JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The order dated 15.3.99 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Dharmanagar, North Tripura, in T.A. No. 7 of 97 refusing to condone a delay of 2 months 22 days in filing an appeal against dismissal of the T.S. No. 7 of 97 by the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Dharmanagar has been called in question in the present revision petition. 2. 1 have heard Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. S. Das for the Petitioner and Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Respondent. 3. Mr. B. Das, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the question of limitation should always receive a liberal consideration as otherwise the substantial justice may become a casualty at the altar of sheer technicality. Giving reference to Order VII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure he advanced another argument that there were good grounds for exemption from the law of limitation. The plaint which was presented before the learned trial court was filed after the period of limitation as held by that court. The above rule, as sought to be relied on by Mr. Das, provides as follows: VII (6). Grounds of exemption from limitation law: Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed: Provided that the court may permit the Plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint. 4. Mr. Das, however, could not show what were the precise grounds for exemption and whether the same were set out in the plaint. However, elaborating on the question of the correct approach to be taken to a prayer for condonation of delay in presenting an appeal, Mr. Das has discussed the law laid down by the Supreme Court in several decisions which are briefly noted below: In Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation and Ors. However, elaborating on the question of the correct approach to be taken to a prayer for condonation of delay in presenting an appeal, Mr. Das has discussed the law laid down by the Supreme Court in several decisions which are briefly noted below: In Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation and Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 1341 , the Apex Court held that it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. The relevant portion appearing in para 6 in the said judgment is quoted below: As the above Section is in pari materia with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be profitable to ascertain the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to cases of illegal or irregular exercise or non-exercise or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. If a subordinate court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. 5. In Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C. reported in AIR 1985 SC 606 the legal heirs of the deceased were not brought on record within the statutory period of 90 days after his death. No step was taken to bring the said legal representative on record for a period of 6 years. But the apex court observed that failure to submit application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record is not a circumstance to provide a valid ground for refusing to grant the application for setting aside the abatement. No step was taken to bring the said legal representative on record for a period of 6 years. But the apex court observed that failure to submit application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record is not a circumstance to provide a valid ground for refusing to grant the application for setting aside the abatement. It was further observed that in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a Respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. This decision of the Supreme court relied on by Mr. Das has no direct bearing in the case on hand for deciding the issue we are addressing. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. MstKatiji reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , the Supreme Court strictly favoured a liberal approach to be taken on question of limitation. The relevant observation appearing in para 3 of the said judgment is quoted below: 3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause", employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days' delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days' delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6. In Gauhati University v. Niharlar Bhattacharjee reported in (1995)6 SCC 731 it was held that in the facts and circumstances of that case though the limitation begins to run under Article 123 from the date of decree, but when it is shown that the summons were duly served, the limitation would begin to run only when the Appellant had knowledge of the ex parte decree. In the case on hand, the order dated 9.6.97 was not passed ex parte though it has been contended that the lawyer of the Plaintiff-Petitioner had intimated about that order dated 22.7.97 who also wrongly advised that the period of limitation was 3 months from the date of passing of the said order. The latest decision of the Supreme Court which has been cited by Mr. Das is in K. Rudrappa v. Shivappa reported in 2004 AIR SCW 5106. This decision needs a careful reading as it has come after the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure with effect from 2002. All other decisions referred to by Mr. Das being prior to said amendment may not have direct bearing to the question regarding revisional jurisdiction of the High Court as has been further narrowed down by the said amendment. All other decisions referred to by Mr. Das being prior to said amendment may not have direct bearing to the question regarding revisional jurisdiction of the High Court as has been further narrowed down by the said amendment. In Sivappa (supra), the father of the Appellant before the Apex Court instituted a proceeding in the court of District Judge, Davengere. While the appeal was pending the father died and the Appellant was not aware about pendency of the said proceeding instituted by his deceased father. He came to know about the same only after receiving a letter from the advocate engaged by father that the appeal had come up for hearing. Immediately informing about the death of his father, an application under Order XXII Rule 3 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure by the Appellant and his brothers for bringing them on record as legal representatives of the deceased was filed. The said application was rejected by the learned District Judge on question of limitation and also failure to make a prayer for setting aside the abatement. Though following that order of the District Judge, the prayer for setting aside the abatement and condonation of delay in presenting the petition for bringing the legal heirs on record were filed, but the same were rejected. The Civil revision filed against the said order was also rejected observing that no grounds were made out by the Petitioner to admit the revision. In the special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court it was held that the hypertechnical view ought not to have been taken by the District courts in rejecting the application, inter alia, observing that no prayer for setting aside the abatement of appeal was made. The decision rendered by the Apex Court in para 10 of the above noted case reads as follows: 10. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The case of the Appellant before the District Court was that he was not aware of the pendency of the appeal filed by his father against the order passed by the Tehsildar. The father of the Appellant died in June, 1994 and the Appellant came to know about the pendency of appeal somewhere in September, 1994 when he received a communication from the advocate engaged by his father. The father of the Appellant died in June, 1994 and the Appellant came to know about the pendency of appeal somewhere in September, 1994 when he received a communication from the advocate engaged by his father. Immediately, therefore, he contacted the said advocate, informed him regarding the death of his father and made an application. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the learned Counsel for the Appellant is right in submitting that a hypertechnical view ought not to have been taken by the District Court in rejecting the application inter alia observing that no prayer for setting aside abatement of appeal was made and there was also no prayer for condonation of delay. In any case, when separate applications were made, they ought to have been allowed. In our opinion, such technical objections should not come in doing full and complete justice between the parties. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have set aside the order passed by the District Court and it ought to have granted the prayer of the Appellant for bringing them on record as heirs and legal representatives of deceased Hanumanthappa and by directing the District Court to dispose of the appeal on its own merits. By not doing so, even the High Court has also not acted according to law. 7. It is no longer res integra that the revisional jurisdiction of High Court has been narrowed down by insertion of the first proviso below Sub-section (I) of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act of 46 of 1999. The said Sub-section with its proviso reads as follows: Section. 115. 7. It is no longer res integra that the revisional jurisdiction of High Court has been narrowed down by insertion of the first proviso below Sub-section (I) of Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act of 46 of 1999. The said Sub-section with its proviso reads as follows: Section. 115. Revision-(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears: (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, The High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it has been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (a) the other, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, of (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. It is important to notice from the above proviso that this Court can interfere under Sub-section (1) in three circumstances mentioned therein where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. The question is if the order impugned herein had been passed in favour of the Petitioner herein condoning the delay whether it would have finally disposed of the proceeding before the appellate court. The answer is certainly in the negative. 8. Having set out the legal position as above, it may be seen what is the factual position in the case on hand to be placed on the anvils thereon. The answer is certainly in the negative. 8. Having set out the legal position as above, it may be seen what is the factual position in the case on hand to be placed on the anvils thereon. It is the case of the Petitioner herein that Kilicharan Trivedi along with his brothers were the owners of fifty percent of certain lands, the remaining fifty percent were owned by their cousin brothers Bisheshwar Trivedi and Rameshwar Trivedi. As the two cousin brothers were living in Rai Barilley, Uttar Pradesh, they were possessing their shares through their co-sharers, Kalicharan Trivedi and others. Kalicharan Trivedi was the owner of 24 acre of land which he had already sold out to Samarendranath Roy and Debandra Debnath in theyear 1972 and 1978. Thereafter, he sold out 2 karas 6 dhurs of land to Smt. Jaba Nandi on 18.11.85 by registered sale deed. Exactly this part of the land was purchased by the Plaintiff-Petitioner from the attorney of Bisheshwar Trivedi and Rameshwar Trivedi on 3.5.91. The contention of the Plaintiff-Petitioner is that Kalicharan Trivedi wrongly and illegally sold 2 karas 6 dhurs to Smt. Jaba Nandi as the same was owned by Bisheswar and Rameshwar and, therefore, after purchase by him of the same land on 3.5.91 he had filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession by evicting Jaba Nandi therefrom. It has also been admitted by the Plaintiff-Petitioner that Jaba Nandi had been in possession of the suit land by virtue of sale deed dated 18.11.85. Learned trial court held that the suit filed in 1997 by the Plaintiff-Petitioner was not maintainable as it was barred by limitation, the cause of action having commenced from 18.11.85, the period of limitation being 3 years therefrom. The other question regarding maintainability is that without seeking cancellation of the sale deed in favour of Jaba Nandi within 3 years from 18.11.85 no suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession was maintainable. Mr. Das submits that the learned trial court committed serious error by taking a view that the period of limitation would start from the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of Jaba Nandi on 18.11.85. Relying on the decisions noted above, it is the case that period of limitation should be commenced from the date of knowledge. Mr. Das submits that the learned trial court committed serious error by taking a view that the period of limitation would start from the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of Jaba Nandi on 18.11.85. Relying on the decisions noted above, it is the case that period of limitation should be commenced from the date of knowledge. Admittedly, the plaintiff-Petitioner purchased the land from the attorney of Bisheswar Trivedi and Rameshwar Trivedi on 3.5.91. As another registered sale deed already existed in respect of the same land since 18.11.85 and the same being patent, it certainly came to the knowledge of the Plaintiff-Petitioner at least on 3.5.91 when necessary search was made before registration of the sale deed executed in his favour by the power of attorney of Bisheshwar Trivedi and Rameshwar Trivedi. Counting from 3.5.91, the suit filed in 1997 is obviously time barred as the period of limitation for declaration or cancellation of a document under Part-III or Part-IV of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is only 3 years. Thus, even if the period is held to have run from the date of knowledge the suit was time barred leading to dismissal of the suit. 9. The appeal that was filed against that order of dismissal was again delayed by 2 months 22 days which was sought to be condoned by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The reasons for the delay has been stated to be wrong advice preceded from learned Counsel for the Plaintiff. Learned appellate court has elaborately discussed the reasons shown for the delay and placing reliance on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court ( AIR 1983 Cal 124 ) and of this Court reported in (1991)1 GLR 339 came to hold that wrong information regarding the period of limitation could not be the basis for condoning the delay. This being the revision petition, it was required to be shown how the learned appellate court had acted illegally or with material illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if there is any error of law or fact if the same is not related to jurisdiction of the court, there is no scope to interfere, more so, in view of the further restriction imposed by the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Even if there is any error of law or fact if the same is not related to jurisdiction of the court, there is no scope to interfere, more so, in view of the further restriction imposed by the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure. 10. For the reasons and discussions aforementioned, this revision petition does not have any merit and consequently the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost. Petition dismissed