Judgment :- (Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 397 (1) r/w 401 Cr.P.C. to set aside the order of the dismissal dated 23.04.2004 made in C.M.P.No.1195 of 2004 on the file of the learned Additional District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Ambur, and allow this revision. ) This revision has been preferred against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ambur, dismissing the complaint filed by the complainant. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The complainant was a member in a Chit Funds A1, of which A2 to A4 are partners. The chit amount is Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only). He has paid Rs.5,000/- as subscription for every month. A2 paid Rs.45,000/- to the complainant as cash. After taking his commission of Rs.5,000/-, the balance amount of Rs.50,000/- was issued to the petitioner complainant. A2 issued a cheque drawn in Punjab National Bank for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) in favour of the petitioner complainant. On 02.09.2003, when the cheque was presented, it was bounced. On request of the accused A2, it was represented on 06.02.2004, again the cheque was bounced. Therefore, a statutory notice was issued on 07.02.2004. A reply notice was given by A2 on 04.03.2004. On 10.03.2004, a complaint was filed and it was represented on 18.03.2004. On 23.04.2004, the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on two grounds. 1. That A3 and A4 are not partners of the firm and 2. That already cheque was bounced on 02.09.2003, no notice was issued, second time it was presented on 06.02.2004 and therefore, it was not maintainable. As regards the first ground that A3 and A4 are not partners of the A1 firm, though they were impleaded first as accused, subsequently, when the complaint was represented on 18.03.2004, the names have been deleted and that only two accused A1 and A2, A1 being the firm and A2 the Managing Partner are now impleaded as accused. 3. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned Magistrate that A3 and A4 have been impleaded even though they are not partners is not factually correct. Apart from that even at the initial stage, without taking evidence, how the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that A3 and A4 are not partners is not known. 3. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned Magistrate that A3 and A4 have been impleaded even though they are not partners is not factually correct. Apart from that even at the initial stage, without taking evidence, how the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that A3 and A4 are not partners is not known. As regards other contention that the cause of action arose on 02.09.2003, when the cheque was returned for the first time and the complaint was filed only after the cheque was retuned for the second time, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable is also not sustainable. When the cheque was returned on 02.09.2003, no notice was issued to the accused. When the cheque was again presented on 06.02.2004, the cheque was returned as there was insufficient funds. Therefore, notice was issued on 07.02.2004. As regards the cause of action, which arose for laying the complaint as held in Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the learned Supreme Court has observed as follows : " 6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action" means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act: (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt / liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. If we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term "cause of action", certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142 (c) arises – and can arise – only once. 7. Besides the language of Section 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action, there are other formidable impediments which negate the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque, there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour, the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage, it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again. 8. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept of successive causes of action is that it will make the period of limitation under clause (c) of Section 142 otiose, for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the drawer, can circumvent the above limitative clause by filing a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of statutes, the court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part should have effect, the above conclusion cannot be drawn for that will make the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory. 9. Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too, within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. Having given our anxious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonised, with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right – and not cause of action – accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires." 4. In this case also, there is no dispute that the cheque was drawn for payment of amount of money for discharge of a liability and the cheque was dishonoured; that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; that the payee made a demand for payment of the money due under the cheque by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and that the drawer failed to reply within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The payee can present the cheque any number of times, but once he issued a notice of dishonour, that is the cause of action and on arising of such cause of action, he must issue notice, within 15 days and must file a complaint within one month after the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. 5. The cheque was returned on 06.02.2004, legal notice issued on 07.02.2004, reply issued on 04.03.2004 and complaint filed on 10.03.2004, returned on 11.03.2004, and the complaint represented on 18.03.2004. Therefore, all the requirement of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have been applied with. Therefore, I do not find any justification dismissing the complaint filed by the complainant. 6. In the result, the revision is allowed. The learned Additional District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Ambur is directed to take the complaint on file and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law, with in six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.