Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Salkia Businessmen’s Association and others -v- Howrah Municipal Corporation and others, reported in AIR 2001 S.C. 2790 and submitted that the memorandum and terms of the compromise become part of the orders and the Courts must see that the said terms of compromise are honoured. In para-8 of the judgment the Apex Court observed as follows : “xxx If Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, and encourage party litigants - be they public authori¬ties, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go-bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of the Court- the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process - a costly consequence to be jealously averred by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in States in the country. It does not, in our view, require any extraordinary exercise to hold that the memorandum and terms of the compromise in his case become part of the order of the High Court itself when the earlier writ petition was finally disposed of on 13.2.1991 in the terms noticed supra notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order.The orders passed in this regard admits of no doubt or give any scope for controversy. While so, it is beyond ones comprehension as to how it could have been viewed as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibil¬ity to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in letter and spirit. As long as the earlier order dated 13.2.1991 stood, it was not permissible to go behind the same to ascertain the substance of it or nature of compliance when the manner, mode and place of compliance had already been stipulated with meticulous care and detail in the order itself.
As long as the earlier order dated 13.2.1991 stood, it was not permissible to go behind the same to ascertain the substance of it or nature of compliance when the manner, mode and place of compliance had already been stipulated with meticulous care and detail in the order itself. The said decision was also not made to depend upon any contingencies beyond the control of parties in the earlier proceedings.” Learned counsel for the petitioners also cited two other similar decisions in the case of Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo -v- The State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1956 S.C. 346 and Dr. Renuka Datla(Mrs) -v- Solvay Pharmaceuticals B.V. and others, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 149 . Shri Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No.2 placed reliance on a decision in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. -v- Rajendra Singh and others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1165 . In Para 4 of the said judgment the Apex Court observed as follows : “For a High Court in India to say that it has no power even to consider the contention that the awards secured are the by¬products of stark fraud played on a Tribunal, the plenary power conferred on the High Court by the Constitution may become a marriage and people’s faith in the efficacy of the High Courts would corrode. We would have appreciated if the Tribunal or at least the High Court had considered the plea and found them unsustainable on merits if they are merit less. But when the Courts pre-empted the Insurance Company by slamming the doors against them, this Court has to step in and salvage the situa¬tion.” On perusal of the aforesaid judgments it appears that while exercising writ jurisdiction this Court if satisfied that fraud as a matter of fact has been committed while entering into a compromise it can always interfere with the same and pass neces¬sary orders. 6.
6. If the case is examined in the light of the allegations made by the opposite party No.2 it will appear from the record that after the matter was settled before the State Level Lok Adalat a petition was filed by the opposite party No.2 before the Tribunal alleging therein that after verification the Insurance Company has come across number of defects with the papers of the alleged case for which it would not be safe for the Insurance Company to accept the settlement/compromise. There is no allega¬tion that the conditions on which the compromise has been arrived at had not been satisfied. However, in course of argument it was contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.2 before the Tribunal that investigation report indicates that the deceased committed suicide and no such acci¬dent took place. A copy of the investigation report has been made available to this Court for perusal. The Investigator has ob¬served that on his enquiry in the locality as well as at the spot of the accident it was fond that the deceased intentionally and deliberately committed suicide.Basis of such observation is statement of one Trupti Sarangi and examination of Principal of Jagannath College. Said Trupti Sarangi is the neighbour of the deceased who is supposed to have said that the deceased was suf¬fering from kidney ailments and had gone to Appollo Hospital for treatment. On the date of accident said Sri Sarangi went to the spot and gathered from the local people that the deceased know¬ingly and deliberately jumped to the front of the running trekker and committed suicide. Persons from whom Sri Sarangi obtained this information is not disclosed. The only other material avail¬able during investigation is that the deceased was having some ailments and was not attending college. On analysis of the entire investigation report it appears that the sole basis for such observation that the statement of Sri Trupti Sarangi who had never seen the accident and could not disclose name of the per¬sons from whom he heard that the deceased committed suicide. On the other hand, after FIR was lodged investigation was taken up by the police and having found prima facie case charge-sheet was submitted against the driver of the offending vehicle for commis¬sion of offence under Sections 279/304-A of the Indian Penal Code.
On the other hand, after FIR was lodged investigation was taken up by the police and having found prima facie case charge-sheet was submitted against the driver of the offending vehicle for commis¬sion of offence under Sections 279/304-A of the Indian Penal Code. From the records of G.R. case it appears that relying on the statement of witnesses examined during investigation the Investigating Officer has found prima facie case relating the accident and accordingly submitted charge-sheet against the driver. Charge-sheet filed by the Investigating Officer is based on statements of witnesses examined during investigation as well as other materials, whereas the basis of finding of Investigator of the opposite party No.2 is the statement of one Trupti Sa¬rangi. I am, therefore, of the view that considering the present facts and circumstances the investigation taken by the police on the basis of the F.I.R. relating to the accident is acceptable and the report of the Investigator of opposite party No.2 cannot form the basis of finding that the deceased committed suicide. 7. In view of the discussions made above, I allow the writ application and set aside the impugned order and direct the opposite party No.2 to honour the compromise arrived at between the petitioners and the opposite party No.2 in the State Level Lok Adalat and pay compensation as directed within a period of three months from today. Application allowed.